Doubting the fact that an entity cannot be in two different places at the same time is a form of unhealthy skepticism. Seek refuge with Allah and do not give way to such whisperings from the shaytan.

@@Call2TruthChannel The Hanbalis who said that the Throne does not become vacant when God descends did believe that God was then at two places!

Ibn Taymiyyah wholeheartedly believes that Allah knows absolutely all things, such that He perfectly knows all past and future events in detail, from the infinite past to the infinite future, as well as all hypothetical possibilities. However, he also believes in the impossibility of an actual infinite. He has indeed written a book on the question of divine knowledge, but it is now lost. We will have to wait until the book is found and published in order to speak more on Ibn Taymiyyah's views on the matter. Some people hold that omniscience implies an impossible actual infinite, but I do not believe it does. I maintain that Allah's knowledge pertains to an infinite number of concepts, but that these infinitely many concepts map onto an unimaginably large yet finite number of ontologically positive meanings that subsist in His essence and constitute His divine attribute of omniscience. Allah knows best.

الأسباب المخلوقة موجودة تارة ومعدومة أخرى، فهي ممكنة الوجود تقبل الوجود والعدم، وليس شيء منها واجب الوجود يمتنع عدمه.

@@Call2TruthChannel إذاً أليس دليلك على وجود الله تعالى هو الممكن فكيف يمكن أن يكون قديما وبالتالي لا يمكن أن يكون مخلوقا ؟

@@حمزةالربيعي-ل1ت الممكن الذي يقبل الوجود والعدم يمتنع أن يكون قديما، فكل ممكن هو محدث. أما مجموع الممكنات فلا يوجد دفعة واحدة، بل وجوده على سبيل التعاقب

@@Call2TruthChannel سلسلة الممكنات لها بداية أم لا ؟

اللهم يسر ولا تعسر.

@@Call2TruthChannel آمين آمين

كلام الشيخ الذي نقلته لا يلزم منه شيء مما ذكرته.. فهو من البداية لا يقول بأن دين الفلاسفة هو دين السلف.. وإنما قال أن ما يستدلون به على قدم العالم - وهذا باطل وليس مذهبا للسلف - إنما يدل على أن الله لم يزل فاعلا .. وقوله هذا لا يلزم منه أنه أصبح خالقا بعد أن خلق.. أما الحديث فهو لا ينكره لكن عليك أن تكمله .. وعموما الشيخ لا يقول بأن هناك شيئا بعينه قديم مع الله بل الله خالق لكل شيء .. وجميل أن تسمد باقية عقيدتك من الكتاب والسنة..

هو قال صراحة [ومن هنا يظهر أيضا: أن ما عند المتفلسفة من الأدلة الصحيحة العقلية فإنما يدل على مذهب السلف أيضا؛] هو يقول دين الفلاسفة الكفار الذين قولون بقدم العالم هو نفسه دين السلف وطبعا هذا أفترء على السلف رحمهم الله تعالى ، والله تعالى هو الأول ليس قبله شيء وهو خالق المخلوقات كلها من عدم (كان الله ولم يكن شيئًا غيره) والله تعالى خالقا قبل ان يخلق ورازقا قبل ان يرزق وصفاته عز وجل كلها قديمة ليست حادثة تعالى الله، قال الإمام البغوي الشافعي رحمه الله تعالى، [ويجب أن يعتقد أن الله عز اسمه قديم بجميع أسمائه وصفاته، لا يجوز له اسم حادث، ولا صفة حادثة، كان الله خالقا ولا مخلوق، وربا ولا مربوب، ومالكا ولا مملوك، كما هو الآخر قبل فناء العالم، والوارث قبل فناء الخلق، والباعث قبل مجيء البعث، ومالك يوم الدين قبل مجيء يوم القيامة. وأسماء الله تعالى لا تشبه أسماء العباد، لأن أفعال الله تعالى مشتقة من أسمائه، وأسماء العباد مشتقة من أفعالهم، قال النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم: يقول الله سبحانه وتعالى: «أنا الرحمن خلقت الرحم، وشققت لها من اسمي»: فبين أن أفعاله مشتقة من أسمائه، فلا يجوز أن يحدث له اسم بحدوث فعله، ولا يعتقد في صفات الله تعالى أنها هو ولا غيره، بل هي صفات له أزلية، لم يزل جل ذكره، ولا يزال موصوفا بما وصف به نفسه، ولا يبلغ الواصفون كنه عظمته، هو الأول والآخر، والظاهر والباطن، وهو بكل شيء عليم.](شرح السنة 179/1) انتم ارجعو إلى كتاب الله تعالى وسنة النبي ﷺ واتركو دين الفلاسفة الكفار الذين يقولون بقدم العالم والله ابن تيمية لن ينفعكم عند الله مثقال ذرة .. نبرأ الى الله من هذا الضلال، @@HamzehKhaled97

@@m.u.s_t_a_f.a هدانا الله وإياكم للحق .. اقرأ الكلام بتجرد الشيخ لا يقول بأن هناك قديم مع الله... ويقول بأن الأدلة العقلية الصحيحة عندهم إنما تدل على أن الله لم يزل فاعلا.. وإلا فهو بنفسه رد على قولهم بقدم العالم وأبطل بعض أدلتهم .. وناقش المعضلة الزباء ..

الحمد لله. هذا من فضل ربي. وجزاك الله خيرا.

كيف لي أن أتواصل معك أستاذي الحبيب؟ طبعا إذا لم يكن في ذلك إزعاج

@@HamzehKhaled97 السلام عليكم ورحمة الله. أشكرك على حسن ظنك بي، لكني لست أستاذا ولا أدعي العلم، بل أنا مزجى البضاعة في العلوم الشرعية، وجل اهتمامي العلمي متجه نحو جانب مخصوص ضيق من كلام ابن تيمية رحمه الله في الأمورالعقلية. حبذا لو تواصلت مع من هو أرسخ مني علما، فإن هذا أنفع لك. بارك الله فيك وزادنا وإياك توفيقا وعلما نافعا وعملا صالحا.

@@Call2TruthChannel وعليكم السلام ورحمة الله وبركاته آمين وإياك.. هو ذات مجال اهتمامي .. عموما زادك الله علما وعملا وفضلا وفهما وإيمانا واحسانا

رسالة شرح حديث عمران بن حصين لابن تيمية رحمه الله... archive.org/details/alfirdwsiy2018_gmail_2611/page/n37/mode/2up?view=theater

حديث آحاد

لا يوجد شيء في الخارج اسمه المادة المتمثلة بافرادها، المتمثل بافراده هو جنس المادة و هو كلية عقلية ليس شيء موجود في الخارج، المواد المتحققة في الخارج كل واحدة تختلف عن اختها و كل واحدة حدثت بعد عدمها

السلام عليكم. قدم نوع المادة لا يلزم منه قدم أعيان المادة عند ابن تيمية. وهذا المذهب هو الصحيح الموافق لما عليه أهل الفيزياء. فإنه قد ثبت بالدليل الحسي أن أعيان المادة تستحدث بعد عدمها من أسباب سابقة عليها، هي الطاقة الضوئية وما يدخل في حكمها.

@@Call2TruthChannel كيف يُدعى وجود النوع فضلا عن قدمه إذا كان النوع مفهوما كليا لا تحقق له إلا في ضمن أفراده؟ ثم لو كان المقصود بقدم النوع مجموع أفراده الحادثة... فكيف يشكل مجموع الحوادث أمرا قديما؟ على أنا نقول: إما أن يكون بين الباري تعالى وبين كا فرد من أفراد المادة "مدة وهمية" أم لا. إذا كان نعم... ثبت حدوث المادة لا عن مادة، وإن كان لا... لزم إثبات القديم غير الله تعالى وهو منفي بالقواطع والإجماع. ليس ثمة أمر ثالث. ومما يقال فيه أيضا: لو ثبت لنوع المادة القدم... لكان إما مطابقا لقدم الباري أم لا. إذا كان نعم.. ثبت القدم لغير الله تعالى وذا محذور شرعي، وإذا كان لا... لزم إما ثبوت القِدَمين أو قل: اللانهائيتين إحداهما أطول من الأخرى وذا محال، إذ يناقض مفهوم اللانهائية، أو لزم أن يكون قدم المادة ليس بقدم اصطلاحا بل لغة فقط، وهذا ما ندعيه. أما تجارب الفيزيائيين فلا تفيد اليقين مبدئيا لنقصان الاستقراء واحتمالات عدة مفسرة للظواهر... بل على مذهب الأشاعرة المسبب العادي يحدث مع السبب العادي لا به؛ لدليل عقلي قطعي - كما نزعم - فلا عبرة ههنا بالتجارب أصلا، إذ كل تجربة من تجارب مآلها إلى المبادئ العقلية، وعند تعارض المحسوس والمعقول يُقدّم المعقول لا محالة، وإلا لزم قدح الأصل بالفرع وذا ظاهر البطلان. أنا أقدر مجهودكم ومسعاكم في هذه العلوم الشريفة لكني أخشى عليكم وعلى متابعيكم أن تجانبوا الحق وتهلكوا فرجاء منكم التحقق والتثبت وفقنا الله وإياكم لما يحب ويرضى.

@@ab9hafs .أشكرك على شفقتك على إخوانك. آمين، وفقنا الله جميعا لما يحبه ويرضاه، وهدانا جميعا لما اختلف فيه من الحق.

وعليكم السلام تقول هو الصحيح الموافق لما عليه أهل الفيزياء. طلعلتو أنتم أتباع فلاسفة اليونان وكنتو تتهمو الأشاعرة بأنهم أتباع اليونان أكشفو حقيقة مذهبكم المخالف للكتاب والسنة وكفاكم تستر بالسلف المخترع المدعى .. تقول قدم نوع المادة لا يلزم منه قدم أعيان المادة من خلق قدم نوع المادة أليس الله تعالى الذي كان ولم يكن شيئا غيره ما هذا الكلام المخالف لكتاب الله وسنة رسوله ومخالف حتى لوحدانية الله -عز وجل- أتقو الله تعالى وأرجعو للإسلام الحق. @@Call2TruthChannel

Insha'Allah. May Allah make it easy. May Allah reward you for encouraging me.

Assalamu alaikum. I mentioned in the e-mail that Allah subhanahu wa taala has "measure" (Arabic: qadr قدر) and that He has "form" (Arabic: surah صورة). This is just a fancy way of saying that Allah has a size, particularly a size that is far greater than the entirety of His creations, and that He also has an image, as is mentioned in the authentic hadith: "Allah has created Adam in His image". Baraka Allahu feek.

@Call2TruthChannel Wa alaikum as salam wa feek Baarakallah. I am familiar with the term صورة. But not necessarily "size" or "measure." That's because those terms weren't mentioned in the Quran and Sunnah, if they were then I'd love to see some evidence Barakallahu feek.

@@moeb840 The term "measure" قدر is indeed used in chapter 39, verse 67 of the Quran. Ibn Taymiyyah uses this specific term to denote spatial measure/size in works such as Bayan Talbis al-Jahmiyyah. A direct quotation is translated by Jon Hoover in the following lecture: kzbin.info/www/bejne/qIa5gaSbhd-SrbM Wa feek baraka Allah.

Thank you for reaching out! I am very happy that you have come to accept the existence of a necessary foundation. That is one step closer to believing in the God of Abraham. Don't hesitate to ask questions. I would love to help if I can. But bear in mind that I might be less qualified in defending the authenticity of Islamic Scripture than I am in arguing for the existence of God as portrayed in the Quran. Also, please see this video to gain a better appreciation of my understanding of God. kzbin.info/www/bejne/l2Kmeq14fp2lp6M

@Call2TruthChannel thank you fir the reply

@@----f You are welcome.

@@----f Please read this booklet which I published three years ago. It is written in an easy and accessible language. I hope it helps. drive.google.com/file/d/1g0XX4M6XTVHgz-5VRYpjadkq5U9Xkdfl/view?pli=1

@Call2TruthChannel wow thank you so much. Looks like an interesting read. Thanks !

Wa alaikum assalamu wa rahmatullah wa barakatuh. Regarding the answer to your first question, an eternal thing must either be: (i) necessary in and of itself, or (ii) eternally necessitated through another. In the first option, the eternal thing cannot be contingent by consensus. As for the second option, it is a case of emanation. Emanation implies that the thing necessitated must have an eternal complete Cause. However, an eternally complete Cause is necessary and cannot fail to exist. Therefore, the thing emanated cannot fail to exist either. This means that the emanated thing is never in a state in which it accepts existence and nonexistence. Thus, it is not contingent, for contingency is to accept existence and nonexistence. Regarding the answer to your second question, the claim that chemical changes involve substantial origination is indeed controversial. In "Ibn Taymiyyah on Creation ex Materia", I mention that I personally incline towards the view that chemical changes involve substantial origination, but I leave the question open for further scientific and philosophical investigation. However, I also provide an argument by Ibn Taymiyyah which demonstrates that substantial origination must take place, regardless of where we choose to draw the line at which substantial origination takes place Ibn Taymiyyah's argument for substantial origination is an argument from the impossibility of infinite actual division. A contingent substance cannot be divided actually ad infinitum. At some point, the contingent substance becomes very small and must change substantially upon further division. In one of the footnotes, I draw an analogy between Ibn Taymiyyah's argument and the fact that particle physicists today accept that the matter particles annihilate into photons in processes of "Matter annihilation". Baraka Allahu feek.

Thank you for the response. Regarding your answer to my first question, would the following argument for the existence of Allah be sound: 1. The universe is composed of contingent parts 2. Something composed of contingent parts is itself contingent 3. Therefore, the universe is contingent 4. A contingent thing must be originated 5. Therefore, the universe is originated 6. An originated thing requires a cause for its origination 7. Due to the impossibility of an infinite regress of causes, there must ultimately be an eternal, uncaused being that caused the origination 8. Therefore, an eternal, uncaused being exists 9. Since this being is the ultimate cause of everything else, this being cannot be externally influenced to cause the origination of the universe 10. Therefore, this being has a will 11. A being with a will must have awareness 12. Therefore, this being has awareness 13. Something with awareness must have life 14. Therefore this being has life 15. Therefore, this being is an eternal being with a will, awareness, and life

Technically, one could articulate an argument for God's existence from premises 1 through 8. However, I prefer to articulate the arguments from contingency and from substantial origination independently. I believe it is better to keep them as two separate arguments. The two arguments would be articulated as follows: Contingency argument: 1. The universe is composed of contingent parts (i.e. separate substances). 2. Something composed of contingent parts is itself contingent. 3. Therefore, the universe is contingent. 4. That which is contingent depends on a cause that is external to itself. 5. Therefore, the universe depends on a cause that is external to itself. 6. A cause that is external to the contingent things is necessary. 7. Therefore, the universe depends on a Necessary Cause. 8. Therefore, there exists a Necessary Cause. Argument from substantial origination: 1. Our world is composed of substances that originate (this is self-evident for most laymen, e.g. matter particles that come into existence out of energy, trees that originate out of seeds...etc.) 2. Therefore, our world is originated (this is by extension; note that the origination is ex materia, not ex nihilo). 3. That which is originated has an originator (this is predicated on the causal principle; more clearly, if it is accepted that natural effects must have natural causes, then it must be accepted that the origination of a substance requires an originator with greater reason). 4. Therefore, our world has an originator. 5. If our world has an originator, then either the originator is the originated substances themselves, or the originator is an unoriginated Originator. 6. The originator of our world cannot be the originated substances themselves (otherwise either a circular dependency or an infinite regress of originators follows). 7. Therefore, if our world has an originator, the originator is an unoriginated Originator. 8. Therefore, our world has an unoriginated Originator. As for your argument for God's will, knowledge, and life (premised 9 through 15), it is sound except for premise 9. I would instead base the argument for God's will on the fact that God is acting and creating in succession. Such a successive activity implies that God must described with successive events that subsist within Himself and which call His created effects into existence in succession. While it is true that God's decisions and volitions are uncreated and that they are not made into His being by an external Cause, they would not fail to be real volitions if they were. This is just like our will is created by Allah and is influenced by external determinants, but is nevertheless a real will that renders our acts voluntary and renders us morally responsible for our acts.

@@Call2TruthChannel JazakAllahu Khairan

Wa iyyak!@@donutman6239

Wa alaikum assalamu wa rahmatullah wa barakatuh. Thank you for your kind and encouraging words. May Allah subhanahu wa taala likewise reward you. Ibn Taymiyyah's view is very similar to the view of the Karramiyyah in that they both affirm that God is a spatial being. The difference lies in the fact that Ibn Taymiyyah holds that using the term "jism" is an innovation. For Ibn Taymiyyah, the term "jism" can equally refer to true and false meanings, and so the term should be avoided altogether. According to Ibn Taymiyyah, when we speak of God, we ought to affirm correct meanings using scriptural terms. If the meaning intended by "jism" is that God is of flesh and blood, that He is equal to human beings, or perhaps that He is a "jism" in the same sense in which the body is contrasted with the soul, then the meaning of "jism" should be rejected, but without explicitly negating the term "jism". However, if by "jism" it is intended that God is spatially distinct from His creations, is above the world, and will be seen in the Hereafter in a direction from the observers, then the meaning of "jism" should be affirmed, but without explicitly affirming the term "jism". Ibn Taymiyyah's stance is different from that of the Karramiyyah in that the latter explicitly affirm that God is a "jism" who is unequlled by created "ajsam". Moreover, there are some people who have accused the Karramiyyah of exceeding the limits in their affirmations of God's attributes. I have not looked into this, but if it happens to be true, Ibn Taymiyyah would have an issue with this as well. Another crucial difference between Ibn Taymiyyah and the Karramiyyah is that he affirms that God has been acting in succession from past eternity, whereas the Karramiyyah believe that an eternal genus of divine acts is metaphysically impossible. Note that Ibn Taymiyyah had two views on the regress of God's acts, both of which are contrary to the position of the Karramiyyah. The first is that God initially created the matter of this world ex nihilo, but was nevertheless speaking whenever He willed and however He willed from past eternity. In this earlier view, the genus of God's creative acts may very well have had a beginning. The second view is that creation ex nihilo is metaphysically impossible, such that the infinite regress of God's creative acts is necessary, by evidence of the fact that creative agency has to be by way of secondary causes and material conditions. On this, see my video lecture "The Argument for Islamic Monotheism - Part 1 [Existence]" here: kzbin.info/www/bejne/a5DWZp6Fhb2WosU Baraka Allahu feek.

وعليكم السلام ورحمة الله وبركاته Ameen. And you too.

Alhamdulillah!

Please provide pdf of the book. It is impossible to get it to where i live@@Call2TruthChannel

@@physicsinfected2989 There will be a second edition inshaAllah, so bear with me. I will notify you of the kindle edition as soon as it is available inshaAllah. Baraka Allahu feek.

Waiting eagerly@@Call2TruthChannel

Wa alaikum assalam wa rahmatullah wa barakatuh. Rational minds do not disagree that there are truly universal principles which demarcate what is possible in the world from what is impossible in the world. These universal principles, which are referred to as "the laws of metaphysics" in contemporary philosophy, cannot be contradicted by definition. Allah subhanahu wa taala never contradicts these universal laws when He creates and actualizes things in the the world. An example of a law of metaphysics which Ibn Taymiyyah accepted is the law known to Kalam theologians as the impossibility of mudakhalah. This law states that two distinct substances can never occupy the exact same location at the same time, and it closely resembles the law or principle in modern physics which is known as the Pauli exclusion principle, which roughly states that two matter particles cannot occupy the exact spatiotemporal location. As per this law of metaphysics/physics, it is impossible for Allah to actualize a state of affairs in which two different matter particles occupy the exact same location at the same moment in time, because such a state of affairs would be metaphysically/physically impossible. There are other laws of metaphysics which Ibn Taymiyyah argued are universal and cannot be contradicted. Those laws include things like "A body cannot exist in two places at once", the causal principle which says "Every effect has a cause", the law which states that "Substances can only originate out of prior material conditions", and mathematical principles such as "One is half of two". When God creates and changes the world, He never contradicts these truly universal laws. However, this does not limit Allah's eternal power, because Allah's power connects only to metaphysical possibilities, and does not encompass impossibilities and contradictions. Your worry particularly concerns the universal law that is known as the principle of sufficient reason, which Ibn Taymiyyah accepted wholeheartedly. This law states that "Every complete cause is both sufficient and necessary for the occurrence of its subsequent effect". Ibn Taymiyyah argued that God's will is the only cause in existence that is on its own a complete cause for its effect. That is, Allah's will is the only cause that is on its own both sufficient and necessary for the origination of its effect. Whatever Allah wills must happen, and whatever He wills not must not happen. It is impossible for Allah to will an effect without that effect coming into existence straight afterwards, and it is likewise impossible for an effect to take place without Allah willing it into existence. This sufficiency and necessity of God's will for His created effects is an essential aspect of His absolute independence, which has been demonstrated through the contingency argument in the video lecture. However, although Ibn Taymiyyah believed that God is the only independent and sufficient agent in existence and that none of the natural causes is sufficient on its own, Ibn Taymiyyah nevertheless believed that the created natural and secondary causes come together to form complete natural combinations. Since these combinations of created causes are said to be complete, they must be said to be both sufficient and necessary for the occurrence of their particular effects (with their particular attributions and by-products). This means that whenever Allah comes to actualize a sufficient combination of natural causes, then, provided that He does not miraculously invalidate the potencies and receptivities of these causes, He must create their particular effects necessarily (along with their particular attributions and surrounding by-products). Likewise, whenever Allah wishes to actualize a particular effect (along with its particular attributions and surrounding by-products), He must originate its particular sufficient combination of secondary causes beforehand. For example, when Allah creates within the human being a decisive will and power to act, He must create the subsequent voluntary act of the human being straight afterwards. It is impossible for Allah to actualize the human power and will without actualizing the human act. Likewise, using scientifically imprecise language, when Allah causes a potent fire to meet a flammable and unimpeded substance, Allah must create the effect of burning within the substance necessarily. Still, Allah may prevent the effect of burning from taking place by miraculously invalidating the potency of the fire or placing an impediment in the substance, or perhaps through other means that are consistent with the laws of metaphysics/physics. An example of such a break in the natural order of things is the miracle of Abraham (peace be upon him), where Allah subhanahu wa taala said to the fire: ((Be cool and safe for Abraham)). Note that the principle of sufficient reason is compatible with the fact that a particular effect can be caused by different combinations of causes. For example, the very same water molecules may be produced by burning hydrogen and by burning wood. This is because the particular attributions and surrounding by-products that arise from each process are not the same. When burning wood, carbon dioxide is created along with the water molecules, but carbon dioxide is not created when burning hydrogen. In the same way, we can hold that the very substance of our material bodies can be created through means other than ordinary human conception. As Muslims, we believe that, on the Day of Judgement, our very bodies, which today have been created in stages in our mothers' wombs, will be recreated directly out of the earth just like plants emerge from the earth. This second creation is metaphysically possible and is easy for Allah subhanahu wa taala, although our attributions then and the surrounding by-products must be different in at least some respects. Likewise, it is metaphysically possible for the very substance of Jesus (peace be upon him) to have been created through ordinary means of human conception rather than through the miraculous combination of his mother's substance and the breath of the Holy Spirit Gabriel. But in order for that to be true, Jesus cannot have the exact same attributions which he currently has. For example, Jesus could not be fatherless in that case, and could not be referred to as a Spirit from God (i.e. he who is conceived through the breath of the Holy Spirit) or the Word of God (i.e. he who is miraculously created by the divinely spoken word of God "Be!"), because these specific attributions do not apply to normally conceived human children.

I attempted to explain this point on Richard Dawkin's site here. kzbin.info/www/bejne/l2Kmeq14fp2lp6M Baraka Allahu feek

@@Call2TruthChannel I think I understand you better now. However, a question remains for me: Why can't we just accept that Allah Teala created this world with our logic and rules (natural laws) and never contradicts them (as He Himself says in the Quran), but at the same time say that - He too could have done it differently. To stick with my previous example: Yes, in our world, through experience and clear knowledge, soil and other cofactors would have to exist for a tree or plant to grow - but why shouldn't Allah be able to do without them? Using scientific methods, we can accelerate certain processes that would never occur in nature - by exposing the cofactors to other influences. And that's still in DarulAsbab, then what about Allah teala? to give another example: In the dunya we are unable to see Allah teala, even Nabi Musa alayhissalaam was unable to do so - so it is something we call impossible. In Akhira, however, we will not only see Allah teala but also speak to Him directly and not just once. We will also no longer die, although causally speaking it would be necessary for us to die after we have been brought from "death" into life. Wallah yubarek feek

@@sakir8824 Natural laws such as "Fire burns flammable substances" and "the sun rises from the east" are not necessary laws that cannot be contradicted. It is possible for Allah to suspend these laws of nature and replace them with other laws, and as Muslims we must believe in miraculous intervention. Furthermore, it is possible for Allah subhanahu wa taala to create His creations in various ways, through employing a wide variety of secondary causes. Allah is not restricted to creating trees using ordinary natural causes as you seem to imply. Nevertheless, all of the possible laws of nature which Allah selects from must be compatible with the truly universal laws that are known as the laws of metaphysics. These laws of metaphysics include the complete and accurate formulation of the laws of physics as well as the laws of chemistry, and they cannot be contradicted by definition. It is impossible for Allah to cause the world to evolve in ways that contradict these metaphysical laws. For example, Allah subhanahu wa taala has the power to break the laws of nature and create a tree (as we know it) out of gold material. However, in doing so, Allah must cause the gold to break down to more basic elements. Otherwise, the laws of chemistry would be contradicted. Allahu a'lam.

@@Call2TruthChannel sorry for stealing your time, akhilkerim. Assuming that a very small group of Muslims were to fight against an overly strong and large group of enemies - and the entire group of the enemy would lose via karramah, it would be possible for Allah teala to give every single soldier a nightmare that would prevent them from fighting or causes you to switch sides. We know that dreams and the psyche depend on various hormone cocktails and biochemical processes. These are all individual secondary causes, so to speak, but they have their own rules and paths. For example, one hormone decreases when the other increases and biochemically there is no other option = according to Ibn Taymiyyah, would Allah teala be able to simply intervene in this chemistry so that both increase? For example, I don't know of any other secondary causes that could prevent this other than Allah teala directly intervening. Or how can my Duaa, If i pray for rain affect all of the world. We know that Rain Comes with clouds and they also have theyre own way

وعليكم السلام ورحمة الله وبركاته. أشكرك على حسن ظنك بي. اللهم اغفر لي ما لا يعلمون واجعلني خيرا مما يظنون. أنا أقتصر على اليوتيوب والتويتر للتواصل العام. حبذا لو راسلتني هنا في التعليقات. وفقك الله لما يحبه يرضاه وسدد خطاك وجعلك هاديا مهديا.

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم قُلْ هُوَ اللَّهُ أَحَدٌ (1) اللَّهُ الصَّمَدُ (2) لَمْ يَلِدْ وَلَمْ يُولَدْ (3) وَلَمْ يَكُن لَّهُ كُفُوًا أَحَدٌ (4)

From time to time.

Wa alaikum assalam wa rahmatullah wa barakatuh akhi. Regarding Ibn Taymiyyah's epistemology: 1. Ibn Taymiyyah is most famous for his critique of al-Razi's universal rule in Dar' al-Ta'arud, where he argues that the conclusive rational evidence and conclusive scriptural evidence can never contradict. He argues that there can only be a conflict if either the scriptural evidence or the rational evidence or both are inconclusive. 2. Ibn Taymiyyah is also known for arguing that it is permissible to use a fortiori analogies (qiyas al-awla) to come to conclusions about the maximal perfection of God and His divine attributes. 3. Apart from believing in the fitra and Revelation as authentic sources of knowledge, Ibn Taymiyyah was an empiricist who categorized the routes of knowledge into (a) empirical, (b) testimonial, and (c) rational inference or argumentation in the analogical or syllogistic form (a fortiori or otherwise). Regarding language, Ibn Taymiyyah is most famous for his critique of the literal/metapahorical dichotomy, and he adopts a contextualist approach to understanding the texts. This explains why he defends the plain meanings of the divine attributes as understood from the context of the verses. Unfortunately, I have not paid attention to Ibn Taymiyyah's linguistic foundations to say anything more. Ibn Taymiyyah indeed interprets many of the statements of the Salaf in ways that do not conform to the views of the Kalam theologians. He supports his interpretations with evidences which people like me find convincing. That evidence is at times linguistic and at others historical. Sometimes, he explains the statements of the Salaf in light of other statements by the Salaf. I do not know what general principles are at play in his interpretations, but it is clear to anyone who reads his works that he is well acquainted with the words of the Salaf. I have not considered the development of Ibn Taymiyyah's theories after his death. I limit myself to reading Ibn Taymiyyah and his student Ibn al-Qayyim, drawing my own conclusions and consulting experts wherever necessary. Baraka Allahu feek.

I have provided links in the video description for a more detailed explanation. They were included in the message to Richard Dawkins. kzbin.info/www/bejne/a5DWZp6Fhb2WosU

Assalamu alaikum. The impossibility of creation ex nihilo hinges on whether the possibility of the origination of the substances is ontological or conceptual. If the possibility is ontological, it must subsist in prior materials, which would imply that Allah creates only ex materia, such that He may create a substance only after preparing its prior material conditions. However, if the possibility is conceptual, then it may very well be the case that not all of the kinds of substances are preceded by material conditions. In that case, our certainty in the universal proposition that all substances require prior material conditions to originate must be based on an induction that is for all practical purposes complete. That is, we must study all the kinds of substances (e.g. the simple and the compound) to see whether they all originate from prior material conditions. Scientists today accept that nothing is created ex nihilo.

As for the question: "Why must the ontological possibility of creation be grounded in prior material conditions?", the answer is that the ontological possibility of creating indeed does not subsist in the material conditions. Rather, the ontological possibility of creating subsists in God, and this is what it means for Allah to have the power to create the substances, i.e. that it is possible for Him to create the substances of the world. However, this ontological possibility of God to create must nevertheless be accompanied by the possibility of the coming into existence of the created substances. Without such a possibility of origination, it would be incoherent to say that Allah has the power to create the substances, because power connects only to that which is metaphysically possible. Likewise, the possibility of the substances to come into existence must be accompanied by Allah's power to create them. Indeed, it is just as incoherent to say that the substances may originate without the external Creator who has the power to bring them into existence. These two kinds of possibility (i.e. of creating and of origination) must always come together. If the possibility of the origination of the substances is ontological and not conceptual, then it obviously must subsist in preceding material conditions. This is because the possibility of the origination would be a positive attribute in that case, and as such must be predicated of a preceding substrate that carries it. More generally, attributes cannot be self-subsisting, but rather must subsist in a place. This substrate for the possibility of origination must be a preceding creation and cannot be the essence of God. Otherwise, the possibility of the origination of the substance and the possibility to create it will be subsisting in the same substrate. In other words, God will be creating the substances out of Himself, and would be serving as both the Creator and the material condition for His created effects. This contradicts His eternality and His independence which are demonstrated through the contingency argument.

In cases of origination ex materia, the prior substances are indeed not annihilated before the origination of the subsequent substances. They instead must be annihilated at the exact time and place of the origination of the subsequent substances. However, this not a rearrangement of already existing materials, as the process of rearrangement involves no substantial origination.

​@call2truth682 so if the material conditions are annihilated at the exact time and place the subseq6creation is created, what is it about them that makes them material conditions? do they exist at the time the subsequent creation is made? no, since they are annihilated. what is it that these conditions give to the subsequent creation? it cannot be there being or attributes as they are annihilated. what precisely makes them conditions and what do they give to the subsequent creation.

@@mohammedhanif6780 They are conditions for the subsequent effect because they carry the possibility of the origination of that effect.

​@@Call2TruthChannelhow does that possibility get actualized if the prior condition is destroyed? the bearer of the possibility is the prior condition but it no longer exists.

@@mohammedhanif6780 The possibility of the next substance is actualized by Allah's creative act. Allah has the power to create substances, after they are nonexistent, in place of prior substances that carry the possibility of their origination. Note that this creative power of Allah implies that Allah must have the possibility to create. This possibility is an ontological meaning that subsists in His essence and is distinct from the possibility of origination which subsists in the material condition.

Assalamu alaikum. If by "dependent" you mean that Allah is assisted by these material conditions, such that they influence His act of creation of the subsequent effects, or such that they create in partnership with Allah, then that does not follow. But if by "dependent" you mean that the prior materials are necessary secondary conditions by which Allah creates the subsequent effects, such that they are conditions without which Allah's creation of the particular subsequent effects (with the exact specific attributions and surrounding circumstances) is impossible, then that is indeed the case.

@call2truth682 Do the prior material conditions determine the type of subsequent creation Allah creates? if yes, then they limit his freedom to create. However you analyse it, Allah is in need of these prior conditions to create, so be is dependent upon them. there is no escaping that fact. by analogy, I wish to by a car. the prior marerial condition for my purchase of the car is the presence of my wealth - without wealth I cannot buy the car. so my purchase is dependent upon the existence of my havinv wealth. thus I am dependent upon it. likewise, Allah cannot create any substance without the prior material conditions. And so he is as dependent upon it as I am in my way. your attempt to avoid this necessary logical implication looks like making a distinction where none exists.

@@mohammedhanif6780 We depend on external conditions that are not from our own making. However, Allah's act is never conditioned on external things that are not from His own making. He is the Creator of both the causes and their effect.

@@mohammedhanif6780 The material condition indeed carries the potential for a specific range of subsequent effects. This is why I specifically mentioned that Allah "prepares" the material conditions beforehand.

if he prepares the material condition, he does not need it. why can't his own knowledge and power be the grounding of the possibility of the subsequent creation?

From Wikipedia: Abū ʿĪsā Muḥammad ibn ʿĪsā as-Sulamī aḍ-Ḍarīr al-Būghī at-Tirmidhī (Arabic: أبو عيسى محمد بن عيسى السلمي الضرير البوغي الترمذي; Persian: ترمذی, Termezī; 824 - 9 October 892 CE / 209 - 279 AH), often referred to as Imām at-Termezī/Tirmidhī, was an Islamic scholar, and collector of hadith from Termez (early Khorasan and in present-day Uzbekistan). He wrote al-Jami` as-Sahih (known as Jami` at-Tirmidhi), one of the six canonical hadith compilations in Sunni Islam. He also wrote Shama'il Muhammadiyah (popularly known as Shama'il at-Tirmidhi), a compilation of hadiths concerning the person and character of the Islamic prophet, Muhammad (salla Allahu alaihi wa sallam).

Wa alaikum assalam wa rahmatullah wa barakatuh. Both Ibn Taymiyyah and the Ash'aris maintain that Allah is directly involved in the process of creation. However, there are differences between their views. The Ash'ariyyah do not believe that the matter changes substantially, and so they do not accept Ibn Taymiyyah's third category of "origination ex materia". They instead claim that Allah created all of the substances of the world ex nihilo in the past, and was only rearranging them into new forms since then, originating within them successive accidents. By contrast, Ibn Taymiyyah observes Allah's creative agency in the fact that He originates the very substances of the world, after their nonexistence, out of other different substances. So Ibn Taymiyyah is different in this regard. Also, the Ash'ariyyah do not believe in natural causality. They consider the prior materials to be superfluous, such that their existence is not required for the subsequent effects to come to be. For example, Allah does not create the effect of burning by way of a potent fire that is a natural cause. Rather, it is simply Allah's custom to create the effect of burning at the time and place of the fire. According to this view, the time and place of the effect with respect to the cause is arbitrary and could be different. By contrast, Ibn Taymiyyah believes that Allah creates effects by way of real secondary causes, which means that these causes are not superfluous. For example, the fire has a real potency by which Allah creates its effect of burning. The existence of the fire cannot be like its nonexistence. When Allah wishes to actualize the effect of burning in some place, He prepares a suitable cause which is necessary for that subsequent effect (with its specific attributions and surrounding circumstances) to take place. Baraka Allahu feek.