They lose a bit of altitude after the AP disconnects and he overcorrects it to climb over 37'000 feet....this is just pure panic

PUSH THE STICK DOWN

Pilots completeley incompetent pulling a Joystick in panic as they would not be in charge of passengers and a huge aircraft but playing in a luna park

There was a lack of a psychologist when evaluating the hiring of this Bonin, he was completely unprepared to be an airline pilot

RIP To the passengers and crew of Air France Flight 447

There is no way passengers didnt feel sonething was wrong

scary to think there are other stupid Pilots like this out there.

were they able to get the flight back to normal towards the very end and if so when?

I think bonin did not trust the stall warnings because in his mind something was wrong with the aircraft he assumed this because the plane was already showing unreliable airspeed and unreliable vertical speed he assumed that the stall warning was fake and there was something wrong with the plane rather than himself .

The scariest thing is the passengers felt the turbulance but never thought they were crashing, the plane was rattling and making unusual sounds but they assumed it was normal and bad weather, most were wakened and probabaly peeked out their windows into pitch blackness and just sat there expecting the turbulance to end and it did when they were knocked out unconcious on impact with the ocean, the impact was so great people were cut in half by ther seat belts and went through the seats in front of them.

Point your finger at Bonin all you want. Knowledgeable people point their finger at Air France.

Bonin was quick to react to the autopilot disconnect. Aside from slight over corrections, maintained control but then clearly lost situational awareness bringing the aircraft into a deep stall

Fly much do ya

The first few minutes it looks like hes trying to follow the flight director

Incompetence of a criminal level. An amateur would have done it better.

I heard like.. when they would pull up..the stall warning would stop and when the pushed the nose down..like they were supposed to the stall warning would sound. That would be extremely confusing to troubleshoot imo.

I think I can kinda see what bonin was trying to do. It looks like bonin was flying the thrust/pitch setting given in the unreliable speed memory items checklist - 10 degrees pitch and thrust in climb detent. 10 degrees pitch is only used below 10,000 feet. Above 10,000 feet the pitch should be only 5 degrees so this meant that he pitched up 5 degrees more than he should have. He might have done this out of muscle memory because most of his unreliable speed training in the simulator would have been at lower altitudes. When the plane started stalling he applied toga and 15 degrees of pitch which is a standard escape manovuer at low altitude (where most of his manual flying experience would have been from) He may have done this by instinct in a attempt to "climb away from danger". In fact this is exactly what the checklist tells you to do if you stall during takeoff. Basically he was flying the plane by the logic of as if it were at low altitude in normal law. Flying the plane at cruise in alternate law is not something he would have done often if at all. I don't want to be some armchair pilot but this might explain a bit how bonin was thinking

Very hectic flight 😅

This is why I'm not a fan of fly-by-wire, especially if there is no feedback in the control. While Boeing for sure has their problems, aside from the 777 and the 787 they've stuck to the control yoke. To me, fly by wire would feel like a car with no steering inputs. Not natural.

Watching that descent rate is terrifying. They were just...falling.

Someone was tracking them; there isn't any other explanation for the ease of their escape

Future reference... if you're 15° nose up and you're decending at 10,000ft per minute you are doing it wrong...

What if Bonin didn't understand at all that they are at alternative law?

To all the armchair MSFS pilots who put all the blame on the FO: Two things to consider. (1) It took 3 seconds from autopilot disengaging to "Stall! Stall!". The first stall warning was false (due to pitot tubes icing), so no wonder, the later stall warnings were initially ignored. (2) As you can see in this replay, the stall warnings stopped when Bonin pulled the sidestick, and started again when the AoA decreased. This very confusing phenomenon (the airspeed being so low that the stall warning stops) added to the disorientation and to Bonin further pulling the stick. If I'm not mistaken, this fact is even mentioned in the final report of AF 447. I hope Airbus changed this very confusing stall warning behaviour. Last thing to mention: Neither of the three AF 447 pilots was suicidal. They all wanted to save the plane and souls on board. So stop blaming someone who paid with his life!

This most likely wouldn't have happened if Captain Dubois was on the flight deck rather than resting. He would have immediately recognised the problem, known what to do and how to resolve it, and would have immediately spotted Bonin being an idiot. The whole thing was a total shambles even if they hadn't crashed and died. None of them had a proper night's sleep, they all seemed to be hungover, Dubois was having an affair and had been out with his mistress, etc. It was probably a total violation of Air France policy and they would have been fired if they'd survived.

Эта запись была использована в этом видео kzbin.info/www/bejne/fYnSgJljmMZrg9Usi=9Cz-x2jaBx6Yp_Y5

It still amazes how avoidable this was. Why didn't they realise they were stalling?

Seeing the comment section it’s evident that the viewers don’t know about the concept of Tunnel vision. In unforeseen circumstances it’s normal to cling to a particular thing which bonin was doing. He didn’t have enough experience to cancel his tunnel vision and did what he did there. Poor cockpit resource management added fuel to the fire . May god grant peace to the lost souls. Om shanti

Can... Someone... Please... Explain... Me.... WHY did Bonin pulling up the stick so much for NO REASON?

Stupid french

they were falling down, speed falling, but they did not understand that. How is this even possible

Cant Even Show an Animated Plane Hit The Animated Water Because of Sensitivity to The Crash?

It ultimately doesn't matter how you display data if the pilots don't understand how to interpret it. The startle effect has long been explored on this flight, and joined with operating bang on the circadian low, no upset prevention at high altitude and unreliable speed training, poor CRM and a sophisticated cockpit design masking failures, it's what ultimately enabled a weakly trained first officer to lose control of a fully-loaded A330 falling from 37.000 feet down into the ocean in 4 minutes. It's bone chilling. Plus, it's been said multiple times that the only thing preventing the plane from going into an incontrollable tailspin was the yaw damper, furiously moving the rudder to keep the plane's yaw axis into an acceptable range Remind you that this very issue (Pitot tubes icing up and therefore reversion to Alternate law 2, A/P disconnection and unreliable airspeed) has happened dozens of times before this flights (that's the reason Air France started installing updated Pitot tubes on aircraft, and this airplane was scheduled to have its sensors updated upon arrival in Paris). None of the other crews ever got close to losing control of their aircraft so badly. Personally I think that not having an explicit indication for both the angle of attack and the current flight control law is what made pilots first get into this situation and secondly not being able to fly their way out of it. It's obvious for us what Bonin should have done: push the stick forward and manually trimming the vertical stabilizer (which deflected to the full nose-up position after the first climb), and slowly return the angle of attack to a lower value as the plane levels off, setting engines accordingly. They say "pitch and power" for a reason. The problem was that neither pilot (especially Bonin, which was at the freaking controls) didn't know he had to do that, because he didn't understand the situation the airplane found itself in. He thought he was over speeding and even deployed the speedbrakes (which break up airflow over the wings [though at that point the angle of attack was so high that air wasn't flowing there anyway]) and reduced angine thrust. They traded all their kinetic energy for potential going up until their max altitude, and then put the aircraft in a position and energy state so bad they entered an aerodynamic stall at high altitude and started going down. Many people say this wouldn't happen in a Boeing (it did), but the main point of contention is the design of the control stick vs yoke. The yoke is far more obvious for different reasons: it's in front of both pilots, not hidden away; it's mechanically linked; it receives tactile feedback and vibrations as clues in response to aerodynamic forces excreting pressure on the Flight controls. But I think the most important yet underlooked feature of the yoke (Say in a 737, not in a fly-by-wire aircraft) is the consistency of the commands. Pulling up will always, in any condition and at whatever time, no matter the Flight level or where you are in the world, apply the same amount of vertical stabilizer deflection. Rolling right will always deflect the ailerons in the same way. This is not true for the A330 (and the whole family). Pitch input is an electrical signal (and I'm not saying fly-by-wire is bad, far from it), and that electrical signal assumes very different meanings and is interpreted in different ways based on which flight state the aircraft is in. In normal law you can literally pull back the stick as much as you like and not stall the aircraft, since envelope protection features are there keeping you safe, and cutting off the pilot input with surgical precision when they believe it's too much, letting only a safe amount to be passed to the flight controls. In normal law, a stall is close to impossible. In alternate / direct law, things change: the pilot is commanding a direct g-load / roll-rate by using that sidestick input to deflect the control surfaces, without any check. And non having a clear, obvious and large indication to the pilots that the control law changed (and no, ECAM warning isn't that. They read through it but didn't understand it, because they ultimately weren't familiar with their flight control law. In "Understanding Air France 447", the author says he asked a bunch of Airbus pilots which flight control law they were in, and most had to think before answering) leaves the pilot without knowing what their sidestick inputs will do. What bonin tried to do can be better understood by looking at what those inputs would have done in normal, level flight with normal law. Full aft sidestick and TO/GA thrust makes the aircraft climb at the best possible rate. But this only works in normal law. Not in alternate law, not at 37.000 feet, and not during an impending stall. Doing that at high altitude with a degraded control law enabled the crew to lose control of the aircraft and crash it into the Atlantic ocean

that is way i dont like sidestick

Is this game on roblox?

Why was the cvr never released?

this crash is in itself a good argument in favour of the boeing-style yoke instead of the airbus sidestick.

I am not flying air France

i found the loaction here it is! 3°03'57.0"N 30°33'42.0"W

Dubois was too busy banging his mistress in Rio and had no sleep. Bonin was incompetent. Those 2 should not have been allowed on that flight.

The F/O crashed the plane. Period. Stop trying to defend a panicking incompetent pilot. This accident was caused by human error, nothing else. Contributing factors are important but can't stand against incompetence and lack of training.

It's amazing to me that professional pilots don't know basic things that even casual DCS players know.

I've watched and read a lot about this accident, but all of the sources take their time to explain the details of how it went down. Watching it unfold in real time is gut wrenching. Four minutes is nothing. Heart breakingly tragic 😢

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One detail about this accident that particuarly disturbs me is that later on it was concluded by the accident investigation team that after the plane had descended to about FL315 (31,500 feet) that the aircraft was in a virtually uncontrollable state and there was absolutely nothing they could do after that point to effectively recover the aircraft and still have the altitude to establish stable flight again. It would've taken a crew with an extremely competent understanding of flight control to have made the recovery from that It's a pretty daunting fact that even if Captain Dubois had intervened at an earlier time or hadn't had his inputs cancelled out by Bonin that the outcome would most likely have stayed the exact same..

Many disagree with me. But I feel that Airbus's cockpit design is causal in this accident. An inexperienced FO pulled back on the stick all the way to the crash. That is not how you recover from a stall. And because the side stick does not provide tactile feedback to the other side, nor is completely visible like a traditional column or yoke would be, the FO was able to keep pulling back without any of the other pilots knowing so until it was too late.

My question is when one pilot finds themselves in IFR with Thunderstorm conditions with multi instruments failing such as Airspeed gauge failed. When no visual reference outside or can't see ground and your gauges aren't providing accurate readings. You don't know what gauge isn't working or which is giving you False Information. Yes, when I sit in my living room chair I can say when stall warning is going off and you see altimeter dropping fast maybe the plane is in a stall situation. But what if the pilot thought the plane was over speeding? He could've felt the plane was over speeding and seeing attitude and vertical speed indicator showing downward he felt plane was nose diving. I bet its more that a little hard to "Trust" your instruments when a few of them have failed you. Whats scary is even at 37,000ft things happen super quick, only took "Minutes" to go from ok to dead. a Few incorrect inputs and times up. Now we know why or how many pilots die when in IMC and don't trust their instruments etc. Maybe planes are simply Too Big & Too Heavy. Even if this plane glided safely into the Atlantic Ocean it would sink in minutes probably with large fatality as well. Maybe if there's Red Button once pressed the planes designed to split into a few smaller sections and like a Cirrus Plane, Multiple Parachutes save lives. Or add some types of way to make sections Float like seaplanes do. If we let great Engineers add save lives features Instead of, its cheaper to pay off large insurance claims than to add actual needed new safety features in 2022.

Idiots in cockpit.

You have to start wondering if this was suicide by the FO

they managed to kill everybody on the plane in just 4 minutes. 35000 feet is more than enough to recover from a stall