Sir I must say this...Even your wrong answer/calculation helps in understanding a new concept. Additional topic concept 🙌

Thanks for your lecture.

Thank you so much, Professor

This was a marvelous explanation! Thank you, sir!

You're a really great teacher sir. This is really helpful for understanding mechanism design for novices

Best introduction. You're a great teacher

thank you sooooooooooooooooooooooo much

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847 Marlon Harbor

You are GOATED!

now I get it! thank you

In example 2, once we know that M dominates D, that means player 1 will never play D so we can remove it out of consideration for player 2. That means that R strictly dominates L for player 2 since we dont consider D anymore. Which then means that M strictly dominates U for player 1. That leads to C dominating R for player 1 which leads us to a PSNE. So, here we effectively have 4 occassions of strictly dominating strategies.

Çok başarılı video.

thankyou so much sir.....

Unique material and very talented delivery! Thousand times thank you!

Thanks sir.

:(( omg, thank you so much. Everything was explained clearly and easy to understand.

43742 Hailee Divide

Thank you so much sir

Hocam çooooook teşekkür ederim. Sağlıcakla kalın ❤❤❤

Thenku I was searching for this so long😢

thank you professor

Great explanation, I finally understand the equilibrium problems. Thanks!😊

I dont understand how the Hi(t) payoff function works? why adding ∇sqaured*v?

The contract curve is not the same as the set of PO allocations. The black line represents the entire set of PO allocations. The contract curve is a part of that line, specifically the PO allocations that could be reached through trade starting from the initial endowment, and these typically improve both individuals compared to autarky.

At 11:49 it should be a = 1/2

thank you for making this so intuitive & simple.

Thanks!

Great explanation

To start with, thank you for the video explained smoothly, altough there is a point that did not made sense for me, a response will be highly aprreciated if you have time for it. When we were speaking about the player 2 we found that if P < 2/3 , q= 0 but for example let's say P = 60/100 which is smaller then 2/3 , in conclusion the player 1 is choosing U(up) by 60% chance and the player 2 is playing R(right) [ q=0] having the payoff = 1 while he can choose L (left) and take the payoff= 2 by knowing the fact that there is a higher chance (60%) player 1 will play U(up) and playing L(left) will be the regret free option for the player 2 in my example. Is this situation caused by the randomly given numbers in the example or is there something to do with the main concept of the topic ? Thank you for your time.

BTW it seems that one could employ agents that use LLMs and such to set up problems (say the costing) and then run algorithms such as the auction algorithm to make optimal assignments and such. BTW, I (with the help from Chat GPT 4O and Speechify) just made a video and uploaded it to my KZbin channel that explores how one might employ the Generalized Auction Algorithm coupled with LLMs to solve complex problems with many dependencies in the tasks, resources, and timings.

Hocam emeğinize sağlık derli toplu ve anlaşılır anlatıyorsunuz videolar çok iyi. ❤

Gem

How lectures of this quality remain under the covers is beyond my imagination. Thanks a lot Professor.

Increadible good teaching, thank you!!

Would 3.1666… have any meaning. In its simple set.

Thankyou

Isn't Mr Brown's Decision Nodes are A, B and C??

very good content

at 13.30, you said RPS and matching pennies have only 1 pure nash equlibrium each, but shouldn't it be they only have one mixed nash equilibrium?

is this context from the game theory book by steve tadelis

I'm so grateful for finding your channel that I just don't have words to say how THANKFUL I am. Thank you from the bottom of my heart!!

hocam <3

thank you very much

thank you very much

Thank you for your videos :)

Thank you. These videos are really helpful!

Hi, how can I get I touch with you? Anyone can help how to derive the utility function from the expenditure function? PxX + PyY = R is the a way to derive the U(x,y) from this equation? Please need help

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hello elliot can i suggest growing your youtube channel