It's false that the airbrakes weren't used until touchdown. Read page 5-81 of the Entry flight procedures: gandalfddi.z19.web.core.windows.net/Shuttle/JSC-11542%20-%20Flight%20Procedures%20Handbook%20Rev%20E%20200504.pdf They were first opened around Mach 10 to help with pitch trimming, lowered to 65% prior to TAEM interface, then used to actively modulate dynamic pressure when subsonic. Also this program does not do active drag modulation on a profile like the real Shuttle guidance did, if you read the commentary. Have a look at my more recent work for a closer recreation

it's just an emissive wired to the part temperature, you don't do anything yourself

no, the programs are calibrated for my fork of SSS and full RSS/RO

@@giuliodondiok thanks great job though

For those reasons they had the BFS, an isolated computer running a sinplified version of the guidance equations and the OS. There is this presentation on software-induced Loss of Crew and Vehicle (LOCV) www.slideshare.net/slideshow/space-shuttle-flight-software-pass-loss-of-crew-errors-jk-orr-20150827-52150515/52150515 which details one simulated emergency where two rapid engine failures bricked all four primary computers, without the BFS it would have been fatal

What do you mean?

Yes

@@giuliodondi Thank you!

In the several takes I did, sometimes the right engine was shut down. The first engine to fail is either the left or the right at random

If humans were on board we would still shiver I think

​@giuliodondi not as much, the Shuttle had such a low TWR during its RTLS and such a narrow flight envelope that made RTLS hair raising I rather suspect Starship's envelope will be much larger.

in a 2EO situation you only get the Orbiter back if you're in the last 30 seconds or so of powered RTLS or you're in a 2EO GREEN area and within range of Bermuda or an ECAL site, or single engine TAL/ATO. Any other situation and you have to bail out

@@giuliodondi yeah, but still, impressive.

The shuttle never did an abort, what are you talking about?

@@judet2992 he’s talking about in game

@@Kanru-5829 ah nice

@@judet2992 I was referring to KSP RSS, and there was a shuttle abort STS-51F it was an ATO (Abort to orbit) after a single RS-25 failed 5 minutes into the flight

@@nikelinq2899 ah thanks, also I meant RTLS abort.

In 1971 the Shuttle baseline was quite different, with smaller wings and internal fuel tanks. Yet, it still had an RTLS abort scheme involving a combined aerodynamic-thrusting turn to reverse course. You can read about it here: ntrs.nasa.gov/api/citations/19720006189/downloads/19720006189.pdf , not sure if this would have been that much safer. All the problems with the Shuttle concept fundamentally stem from the horizontal-landing/spaceplane paradigm. But spaceplanes are cool. Also, the Vandenberg once-around crossrange requirement was not exactly imposed on NASA by the Air Force, I think they wanted it anyways for aborts, but I don't have a reference for this sadly

@giuliodondi I must confess, I saw that information in a Scott Manley video, stating that the modifications required for the shuttle to fulfill that specific mission profile had made the orbiter more complex than it otherwise had to be, especially regarding the extended hypersonic glide time requirement. It's been a good while since I've watched it, could very well be wrong

@@matthewdev I know exactly the video, the one about the 3A/3B missions. The Air Force requirement was being able to launch into polar orbits from Vandenberg. Then, in 1973, the Vandenberg launch was formalized into the 3A/3B reference mission profile, involving deployment or retrieva of a satellite and reentry in a once-around orbit. These missions did drive the aerodynamic and heat shield design, and yet there is no explicit mention of them beyond a couple papers in 1973/74. This 1977 paper here ntrs.nasa.gov/api/citations/19770026315/downloads/19770026315.pdf studies the exact reentry profile for a once- around mission from Vandenberg and yet doesn't mention the 3A/3B reference profiles. My speculation is that the 3A/3B missions were nothing more than wargame studies (because they're ludicrous and only make sense in a state of war) but the high crossrange WAS useful to NASA for once.around abort capability for the Vandenberg mission they actually were going to fly (STS-62A) . Moreover, high crossrange gives you two or three deorbit windows every day for pretty much any landing site at almost any inclination, so you can wait for weather to clear up, which they did a lot

Towards the end of the program they implemented the ASCENT BEARING and ENTRY BEARING displays which basically are moving maps, kind of like the Orbiter2016 MFDs. They first flew them on STS-126

never tried this. I would just keep the KK groups and static configs and throw the rest, like the Edwards and Vandenberg terrain

kzbin.info/www/bejne/a4LbZ6SIgNh_q7M&ab_channel=RaizSpace kzbin.info/www/bejne/oWSUYZ2Bd55kp6c&ab_channel=RaizSpace

@@giuliodondi I think a video from your perspective would be faster, and much simpler.