Unfortunately for the Zulus they never really adapted their tactics, whereas the British did. The Zulus had tried and failed with those tactics before Isandlwana, when Pearson's column brushed them aside at Inyezane; at Khambula they unimaginatively threw themselves against Wood's paillisades and failed again at Ginginlovu and ultimately in a desperate forlorn hope at Ulundi. The Zulus were excellent skirmishers and the perfect storm at Isandlwana allowed them to gain a great victory with the Bull's Horns.

@@BrendonChase2012 I appreciate the info. The British were tactically and technologically superior to the people they subjugated; but it wasn't just a superiority in numbers and use of tactics, it is was also due that destroyer of armies known as hubris on part of the British command in which the Zulus won that day.

@@gahrzahk Oddly enough, I don't think there was actually that much hubris displayed on the Briitsh side at the time, with the possible exception of Crealock. A good deal of the mythos surrounding the AZW stems from cinematic interpretation rather than actual contemporary evidence. 'Zulu Dawn' was a vehicle for showing British arrogance, although there was actually considerable trepidation amongst many of the officers, particularly those of the ill fated 24th. Nonetheless, the British expected to win; the Zulus were reasonably confident in their arms, even if Cetshwayo foresaw the inevitable outcome of war. Chelmsford seems to have little regard for the colonial officers and even less for the NNC's abilities, but his strategy and tactics were very much in line with his own and general British military experience in southern Africa during the various frontier wars. Pulleine's deployment of his forces at Isandlwana followed Chelmsford's own guidelines, many of Pulleine's decisions made sense in the context of the situation as it unfolded, however, once the scale of the threat became clear Pulleine's lack of battlefield command betrayed him somewhat. Even Durnford's decision to act independently was something Chelmsford had told him he could accept his commanders doing inside enemy territory: Durnford's instruction to 'defend the camp' was something that was first mentioned (curiously enough) during the inquiry after the defeat, his actual order were somewhat vague, but there was no mention that he take command of and defend the camp. The Zulus won a spectacular victory despite not having planned to attack on that day. Ultimately Chelmsford's decision to split his forces was the reason the British lost, although the forces left at the camp were more than sufficient to deal with the threat, had the correct preparations been made. Durnford moved out it seems in an attempt to intercept a perceived Zulu threat to Chelmsford's rear, his scouts blundering upon the main Zulu army, the rest is history.

@@BrendonChase2012 I truly appreciate that information you have given! I'm not a war historian, though I worked in a military museum, part time as a temp. Bio major myself; I'd be able to identify a turtle on the battle ground after getting speared. It must have British command re-assess the Zulu's capabilities, though.

@@gahrzahk The Zulus killed a lot of animals during their rampage at Isandlwana: horses ("the feet of the White men"), oxen, cattle, dogs, sheep and a few mules were all killed and maimed in large numbers. Fortunately, no turtles were recorded amongst the casualties. The British command did indeed re-assess many things, their own tactics and strategy, perhaps more so than Zulu capabilities. Chelmsford would actually command two set piece battles against the Zulus, crushing victories both, for the loss of a combined total of 25 dead. The succesful strategy of two powerful columns used during the second invasion was originally suggested to Chelmsford by Paul Kruger. The five column strategy of the first invasion was predicated upoin the fear, real or imagined that the Zulus might simply avoid the British columns and invade Natal. I suspect the five column approach was a compromise to placate the settlers and keep an weather eye on the Boers to the north; the decision to summon Durnford and his column forward does indicate that Chelmsford thought the decisive moment was close at hand and defending the border could be overlooked. Chelmsford's own communiques with Bartle Frere show he was quite aware that the Zulus were coming for his column, had he sat at Isandlwana they would have come to him. Had the British government sanctioned the war then he may not have felt the need to go searching for the Zulus and Isandlwana would probably have been similar to Kambula.