Value inquiry is an empirical process, but it's also so MUCH more than that too. The definition Dewey provides on this according to Matthew Brown (around 11:00) is reductionist and an oversimplification at best. It's a strawperson of the truth.

excellent talk!

This was an excellent presentation that summarizes much of the state of the art (up to 2022, of course) on values in science. I will recommend it to anyone who wants an overview of the path taken towards now! I just ask whether we also have a fifth tradition: critical theory. Although restricted to the social sciences, it was born assuming the evaluative character of these endeavors, taking some time theorizing about the methods of science, and their relation to political and moral values. Concerning your boxes (values -> science; science -> values, etc.), to me, this branch would just not mark an individual focus, and a question mark on democratic values (for reasons similar to those of Marxists and feminists). Its elaborations on science and activism are quite deep. (By the way, if it has a Marxist heritage, critical theory certainly has had a life of its own for quite some time.)

Thanks for the talk. Very interesting. I would add to your last remark (on how the expected value theory may be applied in a less formal way) that I think it is possible to build protocols for medical action guided by the expected value approach - so as not to require such computation of the private physician. It seems to me that, for example, there is some repetition of certain types of cases of uncertain patients' preferences - the case of blood transfusion is one of them -, and this would turn designing protocols based on your approach a more feasible alternative.

This was really interesting, thanks! It looks to me that we might say that, especially in such fields as mental disorders, categorizing is itself a kind of intervention. I should say that I’m quite sympathetic to your emphasis on “lending voices to patients and under-represented individuals so that they have a say in what norms and expectations should be in play”. I’m trying to argue for things along similar lines in poverty research (actually this is not controversial in literature…). It's fascinating how many people are arguing for a similar pluralistic and participative outlook in different areas of research. Just in case you may not know, this work on psychiatric concepts as moving targets may be of some use: Runhardt (2021), “Reactivity in measuring depression”. Thanks again!

Your concept of medical Gaslighting is really illuminating. Thanks! A question: Do you think that patients' reports about their own pain are easier targets for medical gaslighting than other types of epistemic injustices? After all, it seems to me that is easier to concede that person has great epistemic authority on bodily and mental states related to the pain they are experiencing. In this case, it is not that hard to design medical protocols that give priority to a patient's judgments about their own pain... But since the problem is not reduced to pain, I ask: what other types of states are subject to medical gaslighting?

Thanks for the talk and for adding nuance to this debate! I must say that it dialogues nicely with Hildebrand-Chupp’s talk. It looks to me that a great deal of this debate revolves around what is (descriptively and normatively) the appropriate unit of analysis when talking about (non-epistemic) values influencing a research program or product. Is it the scientist(s) or their environment? (This may be framed as a question of whether we should be individualists or social when designing interventions and reform in scientific practice…) If I understood you well, basically, critics that argue open science is neoliberal are kind of claiming that the movement focuses too much on scientists - while you’re showing how open science is compatible with individualism and more social approaches to scientific practice.

First of all, thanks for the great talk. It really helped me to see things in my own research more clearly now - especially in seeing more clearly what the limits are in my efforts to identify values ​​as causes or as effects in poverty measures. Now, I would like to give a kind of defense of the contingency model against your critique. It seems to me that many folks who adopt this model accept this premise: it is easier to influence the valuations of experts than what causes them. (A confession: at least this is what brought me to this literature.) That is: it is “easier” to identify fulcrum evaluative points in scientific research, and then influence the choices taken at these points, and with it making scientific products take the form that we consider more appropriate - it is easier to do so than to struggle with the social evaluational background ​​that causes experts evaluations. Of course, as you yourself point out, this premise can be misleading, as it could make us ignore the pressures that practitioners suffer and that lead them not to take the valuations that we (or even themselves) consider appropriate. In addition, another premise that motivates the model is: that making explicit “where” or “what” are the evaluative questions of scientific practices contributes to interventions in an important way, and a way that is different from training a researcher's evaluative sensitivity. In the work of making these explicit, the responsibility moves from the researcher to the design of the scientific practice. The evaluative decision points are defined ex-ante, and incorporated by the research community. Again, in the end, it is assumed that it is easier to do this than to intervene in what causes the researchers' valuations. (Or are these two premises examples of applications of the valuographic approach?) However, even taking these two premises into account, from an eminently descriptive point of view, what you suggest as a research program still seems quite attractive. Thanks and congrats for your talk!

Fascinating and terrifying at the same time. Thanks for the talk!

In a talk last(?) year, Wendy Parker used something like the proximate/distal ends distinction to argue for a weak version of the value-free ideal. IIRC the idea was that the distal ends set certain parameters for inquiry, but while actually engaged in inquiry scientists should focus on the aim of producing knowledge that satisfies those parameters. Sort of bracketing off any contextual/"non-epistemic" values. I think maybe, if you disagree with Parker, it's over what "epistemic responsibility" means. She thinks it requires bracketing off contextual values. Do you think that epistemic responsibility requires *not* bracketing off these values?

This is more of a question than a comment. One problem with value judgments made by individuals is that they're hard to observe, and often we won't have good evidence that value judgment X as opposed to Y or Z had a particular effect on the research outcome or behavior or whatever. But if individual value judgments are hard to observe as causes, they'll also be hard to observe as effects. So we can say that this individual was working in this particular institutional, social, political context, and maybe even that individuals in that kind of context tend to make value judgment X. But is this enough to claim that this individual made value judgment X in this particular case?

Expected value theory will be a topic in major lawsuits.

Patient doesn't want it..don't do it. it doesn't work.

Matthew...nice try of trying to cover up a horny man's desires (polyamorous relationship, girl on girl love, bondage....really?). I, as a woman don't feel he's respecting the "woman," but yes, like one of your audience members said...strange how one can see this man is a true feminist. Marston was a sick man who tried to give the impression that he was a pioneer in the women's movement. If he truly was a feminist, he wouldn't have been the author of Wonder Woman...he would have let one of his women do the story telling. Can you imagine your daughter in a relationship with a man like Marston...would you then feel the same? Really? Wow and just to imagine this was 7 years ago! Matthew, I commend your style, but the content is simply self-fulfilling. Fantasy of a nasty man's desires who used his influence and education to share his delusions. Oh, and by the way, Margaret Sanger is a well-known racist. Interesting that she was an influence within Marston's circle.

@1:03 question about him living with two women as a "Haram" . Who is to say he was not dominated by the two women?