No expert here, but I think around 29:00 is where the answer to the "circle of knowing things" is. Before a presup are even able to claim that ""knowledge proves god", they have to use the exact same presuppositions that you do in order to understand anything about the world. So, if you have a list of ten presuppositions required for you to even be capable of interacting with the world, they also have to utilize those ten presuppositions before they can even get to their presuppositions of that God exists, and that the bible is revealed knowledge from God. This gets you out of the "You can't know that you know anything, but I can because of God revealed it for me" loop because if order for them to even begin learning about God, they must make the exact same presuppositions that you do. From there you point out that they are starting from the exact same basic beliefs as us, and then adding on God afterwards. If they try to just say "You are just stealing from my worldview, according to my worldview you cannot even begin to critique me without first admitting that I am correct!" then I suggest asking what they are hoping to get out of this conversation, if they are starting from the position of that they are correct, you are not allow to discuss anything with them unless you acknowledge that they are correct, and if you acknowledge the worldview as being correct then you are incapable critiquing it because according to TAG it *must* be correct.

Simple answer: I don't know. My lack of knowledge is not an argument for a god.

@@pdworld3421 It truly is not.

@@pdworld3421 Thinking... thinking... thinking... ok, it still isn't. There is even a name for your mistake: God of the gaps

_"My view is that Presup actually isn't about certainty at all. It's about justification for predication."_ Whose standard for justification? I bet it's your own, from within your own worldview, that makes everything that follows effectively a tautology. (No other worldview can provide Christian Justification, except the Christian Worldview) _"How can anything be justified when any attempt a non-Christian makes to justify anything is necessarily 1 of 3 lines of fallacious reasoning (as Münchhausen's Trilemma is a descriptor for)."_ You left out the best part! You didn't tell Ozy your brilliant solution to the Trilemma. Do you want to tell him, or should I?

Presup is really just ‘You can’t know anything for certain, but I can due to my special revelation’ ….none of this can be demonstrated to be true it’s all just special pleading and begging the question.

‘Presup isn’t about certainty it’s about justification’ …..yea exactly, you believe a thing there’s no good evidence for, so you make some fancy authoritative sounding arguments and so you feel justified now. Whoopdeedoo.

Aronra shouldn't allow nutters to dictate the way he speaks.

So, to sum it up... I think this intellectual error in which Harris (and other atheists / secularists) think as if they can be neutral or withhold judgement about affirming a worldview at all leads to them not recognizing their own dogmatism. This is exceptionally dangerous. The worst kind of dogmatism comes from those who think only anyone who disagrees with them can even possibly be dogmatic. It means that no matter how severe their dogmatism for their worldview becomes, they'll never have any chance of self-recognition. At least theistic worldview tend to be aware that dogmatism can be a problem. Self-awareness - self control, to an extent. But when a demographic falsely believes they don't have a worldview to defend and therefore can't possibly even BE dogmatic, this tells you they're conflating their system of presuppositions with facts. And it tells you they will never recognize their own dogmatism, since they imagine they're just defending facts when in reality they're defending their beliefs which they're falsely conflating with facts. You can't really get more dogmatic than that.

@user-dy3uh I'll get on that. Let me just grab my magic wand, or magic speakerphone that all academics must obey orders from, and make the declaration.

@user-dy3uh Joking aside, I've noticed atheists tend to pay a lot of attention to the "72% of Philosophers are atheists" thing. First problem with this slogan is: What qualifies as a Philosopher? Someone who obtains a specific degree from mainstream academia? Well, given that they teach exceptionally secular Philosophy in mainstream academia, that result shouldn't surprise anyone. Unsurprisingly, people who have spend a lot of time and money studying secular Philosophies end up believing a secular worldview. Shocker.

@user-dy3uh Now, if we change the definition of "Philosopher" so that it's no longer "someone with a specific degree from mainstream academia" to "someone with a genuine interest in seeking to understand truth beyond the limitations of the scientific method" then it will no longer remain true that 72% of Philosophers are atheists. Virtually all the people you appealed to in your slogan have a priority other than what I just stated. Their priorities are more about social status, financial security, etc... as are most people who seek degree from mainstream university.

@user-dy3uh I say this because I know very well that mainstream academia produces people who can't reason their way out of a wet paper bag, yet they'll have a PhD in Philosophy. I, myself, spent some time studying Philosophy at university. It was shockingly bad, to the point I refuse to return as a matter of principle. So, I'm saying these things from direct experience. You guys truly need to stop worshipping mainstream academia like they're the end all, be all of intellectual pursuit. They are the complete inversion of that.

There is no distinction between ["God"] and a person's worldview. Your worldview is what you interpret [God] through. So the word ["God"] is very subjective in that it will vary depending on the worldview of the person speaking. That's why appealing to ["God"] as the metaphysical foundation of one's worldview is fallacious. And its why saying "truth is what corresponds to [God"] is fallacious in a worldview debate, as it's equivalent with saying "truth is what corresponds to my worldview" (begging the question, since the two competing worldviews are precisely what is in contention)

@ConceptCollection You said "there is no distinction between God and a person's worldview." This is somewhat accurate, in that if it's a creator God then the worldview will entirely derive from that God as the foundation. So, in a sense.. the Christian God, for example, comes as a complete package WITH an entire worldview that cannot be separated from it. You continued "So the word God is very subjective in that it will vary depending on the worldview of the person speaking." This is true, there are many different versions of God people have come up with throughout human history. You continued "That's why appealing to God as the metaphysical foundation of one's worldview is fallacious." Depends on the God being described. For most Gods people have come up with, yes, it would be fallacious. But it's not the case for the Christian God as there actually is justification for the Christian God, unlike all others. Presup justifies the Christian God with transcendental argumentation (deductively valid form of justification), so it's not arbitrary or subjective. The Christian God objectively exists and this is deductively justified (which means it is necessarily true, not just probably true). You continued "And it's why saying 'truth is what corresponds to God is fallacious in a worldview debate, as it's equivalent with saying 'truth is that which corresponds to my worldview (begging-the-question, since the two competing worldviews are what is in contention)" Same difference as the previous quote: Justification is what wins debates. We have justified the Christian God's existence, so it's not fallacious.

@@lightbeforethetunnel You said _"there is no distinction between [Reality] and a person's worldview."_ This is somewhat accurate, in that if it's a [Non-contingent Reality] then the worldview will entirely derive from that [Reality] as the foundation. So, in a sense.. the [Objective Reality], for example, comes as a complete package WITH an entire worldview that cannot be separated from it. You continued _"So the word [Reality] is very subjective in that it will vary depending on the worldview of the person speaking."_ This is true, there are many different versions of [Reality] people have come up with throughout human history. You continued _"That's why appealing to [Reality] as the metaphysical foundation of one's worldview is fallacious."_ Depends on the [Reality] being described. For most [Realities] people have come up with, yes, it would be fallacious. But it's not the case for the [Objective Reality] as there actually is justification for the [Objective Reality], unlike all others. [Transcendental Idealism] justifies the [Objective Reality] with transcendental argumentation (deductively valid form of justification), so it's not arbitrary or subjective. The [Objective Reality] objectively exists and this is deductively justified (which means it is necessarily true, not just probably true). You continued _"And it's why saying 'truth is what corresponds to [Reality] is fallacious in a worldview debate, as it's equivalent with saying 'truth is that which corresponds to my worldview (begging-the-question, since the two competing worldviews are what is in contention)"_ Same difference as the previous quote: Justification is what wins debates. We have justified the [Objective Reality's] existence, so it's not fallacious. In my initial response, I utilized your precise wording and replaced the term "God" with "Reality." In my subsequent reply, I replaced the phrase "creator God" with "Non-contingent Reality" and the word "Presup" with "Transcendental Idealism," while substituting the term "Christian God" with the concept of "Objective Reality." It was just to get you to think about the implications of what you've stated by parody of reasoning. Now I'll actually address your claims. 1. _"There is no distinction between 'reality' and a person's worldview."_ It is important to distinguish between objective reality and an individual's subjective interpretation of reality. Reality refers to the external world, independent of personal beliefs or perceptions. While a person's worldview influences how they perceive and interpret reality, it does not determine or alter the objective reality itself. If your claim were true, it would *imply that* a person's worldview and their perception of reality are inseparable and indistinguishable. In other words, how individuals view and interpret the world is entirely shaped by their worldview, and *there is no independent, objective reality* that exists apart from individual perspectives. This perspective suggests that *reality is entirely subjective* and *dependent on one's subjective beliefs, experiences, and perspectives.* 2. _"The word 'reality' is very subjective."_ The word "reality" itself is not subjective. However, people's interpretations and understandings of reality can be subjective based on their worldview, experiences, and biases. Different individuals may have varying perspectives on reality, but that does not make reality itself subjective. 3. _"Appealing to 'reality' as the metaphysical foundation of one's worldview is fallacious."_ It is not fallacious to consider objective reality as a foundation for one's worldview. Many philosophical and scientific frameworks are built upon the assumption that there is an objective reality that exists independently of individual perspectives. However, it is true that one's worldview and subjective interpretations can *influence* how they understand and interpret reality. 4. _"Saying 'truth is what corresponds to reality' is fallacious in a worldview debate."_ In a worldview debate, different perspectives on truth may exist, and individuals may hold different conceptions of reality. The statement "truth is what corresponds to reality" can be problematic in such a debate because different worldviews may have conflicting interpretations of reality. It is essential to recognize that truth claims and their correspondence to reality can be influenced by individual perspectives and different worldviews. Furthermore, the statement _"Saying 'truth is what corresponds to reality' is fallacious in a worldview debate"_ is not necessarily correct. While it is true that different worldviews can shape people's interpretations of reality and their understanding of truth, it doesn't automatically make the statement fallacious. In a worldview debate, the statement _"truth is what corresponds to reality"_ can serve as a metaphysical starting point or a shared understanding for discussing and evaluating different perspectives. It establishes a foundational principle that truth claims should align with the objective reality that exists independently of individual beliefs or subjective interpretations. However, it is also crucial to recognize that different worldviews may have varying interpretations of reality and different criteria for determining truth. The fallacy would arise if one assumes that their particular worldview is the sole arbiter of truth and dismisses other perspectives without proper justification or engagement (correct me if I'm wrong but, is that not essentially what you're doing?). It is important to approach worldview debates with open-mindedness, critical thinking, and a willingness to consider different interpretations of reality and truth. TLDR; While it is true that individual worldviews shape how people interpret reality, it is important to maintain a distinction between objective reality and subjective interpretations. The relationship between truth, reality, and worldviews can be complex and nuanced, and it is essential to consider the specific context and arguments being made in any given debate or discussion.

@@lightbeforethetunnel _"There is no distinction between "reality" and a person's worldview."_ That's a weird thing to say from someone who goes on to immediately point out the distinction between reality and a worldview. _("Your worldview is what you interpret reality through. So the word "reality" is very subjective in that it will vary depending on the worldview of the person speaking.")_ _"That's why appealing to "reality" as the metaphysical foundation of one's worldview is fallacious."_ Sounds like more of your usual special pleading to me. Sounds like you're trying to suggest that we can't appeal to anything, independant of our worldview, except the Christian God, because you've tacked on some a priori attributes that you can't justify. _"And its why saying "truth is what corresponds to reality" is fallacious in a worldview debate, as it's equivalent with saying "truth is what corresponds to my worldview" (begging the question, since the two competing worldviews are precisely what is in contention)"_ It's the same thing you attempt to do with the TAG. P1) is simply a statement within the context of your own worldview, and the only conclusion that _can_ follow from that is going to be limited to the context of your worldview. You've made no argument for any sort of metaphysical necessity for God. You're argument is just saying that, _In your worldview_ God is necessary.

A claim to truth isn't a claim to knowledge. Claiming X is true suggests the claimant believes X, but it doesn't entail it (they could make the claim without actually believing it). Now if they make Claim X, and they believe Claim X, then that means they think X is true. However, that doesn't entail that they know X, nor that they're making a knowledge claim. Therefore, asking someone who makes a truth claim (which only suggests something about what they believe) how they know the claim to be true is a loaded question (because they never said they knew it). What you should instead be asking someone who makes a truth claim is, WHY do they BELIEVE X (think X is true)? Another point is that by asking someone how they know X, you already have some notion of what knowledge means, and perhaps what its ontology is. If your notion of knowledge differs from the person you're asking, then it's a loaded question. If by knowledge you mean a justified true belief, then you're asking someone to provide an internal, epistemic justification. But if someone is an externalist with respect to justification, then you're asking them for an internal justification for something they believe is external (which contradicts their notion of what knowledge is). The ironic thing, as articulated in this video, is that presuppositionalists are externalists with respect to certain basic beliefs who demand others provide an internal justification for their basic beliefs, which is both inconsistent and a double standard. They also provide no satisfactory solution to Gettier cases, skeptical scenarios, or the problem of the criterion, all while claiming to have the upper hand against Fallibilists.

@@ConceptCollection Hi Do you know "A claim to truth isn't a claim to knowledge" or not ?

​@@soloscriptura I think that given your inquiry, you've manifestly not grasped the relevant points I've made. Perhaps it was my fault for not being overtly, redundantly, superfluously specific. I'll try making one of the salient points crystal clear by adding a term to my statement and then explaining it further (although it should have been obvious given the things I said following the statement anyway): "A claim to truth isn't *necessarily* a claim to knowledge." What this means is that JUST BECAUSE someone makes a claim about what's true (i.e., a truth claim), that does not require that they're making a claim about what they know (a knowledge claim). For example, John could say: _"My car is parked in the driveway."_ If John thinks that the proposition: "My car is parked in the driveway" is true (and the "my" is indexed to him, and not someone else), then it means that John believes his car is parked in the driveway (because to believe something at minimum means you think it's true to some degree). So when John said "My car is parked in the driveway", he was indeed making a truth claim. Anytime someone states something in the form of a declarative sentence without providing evidence or proof, that's a claim about what's true (a 'truth claim'), regardless of whether the speaker holds the propositional attitude of it being true (believes it) or not. Now, while it's true that John uttering the statement "my car is parked in the driveway" is a truth claim, it does not logically follow that John believes it, nor that he knows it to be true. By uttering the statement "My car is parked in the driveway", John is suggesting that he believes it, but it isn't necessarily true that he believes it at all (he could very well be lying). He might just have his wife's new b-day gift there (a brand new car). And when he was unexpectedly asked if his car was in the driveway, hey lied and said that it was because he did not want to prematurely spoil the surprise (it's a surprise b-day party). When in actuality, he parked his own car on the street curb. Now a different scenario. Let's say that you ask John the following question: "where is your car parked right now?" "It's in the driveway, where I Ieft it 30 min ago when I got home", John replies. This is a truth claim, which is suggesting that John believes (thinks it's true) that his car is in the driveway. Ergo, "it's in the driveway" can be rephrased as "my car is in the driveway right now." That is a truth claim. But then you ask him if he knows whether it's been moved or stolen in the past 30 min and he replies with: "obviously not, because I haven't checked since." John is implying that if he states what he believes is true (which is a truth claim), that's different from what what he knows to be true, both of which involve the notion of truth. John thinks that if he doesn't know if it's been stolen, then he doesn't know that it's parked where he left it; and if he doesn't know that, then he doesn't know where his car is parked right now. John clearly made a truth claim as to where his car is parked, which is some indication of either a) what he thinks is true, b) what he "probably thinks" is true, or c) what he thinks is "probably true" (a distinction with a relevant difference), but this isn't an indication about what he *knows* to be true. In fact, John explicitly denied that he *knows* it to be true. There must be more to knowledge than just thinking something is true (belief), and even more than just believing something is true that is actually true, because then any lucky guess or true belief you hold for no good reason whatsoever that just happens to be true would count as knowledge. But there are various competing theories as to what knowledge is, and they all include the concept of truth. There are also many theories of what truth is as well. This is what I mean by "A claim to truth isn't *necessarily* a claim to knowledge." If you ask me how I know that a claim to truth isn't necessarily a claim to knowledge, I would defer you to such examples that demonstrate this. If you need it broken down further, I will explain what I mean by knowledge and it's relation to truth and belief, what others could mean by knowledge, what necessary and sufficient conditions are, what analytic statements (analytic truths) are, and how they apply to what I said. *TL;DR:* Given what I mean by "know", "knowledge", and "truth", I do know that a claim to truth isn't necessarily a claim to knowledge, but that is irrelevant to the point I made, as it still stands irrespective of whether I (me specifically in this case) am making a knowledge claim or not. However, I have no idea what you mean by the polysemous word "know", and I highly doubt you have any informed analysis as to what knowledge is.

@@soloscriptura damn bro you didn't even bother after you actually got a good answer.

He's been popping up again recently with some good content.