Oil was not 'the lifeblood of the nation.' Coal was. Oil was the lifeblood of the military, and the military was not 'the nation' though the leaders of the IJN and IJA mistakenly thought so. Prior to war with China, oil provided 7.3% of Japan's total energy consumption - civilian, industry, government, and military. Coal (and coal gas) provided about 68% of the nation's energy consumption, hydroelectric 16 to 18% (depending on rainfall), and biomass (usually charcoal used for home cooking and heating) about 10%. BTW, though the US produced and consumed much more oil than Japan, the top provider of energy to America was coal as well. Coal was king in just about every industrialised country except for the few nations that had abundant hydroelectric power. Japan began rationing oil products in 1938, two years before America's restriction of the export of aviation gasoline and three years before the restriction on the export of all oil. We see companies like Toto, a maker of ceramic products which is energy intensive production, switch from oil to heat its kilns to coal and coal gas. Moreover, though the US was the world's largest producer of oil, it was not the world's top *exporter* . Venezuela was. By a huge margin. In 1928, Venezuela surpassed the US as the world’s largest oil exporter, and by 1936, it was exporting almost as much oil as the next seven exporters combined-the United States, Peru, Iran, Romania, the Dutch East Indies, Iraq, and the Soviet Union (43.05 million tons versus 44.39 million tons). Prior to WWII Venezuela was Britain's largest supplier of oil; Venezuela’s market share rose from 17 per cent to 49 per cent during the 1930s. Further, Venezuelan oil was cheaper than American. It was so cheap that in 1932 the US imposed tariffs on Venezuelan oil that removed it from the US market that had been its chief destination of output; these tariffs were ended in 1939 as American increased production to aid Britain. Yet Japan did not diversify to Venezuelan, Mexican, or Peruvian oil. Japan had 0.5% of the motor vehicles that US had, meaning little oil was used for these, and the fuel rationing of 1938 eventually removed private cars from the roads. By 1941 the 77,000 trucks operating in Japan had their allotment reduced to one-third the level of 1936. Railroads were powered by coal (intercity routes) and electricity (intracity routes). Even buses were converted to coal and charcoal beginning in 1938. Commercial airline service barely existed; Japan Air Transport carried 70,000 passengers in 1938, many of whom were military officers and government officials. Who other than the military was was the chief consumer of petroleum? The merchant marine and the fishing fleet. If we look at 'peacetime' Japan's oil imports of 1936 (before the military took over the economy), we find Japan was importing less than 30 million barrels from the US. Yet even this total was inflated due to the 1934 law requiring oil importers to maintain a 6-month stockpile in Japan. (Japan built an oil stockpile exceeding 50 million barrels, estimated to be two years of civilian consumption, before 1940.) The average price of oil in 1936 was $1.09 per barrel (and ranged from $1.02 to $1.18 per barrel from 1937 to 1941), meaning that Japan's oil bill ranged from about $32 million to $40 million. In 1938 Japan imported $60 million more in US cotton ($88.3 m) than US oil ($28.3 m). Could we claim cotton was the lifeblood of the economy? In '40 it was only $3 million more as cotton imports fell and oil imports increased. Why? War beginning in '37 and the establishment of war mobilisation in '38. In 1938 civilian consumption of petrol dropped 60% due to rationing and continued to fall. Oil consumption was a military concern and not an entire nation one. Japan was a multi-billion dollar economy, estimated to be worth from 9 to 10 billion US dollars in 1941. Its oil bill was negligible. Yet in autumn 1940 Tokyo tried to strong arm the Dutch East Indies to increase oil sales to 3.5 million tons (about 25.5 million barrels) and _accept payment in yen_ . The Dutch government responded that 1) it was not an oil merchant; Tokyo needed to negotiate contracts with the oil companies, and 2) payment in Dutch guilders or US dollars was only acceptable. Examining the claim that 'oil was the lifeblood of the nation' I've shown that the claim is untrue. It was used by the military as a pretext to rationalise the take over of the country and war. This lie cost Japan millions of lives and billions of dollars worth in misallocation of the taxpayers' money and destruction of the nation to acquire oil worth tens of millions. A dreadful return on investment.