1. Free-Rider Problem Explained: Prisoner's Dilemma, Collective Action, and Governing the Commons

This video describes the Free-Rider Problem, explaining that environmental resources are common-pool resources (the commons) which makes them prone to the Tragedy of the Commons. I use concepts from Economics (the Prisoner's Dilemma Game) and Political Science (Theory of Collective Action and the Design Principles of Elinor Ostrom) to explain how we can avoid the Tragedy by encouraging people to cooperate.
We all care about the environment and generally like being in natural surroundings. Why then, are environmental problems growing and becoming more complex to tackle? This video series answers this question and explains the challenges and complexities associated with environmental problems.
Here are the concepts explained in the video:
0:00 Intro to series
0:35 Free-Rider Problem
2:23 Common Pool Resources
3:45 Prisoner's Dilemma Model (Game Theory)
5:21 Application of Prisoner's Dilemma in Environmental Problems
6:49 Theory of Collective Action
7:53 Ostrom's Theory of Self-Governance
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This video is based on chapter 1 of the book, Governing the Commons by Elinor Ostrom.
Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge university press.
Link to the book: wtf.tw/ref/ostrom_1990.pdf
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[@PreciousBestSJ]

The simplicity and easy-flow of the lecture is amazing. I wish professors would be this simple.

[@VanyaBisht]

Thank you for the kind words :)

[@voidisyinyangvoidisyinyang885]

@@VanyaBisht Uttarakhand must be a fascinating homeland. thanks for your work.

[@VanyaBisht]

@@voidisyinyangvoidisyinyang885 It is the most beautiful place in the world :)

[@sophiaw-b2708]

Finally I understand this ! Thank you!!

[@VanyaBisht]

Yay 😁😁

[@sophieka4579]

Great video!!! Hours of reading economic articles and nothing. 10 minutes video and now everything is clear. Thank you

[@VanyaBisht]

Thank you so much Sophie :)

[@jayantkulkarni4396]

Congratulations Vanya! Good description of the problems of environmental conservation, well explained in layman's language.

[@sudattamohanty7239]

Wow! What an insightful video! Can't wait for the upcoming videos in the series! :D

[@amit37asthana]

Congratulations Vanya! Very well explained. Liked it very much. God bless you. All the best Amit Asthana

[@bimalchandrapandey5520]

Good job Vanya! The language is simple and effective. The way you discussed the topic is impressive. Contents is also tight and concise but full of desired information. Good start. Keep it up. All the best.

[@narendrabisht7054]

Hi Vini Wonderful. Don't believe that its your voice. Too good and clear.

[@harshpanwar5963]

Blessed to have encountered this lecture.

[@aviral1991]

Great start vanya! Keep going :)

[@jeewanbisht49]

Well done.

[@bitknowledge.2493]

Thank u so much 🥰💕💕💕

[@LuisRomeroLopez]

This such a good video! Love how the topics were organized!

[@VanyaBisht]

Thank you!

[@zyzzyvette]

Vanya your work is incredible as always! Thanks so much for your hard work, it is appreciated.

[@VanyaBisht]

Thank you very much!

[@ayomidevaldis3174]

Awesome content vanya.

[@VanyaBisht]

Glad you enjoyed it :)

[@farizkaalwahida6570]

Just brilliant

[@VanyaBisht]

Thank you :)

[@Manu-lc4ob]

Shouldn't it be 0,20 and 20,0 (rather than 5,20 and 20,5) else they have no incentive to testify

[@VanyaBisht]

The actual numerical value doesn't matter (for a qualitative analysis as presented in this video), the important thing is that the incentives to testify are kept lower than the incentive to stay silent.

[@CrazyDessert]

@@VanyaBisht Manu is right. The numerical value doesnt matter but the relation does. In the prisioners dilemma its always better to defect no matter what the other player does. This is not the case with your numbers. If in your example the other one cooperates it is equaly good for you to cooperate as it is to defect. Thats a way of looking at the situation but its definetly not a prisioners dilemma. Look it up: in prisioners dillema defecting is a dominant strategy, meaning that its ALWAYS strictly better to defect - no matter what the other one does. Doesnt mean that your modelling is not also a good way of looking at situatons where no coordination is possible but its not a prisioners dillema. Im an economics Student with specialisation in game theory so maybe you should research that again. Otherwise its a good Video! :) Edit: May be a bit nit-picking but also your example with the fishing pond where you write: "most powerful wins" in the defect/defect cell is not a prisioners dilemma if that means that the most powerful is better of than she would be in the cooperate/cooperate case. That is because in prisioners dilemma both are worse of in the defect/defect situation than in coop/coop. Technically spoken defect/defect is not pareto efficient but the only nash equilibrium. But again thats also an interesting modelling approach for such a Situation!

[@VanyaBisht]

Thanks for the detailed explanation!

[@CrazyDessert]

@@VanyaBisht you're welcome! Actually I think that your modiefied prisioners dilemma is very interesting so thank you for that :) Yours is more about trust and about what each Player thinks the other one could do. You only defect because of fear that the other one could possibly defect, but initially there is no clear reason why the other one would defect except from fear that you could defect and so on... So you don't trust just because you're not sure if the other one trusts you. Thats a weird Situation...