5. Hume's Central Principles: Hume on Causal Necessity

[@IanFrantz]

Great presentation and coverage of the topic! I learned quite a bit. One take-away for me as I work on the empirical side of data measurement, collection and analysis is this: If indeed causation is the basis for all empirical inference then all empirical claims will necessarily follow from measuring causality.

[@willmurrin9344]

I think I can agree with your premise, but it does bring forth the question: what does it mean to measure causality. Hume's central claim (I think) is that causation is an application of our minds in the attempt to describe the nature of reality. It follows then that causation is not a inherent part of reality, but is inherent only to the minds understanding of reality. In other words, causation exists as a limitation of the mind's inability of understanding how reality is in and of itself. Therefore, if causation is the basis for all empirical inference then all empirical claims are not claims of the world in-and-of-itself; they are instead claims of the understanding as it is as a function of, or in relation to, the world (reality).

[@IanFrantz]

Great points Will. I especially like your last sentence. I worked on this awhile ago so I can't add much more but I did write something up in October and included several cool links which can be hard to find if you are getting deep into this topic maybe I have a few useful things to add: www.linkedin.com/pulse/six-sigma-causation-hume-time-ian-frantz

[@nasreddin6992]

Insightful lecture

[@stephenhogg6154]

Hume makes a clear distinction between facts and values, and that, in itself, demonstrates his causal realism.

[@edwardwoods3097]

Could you refer me to a passage in Hume’s Works that validates your statement? (This is a serious inquiry. I’m not trying to refute you)

[@stephenhogg6154]

@@edwardwoods3097 Just look up Hume on the fact/value distinction. To be honest, I can’t even remember the point I was making here, or its context. I would say - perhaps contrary to Hume - that no clear distinction can be drawn between facts and values, so there is no clear distinction. Hilary

[@emilykluge4459]

Thank you!

[@jamestagge3429]

That by which Hume was able to formulate his proposition and the context in which it functioned and was considered, defines certain necessities that he could not deny OR HE COULD NOT HAVE FORMULATED IT TO BEGIN WITH. Either it is, or it ain’t. 1. He chose to employ in his proposition the concepts of billiard balls specifically to the exclusion of all other things. This cannot be questioned. This means by definition that he had to have recognized and acknowledged the (“physical?” or “sense impression”) characteristics of all of those entities from which he chose the billiard balls or how could he have decided on the billiard balls as opposed to something else such as crochet balls? So the assertion of the form and function of all of those entities in material reality that he had to have perceived (or again, he could not have made the distinct choice he did) was that by which he was able to choose. That he claimed to recognize only sense impressions does not alter the point. There is no escaping this. 2. In that he had to have recognized the physical characteristics of the billiard balls or the sense impressions of them, again, the only means by which he could have chosen them to the exclusion of all else, he had to have known that motion was not one of those characteristics. First, motion is not tangible as is all of that by which the billiard balls were defined in their physicality or the sense impressions which were drawn from them. Secondly, were motion a characteristic of billiard balls, both not just one would have been moving. That the one ball was moving (and not the other) then has to have been the effect of a cause of that motion having been imparted. There is no escaping this. 3. Then, that he had to have known that motion had to have been imparted to the moving ball, he had to have understood that that which imparted that motion was itself a moving entity for which motion was also not a characteristic. I am sorry but this is cause and effect, like it or not. What Hume did in the formulation of his theory was akin to “appealing to truths to formulate a position which denied truth”. He doesn’t get to have done that any more than the rest of us. That entities are distinct, they are that by their characteristics. That they are distinct, they are chosen for their characteristics because each imposes a specific quality (“effect”?) from which to choose. The balls were chosen because they would roll, the reality of that to which he had to have surrendered, a given because they were his choice. He did not choose bricks or the like because they wouldn’t roll, necessary to the purpose of the analogy. That recognition in part defeats his theory of no cause and effect. A final point…..the proposition that ball 1 hitting ball 2 would cause it to move, is inductive only in the most general context of consideration. However, in a sub-context where we consider that motion had to have been imparted to the moving ball, it is deductive. His theory makes no sense. What do you think?

[@martinbennett2228]

Did Hume address the causal nature of empirical perception? Short of embracing solipsism, perhaps in the manner of Berkeley (less his deity), empirical apprehension requires a causal relationship to the empirical faculties. Without that causal relationship, I cannot see that empirical knowledge is possible.

[@FightXScience-wh6kx]

As a point of clarification, Berkeley didn't embrace solipsism. He acknowledged many perceivers, e.g. humans, possibly animals, and certainly God.

[@martinbennett2228]

@@FightXScience-wh6kx That is why I put 'less his deity' in parenthesis. Did he include other animals? I was not aware of that.

[@FightXScience-wh6kx]

@@martinbennett2228 But he acknowledged not just God as perceiver, but other humans