A Virginia Cavalryman on Why Pickett's Charge Failed

[@francisebbecke2727]

I understand George Pickett was asked why he thought the charge failed. Pickett responded with, "I always thought the Yankees had something to do with it."

[@williampaz2092]

😂🤣

[@jamessimpson4577]

I think that about covers it,lol.

[@aaronfleming9426]

Simple but profound.

[@bobbrown5460]

D@#& Yankees 😊

[@davemckolanis4683]

Pickett Supposedly Graduated LAST In His Class At The Academy. But Followed His Orders, Regardless How Stupid They Might Have Been...

[@georgeedward1226]

I've walked the Pickett's Charge field and it's hard to imagine the Confederates NOT being sitting ducks on that ground.

[@ralphtomlinson4520]

Lee's subordinates protested this and other things. What Longstreet, in particular, told Lee would happen, did. Despite the artillery mowing down a lot of Confederates then the concentrated rifle fire getting the rest, still, the Confederates did manage to break the line. The Federals quickly plugged the breach, but the Confederates even getting that fr was a miracle. What's funny is Lee told an opposing General a few years later the only reason he attacked the center was it was the only thing he hadn't tried & he only had enough men & ammo for 1 more attack. Yet none of Lee's subordinates mention this in their comments on it. I have to wonder if Lee said anything like this to his subordinates.

[@wynnsimpson]

Yes especially when you consider the Confederates had to climb a fence.

[@georgeedward1226]

Also it was 87 degrees and they were in wool uniforms, some with no shoes.

[@andrewward5891]

Yeah the Union men cheered the Rebel’s bravely for attempting the charge before killing then.

[@carolynhoffman9757]

I’ve walked Picket’s charge too. It’s mostly uphill, particularly from the Emmitsburg Rd onward. Not to mention that the charge took place in that debilitating heat and was close to a mile.

[@phillipnagle9651]

Perhaps one should ask the question, when did Lee ever win a major battle by a direct frontal assault? He had tried one earlier in the war at Malvern Hill and was easily repulsed. He had seen the absolute futility of a Union frontal assault at Fredericksburg. Pickett's charge was just a bad mistake.

[@alexkalish8288]

I give you Chancellorsville where he did a direct assault and carried the day. He also did a flank attack with Jackson and my gg grandfather's brother Keith Boswell. In truth Lee never won a battle after Jackson died, Cold Harbor was a victory but not a win, Grant flanked him after the battle. .

[@FuzzyWuzzy75]

With all due respect it is easy to play "Monday Morning QB" here with the benefit of hindsight. But Lee's logic was sound. The plan was not a bad one. But everything that could have gone wrong for Lee did go wrong for Lee on the 3rd day @ Gettysburg.

[@phillipnagle9651]

@@FuzzyWuzzy75 There was no "sound logic" on a frontal assault on Union troops which held the high ground. As I pointed out, Lee himself had experienced the futility of this tactic himself and had also experienced the success of defending against it. It was just a bad move.

[@FuzzyWuzzy75]

@Phillip Nagle Lee had attacked hard on the flanks the previous day. He anticipated that Meade would expect the same on the third day and would strengthen the flanks at the expense of the center. What he didn't know was that Meade had excellent interior lines and had essentially reinforced the center by pulling battered units from the flanks and had essentially used them to reinforce his center. Lee also counted on a heavy artillery bombardment to weaken the center prior to the infantry assault. What he couldn't have known to smoke and poor visibility of the Union lines from his position was that artillery bombardment was largely ineffective because most of the rounds landed behind the Union lines. Last but not least Lee was counting on Stuart to ride around the Union flank and hit the center hard from the rear just as his infantry was assaulting the same positions hard from the front. And of course Custer thwarted Stuart's attack. It wasn't a bad plan. The logic was fairly sound. But everything that could go wrong for Lee did go wrong at the worst possible time and all at once. We could argue as to rather or not the execution of the plan was lacking but the logic behind it and the plan it's self was fairly sound.

[@phillipnagle9651]

@@FuzzyWuzzy75 Once again, no sound plan, specially by the South, would include a frontal assault on an entrenched enemy who had the high ground. Lee also should have been aware that the Union had superior artillery and manpower. Finally, there is a difference between attacking an enemy's flanks, which Lee did earlier in the battle, and outflanking one's enemy, which Lee didn't even try. Up until then, Lee's best successes came on defense, with the exception of Chancellorsville, which was won Jackson's flanking move. Even at Chancellorsville, Lee suffered heavy casualties and did not achieve a decisive victory.

[@hansg6336]

It's easy to forget the lack of any battlefield communication beyond: bugles, runners, signal flags and yelling, all of which were diminished or rendered useless in the noise and smoke of battle. However, that still does not excuse the known futility of attacking a fortified position uphill, over open ground.

[@ohauss]

Especially with no secure intel as to whether you've really disabled the opposite artiller or not.

[@Thataintnothing]

And the Center was just reinforced right before the Charge.

[@davidmurray5399]

Aside from a stretch of stone wall, some rail fencing and a few logs piled here and there, the position wasn't 'fortified', and the slope is still pretty gradual. The Confederate columns were broken by artillery fire as they approached the Emmitsburg Road, when they crossed that, canister and rifle fire finished it.

[@xisotopex]

it goes against all sound military principle, well known even then.... I forget the particulars, was Lee sick at all during this battle?

[@ednunez7682]

@@xisotopex there has been wide speculation that he was. Afterward, Lee told his troops, it's all my fault. And it was

[@charlesjames1442]

The same reason Burnside failed at Fredericksburg. Infantry didn’t stand a chance against well entrenched riflemen and artillery, given a clear field of fire and competently lead.

[@Fat12219]

The North was entrenched well 😮

[@romandacil3984]

I looked over Pickett's Charge from both sides of the field and thought that it was suicidal. Advance teams should have started out at midnight to clear the obstacles in between (fence rails) and the rest should have advance well before dawn to get as close as possible to make it harder for Union artillery to target them. That would have lessened the ods against them but they still would have been beaten back though with fewer losses.

[@aaronfleming9426]

Nice idea, but there's a reason there was almost zero night fighting in the Civil War...it was essentially impossible to keep formations together in the dark. Even sending out advance teams is problematic, since both sides have pickets waiting in the darkness to detect such actions.

[@romandacil3984]

@@aaronfleming9426 True night actions are always tricky. All in all Pickett's assault in the mid afternoon, on a hot day with over 3 quarters of a mile of open field was suicidal and should never have been ordered.

[@aaronfleming9426]

@@romandacil3984 Full agreement!

[@randallsimmons391]

During my research of the battle, I found that a significant number of Confederate troops did not have shoes. Crossing the field without footwear may have had a bit to do with this as well. Not pressing advantage when the Rebels first arrived and allowing the Union troops to build breastworks and defensive piles was the most significant aspect of what repelled Confederate assaults. The cavalry charge against Chamberlain should have been preceded by small artillery, that would have put the Union into a much needed retreat and collapsed the flank.

[@althesmith]

Alexander Hunter, a Confederate soldier, wrote in his recollections "The madness of Pickett's charge! It was superb- like the charge of Balaclava; but it was not war."

[@georgegonzalez-rivas3787]

The casualty rate at Pickett's Charge was FAR higher than that of the Light Brigade at Balaclava.

[@nicholasmuro1742]

British won at Balaclava, tho. Accomplished their objectives.

[@georgegonzalez-rivas3787]

@@nicholasmuro1742 Wut? Their "objectives" were muddled and conduserd, their light cavalry was badly mauled by artillery and cavalry counterattacks, and retreated in disarray with famously heavy casualties. You sound like the press secretary for Lord Raglan!

[@nicholasmuro1742]

@georgegonzalez-rivas3787 But they got the canons for the VC tho. Thanks to Cardigan.

[@thomascornell7562]

​@@nicholasmuro1742they got to the Russian guns yes.....put them out of action....no....... prevent the Russians from carrying off the Turkish guns..... their REAL objective...... not even close

[@billstapleton1084]

Pickett's charge was an ill-conceived idea just as, the Union attacking the South at Fredericksburg. There was no way Pickett was going to breach the fixed position of the union. The Union was not going to breach the stone wall at Fredericksburg. Both were mistakes made by the commanders that cost too many lives.

[@kenbash2951]

Actually Pickett's men DID breech the Union line.

[@DrummerDanVa]

You would have thought Lee would think back to Fredricksburg and think this Pickett's Charge looks awefully familiar. Lee gets a lot of credit for different things but as the war went on Longstreet had the grip on reality that Lee had lost. So often Lee talked about God's will. Faith is one thing but stupidity and the incredible loss of life is something else.

[@billstapleton1084]

@@DrummerDanVa Well said.

[@billstapleton1084]

@@kenbash2951 At what cost? To assault a fixed position you need a 3-1 advantage, Anyone who has studied military history knows this, Lee would have known this.

[@kenbash2951]

@@billstapleton1084 3,500 of Pettigrew's men, who ran for their lives back into Seminary Woods, could have made a difference- if they had not gone chicken and run. Pickett sent 2 riders on horseback to challenge the men who were abandoning the charge but to no avail- at least half of Pettigrew's men RAN away. Lee had no way of knowing the men would cower under fire.

[@MrThebirddog]

I walked the ground of the charge. It never had a chance, it was way to far out in the open and the blame can only be put on Granny Lee.

[@wecandobetter9821]

The frontal attack was doomed from the start for many reasons. One overlooked fact was new fuses burned longer than previous once causing most of the cannon fire to fall harmlessly in rear of Union artillery and troops. Once the charge began the north cannon fire did its ghastly deed. The courage to walk across is something that amazes me

[@mitchellreid4205]

Excellent point

[@Kenneth-c4j]

You're right I forgot to mention the Confederate's longer fuses caused many shells to explode beyond the Union troops not harming them much .

[@dadsongs]

I love the format of your presentation. We can "armchair general" until the cows come home, but their words stand as a testimony to what they experienced, and how they chose to remember it. Keep up the great work.

[@imnotyourfriendbuddy1883]

"I always thought the Yankees had something to do with it" -General George Pickett on the failure of the attack

[@philokevetch8691]

This narrative of history is truly inspiring. Thank you. We must not forget these battles and the men and women who fought them.

[@dosrios9517]

Unfortunately the bravery of individual human beings is being cancelled and history altered. One can admire and respect the integrity of any soldiers who bravely follow and exceed requirement of orders given. It doesn’t matter what looking through a historic lens about the cause being fought for means 150 years later.

[@mylesjordan9970]

Were the women you speak of, who made up part of Pickett’s charge, simply canceled from history?

[@efone3553]

Women? there were no women participating in the combat of that era. If it ever happened it was entirely by chance.

[@i.m.9918]

@@dosrios9517 Boy, are you wrong. A dog has violent courage. Moral courage is another thing altogether. When war is ‘so’ bloody and transformative, the PURPOSE for that war always matters more. When men fight to sell the babies of fellow men, to obliged others to do their labor for them, to peremptorily rape, beat, and define the future of other men, the importance of moral courage is even MORE important so as to prevent such agency being given to depravity again, reproducing yet more death. Those who care not about ‘why’ men fight merely fetishize war, diminishing the sacrifices being made and proscribing the very notion of ‘progress’. Boy… are you wrong.

[@salanzaldi4551]

Longstreet tried to warn Lee the charge wouldn't work but Lee wouldn't listen.

[@spencerme3486]

Longstreet saw what happened at Marye’s heights in Fredericksburg. He learned a valuable lesson from it that Lee apparently did not

[@troygoggans5495]

After the war had ended Longstreet met and spoke to Lee but for one time.

[@jaydubbyuh2292]

Long Street suggested a number of things which most any other commander would have not tolerated. Lee had dispatched Stewart to attack the Union position from the rear. Surprisingly an extraordinarily Stewart's attack was untimely and unsuccessful. Lee was hoping to split the Union center with an attack pincher movement of Long street's core and Jeb Stuart. Long Street was absolutely half-hearted about everything Lee ordered him to do after the first day's fighting. I have read German and other European commanders say that they would have had Long Street Court marshalled for his obvious foot dragging when he could not get his way. With all of Lee's successful maneuvers on the battlefield both tactical and strategic this was one that did not come together as he had planned. Anyone who understands the actual planning and implementation of something like a military action will know and understand just how much that can go wrong no matter how well laid the plans, and conversely sometimes things go very well in your favor without any planning and you have to make the most of both situations

[@scott37040]

Longstreet couldn't replace Stonewall Jackson as Lee's confidant. Had General Jackson been at Gettysburg, the tactics would have confounded the Union and the Confederates probably would have won! General Jackson was the tactician, not Lee.

[@robkunkel8833]

My first visit with this site. Love the use of the same photo throughout. It was a good one. You could see John Morgan as a sheriff. I love the detailed description of his regiment at the end. “Pride in accomplishment is hard to silence.” Rob Kunkel, St. Thomas VI 🌴

[@frednone]

The one thing that always gets ignored is Sixth Corp. It was largely unengaged in the battle and was 16,000 men strong and was sitting right in the middle behind the Union Line. The Union could have suffered one to one losses in Picket's Charge and the AoP could have just moved up Sixth Corp and they would have been as strong as at the beginning of the charge, or had they penetrated the line would have been in position to counterattack instantly.

[@cathyharrop3348]

probably true. as I understand it the AOP replaced the one battery silenced in the center of their line. if they had such ready reserves then Pickett's charge was probably futile.

[@fbcpraise]

Interesting, didn’t know that. Outnumbered and with poor position, the charge was pointless.

[@frednone]

@@fbcpraise Yeah, even if Stuart had managed to get his division behind the Union Right, he would have been slaughtered by the 6th. The South lost at Gettysburg when they didn't drop back on Cashtown after the first day.

[@thomascornell7562]

So General Meade had at least one fresh Corp to pursue the Army of Northern Virginia when they picked up and left..... actually could have extended the battle to a fourth day by attacking their position.... would have done more good than the cavalry charge after the Confederates were repulsed...... General Meade was the right man for the defense..... but still too cautious for offensive operations

[@frednone]

@@thomascornell7562 It also reached the field about the same time as Hood would have gotten into position to attack if he had been allowed to go around the Round Tops, so, "The way right is open," was an illusion too.

[@hyacinthlynch843]

Pickett never forgave Lee, and years later said, "That old man had my division slaughtered."

[@markh995]

He was immortalized (unfairly) as they guy who failed to win the war on July 3rd. Adding to why he and Lee had so much bad blood, in 1865, he was drunk on duty and partying the night the Yankees broke through his line and captured the Petersburg railroad, which forced Lee to abandon Richmond. When they were retreating from Richmond, Lee saw him and was heard saying to his aide, "Why is that man still in this army?" The Lost Causers more or less shifted the blame to Longstreet's performance on July 2nd. Still, Pickett's Charge is synonymous with gallantry and folly that in spite of everything, came so close to victory that its fingers brushed it.

[@robertcraig690]

The gentleman believed that if the attack had been made earlier the Union forces would not have been ready. It's my understanding that they were dug in and waiting. The previous evening it had been discussed by the Union commanders and all were in agreement that the next attack would be in the center. I believe no matter what time the attack was delivered it would have failed.

[@dennismoore7935]

i think it means they would still be broken up after the bombardment - seems like the attack was too long after the box barrage

[@donnievance1942]

I read long ago that a Confederate cavalry detachment was sent on a really wide flanking maneuver during the night before the charge. They were supposed to hit the rear of the Union line on the ridge just before Pickett began his advance. However, the cavalry group got lost on the country roads in the dark and were unable to carry out their mission. Pickett's charge could have been a very different affair with a cavalry force striking chaos into the Union ranks from behind. Raiding up and down the line, they could have forced the artillery groups to defend themselves and greatly diminished the rate of fire that was aimed at Picket's men. That's what I thought this video was about, and that was the reason I clicked on it. However, it was never mentioned, and I don't know if the story was true.

[@brianmacadam4793]

I walked the battlefield one week-end, the terrain of Pickett's charge was an offensive nightmare. I can't imagine ANYONE would have planned that assault. I walked the entire thing in late summer ( not particularly hot ) it seemed that the defence had all the advantages. Those that made to the wall would have been dehydrated, fatigued, and shocked by the violence that had been directed on them. Lee had let his calvary get away form the battle ( loosing and important force ) and was believed a single major win could force a negotiated peace; that was a folly given the devastation that had been dealt with on both sides.

[@solentbum]

And yet British Generals set their new army a similar task some 53 years later on the Somme, an attack up a steep slope on a hot July day against an enemy armed with Machine Guns. It seem generals across the whole world are lacking in fore thought.

[@brianmacadam4793]

@@solentbum I agree, except I would use the word "competence" instead of fore thought, .

[@solentbum]

@@brianmacadam4793 I was being polite. The term 'Military Intelligence' is descibed as the ultimate oxymoron

[@patrickgrippo]

@@solentbum military Unintelligence

[@leparfumdugrosboss4216]

​@@solentbumthe british had prepped with an intensive artillery barrage using explosive shells. I their mind there was no more German able to put up a fight in those trenches. They just didn't know their shells were of poor quality and the efficiency of trenches to protect soldiers from artillery. In a sense, they had taken their lesson from Pickett's charge, it just wasn't relevant anymore.

[@danielsprouls9458]

Deciding whether to attack early or to wait until your stronger later, meanwhile your enemy may be getting stronger, is a dilemma comanders have always faced. There is never one right answer, only a commander's best guess. War isn't a chess game where every man is ready and fully equipped at all times.

[@curious968]

Yeah, but central to the Confederate strategy, such as it was, was an artillery barrage before the assault. Until that finished and successfully at that, a charge was folly. I don't know what the earliest feasible attack moment was, but any charge that plays out before the Rebs' artillery was done was beyond madness. So, I doubt if an 8am charge was in the cards.

[@Retarmy1]

It is amazing to hear the words of a person who was actually there as comparing to history professor

[@georgeparris8293]

July 1863: Tactics of the customary assualts in the 1860s did not take advantage of darkness. Pickett's charge ( a walk sholder to sholder across a mile of open ground) should have begun about 0100 on the day of the battle....in the dark. Assuming it made any sense in the begining. There were many other flaws in the campaign. The use of Lee's artillery firing at a ridgeline (clump of trees) sent most ot the shells beyond the stonewall. The attack on the round top should have been the primary target earlier in the battle ...Lee declined Hood's (?) recommendation. Hesitation on the first day, poor use of scouting (not JEBS fault) etc. But I believe the entire campaign could have been planned differently. Instead of going into PA, I believe that Lee could simply have occupied "sugar loaf" mountain near Dickerson, MD and waited for the Union to attaks him (as at Fredericksburg). en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sugarloaf_Mountain_(Maryland). Rather than fight on the 3rd, Lee couold have retreated to Sugarloaf. Early's success late in the war (11-12 July 1864) was an indication of the possibilities. Lee's generaship was uninspired in this campaign and I have even suspected that he was ready to ensure defeat of the Confederacy by throwing away his troops....I know that is a horrible thing to say, but Picketts "charge" was suicidal....on a personal, tactical, strategic and political level.

[@k2991]

Absolutely...I agree and same here. . not to mention Pickett/Petigrew were charging uphill or incline on top of the points that You mentioned..... charging across a mile of open country....literally insane....I read that Longstreet was pissed and was not in favor. .....not to mention the Yankee line was such that they could rapidly concentrate thier line/fire in multiple positions... quickly strengthening there line wherever needed.

[@williampaz2092]

@@k2991It should be remembered that the Yankee Army of the Potomac had already decided that they were going to be attacked at the center of their line. Thus, they moved every single piece of artillery they could to that position and lined them up almost wheel hub to wheel hub. Furthermore, the Yankee 6th Corp - 16,000 strong - was placed directly behind the center of the Yankee line. Even if the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia HAD broken the Yankee Line, a virtual impossibility, the Yankee 6th Corp would have shattered them.

[@aaronfleming9426]

There are reasons assaults didn't take place at night. The lines invariably got horribly entangled and the attacks fell apart. Why on earth would Meade have attacked Lee if Lee was sitting on sugar loaf mountain? Lee wouldn't have been threatening anything. Meade could have simply maneuvered to cut Lee off from his line of supplies and starved him out or forced him out of that position. Meade may not have been brilliant, but as he proved at Gettysburg and Mine Run he was certainly no fool.

[@georgeparris8293]

@@aaronfleming9426 Sugarloaf Mt is in MD closer to DC than Gettysburg. IMHO, Meade could not have allowed Lee to occupy this position which threatened the communications (Railroad) between DC and the west. Apparently, Antietam proved that point....did you forget about that one? [BTW I have been on Harrison Island and crossed at Whites Ferry several times.] Jubal Anderson Early proved the vulnerability of DC and from Sugarloaf you do not need to cross the Monocacy River. Lee would have been much harder to trap in Maryland that being trapped in Pennsylvania. Sugarloaf Mt. looks much easier to sustain than Gettysburg and just as demanding of elimination. Of course, the idea of attacking at night would have been a gamble.... but as the reenactments suggest, the units were virtually shoulder to shoulder during the attack. And it was cooler at night, and I think half the distance could have been covered at a slow walk before the Union realized it was an all-out attack. Pure speculation as to the effect. The loading and aiming of cannons and muskets would have been much slower and less efficient in the dark...this would have partially cancelled the Unions superior fire power and made it more of a face-to-face battle with bayonets.

[@aaronfleming9426]

@@georgeparris8293 If Lee was sitting entrenched on a mountain he wouldn't have been a danger to D.C., and he could have been cut off. If he came out of his entrenchments to threaten DC, he wouldn't be able to recreate Fredericksburg. Also, Meade was a far better general than Burnside. Antietam was an absolutely winnable battle for any Union general not named McClellan. Lee's army in 1863 was much larger than at Antietam, but that very size is what required that he keep moving. Three or four days in enemy territory would exhaust the local area of food supplies and then Lee would have to move north, attack Meade, or go back to Virginia.

[@chestersleezer8821]

Yup, Pickett got it right when he said "I always thought the Yankees had something to do with it". Lee took what amounted to a division and a half worth of troops and pushed them right smack into a heavily defended position backed up with artillery. Oh and this was across a wide stretch of open ground as in over a mile stretch of open ground.

[@gstan471]

Fascinating! Had no idea they were so late starting. Always heard that Lee's failure to send troops to occupy the stony hillside before the battle was also a major factor and hope you'll comment about that some time in the future.

[@bomat761]

Unbeknownst to Morgan was the fact that Meade was already prepared for the assault at the middle the Rebels were to make, the night of day one… that attack was AKA Pickett’s charge.

[@actionjackson1stIDF]

Nice video, short and to the point. I have often wonder if Jackson had not been killed by friendly fire after the Battle of Chancellorsville how different the Battle of Gettysburg might have been.

[@alancoe1002]

Speculation like that can be endless. Another one is what if McClellan had sent the unused 5th Corps across the Middle Bridge at Antietam at the crisis point, when the confederates were stretched to the breaking point. Lee would have been swept into the Potomac. But Little Mac failed, as he did during the Penninsula Campaign, when only a few thousand troops opposed him. But Mac was good at training not fighting. And Lee kept him fooled on his numbers to an absurd degree.

[@lonniemonroe2714]

Me too.

[@joer1678]

It would have been totally different

[@curious968]

You know, a lot of made of Jackson's absence, but it actually sidles up to a significant point. By that point of the war, all those splendid confederate victories had a cost -- not just in raw men but in Generals. Jackson was the most famous and perhaps most important casualty, but he was by then but one of dozens of generals the south had lost. By then, they were missing not just Jackson, but who knows how many other Colonels and regimental commanders that, earlier in the war, were difference makers. You see a lot of talk about folks like Chamberlain on the Union Side of Gettysburg. Where were the Confederate counterparts? I submit that too many of them were already dead by mid 1863 and were never going to be replaced. So, it wasn't just Jackson's loss, but the loss of dozens of people like him and scores of other senior officers that were already, by then, sapping the ANV's effectiveness.

[@HankFinkle11]

Jackson, if given the same orders, would have failed as well.

[@Snuffy03]

Pickett's charge failed because Jackson was dead and Lee was left with the 2nd string.

[@ColinH1973]

Jackson fought an excellent defensive campaign all of the way up The Shenandoah Valley. The Pennsylvania Campaign was a different situation and was ill-conceived from the outset. Lee ignored very sound tactical advice from very competent officers due to his arrogance and self-belief.

[@TraderRobin]

I think a big part of the overall campaign failure, was the fact that both Robert E. Lee, AND General Longstreet, adamantly REFUSED to listen to ANY of the (valid) suggestions brought forth by their subordinate generals, on their first two days at Gettysburg. Had they gone around, and TAKEN the flanks (which the Union hadn't yet sufficiently fortified) by the second day, the battle likely would've ended FAR differently!

[@bkwms2112]

But that's what they tried to do on day 2 and were not successful. Lee thought the flanks were well defended so he decided to attack the middle.

[@Briselance]

@@bkwms2112 "But that's what they tried to do on day 2" Then they should have tried to listen to these valid suggestions from day one. I know this is very convenient to say today, but it might have made the difference for them then.

[@emmgeevideo]

Our host says that "rehashing" is a common practice after "any conflict". The World War II generation that experienced combat famously didn't discuss the war until well into the end of their lives. In my limited experience, it is the non-combatants who were chatty. My father-in-law served in England during WW II as an air traffic controller for the 9th Air Force. He didn't have any life-threatening experiences but had a very interesting time there. It was the first time he'd ever left a 50-mile radius from where he'd grown up. He came back to a blue-collar life and remained in that same 50-mile radius -- except for one reunion in Chicago of his comrades in the 1960s. He loved telling "war stories". There was no rehashing or "what if". Guys like this cavalryman kept all this to themselves. They just wanted to get back to normal life and tried to put the killing behind them.

[@alexandercluster3003]

The attack never stood a chance. Lee was full of himself and his ego got the better of him. His subordinates all knew it was completely futile. The day of frontal assaults were proven to be over in other battles yet he did it anyways. Anyone who has been to Gettysburg and walked the field will instantly know how insane it was.

[@georgeparris8293]

Any thought that Lee had come to the conclusion that he should end the war by losing? John Hunt Morgan actually was more successful, If you are going all in on one had of poker, pick a good hand.

[@aaronfleming9426]

@@georgeparris8293 No. Lee fought way too hard for a long time after Gettysburg to be trying to lose. Could trauma and despair have clouded his judgement? That seems more likely.

[@georgeparris8293]

@@aaronfleming9426 I have no objection to that analysis

[@lonnietoth5765]

At this point Lee was walking on water and you don't question a messiah ?

[@irishjw]

Not just Pickett's charge but I see it this way. What if there had been a day four? Lee's whole Army was on the field but having lost more than Mead were outnumbered two to one. Add to that Mead also had fresh units that had not been in combat yet and with more on the way.

[@johngaither9263]

Don't you love it when officers leave their lane and express opinions about things that in all likelihood, they were never even made privy to? A reporter asked for an opinion and was given one which he promptly printed without further investigation. The favorite quip from infantry about mounted troops was, "Did you ever see a dead cavalryman"?

[@richardlahan7068]

They were ordered to advance over a quarter mile of open ground to attack a strong Union line that was crossed fences they would have to climb over, under canister fire at long range and musket fire at shorter range. What could possibly go wrong?

[@williampinner1893]

Very interesting. Thank you for your research.

[@markpalmer7832]

I have been to Gettysburg many time....I was born and reared in WV.....when to College in Shepherdstown...Ill take his remembering of Pickethe

[@maxenielsen]

Col. Morgan’s concluding comment shows an interesting aspect of warfare of the era - a sense of gallantry.

[@lukebertrichardson7799]

Just a couple of thoughts for your research: 1. Alexander had a timetable for the barrage, not followed by Longstreet, 2. Alexander's barrage landed exactly where it was supposed to; it was an interdiction barrage, with the added benefit of wrecking Hancock's artillery, 3. Longstreet waited so long that Alexander was out of shells by the time the attack happened, 4. Longstreet held back a minimum of 3K troops Lee had chosen for the attack, and then almost sent them in (he was a warhorse, and could feel the adrenaline of success,) when the charge was cresting, but wisely saw it was to late. 5. The attack contained so new fangled ideas, that Lee's old war horse distrusted. He should have removed himself if he could not carry out the attack. Instead while the attack is going in, he was already making defensive adjustments with units supposed to be in the attack. 6. The failure rest on Lee's shoulders, yet the failure of execution rests firmly on Longstreet's head.

[@edwardcnnell2853]

One study I recall showed a failure in the Confederacy's logistics. Certainly a frontal attack that required to march at that distance under the cannon and guns of an opponent was in itself a poor decision. Plus the opponent had the high ground forcing them to fight up hill. Recognizing the poor position of their troops the Confederates fielded a large artillery barrage that was to suppress the Union fire as Pickett's troops advanced. The problem was the manufacturing of the Confederate cannon shell / ball fuses. This was not the fuse that fired the projectile but caused the shell to explode in the air over the heads of the enemy troops. The shrapnel would hit the infantry troops, who had no steel helmets, as well as the artillery men suppressing much of their fire power. The two sides used different types of timing fuses. The Union fuses were metal and screwed in to the shell / ball. Turing the fuse to a certain notch set the time for the shell to explode while in the air. The Confederate fuses were paper and inserted in to the shell / ball. The timing was done by cutting the fuse to the proper length as marked on a fuse measure. The fuse measures were all the same. But the fuses were made at three different factories and there was poor, or no, quality control on the overall production of the fuses. So the fuses burned at different rate. It is thought that 1/3 of the shells exploded harmlessly short of the Union lines. 1/3 exploded on impact with the ground were the shrapnel caused less damage. I have been in that location and the ground is very rocky. If the shell landed where the soil was deep enough they buried themselves and most of the shrapnel just flew harmlessly straight up. It was thought only one out of three shells were fully effective. Combined with the other shortcomings mentioned the shell fuses significantly added to the destruction of Pickett's troops. If the confederate had better quality control over the manufacture of the fuses the results may have been different. It would not be until about 90 years later that the proximity fuse was developed. Basically a crude, miniaturized radar in the fuse that detonated it when close to an aircraft. It was found that it also could be used as a very accurate air burst detonation over ground troops.

[@atgdcommish608]

Pickett's Charge failed because Custer stopped Jeb Stuart from supporting it. Custer is remembered for his devastating loss at the Little Big Horn, but he was one of the great heroes of the Civil War, winning all 11 major engagements he was in. Custer was so instrumental to the Union victory overall that Grant gave the Appomattox surrender table to Mrs. Custer, and Custer himself led the Union victory parade at the end of the war.

[@Briselance]

Jeb Stuart? Maybe. But what support could have compensated for the fact the the Rebs were charging over open ground, uphill, to a fortified position whose garrison had all the time needed to adjust their field guns, then their rifles while being out of the Confederates' own artillery? I don't get it.

[@christophersmith8316]

Cavalry was useless against infantry in the ACW. On the same field Farnsworth was ordered to attack some of the tired out units of Longstreets Corp near Devil's Den and got shot to pieces. If Custer wasn't there some of the reserve infantry would have shot hell out of Stuart and his horses.

[@johncaraway6781]

This. Read Lost Triumph by Tom Carhart

[@chriswilliams5982]

That’s absurd. The cause of Stuart’s delay was his desire to do another great ride around the Union army. The problem was the army was marching in the same direction he was riding. Of course the likely hood of a Calvary skirmish somewhere along the line of march was a possibility, but to claim Custer was the cause is preposterous. Jeb Stuart simply put his ego above the needs of Lee’s need for intelligence leaving him blind except a couple of Calvary regiments which is basically nothing. When he finally arrived on the night of the second day its one of the few accounts of Lee losing his temper. Stuart had managed to capture twenty supply wagons and made the statement to that effect to Lee who snapped “they are but a burden to me now”. Stuart then offered his resignation which Lee quickly rejected and chastised Stuart for making such an offer when he needed him so much. The idea that Custer was a big player in the overall victory is ridiculous. Read any of the great historians who wrote of the civil war and you’ll find few who even mention his name except the account at Appomattox where under a flag of truce he rode into confederate lines and confronted General Longstreet who told him to get his ass back to his own lines or he’d place him under arrest. Read John Gibbons biography, or grants, as well as grants chief of staff John Rawlins , or James Longstreet if you want to know what high ranking officers thought of Custer. All of them called him reckless, a self promoting dandy. Yes he had a few minor’s victories, and one well known charge that if you study was indeed a dangerous and reckless victory. Of course we know history proved exactly what an idiot he was when his reckless behavior got him and almost his entire command killed for his vain glory.

[@anghusmorgenholz1060]

A frontal assault on a dug in artillery position. Multiple walls and fences to climb over just to face near point blank cannon double loaded cannister shot. All because Lee was delusional enough to think that the respect they had for him and how little they wanted to disappoint old Bobby Lee would overcome any opposition. Nope.

[@glenmartin2437]

Thank you. Frontal charges across clear fields of fire are especially costly!! Price against the Federal fort in southern Missouri, for example. Dieppe WW2, Omaha Beach, WW2. Grant tended to avoid such frontal assaults as he improved as a general. If I recollect, only about half of the Confederate artillery rounds actually exploded, reducing Federal losses. Further, at this time, many Federal troops were armed with rifled muskets that had an effective range of 500 yards, a serious improvement over Confederate weapons. This series of battles is very complex! I have listened to US officers and sergeants discuss Gettysburg since grade school. I am seventy-six now. I am still learning. Thank you, again.

[@markrzepkowski2951]

Yes you are correct about most of this but most southerns also had rifled muskets mostly the 1853 British Enfield first seen at shilo…some southerns did carry 1842 Springfield which was smoothbore most notably the 1st Texas…northern soldiers mostly had the 1861 Springfield…rifled muskets could be accurate up to 500 yards or more…also you are correct about the artillery by porter Alexander which they could not see over the emmitsburg road most of it over shot still the largest artillery bombardment in the western hemisphere so many what ifs during this whole campaign on both sides

[@markpalmer7832]

Thank you for Morgan thoughts... sincerely

[@thomasconn6186]

Just goes to show that they had not figured it out, even years after the war. The answer is this: it is folly for infantry to advance across open ground (especially uphill) against an enemy entrenched or behind cover. They still had not figured that out even by the time of WW l. Back then they had this foolish belief that the enemy would cower and flee at the sight of an determined force marching towards them.

[@johnlibonati7807]

I believe the reason they believed the enemy would cower is because Napoleon was so effective. The difference is Napoleon was an artillery man and brilliant strategist and tactician. He set up his columns so they didn’t seem to lose men as the front ranks went down. This led less experienced enemies, who were already bludgeoned by artillery, to flee in terror.

[@jmsdeco]

Excellent video!

[@g.sheppard5270]

The Union center had been broken through by Wright's Georgia Brigade on the 2nd. Maybe Lee was thinking it could be done again.

[@johnfast5852]

Sad for all the people who died.

[@snotnosewilly99]

Lee was hoping that the Union Army would break and run....they didn't. This was a huge gamble by Lee, but it was his only hope. The only other option was just to leave the area and admit defeat without a major battle on the final day.

[@ralphtomlinson4520]

"Lee was hoping the Union Army would break and run". Even Lee's subordinates tried to tell him this wasn't the Army of the Potomac he was used to. McClellan was gone and even some of the subordinate generals had been replaced.

[@nickf2170]

People over look several important points. Lee was over extended by even being in Pa at all. He did not have the supply, terrain knowledge and local intelligence he normally had, and he knew this. He had to make a decisive blow to the Army of the Potomac, or risk destruction of his own army. Lee was accustomed to agressive moves, but without Stonewall Jackson to carry them out, he was in a worse place than he cared to acknowledge. Lee made a stubborn, if not a desperate decision to follow thru with the attack on the Union center on July 3rd. Combined with the many failures to carry out his orders, and a highly determined opposing force, the rest..... is history.

[@keithdmaust1854]

"I think that the North fought that war with one hand behind its back," said Foote. If the Confederacy ever had come close to winning on the battlefield, "the North simply would have brought that other arm out from behind its back. I don't think the South ever had a chance to win that war." - Historian Shelby Foote

[@rogerbrown-ci3ou]

Shelby right

[@TermiteUSA]

SHELBY WAS DA MAN!

[@aaronfleming9426]

In his book, Foote made that comment specifically about economics, and in a sense he was partly right: the Union had vast reservoirs of both industrial and agricultural production. And yet Foote was also badly mistaken: the Union treasury was nearly bankrupt and inflation was rising. More importantly, the voters were sick of war and, until the fall of Atlanta, Lincoln's chances of election were looking bad. Most importantly, recruiting was drying up and the draft was very unpopular.

[@keithdmaust1854]

@@aaronfleming9426 All excellent counter-points. Thanks for info ;-)

[@lexevo]

@@aaronfleming9426Well put. The South needed to know how to win the war. They would never be able to destroy the union armies or take Washington. But all they had to do was prolong the war. Lincoln would’ve probably lost the election. And that might have been a wrap. Even after the loss of Gettysburg and Vicksburg (Vicksburg being more devastating) the union had a hell of a time trying to close the war. Cold harbor didn’t work out all that well. If we think the same defensive campaign but without the Gettysburg losses. It would’ve been that much harder. Or if Lee send Longstreet to relieve Pemberton at Vicksburg. Which is not hind sight. Lee new very well of the situation. Not to mention just a few turns of luck could’ve vastly changed the outcome. Like Jackson not getting shot by his own men. Or Grant mortally wounded instead of Albert Johnson at Shiloh. As Grant had a couple close calls that battle. Many people just see manpower and supplies. But there is more to it then that.

[@alexkalish8288]

My great great grandfather was in the Va cavalry, I knew his son as a boy but have nothing from him in written form - not even a picture.

[@frankmiller95]

Your "great great grandfather's son," aka your great grandfather

[@Emanresuadeen]

The real question is why anyone thought it would work.

[@andrewward5891]

Lee started believing his press clippings about what a military genius he was. Lee was a great general but he looked like a genius compared to the idiots who were commanding The army of the Potomac. Grant wasn’t a great general either but he understood that he could use his manpower and materials advantage to wear Down Lee’s forces.

[@curious968]

@@andrewward5891 But, contrary to common belief, he didn't waste men willy-nilly. He just understood that high casualty rates were the new norm in warfare (which should have been obvious to all, but isn't to this day). It wasn't like he lost 2 or 3 men for every dead reb. What he did was give Lee no surcease. Meanwhile, the West was won (largely by Grant and certainly by his subordinates), a theater Lee never set foot in. Who else won big in two theaters in this war? Grant coordinated with the Navy at Vicksburg. Did Lee ever do that? Grant conducted a successful seige and that was with maybe his fifth serious plan to do so. Did Lee ever adjust like that? The fact is, Grant had a lot of predecessors and every union soldier dead in the east before Gettysburg/Meade was a wasted death. Grant's losses ended the war. Something nobody else did, not even the sainted Lee.

[@mallardcutter7209]

I went to Gettysburg and looked at the battlefield , Pickets charge was all uphill. And the confederate artillery was not effective due to it not being on target and falling short by 75-100 yards.

[@johndickinson8848]

Actually they overshot and caused havoc in the rear area.

[@stevegant7286]

The reason Pickett's Charge failed was because the North had the higher ground, and it was fortified to some extent with artillery pieces. Not to mention there was an obstacle in the form of a fence that the south had to get over. The fence ran across the whole battle line! Pickett's charge is what they call today a suicide mission! Stupid, stupid, stupid, and lead the Confederate army to ultimate defeat! What a waste of good infantry! It was almost as big of a blunder the British army made at The Battle of New Orleans during The War of 1812!

[@badguy5554]

A major question that I have had, regarding the MISSION of Jeb Stuart's Cavalry on the afternoon of July 3rd, has never been answered, at least for me. WAS their mission to hold their position to the east of the federal lines to ensure a "defeated" union army, following Pickett's charge, could not move east and north from their position, but rather flow south-east toward Washington D.C?...............OR................Was it to strike the union line from the rear, at the same time Pickett was attacking from the front? If the later was the case, I don't see how Lee's plan could have failed. If it was the former, than the outcome was predetermined to be a failure. As you know, Jeb Stuart's cavalry was halted, east of Gettysburg, by George Custer's Union cavalry, a situational outcome I feel would have been very doubtful if Jeb Stuart had been ordered to assist Pickett's charge of the Union lIne. This since Stuart was usually NOT a man to be deterred by a much smaller Union cavalry force, which, at the time, was Custer's. Any information on which alternative was actually ordered by Lee would be gratefully appreciated.

[@aaronfleming9426]

It doesn't matter. Stuart's actions were a hail mary at best. His troops and horses were exhausted, and the only way it could have worked was if the Union commanders had been total idiots who were doing nothing. But they were doing things, including using cavalry to screen their rear, as Custer was doing when he intercepted Stuart. It's not a matter of what kind of man Stuart was, it was a matter of the condition of his troops and the fact that he got intercepted by and adequate force. Even if Stuart HAD driven Custer from the field instead of vice versa, Meade would have been amply warned about his approach and a couple of brigades of infantry would have made short work of Stuart's tattered remnants.

[@LesHaskell]

Federal General John Gibbon wrote about his aide de camp Lt. Franklin Aretas Haskell that "I have always thought that to him, more than to any one man, are we indebted for the repulse of Lee's assault." That's the Frank Haskell who coined the phrase "Universe of Battle" that was used as the the title of one of the chapters in Ken Burns' "The Civil War". His quotes are voiced by Garrison Keillor in the documentary.

[@markseslstorytellerchannel3418]

Lee was going for the knockout blow before things turned against him and asked his men to do the impossible.

[@jamesmooney8933]

You, forget about J.E.B. Stuart. Gen. George Custer, Wisconsin slowed down Stuard, and caused Pickett charge to be a Slaughter.

[@aaronfleming9426]

Lee had been looking for a knockout blow for a year. By Gettysburg he should have realized he wasn't going to get a knockout and he needed to adjust his strategy.

[@markseslstorytellerchannel3418]

@@aaronfleming9426 But he came close a few times and won victories (not crushing ones, but still great victories against the odds) he probably knew Grant was going to take Vicksburg and the blockade was getting stronger every day. He must have calculated...this is my best chance. To his credit, he took the blame for the loss.

[@peaceraybob]

20/20 hindsight, relying as it does on actually knowing what happened after the event. I'll note that this fellow was a senior officer yet had no problems with mucking about for half the day, only complaining of this inactivity well afterwards.

[@Daneelro]

In other words, a typical former Confederate officer. What gets me most when reading the recollections of these guys is how they describe themselves (in the collective) in chivalric terms, when their actual conduct was much worse (say in this campaign, capturing black civilians to be sold as slaves).

[@wilsonle61]

Walking line abreast into dug-in infantry and artillery. What could go wrong?

[@thescarletandgrey2505]

Great looking jacket you’re wearing there. Mind if I ask the brand name?

[@curtgomes]

When I was a young my father had a saying about situations that shoulda-coulda been. "IF the dog hadn't stopped to take a shit he would have caught the rabbit"............

[@MrAbzu]

What happened to the theory that slower burning cannon ball fuses from South Carolina caused the Artillery barrage against the Union forces to be ineffective? They say that the cannon balls were exploding behind the lines and not harming the front lines as intended. The Virginia fuse plant had burned down which made faster burning fuses. So did cannonball fuses cut too long for the Artillery barrage to work properly set General Pickett up for failure?

[@christophersmith8316]

Fusing was a problem, but the main reason for overshoots was the trails of the guns digging in and firing high with time. The Rebels were ordered to fire fast, not to re-aim the guns each time with resulted in firing high.

[@manilajohn0182]

Lee's plan of attack on 3 July was sound enough. It was based on a version of the Napoleonic concept of the strategic battle. in which attacks on the enemy flanks (on 2 July) would draw local reserves from the center- and would be followed by an attack on the (supposedly) weakened center (on 3 July). The attack failed for two reasons. The first was that there were insufficient men in the attack columns. The second was that Meade- a West Point graduate- was aware of the concept of the strategic battle and anticipated it. He told Gibbon on the evening of 2 July that if Lee attacked on the 3rd, it would be on Gibbon's front (in the Union center. When Gibbon asked him why, Meade replied that as Lee had already made attacks on the flanks and had failed, any future Confederate attack would be against the Union center. When the attack came, Meade had approximately 20,000 men ready to converge on the attacking Confederates, and they repulsed the attack.

[@dennismatthews7060]

There are problems with this account. The 1st VA Cavalry was part of Fitzhugh Lee’s brigade which took part in JEB Stuart’s wayward ride around the Union army, and it arrived exhausted on the field at Gettysburg on the evening of the 2nd. From this point on, however, the story diverges from the facts as we know them, enough to make me wonder if the author of this account was even present on the field that day. He claims the regiment spent the morning replenishing ammunition and grooming the horses, and that “as far as I can learn” (note, he does not say as far as I know), the armies on both sides enjoyed a quiet respite. Simply not true. At 4:30 in the morning, the Union artillery on Powers Hill opened on the Confederates below Culp’s Hill to mark the start of seven hours of desperate and sustained fighting. At about 6AM, Stuart led his division, including Fitzhugh Lee’s brigade and the 1st VA, on their ride around the right flank of the Union army. Later that day, the 1st Virginia would take part in a charge against Custer’s Michigan regiments, which he doesn’t mention! And yet he laments “had the Calvary been in their saddle at daylight striking for the rear of the enemy’s position…the result might have been different”. When compared to the facts, this 1889 account comes across as no more than an uninformed apologetic for the lost cause written by someone who has usurped Captain Morgan’s identity.

[@lanemeyer9350]

I always thought the Yankees had something to do with it

[@dennisliamardell8906]

Not impressed with Lee’s tactics. Should have fought the war like Washington - hit , run, live to fight another day - Lee never should have quit.

[@presley881]

There were several mitigating factors for the debacle. JEB Stuarts failure to mount his attack on the rear of the union troops. The gigantic cannon bombardment of the union lines was ineffective because apparently the southern artillerymen weren't aware that the fuses for the exploding cannon balls were the slow burning ones because they came from the Chattanooga factory because the one at Richmond had been destroyed, resulting in the intense barrage being ineffective because the ordinance exploded after passing over the enemy lines. Also, there was a double split rail fence in the path of the rushing infantry on both sides of the Emmitsburg Rd. that somehow nobody noticed during the planning of the infantry advance. The majority of the casualties happened there as a result of the Confederate soldiers being slowed to a near halt trying to get over the fences, thereby becoming sitting ducks to yankee fire.

[@pflume1]

When we play D and D, this is what i believe is fireball formation. Same from artillery.

[@tupperlake100]

The intensive artillery barrage before Pickett's charge overshot the mark and inflected very little damage to Union forces. It did let Union forces know an attack was forthcoming. During WW 1 the allies used artillery barrages before frontal attacks. In one of the allies most successful attacks that DID NOT have an artillery barrage. This caught the Germans by surprise,

[@johnobrien5645]

In his outstanding account of Gettysburg, Allen Guelzo quotes Longstreet trying prevail upon Lee to cancel the charge: “General I know of no 15,000 men, however arrayed, who could take that position.”

[@TheDaywalkersDad]

You're stuck with the uniform of the day but I can't imagine running around with those beards in the middle of summer.

[@kk6aw]

What could possibly go wrong with charging across a mile of open field into set artillery and troops who’s intention was to kill you. While your return fire was sporadic and inaccurate except for your artillery and even that was overshooting the target.

[@Valicroix]

I'm pretty sure the federal position was already fortified by the morning of the third. Meade began reinforcing the center with additional troops and artillery during the night because he had predicted that was where Lee would strike.

[@christophersmith8316]

It was behind some low stone walls and some sketchy breastworks of wood. Nothing substantial compared to the '64 campaign.

[@jamesmooney8933]

Pickett's Charge failed for three reasons. First J.E.B. Stuart's Calvary failed to take out the Union Cannons. Second the Union Cannons were hot, and the Union commander stopped the steady firing of the Cannons. The third reason, Lee took the cease of the Cannon as Stuart's Calvary had knocked out the bank of Union Cannon.

[@johngaither9263]

Where and how would Stuart have taken approximately 130 Union cannons? Why did you fail to include that crossing 1 1/2 mile of open ground in full view and line of fire of 2/3 of the Army of the Potomac was an ill-conceived idea fraught with disaster? With no follow on support if it had breached the Union line.

[@jamesmooney8933]

@@johngaither9263 First of all, it was Robert E. Lee's plan not mine. The Union Cannons were pointed in the wrong direction because Stuart would be attacked from the rear on horse back. The artillery units are not armed with rifles. Stuart Calvery were good. The Union Cannons would be useless because it would have taken too long to turn the Cannons around, and even if the did the Calvary would have over run the Cannons. Don't forget that Pickett Charge would be hit the Cannons from the front. We will never know, because Custard stopped Stuart. I say this to counter the popular argument that Pickett's Charge was a blunder by Lee. The idea of a rear pincher attack was done at Waterloo by Wellington. It bothers me the Custard never gets credit for stopping Stuart. Actually Custard's orders were not to attack Stuart, but instead to go into Gettysburg. It was actually Custard dumb luck that changed the course of the battle. I do think that Stuart would have knocked out the Union Cannons from the rear.

[@jamesmooney8933]

@@johngaither9263 Concerning the 1 1/2 mi. march of Pickett Charge. Both Stuart and Pickett would be attacking the Union Cannons. There was no Union infantry protecting the Union Cannons. Once the Union Cannons were over run, then the Southern soldiers could turn the Cannons on the Union positions. You have to remember those Cannons were on high ground, and could be turned against the Union Army. My argument is that Lee was using the tactics that Wellington, which worked at Waterloo. I think that Lee's taking the Army of Northern Virginia was a mistake. The Confederacy strategy was to have a major victory, in order to get European support. Similar to the way the Washington won the Revolutionary War. The South didn't realize that the British could get cotton from India, or Egypt, without going to war. The South wanted a negotiated peace, but that was lost when Lincoln was reelected. Sherman's March to the Sea put an end to the war.

[@aaronfleming9426]

@@jamesmooney8933 A couple of thoughts: 1. Custer gets credit for stopping Stuart, but it was a minor action, so it's not mentioned as often as other actions in the battle. 2. It was a minor action because cavalry were almost never effective shock troops in the Civil War. They were used for skirmishing, scouting, screening, and occasionally as light infantry as Buford did the first day of Gettysburg. But there isn't a single episode in the whole war of a mass cavalry attack overwhelming an infantry position. 3. Building on #2, Stuart's move was never going to work, even if he had defeated Custer. Meade would have been warned and just a couple of brigades of infantry would have been able to easily keep Stuart away from the cannons. 4. You're right that the Confederate strategy was to have a major victory in order to get European support like Washington did in the Revolutionary war, but Lee forgot that Washington didn't get his major victory by going on the offensive. In fact, in the Revolution, the one American invasion of Canada was an absolute disaster. The Americans turned the tide at Saratoga, a battle where the British penetrated deep into New York where they were stopped, cut off, surrounded, and then forced by starvation to surrender. Lee never learned that lesson.

[@jamesmooney8933]

@@aaronfleming9426 You are assuming that Mead would have gotten warnings of Stewart's Calvary. The clash may have been a minor, but it did stop Stewart. Also why was Custard rank a General at the end of the Civil War. Also Custard disobeyed order by attack Stewart. Stewart swung wide around Gettysburg, and then came by south behind the Union lines. The reason Lee order Pickett to charge up hill into the Union Gun Battery is because the Cannons were over heated. Lee interpreted the stopping of the Cannons as being Stewart attacking from the rear of the Gun Battery. If Stewart hadn't been engaged by Custard, then Stewart would have attacked the gun battery from behind on horse back. Stewart would have knocked out the gun Battery. Pickett's men would have charged and backed Stewart's Calvary. If my version is not true, the why did Lee send Pickett Charge up a hill to take a gun Battery. It was suicidal. Lee didn't have the men to waste on a suicidal charge. The Confederacy needed a big victory in order to get backing from England or France. But that backing was never going to come, because Europe was getting Cotton from Egypt and India. The Suez Canal was in the process of being completed in 1869. Some the Confederacy Grand Plan of getting European support was never going to happen. Why would a European power ever want to get involved in a Civil War across the Atlantic? For Cotton which could be cheaply bought in India or Egypt.

[@swgeek4310]

As a "arm chair general" and studying the ground it was pretty much failed from the start. The cannonade was not as effective as it need to be. The ground, over a mile, does offer some low spots with cover (believe it or not) however, you hit a road with a fence which slows momentum further. That spot also opened you right up to direct cannon fire as well as the infantry guns. In Lees defense, even though it was open ground he had to of known that his men would not be under infantry fire for much of the charge and again was hedging his bets on silencing and/or weakening the federal cannons. I believe Lee really felt that confident about his commanders and troops and MAYBE a little bit of arrogance but I do not think that lead him to make the move.

[@Daneelro]

Lee could not have foreseen that smoke would hide the failure of the artillery barrage and that the Union would be shrewd enough to feign their cannons being taken out. He could also not have foreseen that Meade predicted his move a day earlier and thus the Union was well-prepared even by the originally planned time of Pickett's Charge. But he could have waited a few minutes for the smoke to clear, and he could have known about the Union reserves that would have crushed his forces even if by some miracle the charge succeeded.

[@Frankie5Angels150]

Lee lost that day because JEB Stuart, the “eyes and ears of this army,” was kept from reporting back to Lee the presence of Union reinforcements East of Cemetery Ridge. The First Michigan Cavalry, under newly minted Brigadier General George Armstrong Custer stopped him at every attempt. That’s why.

[@JoseFernandez-qt8hm]

timing is always problem in executions of plans... Clausewitz calls it friction.....

[@louisinjoliet8546]

Correct me if I am wrong since it was not mentioned in the video, but wasn't Pickett's Charge launched after the largest artillery barrage between two forces in the US ever (before or since)? I don't know where this "morning attack" was going to come from since the Union forces still had enough artillery to use on Pickett's Charge even after that historic barrage. Say what you will about the wisdom of Pickett's Charge, but a morning attack would not be the solution.

[@christophersmith8316]

There was planned a morning attack on the northeast end of the line, but the Union XII corps got in and attacked first and reoccupied the breastworks that had been partly occupied. After that there was no chance on that front, and plenty of reserves at all parts of the line.

[@geek49203]

I guess I'm trying to see how, after that first day, Lee had any hope of achieving his objective of defeating the Union and forcing a Union surrender? The Union was finally on strong ground, devoid of plans and leadership of idiot top Generals, with greater numbers and a fast line to move more supplies. Union was on its home grounds, where they had things like maps (unlike Virginia?), and were defending their own Capitol -- when meant that every soldier in the Army of the Potomac would've been on the lines if subsequent battles had taken place. This was not the battle Lee wanted or needed, and Lee was trying to make the best of his fate by (essentially) fighting a reversed Fredericksburg.

[@larryhutchens7593]

Here is a comment by a highly decorated US Army soldier, Col. David Hackworth: Hey diddle diddle straight up the middle, isn't there a more sane way to do this. Methods of warfare during the civil war hadn't changed much since the days of knights in armor. March in tight formation across a mile wide open space, let the enemy pick off a lot of the infantry with cannon shot then when they are within range pick off what's left with musket & rifle fire from behind a protective barrier. Great plan there Pickett. The south's plantation economy had created a social system similar to the bloodline hierarchy in England. The second, third, or fourth inheritor of a large plantation did not necessarily have the smarts to be a great military leader. I will admit that I have no knowledge of Picketts background but were not most of the south's military leaders from the upper class? Who was in charge of the forces opposed to Pickett? What was his background? Could it be possible that the forces of democracy overwhelmed the forces of the aristocracy?

[@richardw3470]

Well, a number of the Union commanders were political appointees by their state's governors or bought their officerships in one way or another. A lot of officers on both sides attended West Point, VMI, and other military schools which leaned heavily on teaching engineering, ancient history wars - great classical educations. And, some officers were still elected by their men til they got adopted by the regular army. Burnside and Lee forgot the lessons the colonial riflemen taught the red coats' elbow to elbow lines but it continued in to WW I, and heck, it was still being done in WW II w/troops walking beside tanks. The opening scenes of Gone With the Wind probably happened on both sides; cocky, self-assured young idiots already heroes after they win the war. (I knew some fellows who after watching To Hell And Back quit school and enlisted - we weren't even at war.) Democracy over aristocracy, no, I think eventually it would be the North had the factories and the men to replace the fallen killed by the incompetent commanders they also had.

[@TheLAGopher]

@@richardw3470 Did you mean "Sgt York" instead of "To Hell And Back"? It has been said that the aristocratic society of the south led to it elite youth into military careers,while the elite youth of the north tended to go into commercial pursuits such as banking,shipping,rail roads, and heavy industries such as mining and manufacturing. There were still plenty of northern elites who did go into the military,but there were also plenty of what would be seen as middle and working class guys such as Grant and Sherman who struggled in the real world but would thrive in the meritocracy of a war time army.

[@bkwms2112]

Ask yourself this-where would you rather be? Behind the stone wall or walking in the open field?

[@bluestarcesium]

The southern Infantry had been marching continuously to arrive at Gettysburg and they needed rest to run across the battlefield at Gettysburg. General Lee had to have a victory at Gettysburg. Some of the troops had just arrived at Gettysburg late on July 3, and they did need rest. General Lee should have tried to move around the Union left flank. The Union had reinforced their right flank, and the center. The left flank attack would cut the supply line if successful, and it would force the Union forces to attack.

[@tommyl3207]

Lee's plan imo was very much like going 5-wide in the NFL and then running Inside Zone out of it. He spread the Union Line as thin as he could. Then marched straight at it but at least minute had Pickett veer Left to concentrate the assault on what Lee thought would be a Union line stretched too thin. But the Union Line held like it was Jerome Brown and Reggie White. They were never pushed backwards. Ever.

[@bobbypowell10]

I tend to agree with you. The center of the Yankee line was not strong in the early morning. The lateness of the charge as well as the bombardment of the center gave them time to reinforce the center. Even then, their lines were briefly broken until additional Yankee reinforcements counterattacked. The slowness that Lee's Corps commanders executed his orders during Gettysburg cost the South that battle. The same thing happened on the 2nd day with Longstreet also. Longstreet was a cautious general. Not saying he wasn't good but he preferred defense and counterattacking. The combination of him and Jackson as corps commanders was ideal for Lee, cause Longstreet and Jackson were opposite in philosophy, and Lee and Jackson were also more of the same mindset. So Lee could attack with Jackson or defend with Longstreet. One of Lee's flaws is he gave a lot of latitude to his generals in the execution of his orders. With Jackson, they understood each other and that worked. With the others (Longstreet, Ewell, Hill) ... not so much so.

[@williamcunningham4946]

Do you do any of these videos on events of the American Revolution?

[@Glicksman1]

"Cannon to right of them, Cannon to left of them, Cannon in front of them Volleyed and thundered; Stormed at with shot and shell, Boldly they rode and well, Into the jaws of Death, Into the mouth of hell..." From a famous poem about another failed charge that never should have been ordered. That might be why it failed, you think?

[@michaelvoisey8458]

But they got to the guns slaughtered the gunners engaged the Russian cavalry and most of them got back and the officer who gave them the Generals order directed the brigade to the wrong valley but in both charges brave men ordered charge to by idiots

[@Glicksman1]

@@michaelvoisey8458 Well, we agree that both of these charges were erroneously ordered, which is what I wrote. Do you really want to debate the senseless losses of the Light Brigade during the Battle at Balaklava - now? For those who are not familiar with the famous British cavalry charge on 25 October 1854, now considered to be cautionary military trivia, it was part of a smaller series of actions in the Battle of Balaklava during the Siege of Sevastopol, which took place during the Crimean War (1854-56) between the Ottoman (Turkish) and the Imperial Russian Empires. Britain and France, allies of the Ottoman Empire, wished to suppress the Russian Empire's advances into what were traditionally considered to be Ottoman European lands. It was during the Battle of Balaklava that one of military history’s most famous acts of battlefield bravery, “The Thin Red Line”, and one of military history’s most infamous blunders, “The Charge of the Light Brigade”, took place. The famous "Light Brigade" was a British Cavalry Unit made up of many smaller units, approximately 665-670 men in all, lightly armed with weapons intended for hand-to-hand horseback skirmishing and reconnaissance rather than for fighting heavily armed troops in major battles. The Brigade’s unarmoured men rode light, fast, unarmoured horses, and they were not equipped with artillery or firearms, but only with sabers and lances. Orders were confusingly delivered which were mistakenly interpreted to direct the Light Brigade, reportedly now only 607 men on account of illness and other reasons, to attack dozens of well-entrenched Russian artillery batteries. These Russian batteries provided both forward and enfilading fire (from each side) from elevated ground positions located in a narrow valley on the Balaklava Heights. (This is similar to the elevated, left and right flank, and forward artillery that Lee’s army faced at Gettysburg.) Light Brigades were not trained, equipped nor intended to take and hold such a formidable artillery position. However, when a messenger (Captain Louis Nolan) confusingly delivered an order from headquarters to Major General James Brudenell, 7th Earl of Cardigan, the Light Brigade’s commander, he thought that the Brigade had been ordered to take the Russian positions in the valley, and he led the Brigade to do so. While the valiant Light Brigade did manage by sheer guts and bravery to get to the end of the valley, and inflicted damage and casualties amongst the Russian forces there, it could not hold that position and had to quickly retreat out of the valley under the same withering fire as it had taken when it had charged into it. (This too, is similar to what happened to Lee's army when it retreated after the failed, so-called "Pickett's' Charge".) Of the 607 men thought to have participated in the cavalry charge (sources vary), 271 became casualties: 110 killed, 129 wounded, plus another 32 wounded and taken prisoner. Additionally, 375 horses were killed. After the charge and retreat, the Light Brigade was no longer a viable fighting unit. Accordingly, the charge was for naught, the men killed and wounded were for naught, and the charge was later judged to have been a great blunder at the useless cost of a lot of very brave me, and a lot of fine horses. The foolish, unnecessary loss of the Light Brigade weakened British and Allied forces in the area and generally lowered overall troop morale. The larger Battle of Balaklava was a Russian victory. Russian soldiers who were present and who had witnessed the British charge were later interviewed and said that it had been a senseless slaughter of the British men, and that they felt sorry for them. Some said that they thought that the British cavalrymen had to be drunk to have ridden into that deadly valley under those horrific circumstances. BTW, the 1938 Errol Flynn, Olivia de Havilland film about this subject, while visually rousing and spectacular, is virtually complete fiction.

[@oregonpatriot1570]

Anyone with a little military knowledge and common sense can tell you why Pickett's charge failed. The '3-1 rule' states that an attacking force should have a 3 to 1 advantage over a defending force in order to succeed. _But that was only part of it._ The north had more rifled weapons, while the south had mostly smooth bore weapons, extending the accuracy and range of the north. (Rifles and canon) The line of northerners was able to pick off southern soldiers as they advanced before the southern forces could accurately return fire. (and lets not forget that accuracy and loading is greatly reduced when walking). The north also had the advantage of reserves behind the line of shooters. These 'loaders' could reload the single shot rifles after being fired and pass them back to the front. Depending on the number of re-loaders and weapons available, this could increase the number of _'Minié'_ (rifled) slugs drastically. Rather than 1 or 2 shots per minute, the rate of fire could be doubled or even tripled. With all these advantages Pickett's ranks were devastated by the time they closed within 100 yards. I believe that general Lee would have never given the order to charge if he had not been so successful in previous engagements. Even when faced with defeat, Lee always seemed to find a way to win the day over the last two years. Had he not? He likely would have gathered his remaining forces and retreated to fight another day. Longstreet knew better throughout the battle of Gettysburg, and tried to convince general Lee several times. But Lee couldn't grasp even the possibility of failure.

[@christophersmith8316]

At this point in mid-war the differences in rifled vs smoothbore were not relevant. A few units had smoothbores on each side, the rest were rifled. Smuggled imports and captures had armed up the Rebels just fine.

[@nuancolar7304]

My opinion is that it was a very uncharacteristic tactical departure by Gen. Lee to order such a frontal attack, uphill, across open ground. Prior to Gettysburg, Lee excelled at taking a smaller force and defeating a larger force but he did it with misdirection, flanking movements, etc. If Lee had a much larger force to make that assault at Gettysburg, maybe the lines would have broken, collapsing the Union front. But as it was, it was ill-fated from the start.

[@mortsims]

if you line up and walk directly into cannon fire what do you expect.

[@barryervin8536]

"Virginia cavalryman says Pickett's Charge might have been more successful if participants had been on horses...."

[@jamesmooney8933]

The Cannons would have cut down the horse. Lee had sent Stuart's Calvary around the battle field to attack the union Cannons from the rare. Gen. George Armstrong Custer's Wisconsin Calvary stopped him.

[@smc1942]

Yes this attack should NEVER have happened. What gets ignored is the fact Lee was sick during the campaign. He was already showing signs of the heart disease that would kill him in 1870. He was running fevers, having chest pains, etc. He had collapsed once due to the heat. It was mid summer of a hot year. Lots of men on both sides collapsed from Heat Exhaustion. That didn't help. Lee tried to hide his problems, but they were well known in the Army of Northern Virginia. I've always felt Longstreet should have taken Lee aside, and spoke privately with him. Laid it out in detail. He didn't do this. He was very much not himself in this campaign either. The truth was, Lee saw how close they were to breaking the Army of the Potomac on the first and second day. It was SO close! He was angry his new Corp Commanders Ewell and A.P. Hill had not pushed, like Jackson before them. Both had been good division commanders under Jackson! Lee expected them to show his aggressive actions. Both had been very aggressive as division commanders! But when Ewell lost a leg, he lost some of his drive with it. A.P. Hill became more cautious in Corp Command. He also became more anxious, and was often sick himself from the stress. He may well have been suffering from what we know as PTSD after two years of savage warfare. Having come so close on July 1 & 2, Lee sought to split the AoP in two by sheer will. While he thought he had 15,000+ men on hand to do so, we know now he had just over 12,000 effectives. Longstreet did warn Lee no 15,000 men on Earth could cross that ground, and break that line. After two days of hard fighting, Meade still had over 90,000 effectives and 200+ cannon. More than a match for the troops Lee selected. Even without holding the superior position on a hot July afternoon. Lee made the same mistake he made the year before at Malvern Hill. In his sickness, he didn't see it until it was too late. He took full responsibility for the failure. Even tried to resign for it. One of the great "What ifs" of history is, what if Stonewall Jackson had lived. Most focus on what he would have done on the first or second day of the battle. More important than that to me is, Jackson had a special place in Lee's confidence. Lee trusted him more than anyone else, including Longstreet, but he did become Lee's most trusted lieutenant afterwards. Point is, had Jackson been there, and told Lee what Longstreet did on the third day, and Hood had the day before, there is a good chance Lee would have listened to him. Especially using the tried and true Checking and Flanking manuver! With the AoP dug in along Cemetery Ridge, there is NO WAY Jackson would have gone for a head-on assualt. Jackson ALWAYS went for the flank. He would have pushed Lee to, use Hood's words, "slide around to the right, and roll them up." Or to leave Gettysburg altogether, manuver around Meade, and draw them into attacking, as Longstreet hoped to do. Regardless, Jackson would have opposed the frontal assualt, and Lee would have listened to him. As MANY Southern Officers said that Summer, _"...but Jackson is not here."_ Ewell himself said, _"It took a lot of mistakes to lose a battle like Gettysburg, and I myself made most of them."_ Another General said of another battle fifty years before, _"It was a damn near thing."_ The same was true of Gettysburg the first two days.

[@Daneelro]

LOL? Lee came nowhere close to victory on Day 1 & 2. Contrary to claims by Lost Causers, there was no chance to take Culp's Hill in the evening on Day 1, because unbeknownst to the Confederate leadership, the Union already made defensive preparations.

[@scottjustice3730]

❤

[@JefferyHagen]

General Douglas MacArthur said, the history of failure can almost always be summed up in two words: Too late.

[@davidtirschman6288]

Thank you for your video. Having thr opinion of a cavalry commander no where near what was going on at thr charge gives no real additional information. He was intitled to his opinion and clearly no engaged in more than taking proper care of their mounts.

[@JohnDouros]

Didn't Lee assign JEB Stuart to come around and attack the Union rear? Due to capturing a Union supply train, Stuart's force of 5,000 resorted to looting which delayed his advance. And then had the misfortune to run into Custer and his Wolverines. After 3 frontal assaults of which Custer led each time, Stuart, who wasn't in top form at Gettysburg, turned and retreated believing he had run into a much larger force. An interesting side note, the numbers that Custer led and faced almost match that of the Little Bighorn. On you Wolverines!

[@brooklynbummer]

He was half right, the confederate Calvary was attacking towards the Union rear but the union Calvary , led by Custer, stopped them.

[@derikuk2967]

So, lack of surprise and failure to employ combined arms.

[@bryanhoffman9255]

Need to find out what is causing that clicking noise

[@shaunsteele4968]

I shouldn't need to tell a Virginia calvaryman it was Lee's charge. Picketts orders.

[@lovebug5439]

Longstreet's corps artillery chief, Col. Edward Porter Alexander was in charge of driving the Union off but, the artillery overshot way too much. Pickett's charge had no chance because of this.

[@robertrock8778]

Without smoke-less powder Alexander had little idea how effective his fire was or what adjustments needed to be made.

[@pimpompoom93726]

Lee was hoping the flank attacks on the previous two days had weakened the Union Center, which they had. But, Lee didn't know that the top of Cemetary Ridge was criss-crossed with roads/paths which allowed the separated Union detachments to quickly move around and reinforce the weak points. When Meade saw the Confederate preparations for a frontal assault in the Center, he quickly reinforced it by drawing in units from the flanks. The long time it took for the Confederates to concentrate their forces and then advance forward doomed them. HAD Jeb Stuart reconnoitered the area around Gettysburg more carefully in the days before the battle, he would have been able to advise Lee that a frontal assault had little chance of succeeding.

[@dw_xenophon366]

He must have fought at East Cavalry Field with Stuart on the 3rd.

[@fordprefect5304]

Sounds like he tried to impersonate Napoleon at Waterloo