Anastasija Filipović, Aleksandar Drašković - The Cartesian Shift: Redefining Passions

The Cartesian Shift: Redefining Passions from Medieval to Contemporary Perspectives
Our aim is to explore the novelties that Descartes’ theory of passions brings to emotion theory. First, we contrast Descartes’ passion theory with the medieval understanding of passions, influenced by Christian tradition. We then argue that the contemporary enactive theory of emotions can be traced back to Descartes’ ideas on sensations and the unity of mind and body. By analyzing the passion of sorrow, we show how Descartes’ theory transformed our understanding of passions and influenced contemporary affective science. The medieval theories of passions views the body-soul relationship through a value-laden lens. Thomas Aquinas posited that the soul, being nobler, is divided from the corruptible body. Passions typically unite body and soul, material with immaterial. Augustine claimed most passions corrupt the soul, with rare exceptions like the sorrow of separation from God. Gregory of Nyssa and.John Damascus considered
sorrow, especially the depressing kind, inherently evil, believing it depresses the soul and leads to sin. In contrast, Descartes’ view of the mind-body relationship is not value-laden. He acknowledges the body's role in the passion process, suggesting passions should be understood similarly to sense perception. Descartes asserts that passions are direct perceptions of the bodily landscape, relational in nature, and explained by interactions between bodily motions and the soul. He does not classify sorrow as inherently good or evil but sees it as a natural bodily experience that can be useful or harmful based on its influence on beneficial thoughts. In sorrow, the pulse may feel weak and slow, with sensations like “tight bonds” around the heart and cold spreading through the body. Descartes' theory of passions marks a shift from the scholastic view of an incorporeal mind to the modern concept of an embodied mind, impacting affective science. We identify two key similarities between Descartes’ passion theory and the enactive theory of emotions: both assume the active role of the subject in shaping their experience and suggest our interactions with the world are mediated by embodied appraisal. By comparing the medieval and Descartes’ understanding of sorrow, we demonstrate how Descartes’ theory reshaped our comprehension of passions and contributed to contemporary affective science, bridging historical and modern theories.
Anastasija Filipović (Institute for Philosophy, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade)
Aleksandar Drašković (Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade)

[@AndreaChristofidou]

It is so refreshing to hear a talk (or read a paper) which offers such a positive understanding of Descartes’ philosophy. Of course, as you might be aware, for Descartes the mind is really distinct from body, that is, it is metaphysical distinct in its nature, but not separate from the body. Real distinction implies separability, a logical possibility (unfortunately missed by most of his critics), not actual separation. Furthermore, the unity of mind and the body is not the result of their interaction; rather, their interaction presupposes their substantial union, and without it we wouldn’t be able to feel pain or any other passions or emotions (even if there were causal interaction). Regarding the first question from the audience, Descartes made it clear that he was not concerned with theology in this philosophical enquiries; he also made it clear a number of times that he did not have any arguments to demonstrate the immortality of the mind. See, for example, the Synopsis to the Meditations. See also, his reply to Mersenne, that it is possible that when the body perishes the mind comes to an end too. (Second Set of Replies AT VII 153) I very much enjoyed your presentation. Best wishes, Andrea Christofidou