"Arnhem" by Antony Beevor Book Review

[@TheImperatorKnight]

*Selected Bibliography/Sources* Brereton, L. “The Brereton Diaries: The War in the Air in the Pacific, Middle East and Europe, 3 October 1941-8 May 1945.” Kindle, 2014. Frost, J. “A Drop Too Many.” Kindle, 2009. Hastings, M. “Armageddon.” Pan Books, 2004. Robert J. “Kershaw, It Never Snows in September.” Ian Allan Publishing, 2007. Mead, R. “General Boy: The Life of Lieutenant General Sir Frederick Browning.” Kindle, 2010. Middlebrook, M. “Arnhem 1944: The Airborne Battle, 17-29 September.” 2009. Neillands, R. “The Battle for the Rhine 1944.” Kindle, 2014. Poulussen, R.G. “Lost at Nijmegen.” Kindle, 2011. Ryan, C. “A Bridge Too Far.” Kindle, 1974 Urquhart, R. “Arnhem.” Kindle, 1958. Sosabowski, S. “Freely I Served.” Kindle, 1982. *Links* My “REAL Operation Market Garden” documentary kzbin.info/www/bejne/rIW4dGpvpJl-o8U “The BAD BOY of Operation Market Garden” A video on General 'Boy' Browning kzbin.info/www/bejne/eqfZaXqHfreMjLc The “Who to Blame? John Frost on Operation Market Garden's Failure” video kzbin.info/www/bejne/bXTCeaKDi81-d6s My discussion of Market Garden’s True Purpose using Monty vs Eisenhower’s Memoirs kzbin.info/www/bejne/nGicfJqHi7Fmg68 A video on Kampfgruppen where I talk about some of the Market Garden Kampfgruppen kzbin.info/www/bejne/sHy6lK2QoLZkaZI My Book review of “It Never Snows in September” kzbin.info/www/bejne/Y4O1lYp5rq2jfZo My “A Bridge Too Far Book Review” video kzbin.info/www/bejne/emfZdZ-YqLSeh6c Add me on Twitter @TIKhistory Thanks for watching, bye for now!

[@timsanders33]

So I just opened up my copy of Arnhem by R.E.Urquhart with W.Greatorex. It was originally purchase by my grand father and is a second edition. It must have been popular as both first and second edition were released in the same month. It's a good book. The really interesting thing is inside the book is a letter from Australia house bookshop, dated 28th July 1959 confirming that they've received my grand fathers order for the volumes Australia in the war of 39-45 that had been published and they would send him the next volume as soon as it was published in England. I've no idea why he put it in that book or when but it was probably 1959. Have you read professor John Erickson' s road to Stalingrad?

[@cookingonthecheapcheap6921]

Great video TIK.. Questions out of left field, who do you think had the better tactic to combat the Germans, Monty or Patton? just your opinion, no pressure. I'm just going over the justification for giving Monty the supplies instead of Patton. Have you written anything yourself?, you've got the right view on history that's for sure.

[@PrestigeSpartan]

David Irving is a holocaust denier, all his works have been totally discredited and offer nothing of value.

[@timbushell8640]

Excellent return of the review.

[@ottoheinrichwehmann2252]

How about : Arnhem 1944: The Airborne Battle by Martin Middlebrook ?

[@marinthecreator]

You should make this a new series, disputing people who may be in the wrong. This was very entertaining

[@TheImperatorKnight]

If you have any suggestions, let me know ;)

[@chemnitz6834]

TIK Paul Carell's and John Erickson's books on the Eastern Front?

[@fazole]

If you want to start WW3 (and likely receive an atomic style bombing yourself), you can start with the dropping of the atomic bomb on Japan.

[@oliverdriver3486]

James Walton If this is to challenge the traditional view that generals were right, soviets were primitive, winter lost Germany the war (etc.) I think this would be really interesting/enjoyable :)

[@martianemperor5137]

@@TheImperatorKnight Adam Zamoyski "Napoleon was not a military genius" please refute this.

[@allenatkins2263]

Gavin's misson was to take the bridge quickly, he failed in his primary job.

[@mgt2010fla]

Sorry, you are inaccurate! If you listen this this host's various posts, you will see why you are wrong! As to which author is better for the narrative, a couple of British commenters think only being there, aka Monty's side of important battles, really matter! No historian would agree with that sort of narrow view of battle, also known as the "fog of war"!

[@allenatkins2263]

@@mgt2010fla The entire reason for being there was to quickly gain control of the bridge. I guess I am too dense to follow your line of reasoning.

[@pauldavid34]

That’s correct. Gavin failed to take his objective.

[@thies_0801]

Could you please make a Video where you are playing the Guitarr. I saw it and i Wonder if you can play it ?

[@TheImperatorKnight]

Sure, if your comment gets 100 likes ;)

[@thies_0801]

That´s a challenge. ;D

[@morningstar9233]

Why not ask him for some tips on shelf building while at it? I see those in the background too. A little respect for the man's work?

[@greywhizzadventurer8535]

Come on people, we need this to happen. 100 likes for this comment please.

[@timbushell8640]

more history - screw the guitar ; ))))))

[@MM-nt4iz]

I would also recommend Middlebrook’s account of the actual Arnhem battle. His clear, concise and comprehensive narrative - drawing on interviews with Brits, Germans and Dutch - still reads very well and gives a good ‘feel’ for the experience of the battle. A pioneer of the general narrative laced with individual interview/ eyewitness accounts now so familiar in military history I think he is highly underrated and even his books from the Sixties and Seventies, e.g. The Somme, Convoy, Hamburg, are rewarding reads.

[@doc8178]

Whilst unfortunately I cannot recall his name I was lucky enough to meet the tankie who drove the 3rd tank to cross Nijmegen Bridge. He was a resident in The Royal Hospital Chelsea at the time we met and I asked him the famous tea drinking question. His answer is not repeatable but started with F and ended in ollocks. He told me he never witnessed any such incident with Capt. Carrington an American or a ‘Tommy Gun’. He did add that we were British soldiers and drank tea at any and every opportunity

[@TheDKCover]

definitely Gavin and browning who is to blame. The objective of the drop was to capture the bridge, not land and defend the heights. Gavin should know the importance of speed and surprise in an airborne assault and should have diverted resources to the bridge straight after touchdown. If Browning argued otherwise Gavin should have protested.

[@TheImperatorKnight]

Yes! Agreed

[@Wien1938]

Looking at the post-war record of the three US Army airborne generals, it's less than stellar. I wonder if they cultivated a hero-image of themselves after the war to promote themselves.

[@lordoforder]

No no, we have to stage a stalling action against an ENTIRE FIELD ARMY that is waiting in the middle of nowhere just for us.

[@TheDKCover]

Also intelligence confirming two refitting panzer divisions near Arnhem is ignored, but "hear, say" about 10 divisions near Nijmegen is taken seriously..

[@owenjones7517]

Even suggesting Gavin was responsible often triggers an angry knee-jerk reaction from some, regardless of if you may actually have a point.

[@dyejohn1905]

The main point of the operation was to take the bridges quickly, not going for the bridge immediately does seem to defeat the whole aim of market garden.

[@xaviershit9779]

I really am glad to see that, after receiving all the feedbacks you did and taking down a video, you made an other one, and a 45 minutes one. Not many creators recognize their faults, even less take the time to redo their work. Thanks very much for that, and thank you even more for opening my eyes on WW2. I'm quite young but passionate about the subject, and your videos made me realized how much I was willing to blindly believe any author that was a form of authority like Beevor. You're doing a great job, keep it up !

[@TheImperatorKnight]

Thank you Yohan! I wanted to make up for the failures last week. And I think I've certainly made a better-quality more-in-depth video overall compared to the others. I just wish this had been the video I'd put out in the first place. What you have to understand is that every author isn't going to be 100%. Some are better than others, but none are infallible. What you have to do is read several books from several different authors on the same subject to get a better view of it. This is why I suggest focusing on one or two battles and just getting as many books on them as you can. When you do that, you're able to see the contradictions, the problems and the mistakes. There's something to be said about specializing in history - reading too widely can leave you without a clear knowledge on any subject.

[@neilwilson5785]

Yes good work. Some of your, ahem, language choices in the previous vid were a bit off, TBH, but having said that , the central plank of your arguments regarding Gavin, seem pretty solid to me. Well done, I admire your persistence.

[@nanoduckling]

I think part of the issue is that in terms of personal bravery Gavin is just so impressive. His exploits in Operation Husky make for impressive reading, leading from the front and marching miles with a sprained ankle while conducting what amounted to guerrilla operations. His later work against segregation and the Vietnam war make him a pretty likable figure. No one wants it to be his fault. His personal bravery also makes it hard to accept that he made a mistake at Nijmegen, especially one born out of a over cautious attitude. I mean the man banged up his back during the jump for this very operation for Christ sake. That doesn't change the facts though, he and Browning assigned too low a priority to the bridge and this was pivotal in the failure of the operation.

[@TheImperatorKnight]

People assume that good generals don't make mistakes. Well, Rommel made mistakes. Manstein made mistakes. Monty made mistakes. Patton made mistakes. Everyone makes mistakes. This Nijmegen business was a mistake, and if Gavin is to blame, that doesn't make him a bad general. His combat record doesn't not paint him as a bad general, even with the Market Garden issue. He's a good general, who made a mistake. Now, Browning's a bit different...

[@nanoduckling]

Exactly, history is full of real people, not mythical figures who never screw up.

[@seth1422]

It’s worth seeing Gavin’s own thoughts on the operation. It is intriguing, frank and self-critical. www.508pir.org/voices/g/gavin_jm_03a.htm

[@DocTommy1972]

@@TheImperatorKnight well summed up. Although in this case the mistakes have tarnished Montgomery's reputation rather than the reputations of those who made them.

[@bigwoody4704]

Monty never appeared like the real Field Marshall Walter Model

[@seth1422]

I was reading a copy of the original *_pre_* drop orders to the 82nd Airborne, and it contains a passage that seems difficult to reconcile with the narrative that Browning and Gavin feared swarms of armor from the Reichswald. The intelligence assessment seems to suggest they were mostly frightened of large amounts of infantry in the town, and armor in Arnhem, but no mention is made of armor to the east of Nijmegen. I reproduce the relevant passage below. From the pre-drop written orders for the 508th PIR (82nd Airborne), dated September 13, 1944. Capitalization and emphasis are original: 1. _SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION_ There is no doubt that the enemy has made a remarkable recovery within the last few days, at any rate in the 21 Army Group area. Although we hold ANTWERP, his stand on the ALBERT Canal has enabled 25,000 men from 15 Army to escape North via the Dutch Islands. A captured document indicates that the degree of control exercised over the re-grouping and collecting of the apparently scattered remnants of a beaten army were little short of remarkable. Furthermore, the fighting capacity of the new Battle Groups formed front the remnants of the battered divisions seems unimpaired. In the operational area the remnants of a broken Panzer Division has been sent back to the area north of ARNHEM to rest and re-fit; this might produce some 50 tanks. We therefore reckon that the forces ROTTERDAM to the German frontier might comprise a regiment from 719 Division, a regiment from 347 Division, remnants of 70 Division, a few mobile Battalions from NE of ARNHEM and some scraped up static troops. Also it is reported there are some 4,000 of SS troops training in the area, quartered in barracks in NIJMEGEN. There seems little doubt that our operational area will contain a fair quota of Germans, and an estimate of a divisional strength in this area may not be far wide of the mark. Recent photos reveal that there is a sizable increase in flak. In the immediate NIJMEGEN area there are 10 light and 33 heavy guns. _end of quote_ First of all, it is striking how accurate this assessment was four days prior to the drop. How can we reconcile this with Gavin and Browning's fear of tanks from the east of Nijmegen? Link to the original. The intelligence assessment is at the top of page 3. cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p4013coll8/id/3373/rec/33

[@johnburns4017]

seth1422 _"First of all, it is striking how accurate this assessment was four days prior to the drop. How can we reconcile this with Gavin and Browning's fear of tanks from the east of Nijmegen?"_ It was Gavin who feared the mythical tanks not Browning. After Browning landed, later than Gavin, Gavin convinced Browning to hold back troops to guard against these _tanks,_ After all Gavin was on the ground before Browning, with Browning acting on the feedback of his staff/troops. Browning emphasized that the bridge was priority wanting it taken ASAP, actually giving Gavin the deadlines.

[@seth1422]

@@johnburns4017 I have now shown you this *_primary_* source where the "1000 tanks" are not mentioned. I have also shown you (in other threads) primary sources discussing how Gavin's command decisions were not consistent with a man fearing a massive counterattack. The *_only_* source I have ever heard of about the "1000 tanks" is Poulussen, who is definitely *_not_* a primary source and seems to be a weak reed in general. So what on Earth does this author, and you, have to stand on in this assertion? What is the evidence? As a refresher: we know that on the morning of D+1 Gavin was pushing on Nijmegen with the whole of the 508th. The fact he left only a single company to defend the northern DZs was part of the reason the regiment-strength (with mechanized support) German counter attack of that morning was so effective and the motivation for recalling the 508th to counterattack the DZs before the drops of that afternoon. Then that afternoon, once the attack was repulsed, Gavin made a push to take the 508th back into Nijmegen. At this point Browning overrules him. This is from the 82nd's operations log, a contemporaneous official document recorded by HQ staff: _begin quote_ At 1530, 18 September, General Gavin had a conference with General Browning at which General Browning asked for the plans for the ensuing 24 hours. General Gavin stated his plan for the night of 18-19 September was to seize the bridge North of Nijmegen using one battalion of the 504 and in conjunction with the 508 envelope the bridgehead from east and west. General browning approved the plan in general, but on giving more thought, in view of the situation with XXX Corps, he felt retention of the high ground South of Nijmegen was of greater importance, and directed that the primary mission should be to hold the high ground and retain its position west of the Maas-Waal Canal. Therefore, General Gavin assembled the regimental commanders and issued an order for the defense of position. _end quoted text_ These are *_primary_* sources. What have you got.

[@bigwoody4704]

@@seth1422 I had read the 1,000 tank theory actually started with British Intel as they may have been confusing this with either the Ardennes or the Hurtgen. Poulussen supposedly presented this in his rag 1st however. But considering the allied attacks on German armor the Reichswald would be a good place to conceal/camouflage sizable units of armor from air recon or attack - so at least it would have to be considered

[@walterm140]

@@johnburns4017 That's not true. "General Browning, whose British Airborne Corps would be located in the 82nds sector...as late as the afternoon of D plus 1 rejected a plan for a strong effort against the Nijmegen rail and highway bridges and instructed the 82nd to concentrate on holding the Greosbeek Heights instead." -- "Eisenhower's Lieutenants" p 310 by Russell Weigley

[@johnburns4017]

@@walterm140 _""General Browning, whose_ *_British Airborne Corps"_* Such an idiot wrote that!

[@kevinfright8195]

Things always go wrong, but not to take your objective when it is wide open to take.. is unforgivable

[@Paul9601EX]

I have read the book of Anthony Beevor ‘Arnhem’ . It’s a very interesting book, well written. To the point it becomes irritating. What I mean is the time after time reoccurring message how worried Gavin was for a large German attack from out the Reichswald. It’s simply too much. I must say, being Dutch myself, the maps presented in the book are also somewhat disappointing. Even in Beevor s book it s obvious that it was Gavin who choose to neglect his prime reason of being by Nijmegen. That is take the bridge and hold it. Therefore wasting precious time, if not being the main cause that lead to the disastrous defeat of the airborne troops in Arnhem. Even on a tactical level Gavin would have been better of by taking Nijmegen on the first place. If there where 1000 Panzers in the Reichswald, he would have been better of fighting them in a city then on the field. They would have been an ease target for the infantry between buildings. The airforce could have taken them out in the open fields when they moved out of the Reichswald.

[@nickdanger3802]

Map Nijmegen 17 September 1944 i.pinimg.com/736x/d1/fa/bb/d1fabb09d7b032564d98331e871cf633.jpg

[@nickdanger3802]

Map 1st AB plan Arnhem www.pegasusarchive.org/arnhem/Photos/Map1ParaPlan.gif

[@roddycavin4600]

Read his book. Could not believe that he said Horrocks was wounded in Italy. A shocking mistake for a historian.

[@seth1422]

I'm really puzzled how you get this out of reading Beevor's book, as he quite explicitly says the opposite on several key points. Beevor even quotes the 82nd HQ Operational Diary in which Browning orders Gavin, on the night of D+1/+2, to halt his attack on Nijmegen and wait for XXX Corps. Beevor is explicit about this and never presents an alternative description of what occurred with the 82nd between late D+1 to late D+2. He also never mentions the "1000 tank" quote / theory, and I'm still hunting to see what the evidence of that is. Gavin's primary fear was intense *infantry* counterattacks *immediately* after the dropping, like his division (he had then commanded just one regiment) had experienced in Normandy. Keep in mind, the efficiency of the MG drop astonished everyone, as previous scattered *night time* drops had left paratroop forces with only 1/4-1/2 of their total effective strength in the first 24 hours. Everyone was delighted to find nearly 90+% of every formation available at H+1 because of MG's *daylight* drop. Based on the regiment-sized counterattack (with armored support) experienced by the 508th on D+1, if they had arrived in a night drop they very likely could have been overwhelmed.

[@Paul9601EX]

@@seth1422 I m sorry. It’s been two years ago when I wrote this. It s hard for me now to memorise this., since I’m several books further. So I m not able to answer your question. Not without reading the book again.

[@stephenduffy5406]

The 82nd brought four specially modified reconnaissance jeeps, each with side and front armor plating and a .50 cal M2. There is at least one picture of them lined up in Nijmegen (In the two volume book 'Burning Bridges' / 'The Bridge is Ours' ,by Michael de Trez) , unused. Why didn't they dash off to the bridge, as the British Reece squadron had tried to do?

[@davemac1197]

I believe the 82nd Airborne Reconnaissance Platoon had up to 16 Jeeps, all armored except for the two carrying the 60mm Mortar Squad. I know they were not all delivered on the first day of MARKET GARDEN, so four Jeeps sounds about right on D-Day and represents two of the four Recon Squads. Not enough for a coup de main mission on such a large objective and I only know they were first to arrive at the eastern end of the Heumen lock bridge ("Bridge 7") on the Maas-Waal canal to assist B Company 504th PIR in taking the bridge intact - German morale usually collapses once you cut their supply line and the recon patrol was effectively in the German rear of their Main Line of Resistance (MLR) along the canal. The 504th at Heumen were due to be assisted by Ben Vandervoort's 2/505th landing on Drop Zone 'N', but due to an air traffic conflict they arrived over the zone at the same time as another 505th serial and Vandervoort instructed his pilot (who was leading their whole serial) to fly on to the 508th's DZ 'T' and drop them there. It meant that the battalion was delayed in clearing the northern half of Groesbeek and taking Hill 81.8 above the town and then send a company on to Bridge 7, but the Recon Platoon's arrival was enough to collapse resistance at the bridge. In terms of a coup de main on the Nijmegen highway bridge, Browning's plan for Operation COMET included glider coup de main assaults on the Arnhem, Nijmegen, and Grave bridges, with the Nijmegen mission to be flown by Sergeant Jim Wallwark who led the 'Pegasus Bridge' Operation DEADSTICK in Normandy - he wasn't looking forward to it and half-joked that he and his co-pilot were planning to surrender at the first chance they got! Their passengers were to be D Company of the 7th Battalion King's Own Scottish Borderers, and the D Companies of the 1st Border Regiment and 2nd South Staffords were earmarked for Grave and Arnhem, with six gliders required for each assault. After Montgomery cancelled COMET at the last minute because of the intel situation (II.SS-Panzerkorps arriving in the Arnhem area), he proposed an upgrade with the American divisions added so that 1st Airborne and the Polish Brigade could concentrate at Arnhem with their considerable anti-tank gun resources (each Brigade effectively had a battery and totalled 83 guns, including 16 of the heavy 17-pounders). This meant that planning of the airborne operation was turned over to Brereton and his 1st Allied Airborne Army staff, and here the COMET concept was compromised by deleting the double airlift on D-Day and dawn glider coup de main assaults because of lack of night navigation skills in the USAAF Troop Carrier Command and the risks of the glider assaults on the bridges in daylight. Browning was unable to object after being politically neutralised over the Operation LINNET II affair. He knew if he threatened resignation again he would be replaced by Matthew Ridgway and his US XVIII Airborne Corps. Gavin had been requested by the British (according to Cornelius Ryan's interview notes with Gavin) to drop a battalion north of the Nijmegen bridge to seize it by coup de main, but after toying with the idea eventually dismissed it because of his experience in Sicily - the USAAF crews were panicked by the Flak and scattered his 505th Regiment over a wide area, and Gavin landed with just four or five men to command. Instead he instructed the CO of the 508th to send his 1st Battalion directly to the bridge as soon as possible after landing and securing his initital objectives on the Groesbeek ridge. An instruction that Colonel Lindquist failed to carry out.

[@billbergin8953]

Does anyone think that Middlebrook's book is both absorbing as well as excellent? Maps are excellent and his style makes him a thoroughly good read. On at least two occasions I walked the battlefield using Middlebrook's account and felt I was there. A real classic. Any thoughts?

[@thevillaaston7811]

Yep - its excellent.

[@niners.own.the.packers]

Please can you do more reviews of books that makes a no sense argument. Seeing you frustrated is so entertaining

[@TheImperatorKnight]

Hahaha sure!

[@niners.own.the.packers]

Tasmanian devil comes to mind 😣😫😒😨😱😵

[@fazole]

Bevoor is at times, hilarious. Relating an anecdote about Goebbels from his book "Berlin, the downfall", he states that someone who shook hands with the Reichsmarshall noticed that 'his hands were soft, like a woman's'. Bevoor writes using anecdotes woven into a general overview of events. In this, his books are engrossing, as the history flows almost in a kind of coherent stream of consciousness. He is not dry.

[@nolanolivier6791]

Himmler, not Goebbels...

[@Stephanos480]

fazole ---- Your statment: "an anecdote ABOUT Goebbels he states that someone who shook hands with THE REICHSMARSCHALL noticed that 'his hands were soft, like a woman's". You're mixing Goebbels up with Göring (who was the Rechsmarschal), And the statement is ABOUT Göring. Goebbles was the Reichsminister for Propaganda. Your quote would make sense if you exchanged the word "ABOUT" Goebbels with the word "BY" Goebbels.

[@thethirdman225]

I stopped reading Beevor years ago.

[@dermotrooney9584]

TIK man - what you doing to me? I've got 12 books on my to do list for work and you're making me go back to my Arnhem stack so I can scratch that Para itch (nothing to do with the Rat Pit c1995). Evil.

[@TheImperatorKnight]

Sorry!

[@IrishTechnicalThinker]

Loved your dismantling of Beevor, that's a TKO. Great job! My theory of why Beevor made such a bad blunder on the book is, this was to indoctrinate the mass back home in the United States and that America never does anything wrong technically and had a better mindset for making combat achievements than any other military, thus making the army look better. Blessings from Ireland brother.

[@thevillaaston7811]

A good post.

[@bigwoody4704]

yes thank you I rather liked it myself

[@wbertie2604]

That doesn't make much sense, as there is no 'back home in the United States' for Beevor as he's a British historian who lives in London.

[@johnpalmer7705]

Generally good review. Was thinking of buying the book, but now see I need a complete portfolio of books to get it right. Two points of interest re: 82nd and their bridge: IF there WERE (even the rumor of) “1,000 tanks” in the nearby woods, it would be lunacy to para in the 82nd in the first place - NO way paras could take on, even hold, that much armor. 2nd, interested in what the actual pre-operation plans said about the priorities of the 82nd re: either the bridge OR the 1,000 tanks/protect landing zone? Since the ENTIRE mission was THE BRIDGE, why wouldn’t pre-op plans clearly state that and why wouldn’t Lindquist/Warren operate accordingly? Gavin should not have to tell Lindquist (supposedly a day or so before) to go after the bridge ‘whenever’; plans would/should have required Lindquist to go right at the bridge upon landing??? That would seem to be the pertinent question.

[@295Phoenix]

Browning and Gavin are definitely the reason this operation failed. What the hell was Browning thinking in the first place when he chose to place his HQ with the 82nd instead of the 101st? And that 1,000 tanks in the Reichswald excuse? That's what...5 panzer divisions? Obviously SHAEF didn't take the rumors seriously otherwise they wouldn't have even launched the plan in the form that they did because 1 airborne division can't beat 5 panzer divisions under any circumstance so Gavin shouldn't be allowed to use that excuse either.

[@macro2k7]

that their headquarters were so close to each other (and relatively close to the bridge) is why the blame has to be shared by both not just the one. There must have been plenty of communication between both hq's during the first day where it would have been increasingly obvious that noone had actually been sent to the bridge yet

[@andym9571]

According to another TIK video it wasn't Brownings choice but either Breretons or Montgomery's.

[@morningstar9233]

I watched with great interest. I would agree Mr.Beevor has a great canon. In the now infamous taken down video you rightly called into question his factually unsupported history regarding Arnhem. In this video you've eloquently and painstakingly given the facts. Thank you. I remain vehemently opposed to those who would wilfully or ignorantly misrepresent history. A grateful subscriber.

[@dick3654]

If there were a thousand tanks in the Reichswald one bataillion more or less wouldn't heve mattered. I think that there is no excuse for a para commander not to occupy the target immediately.

[@TheImperatorKnight]

Exactly. If there was 1000 tanks in the Reichswald, they would have made mince meat out of everyone.

[@SgtKaiden]

@@TheImperatorKnight Had they had the fuel and spare parts to move more than 10 inches.

[@nickdanger3802]

Map Nijmegen 17 September i.pinimg.com/736x/d1/fa/bb/d1fabb09d7b032564d98331e871cf633.jpg

[@owenjones7517]

@@nickdanger3802 Point?

[@nickdanger3802]

@@owenjones7517 So people can see for themselves.

[@nickdanger3802]

Planning "The essential plan (Comet) was not dead, however, and on the 10th September 1944, Montgomery personally briefed Browning for Operation Market Garden." "Browning, having asked Montgomery how long the 1st Airborne would have to hold Arnhem and being told two days, replied that they could hold it for four." Pegasus Archive Browning, on line Of the over 2,000 men tasked with taking all three bridges only 740 men captured one end of a lightly defended bridge in Arnhem and held it for 3 days and 12 hours. As I understand it.

[@cassandrab4080]

Assigning blame to one person for the failure of a major operation is always a problem. Market Garden was in trouble from the start, at Eindhoven. As one tiny example, on 19 September Panzer-Brigade 107 attacked the newly erected Bailey bridge at Son with 36 Pz Kpfw V (Panthers) and 11 Pz Kpfw IV's, stopping XXX's flow of tanks & supplies (with a direct impact on events in Nijmegen). Horrock's eastern flank was supposed to have been protected by British VIII Corps (O'Connor), but the Corps started a day late and only engaged Pz Brigade 107 on the 20th. A running battle followed with the Germans slowly retreating via Helmond & Boxmeer, but effectively cutting supplies & reinforcements from reaching Nijmegen 20-24 Sept. By the end of the month, the Panzer Brigade still had 7 Pz IV and 19 Panthers. As Abe Lincoln would say, everyone in the British army seemed to have the "slows" that month.

[@cassandrab4080]

Yes, some British tanks & infantry have traversed the road to Nijmegen, but has Horrocks really "taken" the 50 miles between Eindhoven and Nijmegen? The town of Best, just west of Eindhoven, wasn't clear of Germans until 24 October. On the east flank, the town of Helmond wasn't taken until 25 Sept. The road between the Veghel and Grave bridges was in German hands 20-24 Sept. ...And that's the point: one key failure of Market Garden was not securing the flanks, which was the job of XII Corps (Richie) & VIII Corps (O'Connor the Great). I've never seen an M-G account that explains their delay and mediocre performance. (XII Corps,waiting south of Best, didn't enter the battle until day 5!)

[@Ratty98]

Nice video. I understand why you remade this video but i my personal opinion I don't think it was necessary but a great video either way.

[@TheImperatorKnight]

I needed to redo it because many people hadn't seen the originals, and this one is a far better quality than the previous two, plus more in-depth.

[@arnesaknussemm2427]

Why were they so concerned about this unconfirmed report of 1000 tanks in the forest when they ignored actual proper reports backed up with photographs of the panzer division around Arnhem?

[@davidrendall2461]

I have just finished this book and agree completely with your conclusion, it could have been THE book on the subject, but fell so short it actually made me reassess some of his other work. Beevor had no excuse, there is more than enough new research, differing views and distance from A Bridge too Far, to make a truly great narrative history book. He had the skills and position to really take a swing at the myths, what I read sounded like a fan of the film, making the old myths stick to new evidence. When Ryan was writing his book: General Gavin was a senior R&D man at the Pentagon, General Maxwell-Taylor was the professional head of the US Army, having just replaced General Ridgeway in that office, while Eisenhower was President. Monty was under a cloud for his awful memoirs, Browning was retired to obscurity and Britain was loosing its grip on world affairs at Suez. It would have been a brave man indeed to say the US generals were the problem in Sept 1944. Beevor had no excuse.

[@DanielWW2]

5:34, sorry TIK, but I am subtracting one star from this review. That map is just awful. ;) Not only did most of the land east of the IJselmeer, now called Flevoland, not exist in 1944, but to the north the Waddenzee is a complete and utter trainwreck. It looks like a low tide map because the Waddenzee becomes passable on foot with low tide. With high tide, not so much. :P

[@TheImperatorKnight]

I'll accept that :) You know, this was my first ever map I ever made for any history video. I didn't feel like making an up to date version, so instead I just dug this one out and reused it. And everyone had the same complaints last time too. That's why I covered up Zuiderzee with the word "IJsselmeer" - because I knew people would cry about it.

[@fuzzydunlop7928]

Interestingly enough, some Florida-locals refer to their awful, fetid swamp of a state as "Flevoland" I am uncertain as to why.

[@DanielWW2]

They might be Dutch migrants. Flevo comes from the Roman name of the lake that was located there. That lake disappeared because of rising sea levels. The connection to the sea was blocked again by 1932. Land is typical Germanic and used by English, Dutch, German etc.

[@WillN2Go1]

I'm really impressed that in at least one of your Stalingrad videos you're very harsh on Antony Beevor, but here you're very positive. This indicates an open mind, depth of knowledge on the subject, and a willingness to discuss and consider different aspects of a source. And just let me harp a little on my favorite idea about the value of history: Barbara Tuchman: didn't want to pursue an advanced degree because she didn't want to get marginalized in some corner of some small subject, instead she wanted to contribute more. Her Guns of August, published in 1961 (I think). In a nutshell, she didn't blame the Germans or blame the French, or Gavrilo Pricip, instead she argued that all these 'leaders' thought they could threaten and the other guys--who were just like them--would back down. That the king of England and the kaiser, were clones should've been a hint. No body backed down and millions of people died. Kennedy having just read her book, when the Cuban Missiles Crisis flared up, knew that the macho-variation of the ultimatum approach was likely to end very badly... so he and Khrusuhev chose instead not to blow up the world. (At the time of course the American version was that the Soviets completely backed down... but later when people learned about the removal of Jupiter missiles in Turkey being a quid pro quo, no one (meaning Hawks in the US) cared. ) My grandmother told me, "Learn history, because it can kill you." From what I've seen so far of your approach, you incorporate these concepts.

[@oddballsok]

Another clarifying thought about opportunities and dropped opportunities: Once the british were present on "the island" in full force, feeling secure enough to consider it "under control". (say, 22nd sept). WHY didn't they set up actions to CROSS the maas left and right of Arnhem ? After all, the river is quite SMALL there (so much smaller and slow streaming than the Waal at nijmegen) , and easily passable by any mediocre swimmer. Once the military is present IN FULL FORCE with tons of artillery. It should be a textbook excercise to cross a damned little river ?!?! Right ? The germans were able to ferry over quite a few tiger tanks over the Pannerden ferry. Let alone the many halftracks , trucks and SS men. Certainly the germans on the north bank would NOT be able to defend ALL along the maas against crossing brits all over the place ? With also full command of the skies ?!?!? Nope, they DECIDED to BLOW UP the Arnhem bridge . !!!!! The british command conceded that they do NOT wish for further advancement, and made sure the germans would not try anything bold (raiding?) going south either. This shows the british were NOT INTENDING to land in Arnhem with Frost hanging to his fingers and FIGHT INSIDE ARNHEM CITY like they just experienced in NIJMEGEN. Their idea was to enter Arnhem and SPEED THROUGH to the Ijsselmeer. UNRESISTED and UNCHALLENGED. In other words, ONCE it became clear that there was german RESISTANCE in Arnhem (17th and 18th sept), there was NO POINT in reaching Arnhem fighting. Frost or not. The british command had ALREADY given up on Frost !!!

[@oddballsok]

Now that 's food for thought ;)

[@johnburns4017]

The Maas and Waal were too wide to throw Bailey bridges across.

[@oddballsok]

pontoonbridges can technically cross any width of river. The maas at Arnhem is also not a fast flowing river (the Waal at nijmegen is...) and not very deep either.

[@johnburns4017]

The aim of Market Garden was surprise and speed. Pontoon bridges take time. Bailey bridges can be thrown across very quickly. Indeed after the Guards seized the Nijmegen bridge the Germans kept shelling it. creating a hole in the roadway of the bridge. A Bailey bridge was thrown over the hole. Operation Comet planned to be launched on 2 Sept, was cancelled due to German resistance and poor weather. Eisenhower's directive of 4 Sept had divisions of the US 1st Army and Montgomery's view of taking multiple bridges on the Rhine from Arnhem to Wesel. The British 2nd Army needed some divisions of Hodges' US 1st army and the First Allied Airborne Army (which Monty controlled anyhow). Hodges' would protect the right flank. the Canadians would protect the left flank from the German 15th army. It was to chase a disorganized retreating enemy preventing them from manning the German West Wall, gaining a footing over the Rhine, consolidating and then clearing the Scheldt to open up the port of Antwerp. A sound concept which even the German generals agreed would have worked.

[@roodborstkalf9664]

Good comment. First the river west of Arnhem is the Nederrijn not the Maas or the Waal. There is also a fourth major river in the delta, the IJssel just northeast of Arnhem, streaming north. But totally agree with you that the British high command at some point in the second half of september 1944 must have made a decision that a beach head over the Nederrijn in Arnhem was now irrelevant and that the immense sacrifice of British troops in Arnhem had been for nothing. Of course they couldn't say that.

[@rubbybobinson3543]

Just got Beevor’s book but decided to reread “It Never Snows in September” which I read about 20 years ago. Got interested when I was a teen when a neighbor gave me “A Bridge Too Far”.....before the movie. Haven’t read much since Middlebrook’s came out but have bunch of others under my belt before that. Your Battlefront series got me reinterested. Thank TIK.

[@crabbytemptations1771]

TIK have you tried contacting Anthony Beevor? I've googled historians and emailed them with questions several times and always got a reply. I find a blend of flattering and inquisitive words works every time. Try asking him for a reference and see what he says. It would be very interesting.

[@crimsonerrant]

Probably I arrive late to the party. I’m not a professional historian not an expert, but as someone who has been studying the op for around 20-25 year I have my own opinion. I also must comment that I have no horse in that race (I’m not a Brit, nor American, nor Pole, not even German). Clarified that. My perception is that there’s a lot of nationalistic blame hunting. Brits blaming Americans, Americans blaming Brits, etc. IMHO Market Garden was an extremely ambitious and risky operation that while it was executed quite well, it failed mostly due to lack of proper intel. We know that now, but most of the generals on the field at that time did not, so it’s kind of pointless to go full armchair general harshly blaming and bashing people (especially when they happen to be Brits vs Americans).

[@RiverRev]

My father made the crossing in a boat at Nijmegen and stood next to Col Tucker when he called the tanker cowards. He told that story all of the time and remembers the anger among the 504th that XXX corps would not advance. My resource is a primary resource.

[@RiverRev]

And there is the difference. American paratroopers were trained to advance and take the objectives. From their perspective, stopping after the bridge was to fail to take the objective. Few would consider the actions of XXX corps as true cowardice but the failure to move forward was seen by the Americans as a dereliction of duty. Again, this is from a trooper who took the bridge ( my father). You can relight the war and create different motivations after the fact but the perception of the 504th was that the British failed to advance.

[@RiverRev]

My father was part of the 504th PIR which took all of its objectives then moved out of its zone of control to take the Nijmegen bridge. So, his regiment went beyond its responsibility to insure victory. From that perspective crossing a bridge and stopping was doing less than what was expected, especially when there was significant time in the day remaining to advance. If you look at the history of the 504th PIR in the war you will see that satisfaction with the status quo is not part of their unit psyche.

[@OldWolflad]

@@RiverRev There is this claim that the American Paratroopers were then prepared to go on to Arnhem, but the Brits stopped and were drinking tea. The British account from tank crews was that the US Paras were exhausted having crossed the bridge. The commander of the 5th British tank across said there was no Paras in site when he got there. Lord Carrington who met US Airborne, said they were delighted to see the tank support and there was no desire to go on to Arnhem, as has been suggested post-war. Gavin's own war diaries also confirms their delight at seeing the British tanks, for fear of a German counter-attack.

[@RiverRev]

@@OldWolflad I've seen the claim. It usually also pairs with blaming the Paras for not taking the bridge earlier before resistance built up. There is some excellent research on this from a Dutch historian named Frank Van Lunteren that sides with the US story.

[@OldWolflad]

@@RiverRev Hi George, I usually find that the truth lies somewhere in the middle. Both Brits and Americans have vested interests, but ultimately the average soldier is not to blame. The problem here is you have 2 different sets of direct witnesses with different interpretations, but it is perhaps telling that Gavin doesn't highlight it in his own diaries. Some versions says the British tanks arrived 45 minutes before the American Paras. I like Tiks analysis, tho some feel he is just anti-American. I don't actually think he is as he praises the 82nd who went across in boats extremely highly. The key for me is the validity of pre-battle instructions - saying to secure the heights first of all, are these genuine? I think all Paras are elite troops aren't they, the cream of each infantry. To be fair, Frank Van Lunteren's book is specifically about the 504th PIR and I would question some of his findings. I actually wrote to him about several key points but got no reply.

[@adarbrauner4913]

Hi, I read Gavin's memoirs; one aspect TIK isn't taking in consideration is the dispersal and confusion of airborne troops after landing; now, true this jump was done in full daylight , and by the time 82nd airborne troops were seasoned veterans of two previous combat jumps (at night), still Gavin tells of the initial difficulty to gather the troops and to establish communications, including a very close and dangerous encounter with a German patrol while walking with few other troops on the way to find/establish his command post, where bullets flew directly over his head; he also tells of the great concern about possible tanks/strong reserves in the Reichwald (but I cannot recall anything near to 1000 tanks, claim which is simply ridiculous), and of the necessity to defend the landing zone; therefore a point may be made of the time needed and expended to gather some troops and his staff, establish his command post, and communications with the other subordinates...together with the unceirtanty of the situation and of enemy's forces and disposition...

[@skelejp9982]

I find it amazing how Attack Planes made such a difference in Normandie but not on "Arnhem" Battlegrounds. Horrocks made it to the Bridge,planes could have easily suppressed the Enemy ,to give way for more Tank& Motorized Infantry Support,and go thru to Arnhem. Too much of this Operation was directed on So Called Important Information, like , 'they might Flank us' , or ' they have a 1000 Tanks hidden in the Woods !' After the Horrors of Normandie , Brits and US Soldiers became less Aggressive,and Focused more on Survival ,this was different with Polish Soldiers ! Polish Soldiers had way less problems with Combat Stress, same with Germans Soldiers ! Greetings!

[@chrisjgrey]

Great videos, really enjoy watching them. Regarding the origins of the "1000 tanks in the Reichswald" rumour I remember reading 'Freely I Served' by Polish commander General Sosabowski. In it he explains that the Poles under his command were due to try and take Nijmegen bridge in one of the previous planned (but cancelled) airbourne operations. The exact wording from the book escapes me but he did state that he didn't consider that the First Polish Independent Parachute Brigade was a strong enough formation to take the bridge and hold-off the large suspected German force in the Reichswald. Perhaps it's possible that the rumour about suspected German forces in the forest was active before the planning of Operation Market Garden was finalised, maybe even earlier. Btw thanks for exonerating the Poles for the failure of Market Garden. It's much appreciated.

[@nickdanger3802]

Operation Comet 1st Airborne and the Poles were to be tasked with the entire mission.

[@timboie444]

One thing that puzzles me is why wasn't there more allied air support?

[@andygass9096]

There seem to be a lack of "grip" all round. Montgomery should have had a better grip of the planing, Browning should not have allowed Gavin to de- priorities the capture of the bridge which after all is the whole point of the operation.

[@andrewuy1294]

i love that you reply to a most of your comments. must be a very hard thing to do.

[@TheImperatorKnight]

I try my best, but yes it isn't easy at all, and unfortunately I think it will only get worse as I gain more subscribers. The best time to get a reply from me is in the first few hours after the video releases on a Monday because I dedicate the evening to replying to people. Currently I do read all the comments, but it's getting harder and harder to keep up! Also, some people assume because I haven't replied to their counter-arguments that it's because I'm ignoring them because what they're saying is correct. Well, no, it's because it takes longer to create a decent well-argued comment, so sometimes I have to put it off until later while I reply to the majority of comments that don't require too much time to reply to. I'd rather reply to many comments than just a handful.

[@andrewuy1294]

TIK why not hire people to help you in replying or something, i guess they would help a lot. i do hope you get through that arguement thing though :)

[@andrewuy1294]

TIK actually, if you think about it, some fans actually reply for you and more will do so as your channel grows. anyway, thanks for the videos and i love them.

[@marcppparis]

Thinking about the responsibility for the failure ... definitely Gavin & Browning. Argument can also be made for the air force not dropping the paratroopers more than one drop per day and closer to Arnhem. 1st airborne could have held the bridge until relieved and tied up the German units around Arnhem

[@TheImperatorKnight]

Arguably that was Brereton's fault, or the Troop Carrier Command commander (a guy called Major General Williams), for not dropping the paras closer to the bridge. But yes, I agree that if they had dropped closer it could have changed the course of the battle.

[@marcppparis]

I wonder why the Germans weren't more aggressive in blowing up bridges i.e why XXX Corps wasn't held up by more destroyed bridges? IMO that was the riskiest part of the operation: a serial set of bridges. A few blown bridges could hold up XXX Corps to the point of operational failure. That makes the failure to capture the Nijmegen bridge immediately even more ridiculous. This is one that could not be easily replaced or repaired. The necessity for all the bridges to be captured is the biggest argument for the "rotten plan" explanation. You can be 90-95% successful but still fail. Had Gavin captured the Nijmegen bridge it would have been considered a "bold plan that was executed perfectly" instead of the "rotten plan, poorly executed"

[@TheImperatorKnight]

According to the books, Model wanted the Arnhem and Nijmegen bridges for a counter attack.

[@johnharker7194]

Did Montgomery know that the bridges were safe from demolition? That seems like a huge gamble. Great video, I was hoping you'd talk about the quote from frost which places the blame on Browning. But you did make a video that goes deeply into that. Perhaps Beevor was alluding to that. But I have no idea why he wouldn't say so.

[@TheGrant65]

@thedudepdx - Supply and, as TIK says, to assist counterattacks. Ironically, one of the rival plans considered by Montgomery called for the Allies to simultaneously destroy the bridges they tried to capture in Market Garden. The idea being to tie down and fragment the German units immediately west of the Rhine. That would have helped open up the Belgian/Dutch ports but ... as we know, Monty was in no hurry to do that.

[@charlesmaeger6162]

Tik, thanks for covering this complicated battle.The Battle of Arnhem - September 17, 1944 to September 26, 1944. Montgomery conviced Eisenhower (who had deep reservations) to go ahead with Operation Market Garden.This Operation would put the Allies in front of the bridges over the Rhine River and the border of Germany and the industrial Rhur Valley.

[@davemac1197]

Nonsense on Eisenhower. Eisenhower was similarly unapologetic when he declared after the publication of Cornelius Ryan's best-selling account, A Bridge Too Far, “I not only approved Market-Garden, I insisted upon it. We needed a bridgehead over the Rhine. If that could be accomplished I was quite willing to wait on all other operations.” (Eisenhower: A Soldier's Life, Carlo D'Este, 2015)

[@bigbennottheclock1353]

Another great viedo! I like the two from last week too lol. Biggest difference is u don't call Beevor a lier this time... Although this one makes him look much worse. Loved it. Keep up the good work! Btw your oil viedo is a must view. Changed my Outlook a lot. Tyvm

[@fireman2375]

As much as I enjoyed your review, I cannot shake the feeling that one of the points where you critisize the book is a case of "The conclusion is something I don't agree with", which in no case should affect a review. I guess the debates on how to judge the events at Nijmegen will go on for a long time in the future, and maybe it will never be definitely solved. But agreed, failing to provide evidence for some of the arguments is a big problem.

[@matthiuskoenig3378]

but the book claims the brits were late when they weren't. thats a false claim and should reduce the quality of the book.

[@vicmclaglen1631]

I think Beevor, while generally doing a good job with impartiality, does strain in some instances and retains his own favorites and prejudices here and there.

[@johnburns4017]

A history comic writer, not a historian.

[@willosee]

Really good video. Having read all the major works on the subject and ignoring the strategic arguments a few things keep recurring to me. 1. Obviously there was considerable group think amongst the leadership. However someone at that level should have been the Devils Advocate. If MG worked and Antwerp was taken that would have to be seen as a major plus. This doesn’t exclude the Saar option but Antwerp is a massive port and rail hub. 2. Even though there was limited planning time there were a series of insane planning failures. a) either the radios work or they don’t. Replicate the physical environment and out them through rigorous testing. b) Ensure the ground to air communications were perfect. Build multiple layers of redundancy into the plan. c) an easy way to make air drops easier is to make the drop zone bigger. The three bridges were THE primary objective but each division had different jobs. 1st Div was the bridge and hold on. Hold on means being able to get resupplied. This implies landing on Arnhem en masse. d) the rejection by the Air Force of more than one drop and on top of the town was enough for Browning to escalate this to Ike/Monty. 3. The humit and general intelligence was far too diffuse. a) if they were that worried about the Reichswald one guy on a bike dropped in could have made things much clearer. b) not using Dutch officers in the planning was criminal. c) given Monty owned the plan Ike’s people should have gone to town on the what if’s. d) where was the cross sectional intelligence analysis? Photo/humit/radio? And Ultra!!!!! 4. Horrocks seemed fine talking objectives but not exploiting them. Admittedly the corridor was narrow but the lack of a combined unit to exploit the Nijmegen bridge was costly. 5. A’s you point out Gavin then Browning were most at fault. All three bridges had to be less than three hour objectives. You could argue that the whole plan was madness due to the road but given they nearly did it suggested maybe it wasn’t too bad. 6. A two jump day concentrating on the bridges would have seen all objectives seized very quickly. Again if the VHF wasn’t a farce then the Air Force could have concentrated on opening the road north as well as interdiction of German movement. Again there was no triangulation between the ground forces calling in air support to protect the resupplies. Also in the case of the 1 Div a bigger zone of control would mean they could also attack German AA positions. 7. Have seen little written about trying to isolate north of Arnhem by massive bombardment of rail and roads like at Normandy. Strange that forward assets like SAS were not deployed simply to identify night movements. 8. The threat assessment seems very thin. There were basically seven spots the Germans would attack; the three bridges and the two sides of the road north of Eindhoven. Continuous CAPs and roving interdiction air units could have both identified threats , attacked and slowed them while other rotating units became available. 9. Given that German armour had the same problems as the British that they had to use roads to attack the corridor there seems little thought in terms of making strongholds, well supported by air cover, to deny the German armour access. This would have forced the infantry to bear the brunt of the fighting. 10. Knowing what Model was like what did the Allies expect? They had gone through the worst fighting in WW2 arguably in Normandy. A war is a title fight not a single round. 12. Reading all the Allied stories of the Western Front it strikes me that Ike struggled to impose a unified command structure on all of the leadership. MG was arguably as important as Normandy, certainly it was complex. They needed a Red Team approach to poke holes in the strategy and identify exploitation assets. That was Ike’s job. Like McCarthur it always seems like his personal circumstances were too comfortable and hence he was too removed. Ridgeway and Le May were polar opposites. Despite not being theatre commanders they had first hand knowledge of the tactical issues their men faced. It reminds me of Westmorland in Vietnam.

[@roodborstkalf9664]

Very good comment. I just read the book. Was amazed how mediocre allied command was.

[@aden5776]

This video is much better than last week's videos. It goes into much more detail.

[@TheImperatorKnight]

I wanted to make up for my mistakes :)

[@gandydancer9710]

@@TheImperatorKnight Still, I would like to see the first version.

[@Peorhum]

I think the "problem" of drinking tea, is because Americans see it as sitting down and have a party, tea and cakes with nice music playing. They don't realize it is equal to having a meal in American terms.

[@l1wolf14av]

I'm pretty sure that Antony Beevor is British though.

[@Peorhum]

True but I am speaking over all on American views of drinking tea. Beevor seems to be marketing to the US market in this book it seems. I have not read any of his books yet and it seems he has a nice style of writing but also seems he is a twit too. Not sure I want to read his books now. I don't read such books for the narrative, I want facts. It is odd how older writers were more fact based, and a little dry, even if their opinions were biased, old school. While many new writers have more facts available but are more about narrative/story and don't care as much about facts. Where old writers were out to defend their nation's military from bad press, new writer seem more about putting them down to sell more books. I am sure there is a balance to be had.

[@l1wolf14av]

I could see that. It would even explain why he wants to pin the blame on Browning and remove it from Gavin; paint the Americans as superior to sell more easily to an American audience. It's a shame if that's the case, him trashing the British soldiers just to sell more books. They deserve better.

[@sextuspompeius1266]

Tea is good to

[@l1wolf14av]

agreed

[@andrewpease3688]

The obvious question is, why did the operation go ahead if there was even a remote possibility of 1000 tanks waiting to flatten the poor paras?

[@TheImperatorKnight]

I wish I knew the answer :(

[@ahfanzai]

Well at least from the movie 'A bridge too far', they had canceled a few airborne operations due to tanks. And Frost was getting very frustrated and his ego got the better of him. The intel lad did show him tanks around the place and he ignored it and approved the mission.

[@johnburns4017]

Only Gavin thought there was 1,000 tanks.

[@floydfanboy2948]

Good question...

[@andrewpease3688]

John Burns ,Next obvious question, was there any retrospective enlargement of this threat?

[@docmatteson2010]

I just found your channel. Excellent work and I can’t thank you enough for being so thorough. It is great to hear disputes of the popular repeated history. It’s to bad that any disparaging comments were made. They were all heroes and all leaders make mistakes, they should own them and use them as lessons learned so future leaders may not make those mistakes. I’ll be getting Beavers Arnhem! I look forward to your other reviews and recommendations.

[@SNP-1999]

Considering that taking all of the bridges was the key to success of M-G, one wonders why elements of the 82nd Airborne were not dropped NORTH of the Nijmegen bridges, from where they could have taken both bridges over the Waal and also would have been in a position to strike North and take the Arnhem road bridge from the SOUTH ! There are so many imponderables and incomprehensible mistakes in the planning of M.G one has to honestly question whether the allied commanders wanted it to fail from the start.

[@seth1422]

Failure to drop on both sides of the Waal was a grave oversight. Gavin was actually offered the choice of dropping one battalion north of the river, but declined it probably fearing its hopeless isolation on open, indefensible ground if the Germans had any strength in Lent or Elst. In the plan for Operation "Comet" (which was Monty's initial plan to only use the 1st Paras and the Poles) one of the British regiments would have dropped at Elst. There is no clear explanation of why this was scrapped from the second draft, but could have had an enormous impact on the battle.

[@roodborstkalf9664]

I just read the book and was also thinking sometimes: "Did they even want to win?". The planning of Market Garden was a farce and the execution was also very mediocre.

[@Kalach444]

Hello Tik! Is there any way to contact you via fanpage or facebook? Great materials im amazed how professional you explain thigs. Greetings from Poland!

[@varovaro1967]

This is excellent and the guitar back there changes the tone! =)

[@TheImperatorKnight]

Haha one day I'll do a solo-outro for you ;)

[@kevinpascual]

I see what you did there...

[@raymondwestland2512]

One little mistake in the video though. The 82nd Airborne wasn't at full strength by the time 30 Corps arrived. The 325th GRI joined the 82nd Division later during the battle due to bad weather in England. Another thing I don't understand why Gavin didn't plan for a coup the main type of assault on the Nijmegen bridge by parachuting a batalion north of the bridge in similar fashion as the 504th PIR captured the bridge at Grave.

[@seth1422]

Part of the reason this is unclear from TIK’s discussion is that he doesn’t mention the 82nd’s long list of objectives. In addition to (1) Nijmegen bridge, they also were tasked with taking (2) a bridge on the Maas at Grave, (3) a rail bridge on the Maas (which was blown instantly by the defenders), (4-7) *four* bridges across a major canal that lay between the Maas and Waal (of which two were blown and one partially destroyed) and finally (8) the Groesbeek Heights. The last of these is much debated, but the Heights are the tallest point in the Netherlands and provided perfect artillery observation of the road between Grave and Nijmegen. Without taking them the road would have been closed to all, or at least soft-skinned, traffic by just a few German guns. Gavin had nine battalions to achieve these objectives and secure his drop zones. He assigned one battalion to Grave, one to the Maas rail bridge, one to Nijmegen bridge, and two to the four canal bridges, while holding back four to secure drop zones. This is nearly an identical ratio of total force used by the British at Arnhem to secure their drop zones, and given the brutal German counterattack 10:00 on D+1 against the Heights, proved only barely sufficient. TIK’s analysis of the fighting at Arnhem is very good, but he does not discuss the 82nd’s plight and hard struggle in nearly enough detail.

[@T.S.Birkby]

@@seth1422 The irony of the "he said/she said" is that TIK doesn't use the pre-battle orders, war diaries, after action reports as primary sources of reference, TIK uses conflicting authors against one another. How many times have you heard; read this book by A and that book by B because book by C is wrong, yet doesn't provide original documentation to clarify

[@sorsocksfake]

Hindsight is 20/20. Historians seem to judge by what actually happened. That's the way our brains work. Hence the wikipedia calls Nijmegen an allied victory, when it was at best Pyrrhic, and arguably a decisive strategic defeat. For assigning blame, one must judge by what the commanders knew and could expect. This also applies to Groesbeek, which had to be taken. Worth noting that you omit the 82nd's other big objective, securing the Maas (Meuse) crossing. That and the Waal are both massive 800 ft wide rivers, they had to be taken and held... and due to the geography, Groesbeek was required to hold the area. I think this gets missed because the Meuse crossings were achieved so easily. That said, there's a third point where hindsight makes all the analyses go wrong. Market Garden was a complete and total failure beyond the Meuse crossing. The objective was to capture the bridges before they could be blown up. Could. The moment the Germans took the Waal bridge entirely, the operation failed. Only an incident of the dutch resistance cutting the fuses to the bridge's explosives happened to amend that; that was outside the hands of the allied military, and so as far as they were concerned, they let the bridge be blown up. That's not true for a historian, but it's 100% true for judging the commanders. Having said that, let's be more rough.The Brits and even Frost, also failed. They never secured the Arnhem bridge. They only secured a holding position at one end: valuable, but the Germans could still have blown it up from the other side. And finally, the RAF completely failed. Without air cover, the Germans could even have bombed down the bridges and trapped whatever troops had crossed.

[@sorsocksfake]

Finally, as a "what if": what if the allies had not dropped the 101st, but instead taken that area in more conventional ways? Particularly, having the engineers right at the front to instantly restore whatever bridges the commandoes would fail to take. Then, the other divisions could have had more strength. The 1st might have actually won at Arnhem, and the 82nd might have had the manpower to go for all three objectives in force. Plus they would have had the 101st in reserve for whatever part ended up going wrong. For instance, to reinforce the tanks and hold the roads. Maybe even land them a day later in the Betuwe (between Arnhem and Nijmegen) to attack both bridges from both sides.

[@askeladden7930]

Solid review TIK!

[@TheImperatorKnight]

Thanks! Glad you liked it!

[@gazbertram5559]

The problem with the closing days of ww2 from Normandy onwards especially. The commanders were far to competitive with one anotherTrying to race to different locations to fast and they didn't think of the lives it would cost them.

[@TheImperatorKnight]

Agreed. It was all about egos. The men suffered as a result.

[@stevep5408]

Gee I thought that problem became apparent at Sicily?

[@jbrowne9381]

@@TheImperatorKnight Patton's "Monty is a tired little fart" comment exemplifies the egos we were dealing with.

[@gandydancer9710]

Not just then. Retired General H.R.McMasters appears regularly in Hoover Institution videos ("Goodfellows", and his own series, which I've avoided) and I am always impressed by how feckless and juvenile his takes are. Putting McMoron back in charge of anything would definitely cause an undue risk of WW3.

[@SnEaKyGiTau]

Have you considered doing a talk focused on 30 corps? I think it would be interesting to learn about the officers,experience, progress of the mission , equipment, supporting elements, quotes from those involved etc

[@Jelperman]

29:00 If the Allies really thought the Germans had a thousand tanks stashed in the woods nearby, then there's no way they'd drop an airborne division in the area -especially not the Corps HQ. Even the Imperial Japaneses Army wasn't THAT suicidal. I get the impression that Gavin might have been in over his head, being a one-star (brigadier general) who had only recently been put in charge of the division when Ridgeway was promoted. Browning deserves as much if not more of the blame since he was the senior-most officer in the whole operation and was with Gavin at Nijmegen.

[@bilgerat6060]

Completely agree. The whole 1000 tanks rationale doesn't make any sense. If there was a realistic chance of even a Pz division in the Reichswald then the whole operation should have been cancelled. The only reasonable conclusion is that it wasn't credible. Therefore why were Gavin (and Browning) so fixated on it that they completely lost sight of the whole reason they were there in the first place?

[@lauriepocock3066]

Knowing Eisenhower’s and Montgomery’s passion for detailed planning I could never understand Arnhem. Both expected and planned for it to take a year to reach the German border. In the second week of August both America and British were not more than twenty miles for where they started on June 6th. By the end of August, they were in Belgium with supply lines stretched. Admittedly there was the 1st Allied Airborne Army unused in back in England. However, there has to be something that convinces Montgomery, and for Eisenhower to sanction committing that amount resource on an operation which neither are fully convinced would be successful. We know Hitler believes he has a game changing weapon. People usually take this to mean either the V1 first launched after D Day, the ME262, or the V2 which was hitting London and Antwerp by early September. Is a V2 with only one ton of explosive a game changer. No. It’s got to be the most expensive delivery system ever. I now believe that Arnhem was sanctioned because there was a real fear that Hitler was close to having an atomic warhead, or a very dirty radioactive bomb, hence the rush to get into Germany at all cost to at least deny Hitler suitable launch sites to hit London. When, in November 1943, the Norwegian resistance sank the Hydro it had on board four ton of heavy water. That amount was just sufficient to allow the German reactor to go critical, but that is not information that is known until after the war.

[@gandydancer9710]

Nice unsourced scenario for an alternate history novel, but neither Eisenhower nor Montgomery knew squat about A-Bombs. And if Monty wasn't ENTHUSIASTIC about trying to steal Patton's thunder nobody else has noticed this.

[@user-do3wt9sk7t]

Was this true ??? Fearing that 1st Airborne Division might be in grave danger if it landed at Arnhem the chief intelligence officer of the division, Major Brian Urquhart, arranged a meeting with Browning and informed him of the armour present at Arnhem. Browning dismissed his claims and ordered the division's senior medical officer to send Urquhart on sick leave on account of "nervous strain and exhaustion"

[@stevejustice9491]

It is in the movie but I have never seen it covered in any documentaries. If he was a real person I am sure he would have been quoted somewhere. I think his character is to symbolize reports and many poeple in one character and is dramatic liscence.

[@stevejustice9491]

جرائم وحوادث see comment below

[@stevejustice9491]

جرائم وحوادث Steve justice.

[@user-do3wt9sk7t]

steve justice ok 👌

[@TheImperatorKnight]

Apparently, according to Breevor's book, the photos taken were actually of German tanks in the Eindhoven area. I have no idea if that's true or not, as that's the first time I've heard that, but it might be.

[@scottmiller6958]

Assuming Warren's battalion HAD taken Nijmegen bridge on day 1, they probably could not have held it (at least the north end), so the arrival of 30 Corps would likely have found the same situation they found in reality.

[@robdmorton]

I love these detailed explanations. My understanding prior to your Market-Garden vids was so off-target. I just didn't do the research like you are able to do so well. :-)

[@TheImperatorKnight]

Market Garden has always been my favourite battle - and still is. It's the one battle I can say I know the most about. Stalingrad is my second favourite, although I'm still not 100% on it yet (although to be fair, it is a much bigger battle).

[@zacharyroussie4746]

I will definitely pick up this book. My knowledge of Market Garden is pretty much limited to the parts in Stephen Ambrose's excellent ( in my opinion) Band of Brothers.

[@eto_el_348]

_"Beevor is a man who traded historical truth for sensationalism. " (с) Isaev_

[@gerbil61]

Oh dear. I have Beevor's D Day on my shelf waiting to be read. After listening to this review I have a feeling that book is never going to get read.

[@eto_el_348]

@@gerbil61 You still do not know about his opuses about the red army. They have really cool stories taken from a sick fantasy.

[@dgray3771]

@@gerbil61 My guess of the narrative will be the heroic Americans are cruizing the French countryside and beating the germans left and right while the brits are stuck at Caen drinking tea.

[@andym9571]

Probably no mention of the launching of the amphibious tanks too far out to sea or the disinterest from the Americans to using any other " funnies" which surely would have helped at Omaha

[@dgray3771]

@@andym9571 Yup, I really feel that the Americans though their efforts in the pacific were great, more or less treated the European campaign as a secondary show. So little effort is done in media and written work to show the British and Canadian effort. In my country the Netherlands, we have massive graveyards for the Canadians. I know about their fights here, really brutal. My mother's hometown of Apeldoorn was freed by the Canadians, and where I live now Bergen op Zoom, has a massive commonwealth cemetery. Mostly Canadians. Actually, Bergen op Zoom is the anchor for the campaign clearing the northern flank of the battle of the Schelde. Which was vital to secure the Antwerp port. almost 13000 soldiers died in that battle half of which were Canadians.

[@varovaro1967]

Would Beevor be able to see this? I imagine someone could let him know...

[@thevillaaston7811]

Would Beevor be able to see this?.. I hope so.

[@Doc_Tar]

What? No mention that the British Airborne only managed to capture one side of Arnhem Bridge, that they were landed too far away from the objective to have a chance at success, that their communications were awful and that they arrived piece meal into a pitched battle with German armor units? But the 82 Airborne has to take the full blunt of the blame for the failure of Market-Garden? The real blame is in planning and intel before the operation even started. This was a disaster doomed to fail before the first aircraft took off to deliver paratroopers into Holland.

[@OldWolflad]

All those are valid criticisms, but the British still did take the bridge at Arnhem as required. If 82nd had taken the bridge, 30 Corps wouldn't have been wrongly used as the scapegoat.

[@cwr3959]

It was ninemagen, just accept it.

[@nicholaspatton1742]

As an illustration of how rumors become fact. Some LT. aware of the plan says , 'wouldn't it be fubar if there was 1000 tanks in the riechswald'. Colonel walking by overheard part of the statement; walks into his meeting and says 'I heard there was a thousand tanks in the Riechswald'. General says 'haven't heard that but we better have caution. Better tell Gavin'. Intelligence officer tells Gavin 'we think there might be 1000 tanks in the Riechswald. Gavin to his men.. 'we got 1000 tanks in that forest'. Just an idea.

[@KapiteinKrentebol]

6:00 It's incredible how often the map of the Netherlands is wrong. Landreclamation of the waters around the island of Texel isn't planned until 2150. :)

[@jandenijmegen5842]

I agree; that's three stars deduction for this interesting review. According to this map Germans could have escaped easily from their pocket after the allies would have reached the IJsselmeer.

[@kevinpascual]

As I mentioned in Patreon, I did give Neilland's book a listen and it was a neat perspective. But I have to warn some readers of his approach to Montgomery becomes a bit overbearing, but recommend it with this caveat.

[@TheImperatorKnight]

I liked your comment so more people can see. And I agree.

[@kevinpascual]

My main question is if they believed that a thousand tanks were in Reichswald, why go through with Market Garden if it means risking high casualties of your elite airborne force? Another question is why they believed that the Wehrmacht could muster a concentrated force of 1000 tanks when the Battle of the Bulge came as a complete surprise?

[@davidolie8392]

@ Kevin - I had the same thought. If there had been even 500, or 300, German tanks in the Reichswald, it would have made no difference how much of the 82nd had stayed on Groesbeek. It would have been overrun and destroyed, rendering the entire operation military malpractice of the first order. I also find it strange that the Reichswald is later described as "too thick for tanks". It was actually a managed state forest (hence the name) with very little undergrowth and many firebreaks. The British and Canadians were operating Churchills, Shermans, and other tanks in there the following February, although not without difficulties.

[@kevinpascual]

I'd love to see a battlestorm documentary on the Hurtgen Forest battle or the Seelow Heights.

[@johnburns4017]

Neillands was a well respected author of many books. As time went on he got fed up with Americans changing history, and especially their unwarranted castigation of Montgomery. The US generals were poor to mediocre, Monty made them look like complete amateurs. Monty's record speaks for itself. He never once retreated.

[@doc8178]

At 09;05 you comment the Warren made it to the bridge at midnight and later comment he was ordered to withdraw at 23:00, which one is correct?

[@michaellucas4291]

It appears the debate comes down to one question, Could the 82nd capture both ends of the Nijmegen Bridge on the 17th. They been a lot of arguments but they has been no evidence to support the assumption if the Bridge had priority over the Heights the 82nd would have capture the bridge. By using the following sources is it possible for the 82nd to capture both ends of the Nijmegen Bridge.Sources are: US official History of WW2Lost at Nijmegen: PoulussenSeptember Hope: John McManusIt Never snows in September : Robert KenshawIn John McManus book on Page 123 there a map showing 508th LZ , 1st Bn objective of De Ploeg, which was 3 miles from LZ. The distance from De Ploeg to bridge from was 3 miles. The US Official History on page 162 states that Col Warren 1st Bn: “The assembly and movement to De Ploeg took approximately three and a half hours. “. Poulussen indicate that Warren and the 1st Bn moved off at 14:00 hours 40 minutes after the drop. Therefore using both sources it appear it took 1st Bn 2 hours 50 minutes to cover the 3 miles arriving at De Ploeg at 17:00 hours. If he continue heading to the bridge at the same rate he would have arrived at 19:50 hours. Further Poulussen has a map also show the initial objectives of the1st, 2nd and 3rd Bn’s. The distance to bridge from LZ via 3rd Bn initial position is 5 miles. Poulussen in the section headed The Keizer Lodewijk Plien states that the 3rd Bn started landing at 13:36 hours and reached Beg-en-Dal by 16:30 (a distance from LZ of 2 miles). Base on the time to assemble and march to Beg -en- Dal the 3rd Bn if it continue heading to bridge without stop could have reach the Bridge by 19:30 Hours. Kenshaw in his book Chapter 8 described the German force in Nijmegen and how their commander deployed this force at the bridge. He also places Capt Graebner and 9 SS Recon Bn at Elst at 19:00 hours and in Nijmegen at approx. 20:00 Hours. Based on speed of the vehicles in Graebner Bn, the wheeled and halftrack could cover the distance in 30 minutes, the assault guns would take approximately and hour. Therefore the earliest any of Graebner command could have reach Nijmegen is 19:30 hours. Further Kershaw states that Grawbner orders were to remain at Nijmegen. Therefore based information from the above sources it appears that there is no certainty that the 82nd would have captured both end of the bridge on the 17th even if the bridge had priority over the Heights. The most likely outcome would be the Germans still holding both ends. There is a slim possibility that the 82nd may have been able to capture the southern end. But it would depend upon when the 82nd arriving at the bridge verse Graebner arrival and the level ofresistance of Henke group.

[@christerbergstrom2957]

TIK, you should read my book in two volumes, "Arnhem 1944". It is in English.

[@thevillaaston358]

Is it available for free?

[@Zeunknown1234]

Amazon link please.

[@niners.own.the.packers]

Had there been 1000 panzers, how would the under strength 82nd airborne have any hope in stopping it. If there was 1000 panzers surely the whole operation would have been scaled back or cancelled. As surely an army or even an army group would have been needed to combat it

[@johntillman6068]

The operation went ahead even with evidence of two SS Panzer divisions around Arnhem.

[@jsfbr]

Part of the process to reach a settlement on this matter should be understanding what kind of generals Browning and Gavin were, their states of mind at that moment, their yearnings, anxieties and recollections, their interpersonal dynamics etc. Those would be required to give minimal psychological basis to the theories under analysis. How distant or close/engaged was Browning? How much did trust, interfere, was willing to change propositions from his subordinates? How much did he trust Gavin? On a darker path, was he s career-oriented fellow? Was he prone to use arguments to defend himself when things went wrong that put the blame on his staff? Similar questions and others apply to Gavin as well. Whatever is the case, in the end, Browning was directly responsible for ensuring the mission was accomplished, so he will never be left out of this hook. The same is valid for Gavin as commander of the 82nd. It doesn't matter what said what: the responsibility falls on both generals, with weights subjected to dispute... But Gavin is certainly responsible, at the very least for not dispatching a fully capable fighting force to the Nijmegen bridge right after landing.

[@r-saint]

Beevor did this so his book made better sells in America. Duh?

[@TheImperatorKnight]

Haha

[@richardkappes6112]

I don't blame anyone individual in the battle . Blaming Gavin for plan that had fatal flaw is wrong. The failure lies in the plan that had British drop 12 miles from Arham. For any problem of dropping the southwest side bridge would been of set by what have what gotten. Easier and closer access to the bridge a blocking forces for SS panzer group moving to south

[@TheImperatorKnight]

The point is, the plan as it was could have worked, if Gavin had taken the bridge. But yes, the plan could have been better.

[@TheImperatorKnight]

And you're correct. Having the British drop closer to the Arnhem bridge, and block the panzers from rolling south is a good counter argument. Sadly, it's one that only a very select handful (maybe 5 people ever on my videos) have ever made. So congrats for identifying it!

[@FairladyS130]

The situation concerning Gavin is quite clear and has nothing to do with the overall plan which you are obviously using as a diversion so shut up.

[@johnstimitz2629]

Had there not been intelligence failures, prior to the start of Market Garden, such as the “1,000 tanks” in close proximity to the drop zones and the failure to report the presence of an extremely depleted, but still threatening 10th SS Panzer to the north, do you think Gavin would have acted differently? To the best of my knowledge, and please correct me if I’m wrong, Gavin was unaware of that threat from the north of Nijmegen. Also, would have not been better for Browning to stay “home” thereby allowing the 82nd to use the resources used by Browning, gliders and such for more glider infantry, anti tank units and airborne artillery that Gavin COULD have deployed to protect the landing zones? Looking forward to your reply and thanks in advance.

[@sean640307]

@@johnstimitz2629 I have always had that thought regarding Browning being there unnecessarily. Without being too blunt (or perhaps yes, being blunt), Gavin's decision to take the heights to effectively hold Browning's HQ could well have been nothing more than "sucking up to the boss". Either way, Browning's desire to seek the glory by being on-hand is a distraction they could have done without. Given the issues that 1st Para had, having more transports assigned to them would also have been a huge benefit. I just wish they had done like they did a Pegasus Bridge in Normandy and landed right next to it. Whilst it wasn't fatal, it was a serious deficiency. The bridge at Nijmegen was fatal, though.

[@MBCDC1]

The one and only reason paratroopers were dropped ahead of 30th Corps should have been to secure the way to Arnhem, and for that purpose the bridges on that way had to be taken - and this should have been the absolute main priority. If there were such grave concerns because of the mysterious 1000 tanks in the Reichswald vis-à-vis the Groesbeek-Heights, why not take one of the following two options? One option could have been to take a part of the big allied bomber fleet and bomb the living daylights out of Reichswald some hours prior to the landing and then let the 82nd focus on the bridge? I mean, 1000 tanks would have needed a lot of space to hide. A heavy bombardment would certainly have revealed the presence or non presence of such a large unit in the Reichswald in a more or less impressive manner. The more slick and less laborious variant would have been to simply better cooperate with the Dutch resistance and ask them to evaluate the situation in the Reichswald prior to the beginning of operation Market-Garden. Then Gavin could have sent a respectable force to the bridge right from the get go, and both he and Browning could have slept calmly from here on. Even if the time-schedule for the execution of Market-Garden was narrow (Monty is greeting…), this could have been done before, to give the airborne divisions the opportunity to focus on their main targets - the bridges.

[@christophermancini7380]

An excellent review as always TIK. I've just finished reading Beavor's book last week (but unfortunately cannot reference it exactly as it was a library loan). I have yet to read Robin Neillands book but have to; I did my graduate thesis on the Dieppe Raid and it's reasons for failure, and Neillands book on the subject was an excellent secondary reference. Growing up, I always looked at Ryan's A Bridge Too Far as the definitive work on Market-Garden, and yes, I was swayed by the Hollywood movie-which although better than most, seemed to want to pay every available American and Brit movie star to play bit parts. I do agree that the failure of the 82nd to take the bridge (or at least make a stronger effort too) on day one was fatal to the operation. I don't think this was Gavin's finest hour, and one wonders if the division's original commander Matt Ridgeway would have still been in control whether he would have not made Gavin's error. However, as Beavor points out, Browning had come along to Nijmegen with his massive caravan and was in overall command. Browning did seem to agree that holding Grosbeek Heights was of paramount importance, and did nothing according to Beavor to urge Gavin to send more men to take the bridge on that first day. I agree that Beevor is harsh on XXX Corps, and on Horrocks. He seems to imply that Horrocks was perhaps was overly fatigued and in pain from prior wounds, and uses a statement that he made later during the Battle of the Bulge (that may have been made in jest) to suggest that Horrocks made not have been in been in his right mind. Also, Beavor mentions in addition to the tea drinking that early on the second morning that Joe Vandeluer and his brother and a female correspondent went for a dip in a swimming pool before leading the Irish Guards that morning. If I'm not mistaken, there was a Bailey bridge that was still not completed yet? Beevor does mention though how XXX Corps had to repeatedly have to send tanks back south along the highway to help the American airborne units deal with the increasingly strong German armor counterattacks. I have always thought that a key to the operation was that XXX Corps needed strong flank protection, and that this was to be provided for on both sides of the highway. I read little on why these units were slow to advance and provide much needed support other than perhaps the lack of proper roads and having to deal with the myriad of canals may have held them up? Beavor's narrative however is excellent overall. He brings to light the effectiveness of the Dutch underground, who unlike partisans in other parts of Europe had no woods, swamps, or mountains to hide from German reprisals. Also Beavor highlights how quickly the Germans formed their ad hoc "kampfgrüppen," and how both the 9th and 10th SS Panzer divisions were indeed nearly devoid of any serviceable tanks at the beginning of the battle. The ability of the Germans to quickly reenforce Arnhem-Nijmegen with armor by rail (including more than one battalion of heavy King Tiger tanks) is astounding in face of Allied air supremacy (?), as these beasts had to drive a considerable distance from the nearest railheads. I have never heard that the First Airbourne also had to contend with air attacks by strafing German fighter planes? One would have thought that any Luftwaffe fighter would have been immediately pounced upon by supporting Allied fighters? Excuse me for going off on tangents as always! TIK, keep up the fine work as I always enjoy your videos and look forward to the next.

[@alhesiad]

I don't remember if you said it in the documentary, but from where Gavin gets his idea about the magical panzers in Reichswald?

[@TheImperatorKnight]

I do say, but the answer currently is "some report". I don't have more details than that at the moment.

[@GeographyCzar]

TIK This is central to the debate over whose fault it was that the Groosbeek Heights were so emphasized over the Nijmagen bridge. Gavin didn't come up with the 1,000 tanks story on his own. (In fact, I doubt if anyone believed it was that high, but the idea of large armored formations in a position where they could counterattack the allied flank from a concealed position is one the Germans might well have exploited thru counterintelligence activity even if they didn't actually have the force available.)

[@MarioMario-vn3fx]

I used to solely blame monty for the failure. Now my view has changed and may be biased because I'm an American but I mainly Blame Monty and Browning, though I can place some blame on Gavin on wanting to take the heights.

[@TheImperatorKnight]

Mario, that's fair. You can still blame Monty and Browning, just so long as you accept Gavin's role :) And Frank, the ratio is entirely up to you and your interpretation. I also put more emphasis on Gavin's role, but that's my opinion. I can't argue with someone if they still place the blame higher.

[@MarioMario-vn3fx]

Yeah, Browning really should've directly ordered Gavin to move on the bridge and to ignore the heights. I mainly go by your video review of Browning's career on that.

[@TheImperatorKnight]

Yes, exactly! But it seems Browning and Gavin were in agreement (unlike what Breevor's book says).

[@MarioMario-vn3fx]

Yeah. It is one of the great 'what ifs' of history if unknown to most people. If Gavin had gone for the bridge history might've changed. Though would the war be over earlier? eh, that is harder to say. since the Germans were preparing for the battle of the bulge, and the highway had already been cut several times already.

[@johnburns4017]

TIK, Brereton gets away Scot free. _Therefore, since the air planners - specifically Brereton and Major-General Paul L. Williams of the IX US Troop Carrier Command -_ *_had the casting vote over the air element in Market,_* _the decision was made for Arnhem, the target town for a thrust north from the narrow bridgehead over the Meuse-Escaut canal east of Antwerp,_ - Neillands, Robin. The Battle for the Rhine 1944 Monty came out with Operation Comet, which was _multiple_ crossings of the Rhine around Wesel. Eisenhower was receptive. This morphed into Market Garden, a single crossing of the Rhine. Brereton and Major-General Paul L. Williams were highly instrumental in the plan, overruling Monty.

[@theodosius1017]

I was inspired to dust off my copy of The Operational Art of War and give the Market Garden senario a go. Dropping at both ends of the bridges makes a huge difference. In my playthrough 1Ab gets pushed back to Elst. 10SS uses the ferry at Osterbeek to get onto the Island. What does come across is logistics and artillery. 30 Corp still has to run up and down the line fending off weak but persistent kampgruppe. Easy to beat but each battle takes up time and supplies. The 82 and 101 can't be everywhere and the German units can easily infiltrate and cut the road. What was interesting was that denied the oportunity to occupy Nimjengen 10SS moves to the East joins up with the odds and sods near Gross beck and pushes into Nimjengen. Once 30 Corps artillery comes up though it's all over. Because the airborne are dropped on the objectives and are not expended in head on street fighting attacks you end up having lots of relatively fresh infantry backed by artillery to push on and clear the Germans from the Island. This is of course a computer game and Elmer (as the PO is lovingly called) is not that bright but it does give a useful perspective.

[@parkjk2]

I’m having trouble with a bit of tautology in your analysis which I otherwise find compelling. You seem to conclude that Gavin’s decision to secure the heights first and the bridge second was ultimately to blame for the failure of Market Garden because there was no actual threat from the heights. Well, of course that is true at its most reductionist. However, if it can be confirmed that there was a genuine belief that there were a thousand German tanks in the Heights, then Gavin’s actions at Nijmegen were wholly justified. His delay in sending troops to secure the bridge was a result of the time it took for him to determine there was no actual threat, or that there was less of a threat, from the supposed thousand tanks in the heights. An argument could be made that he perhaps took too long to make that determination, or that it was unreasonable to have believed there were that many German tanks there in the first place, but those are not the arguments you are explicitly making-only alluding to tangentially-as far as I can tell. In fact, you admit you do not know why Gavin believed there were a thousand tanks in the Heights, but that it was a sincerely held belief by many at the time not just him. Only in retrospect and with the benefit of hindsight do we get to say Gavin should have moved on the bridge sooner and with greater numbers because the German threat from the heights was illusory. But at the time it would have been tactically foolhardy to ignore the gravest threat believed to exist and move on the bridge before that threat was neutralized. To have done so, and had their intelligence about the thousand tanks been true, would have caused the wholesale slaughter of Gavin’s paratroopers and 30 Corp (in my opinion) in addition to the outcome at Arnhem. The question later facing Gavin at his inevitable court martial would have been Why did you ignore the thousand German tanks in the Heights you were briefed beforehand were there? His answer would be far less defensible than to the question Why did you decide to secure the Heights first and not the bridge?-a decision you seem to be faulting him for now, many decades later, with the benefit of hindsight and perfect intelligence. I do agree with you that his subsequent assertion that he ordered the 508 to take the bridge pre-drop seems to be a cover-up, but to me he was covering-up for the time it took him to confirm the German threat from the heights was not real, not that he chose to secure the heights before the bridge in the first place. This would also explain why he has insisted 30 Corp was behind schedule before reaching Nijmegen. Gavin needed a way to downplay his “delay” in confirming the falsity of the intelligence he was given.

[@gaslightstudiosrebooted3432]

Rundtstedt: Bittrich's Panzer Korps will need some rest if they are to stop Patton..... Arnhem! (Puts the card bearing the 2nd SS Panzer Korps on the map) Arnhem.

[@costaricanaturephotography3027]

I've researched this decision as much as I think possible and still have no idea if it was just a random chance he chose Arnhem or if there was some intelligence he had seen/read that influenced his decision. Any ideas?

[@nickdanger3802]

11.40 XXX Corps scout cars arrived at GRAVE, 13 miles from the Waal bridges (on current map by route taken). At this point XXX Corps had averaged just over one mile per hour, if it had continued at that pace it would have arrived at Arnhem bridge at around 0800 on the day Frosts' men ran out of ammo and lost control of the north end. Current maps have distance at 70 miles and not the 64 usually cited. photo Arnhem bridge pbs.twimg.com/media/CsonTzeWYAAabjc.jpg:large

[@bigwoody4704]

Good find ND

[@nickdanger3802]

@@bigwoody4704 Look up: Netherlands 17-25 September 1944 uk

[@bigwoody4704]

@@nickdanger3802 you're preaching to the choir.I'm trying to stay off his pathetic platforms his response to TS Birksby told anyone all they need to know and I quote "TIK wrote Birkly, I've replied to your messages. The formal orders don't change anything. I'm not sure what you're getting at. *You've provided evidence, but no argument.* Nick the fooking evidence is the argument.He's starting to make Ribbentrop and Molotov look good

[@jsfbr]

(1) My brother is about to return from vacationing in GB, and he's bringing Beevor's book on Arnhem to me. Listening to this video for the second time so I can properly interpret it's content. (2) As I commented earlier, it took me a while to grasp the relevance of 82nd's failure to take the bridge at the first day. That's how errors are perpetuated as truths, and why history demands careful and constant revision. Thanks for your participation in it. (3) I'd like to know why Market Garden is so appealing. I don't. But it is an epic that attracts me like a powerful magnet. Yes, maybe it's exactly that: it's an epic story.

[@bringyourownbrilliance4353]

This is another fantastic presentation in my not-so-humble opinion. I would like to "cherry pick" the reference to the "1000 German tanks" in the Reichswald area? The question which was inspired is and suggestion perhaps for another video? What was the status and effectiveness of reconnaissance operations before the plan of Market Garden? Cherry picking again; there was mention during this presentation relating to the information forwarded by the Dutch underground network. Finally, returning to the status and role of reconnaissance; how did it compare to the reconnaissance leading up to say, another critical battle: the operational plans leading up to the battle of Dieppe of August 19, 1942? Thank you.

[@oddballsok]

10:19 btw...having 3000 men, halftracks with 20 mm (TWENTY MM!!!) fastfiring antiaircraft guns , Armoured cars !!; and RUSSIAN antitank-guns ..my bet is that collection is a SERIOUS DEADLY threat to perhaps "elite" UNPROTECTED paratroopers that have NO TANKS, NO ARMOURED CARS (but jeeps) , NO ARTILLERY (but small mortars) ... Djeeesh..talking about being biased... I bet the "luftwaffe" personal KNOWS how to use the damn flak guns on their trucks ?!?!? Or were they Luftwaffe cooks and luftwaffe stenographers ??? three thousand cooks and stenographers ????

[@oddballsok]

and then 11:10 ...this attack SOMEHOW GAINED..(!!!!) local successes...DUH ! somehow ?!? Against the ELITE 82nd??? Geesh, I wonder how this was possible ? With these collection of old men, cooks and trucks and guns pushing through the FORREST? Where the ELITE 82nd is in THEIR element ?!?!?! Oh my...maybe you suffer from ill bias too... Anything pushed to serve YOUR biased conclusion. Reality/truth isn't that. You claim yourself, keep the OPEN mind.

[@bigwoody4704]

@@oddballsok Thank You for your candor in pointing out the reality. It's convenient for some to have blame pre assigned to get their hero off of the hook. The 1st 55-60 miles of this debacle are being ignored by most here - that put the operation back 24 hrs.But the real Culprit - Montgomery was no where around as his plan came apart by the seams at many points/places

[@mihaiserafim]

Wow! What a turn out this is! Great video Lewis! BUT I have to take a star from the five for the following error: you didn't shed any light on how a company lost their way in the city? This is one big WTF moment. Try to do better next time! :)

[@TheImperatorKnight]

Haha sorry! But Lost at Nijmegen has you covered there ;)

[@mihaiserafim]

TIK :) Thanks!

[@alexandershorse9021]

Hi TIK The problem with Beevor is he is a good story teller but he never lets the facts get in the way of a good story. That is the answer to your question about Nijmegan. I have read several of Beevor's books - Stalingrad, Berlin and Arnhem. After a while you realise Beevor uses a lot of stock phrases and basically makes stuff up. Some of his descriptions, especially in Stalingrad, of what was going on in German bunkers are clearly fiction. He couldn't know and gives no sources. His descriptions of field hospitals are very similar in Stalingrad and Berlin. He has a weird obsession with Christmas celebrations and so on. You were part of the debunking with your Pavlov's House vid. I wasn't surprised. He casts people as heroes or villains. In Arnhem Gavin is cast as a hero and Browning as a villain. In Stalingrad Paulus is the villain and Chuikov a hero. This is not a good way to write history but makes for a good read.

[@williestyle35]

Beevor can frame a story on history well. I never liked his Stalingrad book for similar reasons though, he includes things that are not recorded in any sources. This is not really uncommon in some historical storytellers works ( Stephan Ambrose, et al.). Which reminds me of Maj Gen Gavin's story about 1 000 tanks ..

[@user-dc1ud6px3s]

Interesting how the movie portrayed American paratroopers as heroes with cando attitude, and British tankers as slow and sluggish. I guess the production had the American box office in mind.

[@thevillaaston7811]

Yep.

[@bigwoody4704]

Instead of covering Monty's behind like this place

[@RobbyHouseIV]

I think the decision to drop the paratroopers so far from the objective points due to concerns about anti-aircraft fire is the real culprit for the Market Garden fiasco. I've read where in some cases paratroopers were dropped 7 or 8 miles from where they needed to be. Surely this span of "safety distance" away from the anti-aircraft batteries clustered around the several bridges to be captured was excessive and could have been closer while still maintaining a safe margin. But that's just me with my armchair generalship. ;-)

[@TheImperatorKnight]

That was at Arnhem. And yes, this is why I said the Arnhem drop was a disaster (apart from Frost's units). Those drop zones were way too far from the objective. They could and should have landed some of the paras south of Arnhem.

[@costaricanaturephotography3027]

Very good points. I doubt XXX Corp even get to the bridge but if they did, think you are entirely correct. They could have also destroyed the bridge with tank/artillery fire if it came to that.

[@fazole]

Bevoor states that the landing zones were too far away at Arnhem. In fact his view is that the whole thing got off on the wrong foot from the beginning from poor planning with out of date info. Things as simple as planning 2 drops per day and then realising the days were shorter in September and that the distances involved were too great for the tow planes to drag two gliders.

[@fazole]

I think you should watch the video I mentioned. I admit that I have not read the book, so I only have a glimpse of Bevoor's points. He does state that he believes it is quite possible that Monty was suffering from a "high function Asperger's syndrome". He bases this on statements, such as Monty's sister, from those who knew him.

[@fazole]

Perhaps, the fact that Monty did not seem to really keep a firm hand on the events of M-G is a criticism. I have heard Bevoor criticise the Americans, though not as strongly as the British. He stated Eisenhower did not establish who was in charge of certain operations and as a result the generals were battling rivals at time. He does seem to hold the British military officers of the time in quite a bit of disdain. He states it was more of a gentlemen's club based on breeding rather than brains or ability. I think this is true to an extent. The British had Monty and the Yanks had MacArthur to deal with,

[@user-do3wt9sk7t]

QUESTION I wish someone would answer did Stalin was planning to attack Germany in 1942 before Barbarossa'

[@tenarmurk]

جرائم وحوادث there is a Video on that on that on his channel

[@user-do3wt9sk7t]

Ten Armurk great

[@andygass9096]

No evidence Stalin was planning to attack Germany , all the indications were that he was playing for time while building up his forces for the inevitable showdown.

[@Rohilla313]

جرائم وحوادث This was a myth propagated by Victor Suvorov (not his real name) in his book “Icebreaker”. The myth has been laid to rest when David Glantz published his “Stumbling Colossus”. There isn’t a scrap of reliable evidence that Stalin was planning a preemptive strike on Germany before Barbarossa.

[@roodborstkalf9664]

Unclear, it plausible but i haven't seen conclusive evidence.

[@AlphonseZukor]

Maybe the book and film "A Bridge Too Far" had an affect on the British historians of Beevor's generation and certain things were just taken for granted. It would be interesting to ask Beevor about his conclusions. Maybe he mentions it in one of his book tour videos.

[@stevengrant4651]

Up to this point in the war most successful airborne operations against bridges landed very close to them. Here in Market Garden the troops were landed miles away from the bridges. Now everyone wants to blame Gavin. If the bridge was considered that important then there should have been a plan to take the bridge. In Arnhem they had a plan. On the face of it a not very smart plan, but still a plan. You can blame Gavin for not being aggressive enough but he didn't come up with the plan.

[@MelvinWillikers]

Gavin said he said a lot and he seems to be at the centre of the mess. I think the damming thing for Gavin is him blaming everyone and their granny.

[@TheImperatorKnight]

That's another point. It definitely comes across as someone trying to squirm out of a tight spot.

[@boredtodeathwth]

Dude, I played Close Combat: A Bridge Too Far. I need no books!

[@briancoleman971]

Me too! lol . It is clear though when you play this game that the British paratroopers holding the bridge by no means controlled enough to allow easy crossing by 30 corps. A few Stugs could have prevented any crossing of the bridge, at least until enough artillery was up.

[@larsmathiesen8999]

I can not explain Beevor's conclusions because he writes that Gavin has the "Tiger Paranoia" from the encounter with the Herman Goring Tigers in Sicily and orders the antitank guns in in the 1st drop. But he do not write about that the Dutch resistance movement had been compromised some time before that so the London based intelligence services tended not to believe the reports from them. So the report of no tanks in the woods was ignored as well as the reports about the 9 and 10 SS Div. seems like SOP to ignore Dutch reports at the time. But it seems very possible the Gavin was paranoid as hell abut Tigers coming out of the wood because he knew that only the Sherman Firefly would have any chance against it. When you see accounts after North Africa it seems that every German artillery piece is a 88 and especially after Villers Boncage every German tank is a Tiger (even the accounts about Frost states that he knocks outs Tigers with a PIAT, but it was actually just Stugs) So even today Tigers and 88s have a mythical status in peoples minds, in reality it should probably be the "ripping cloth" sound off a MG42 that should be the symbol of death in WW2

[@markkelly9621]

Maybe I am being cynical but is the book on sale in the US?? Very good video btw. Your videos on Arnhem seem to suggest that contrary to the widely accepted consensus, that the plan for the Operation was relatively solid, at least not a disaster waiting to happen.

[@juliusEST]

Awesome video, as always! Also, is it done yet? :D

[@TheImperatorKnight]

Haha sadly not :)