'Artillery conquers, infantry occupies': British Artillery at 3rd Ypres | Simon Shephard

[@Splodge542]

Clarity and detail. I love it when professional soldiers address us. Alanbrooke "talked fast, thought fast and walked fast". It really gives you an idea of how intelligent these men had to be to devise the artillery plan. And yet they could not deliver victory.

[@gb3007]

According to the bn war diary the 20th DLI were called up from division reserve to assault Tower Hamlets at the battle of menin rd. The war diary claims that they gained the slope but were unable to summit due to heavy casualties and heavy fire dominating the heights. My gt grandfather fought there, he was a runner/bugler in the 20th DLI. This video has been informative and helps add to the picture of what he, and the rest of the British empire forces who fought at Ypres, had to witness and endure. Thanks

[@jonathanmarsh5955]

Thank you, Simon, for that very clear and informative presentation.

[@naikhanomtom7552]

I'm about to join the Royal artillery and found this whilst doing some research. Loved it, thank you.

[@Grendel650]

Fabulously informative lecture! Thank you.

[@aaroninlatin]

Great presentation. I am always interested in learning more on Third Ypres.

[@Chiller01]

I’m 4 months late but I found this presentation highly informative. The intricacy of the artillery planning is certainly impressive. It’s interesting that the Canadian perspective of Passchendaele is largely negative. Arthur Currie, who was at times dismissive of the British general staff, was reticent to make the attack. He predicted 16,000 Canadian casualties for little or no strategic effect. He was eerily accurate on the first count. The second I suppose is open to debate but I tend to side with Currie. The presenter addresses the tactical and operational aspects of the artillery component of this battle exceptionally well. The strategic objectives and outcomes are not, I suppose, in the purview of this lecture.

[@CalicoJack1803]

Wonderful lecture. Thank you!

[@dermotrooney9584]

Sparkling! Thanks very much. 👍

[@scottn7cy]

Very well done. Thank you for sharing this!

[@evanwain1471]

Yes Great Work!!

[@kennethmilne6787]

Very interesting and informative , thank you, my Grandad was in the 91st Siege Battery , I know they went to Gallipoli but after that I'm not 100% sure of their whereabouts , but I'm working on it

[@JHamList]

Awesome presentation! Very well laid out and informative!

[@philipryan25]

Thank you

[@yukikaze3436]

RFC communiques 1915-1916 and 1917-1918 both have mentions of RFC Squadrons spotting for Siege batteries (usually). There was a picture of a 124 Siege battery 9.2 inch howitzer the RFC Communiques 1917-1918 28 December 1917 21 Squadron spotting for them 2 oks on a hostile battery damage 2 pits and causing 3 explosions.

[@marktuffield6519]

I think I am right in saying that the Kite Balloon Sections were part of the RFC, not the RE at the point under discussion.

[@yukikaze3436]

A fine presentation!

[@davidjackson563]

You have the terms large scale and small scale reversed. Its a fraction. Small scale shows large areas at less detail. Large scale shows smaller areas at greater detail (former artillery officer and Cartoghrapher for 37 years).

[@gregforrester4851]

how long did it take to "lay"a 65 lb gun &how long did it take to fire and reload a 65lb gun.?

[@sharlin648]

These numbers boggle the mind when it comes to the sheer number of guns and men involved, also question, how big were these artillery batteries in terms of numbers of guns, I assume with the heavier guns like the 9.2 and 12/15-inch BL Howitzers it was only a handful of weapons?

[@simonshephard2727]

18-per and 4.5” batteries were established for 6 guns as were many of the large calibre guns. However once you get to railway mounted guns these could range from 3 down to 1 gun per battery.

[@RIZALDURPAY]

Good luck....

[@Aubury]

Bite and hold ? Was Haig right to attack here ? Should he have called Ypres 3 off sooner ? Cambrai, with more reserves a better option ? To much hind sight by me ? Excellent lecture .

[@beeldpuntXVI]

De slag van de Mesen rug or battle of messing ridge in juni or June a month earlier was very successful. 19 underground mines exploded and where felt to London. 2 still remain,… waiting to explode today. This was in preparation of the 3 battle of Ypres. So lots of preparation. Everything was looking fine at than moment and once an offencicive this magnitude is planned, it’s difficult very difficult to call of. Al the men in place, field hospitals, supply chains,… is established…. Afterward in 2021 its simple but even whit our level of communication, supply chain etc itc very difficult to redirect.

[@alganhar1]

Hind sight is certainly part of it, it is difficult sometimes to remember the constraints, especially technological that the commanders of the day worked under. i do tend to think that Haig did keep 3rd Ypres going longer than it should have, but then I also think he learned that lesson and applied that the following year when he wound down Amiens despite French objections once German resistance had started to stiffen. As for the bite and hold, problem was two fold by the middle of the war. First is those defences were in depth. more than twenty miles deep in many places. Both sides could penetrate the others defences but breaking through was all but impossible due to a few main problems. Problem 1) Cavalry was obsolete in its traditional role, but there was no valid replacement. I know people point to tanks and argue that they could replace the Cavalry bur even in 1918 this was not the case. They were simply too slow and too unreliable. They were a shock weapon that rapidly lost its edge as breakdowns and combat casualties whittled their numbers down. As a result there was no rapid exploitation force that was really capable of causing mayhem in the enemies rear areas. Second issue is linked to the first, speed. The attacks were conducted at leg speed of the infantry. Problem is both France and Germany had literally designed their railway systems with a mind towards future potential war with each other, so there were a lot of lateral connections. This made it easier for the defender to gather and concentrate reserves and reinforcements far, far faster than the attacker could consolidate. Even the big and tactically relatively successful Spring Offensives were stopped in large part because of this, though lack of supplies and the fact the German infantry started outrunning its artillery support also played significant roles.