Arguments of Indirect Skepticism

[@alittax]

Thank you for your superb videos!

[@3DMint]

Yeah, I'm not sure if self-referential claims or specifically the self-referential claim in P3 expresses a proposition. Since by definition proposition are bearers of truth or falsity.

[@3DMint]

Of your first argument*

[@Paradoxarn.]

My original objection (that skepticism hinders philosophical progress) was answered very eloquently in this video. I'm now convinced that my objection has been rebutted successfully. On that note however, I would like to point out that point out that you are in danger of presenting a false dichotomy as skeptics and dogmatists as you defined them doesn't exhaust all possibilities. I'm not accusing you of anything but I would like to point out that I don't identify with either. I'm not a skeptic since I believe knowledge is possible and I'm not a dogmatist since I'm more than willing to change my mind, abandon or add axioms and reform my epistemic position when presented with a problem. I think that in your video "Pyrrho and the Academics" you called those who weren't skeptics dogmatists or epistemists. I would like to suggest that you should hold these two to be distinct. Both would believe that knowledge is possible but the dogmatists would be epistemists who doesn't think that any of their beliefs needs to change even if their beliefs cause problems such as contradictions. I wrote another comment in response to your arguments in your previous video. Edit: I would like to point out that if indirect skeptics all have a "proclivity" for epistemic nihilism (not caring if they know) and everyone became indirect skeptics the problem would still remain. I note this since you wrote a comment saying you skeptics lack any proclivity to form beliefs. This would imply they lack any proclivity to form true beliefs, which worries me.

[@alwaysgreatusa223]

The supposed 'proposition' that asserts 'this proposition is false' is not logically a proposition at all. This is because the proposition that asserts 'all propositions are true or false' is a logical proposition -- which is to say it is analytic, not synthetic. In other words, being true or false is the essence of a proposition. Any supposed 'proposition' that results in a self-contradiction is not logically a proposition at all. Supposed 'propositions' that result in a self-contraction only appear to be propositions, yet they do not result in any meaningful statement, thus they are not real propositions at all. The supposed 'proposition that asserts 'this proposition is false' does not result in a meaningful statement, as it is simply meaningless to assert the falseness of an assertion that has no subject other than itself.

[@quad9363]

Can the dialetheist's position be proven unjustified by a contradiction?

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

There is a distinction to be made between the dialetheist who believes that some but not all contradictions are acceptable, and the trivialist who believes all statements are true. We can show bad contradictions for the former. The latter is nonsensical and I have yet to find someone that holds it.

[@polemizator723]

Notes. 1:08 I don't know is there contradiction. I can be wrong about it. Mayby the laws of logic are non contradict (Tarski proposition for example) and assert dogmatoc position is true knowledge. But there is no way to doubt dogmatic position. (Wittgenstein on certanity) 3:03 nagation P3. What means ,,arbitrary"?. 7:06 ,,showing"? How is it possible to show somethink? Susepnd jugment. Maybybthere is no showing. 4:49 Useless is cool 12:34 Mayby dogmatst are right. Mayby even from pragmatist point of view, it is correcr. I see no way that sceptic can show that dogmatist are wrong.

[@andystitt3887]

The Matrix sounds good.

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

+3DMint If you want to engage in discussion you really should make it possible to respond to your comments. First: If you think that the third premise doe snot express a proposition, then replace it with "the proposition is false" does not express a proposition and you will have the same problem. kzbin.info/www/bejne/g6Svgn59msSUn9k Second; for the second argument, the arguments against the foundationalists can be found here (kzbin.info/www/bejne/j3-pqoR6bd-roa8) and the arguments against a version of falliblism can be found here (kzbin.info/www/bejne/q2GogHlra9eifqs) Third as to P7d, this seems equivalent to simply saying that some belief in an inexhaustible set is true, which seems very similar to one of the really vague but hard to doubt statements is true. How do you doubt the claim that "something is true" is true? Here's my video on doubting hard to doubt claims like this. kzbin.info/www/bejne/jp-Tf6aVbamLd8k Fourth, I never claim to know that the rebuttals defeat the objections, any more than I claim to know that the objections actually challenge the arguments. I don't claim to know that I have succeeded. I'm simply presenting arguments that seem to work. They very well might not.

[@3DMint]

Oh. How do you make replying to comments possible?

[@Elgeneralsimo69]

"If the conclusion is that we don't know why the universe appears to follow laws, then the skeptic has done their job" A trivial job. To doubt is trivial; I can doubt things rationally and irrationally since doubt is a belief regardless of your claims otherwise and beliefs can be rational and irrational. In a sense all you have proven is that anytime we multiply any number by zero, it will return zero and then using this fact to say that we can't trust any number since it can always be made zero. This is like your position since I can (trivially) doubt everything then (trivially) I can't trust anything. *It is OVERCOMING DOUBT that is the true measure of the skeptic and not just how many doubts they can collect or expose.* At the end of the day, a skeptics job to _expose doubt_ is very important as a corollary to a scientist who's job is to _invalidate doubt_. But like a scientist is skeptical about somethings and others, a skeptic must also be balanced and while their focus must remain on the skeptical side, they too must embrace some non-skeptical ideas in order to compliment the scientist in their pursuit IMO. 10:42 I disagree it is they who deny contradiction; I believe it is you. After all, to "believe a contradiction" is to believe that p and ~p are both true... the very definition of irrational! Thus the skeptic is the one that is imposing the DEFINITION that a contradiction is irrational. A non-skeptic would simply use a logical system where that contradiction was not irrational (such as fuzzy logic as you mention or heyting logic/algebra as I've mentioned before). This is at the heart of what I think you are saying at the end of the video, 11:22 onwards.

[@3DMint]

Your second argument unwarrantedly assumes that a justification of beliefs has to be inferred and can't be non-inferential which begs the question against foundationalism.

[@3DMint]

Also, why assume that justification can't be defensible huh? You keep begging the question against fallibilists who recognise that we're fallible but argue that doesn't mean we don't have knowledge.

[@3DMint]

+3DMint defeasible* not defensible

[@KabeloMoiloa]

Hmm. If I had to formalise my current worldview in a way that is amenable to indirect skepticism, I would do it as follows 1) Intuitionistic type theory is a consistent language for describing the world around us 2) Cox's theorem shows that this language has a unique sub-language called "probability theory" for truth-tracking reasoning under uncertainty, where "truth-track reasoning under uncertainty" is defined using the axioms of Cox's theorem. 3) The human mind is close enough to a "truth-tracking reasoner," for my beliefs about many things to be close approximations to what is actually true. These propositions for a coherent set of empirical and mathematical theories, that can be used to found beliefs (founders tim) Intuitionistic type theory says the extended liar paradox, and all meta-liar paradoxes are meaningless, I don't really seem problem with this. But I'm curious on how you would counter this, I'm sure you have some clever argument :)

[@3DMint]

Also you face a huge undercutting defeater to your rebuttals to the objections. How do you know that these rebut the objections? Perhaps we all can see why your responses fail but you? See, you can never escape the charge that scepticism is an undercutting defeater of itself.

[@3DMint]

Regarding P7d, one can define x as the set of all alternatives and the claim is then trivially true

[@DevinBigSeven]

P3 '..."This proposition is false"...' seems like nonsense to me because "This proposition" is referring to something that is incomplete, not a proposition. You could restate it as "Px := The proposition, Px, is false". The Px reference has not yet been instantiated; it is still being formed, so the statement is not a valid proposition. To make it a proposition, you could also rewrite it as "Px := There exists a proposition Px, s.t. Px is false", which is false because Px just a symbol when the reference is made. Px will be a proposition only after the statement is complete. An alternative might be an infinite self-referential statement where you substitute in for the reference Px in "Px := The proposition, Px, is false", with "The proposition, Px, is false", and then substitute again and again and so on; but again Px would never become a proposition; it is an incomplete or non-terminating statement, "The proposition ('The proposition (...) is false') is false". So P3 is fallacious because what "The proposition" refers to is not a proposition.

[@necro6392]

FIRST. Good video enjoying this series buddy.

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

Frantic Absurdity Awesome. Thanks for watching man.

[@no.neutrality.apologetics900]

Attempting to make an argument that evades belief is the biggest shoot yourself in the face fallacy that has ever been contrived. It's the axiom behind the axiom that one cannot get behind. It's why even in your dreams when logic is seemingly absent to assess bizarre scenarios, you either believe that the dream is real or you believe that it is all a dream. But nevertheless, you believe and you believe that you believe that you believe not that you believe that you believe belief that you believe . . . . . . uhm, yeah so I can't do that many transcendent reflections but you get the point :)

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

Why do you believe that I must believe something to make a statement? Certainly I could be a philosophical zombie (kzbin.info/www/bejne/jYG3aYyBo7FoobM) and have no mental states whatsoever, so why is it so difficult to think that I simply lack the mental state "believe". There are so many other mental states. Simply because analytic philosophy focuses so intensely on belief, it does not mean that other propositional attitudes do not exist or that they cannot be used to argue or live. Furthermore, it does not seem that either I believe that there is an odd number of humans alive right now or I believe that there is not an odd umber of humans alive right now. It seems that I can lack either belief. (Here's a similar argument but in the context of religion: kzbin.info/www/bejne/pnzSaHl4iqebgbM) And when I lack such a belief, I'm skeptical of Doxastic Logic Axiom 4.2 that I must believe that I lack such a belief (kzbin.info/www/bejne/g2KypYGbd86AfZo).

[@no.neutrality.apologetics900]

Why??? The same reason why the liar's paradox fails to debunk the LEM and LNC. In your response to me, you have just stated- "I believe that it is true that, it is certainly possible that I could be a philosophical zombie and have no mental states whatsoever." (1) IF you make the case that not every proposition, or even any proposition, has the inherit "I believe that, it is true that" claim within the proposition then we don't, or won't, agree on the definition of a proposition and no reconciliation is logically possible (since we both understand that logical progression requires a position of agreeance to proceed from) All other propositions you made here I defer to this argument as well. (2) IF you direct me to your videos on doxastic or epistemic modal logic (which you did and I happily watched them :) then you're assuming that I agree with the model of either of which I am making my argument in (1) I do not and here's why. The model shows double negation as a means to reverse to position based on the principles we use in math. But that's not the error in and of itself. This assumes that each preceding belief is on the same level plain of reflection to do so, which they are not. Each reflection is the meta language of the belief being reflected upon. Each added layer of belief about what is believed, is transcendent or outside of the previous reflection. It's the same reason that, for ex. "The statement after this statement, is false." "The statement preceding this statement, is true." . . . fails to debunk the LNC and LEM yet again. One of the statements is the reflective meta statement on the other, therefore, only one is actually referring to the other. If you disagree with this, then it would seem that you have to agree that any value of T or F placed on a statement is not meta language but subject to the proposition in reference, and therefore actually part of the proposition as whole. And to this I refer back to (1) since we do not agree on what constitutes a proposition. I will concede that it may be possible to have zero beliefs regarding anything conceptually. I do not know nor do I know that I believe so, or believe that I know so. The problem which arises for you (or even myself in saying so even though I do not claim to be a skeptic) as the skeptic, is that you cannot posit on them by any spoken or written language in accordance to logic while avoiding having propositions that reflect what you believe. The scriptures actually go much deeper into these aspects if you wanted to be challenged further but here is a summation. The heart/spirit drives desire/motive. Desire/Motive drives hope. Hope drives belief. And that's only half of the equation. The other half involves how the Mind compels belief. And the two forming belief, results in choices based on the belief. That essentially means we do not choose what we believe. Our choices on which we act/don't act of "free will" are only choices that follow directly we believe is the case. This is consistent throughout scripture since logic comes from the Logos of Theos, the creator of all things. (I brought this up because I won't pretend to be neutral in my beliefs of Christ, which it seems you already realized is the case :) I would enjoy a civil debate with you on all this but I doubt either of us have the time. Enjoying the correspondence as such, and thx for responding!

[@encouraginglyauthentic43]

​@@no.neutrality.apologetics900 They didn't say that they believe they're a philosophical zombie. Stop trying to win the argument and actually comprehend.

[@rodolfo9916]

What if dialetheism is true, then there isn't any problem in beliving logical contradictions.

[@jimbouzoukas]

When you construct the first reductio ad absurdum against the law of excluded middle, you need a belief in the law of non contradiction and in the process of "if-then". Where do I go wrong?

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

jimbouzoukas They are all included in the first line of the reductio (along with all other laws of logic) that's why we can't dogmatically deny the LEM, We don't know which law of logic is the problem.

[@danielcappell]

In objection V, you espouse redefining "knowledge" so that that is attainable (because the knowledge described by current convention definitions are not actually attainable). Could we not also redefine "belief" so that beliefs are not dogmatic?

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

You might redefine beliefs so that they are probabilistic, saying that we can have degrees of belief, but that will have its own problems. Check out my series on Bayesian Epistemology for more on that. kzbin.info/www/bejne/j4PdaZebnq9obac

[@_pink_clovers]

I fall along very similar lines to you but it seems you can avoid the issue of TLP by simply saying that it may be the case that not all collections of words are propositions, and that TLP is not actually a proposition, and that, while a grammatically complete statement, it is not a logically complete proposition.

[@andystitt3887]

Isn’t suspending judgement a judgment in itself?

[@owlnyc666]

No. That is a tautology . I think?😀😉

[@encouraginglyauthentic43]

Do you know what judgment is.

[@alwaysgreatusa223]

So, what you believe is that you can argue without beliefs.

[@encouraginglyauthentic43]

Verify the existence of beliefs.

[@alwaysgreatusa223]

@@encouraginglyauthentic43 Verify the existence of anything.

[@encouraginglyauthentic43]

@@alwaysgreatusa223 Now you see why your first comment was useless.

[@alwaysgreatusa223]

@@encouraginglyauthentic43 No, I don't

[@alwaysgreatusa223]

@@encouraginglyauthentic43 What makes you believe verification is critical ?

[@Lugyfour]

Aren't you able to "save" the laws of logic by changing the second assumption? P2) The laws of logic require statements which can only have the proposition true or false but neither both nor none of them. This way you simply limit where logic applies and where it cannot be used by definition.

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

This will just lead into a version of the liar's revenge paradox. Basically, take something like the statement "Either this statement is false or the laws of logic do not apply to it (note this is an inclusive or))." It can't be true, because if it was true, then it can't be false and the laws of logic must apply to it. It can't be false since then it would be true and the laws of logic would apply to it, but we already said that the laws of logic can't apply to statements which are both true and false. But it also must be a statement to which the laws of logic apply, because if it was not it would be true. Here's more on the liar's revenge: kzbin.info/www/bejne/g6Svgn59msSUn9k

[@COEXISTential]

Quick question re: "The Proposition 'This Proposition is False' is neither true nor false." Could this not be resolved by resorting to your premises in your second argument? Specifically P3 and P4. The above proposition is both self-referential and circular, and is therefore not a logical statement. Failing that, could all self-referential statements, or at least all self-refuting statements, be a special class of proposition that is just a by-product of the way our language works? Isn't this just another iteration of Bertrand Russell's issue with sets that couldn't include themselves? (I hadn't seen the Bertrand Russell outro until after I wrote that.) Indeed, your subsequent point about LEM/Fuzzy Logic effectively makes this point. The Sorites paradox illustrates the problem with LEM vs. natural language pretty well, does it not? Your self-refuting proposition, then, could just be seen as a very lean Sorites paradox.

[@PotterSuppositionalist]

The principle of Excluded Middle only matters to bivalent logic systems. It isn't necessary in Fuzzy Logic because that is a many-valued logic system. The principle of Excluded Middle states that all propositions are ether true or false and nothing else. It doesn't matter if the statement itself is circular. While you could devise a system in which self-referential propositions are not allowed, not all versions of the Paradox do so. The Liar Cycle refers to other statements.

[@ElectricQualia]

The liar paradox has more solutions than one can think of, none of which conclude the laws of logic are false (which is self-defeating). 2 solutions that appeal to me are Tarski's hierarchy of languages and metalanguages, and contextualism. In any case your proof suffers from underdetermination and confirmation holism, as in a conjunction of the laws of logic which leads to a contradiction, doesn't tell you which law is the incorrect one, nor does it tell you if it is one of the other background assumptions which was false. It could simply be 1 law of logic like the LEM, which isn't really a law, OR you have a false implicit background assumption.

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

ElectricQualia Tarski's solution has its own problems. The Liar's Revenge paradox is one. kzbin.info/www/bejne/g6Svgn59msSUn9k Yablo's paradox is another: kzbin.info/www/bejne/iaqnn32opbGLmtk And I agree that the problem of underdetermination is there, and that's why I don't conclude outright that the laws of logic are false. I suspend judgement because I don't know which leads to a contradiction. Underdetermination is fun! kzbin.info/www/bejne/maCbkpd_g7V2pNU

[@ElectricQualia]

Carneades.org Revenge paradoxes and Yablo's paradox are problems for para-complete and para-consistent solutions, not for Tarski's. Tarski's solution follows form the "undefinability theorem", most objections to it are stylistic rather than formal objections. Its the most elegant way out of the problem. I agree on underdetermination. However, it isn't just the laws of logic, there are many background implicit assumptions which could also be fallacious. For example, 1- that laws of logic are self referential or 2- that doxastic voluntarism is true or that 3- truth can be well defined from within a formal language at least as strong as arithmetic (proven wrong by Tarski's theorm), or that 4- arguments exist in a vacuum without no one making them!...etc

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

ElectricQualia I am confused. Explain to me how Tarski's solution avoids these paradoxes. The undefinability theorem seem to concern mathematics more than it does logic and language. But I might be wrong. Next, I missed a problem in your first comment. You think that denying the laws of logic is self defeating, then how do you explain the wide variety of non classical logics that do just that? "There are many background implicit assumptions which could also be fallacious" As noted above, there background assumptions are not mine.

[@ElectricQualia]

Carneades.org As I said, the revenge paradoxes refer to para-complete and para-consistent solutions, I.e Non-classical solutions which reject the LEM. The "undefinability theorem" is a proven result in logic and the foundation of mathematics. Math and logic aren't mutually exclusive, logic is considered to be in the foundation of math. Tarski's solution, retains classical logic with the LEM, but posits a hierarchy of languages and meta-languages to escape the liar. To make a long story short, truth cannot be defined rigorously from within a language itself. You have to jump up in the hierarchy to define truth for the lower language and so on. So the self referential liar is totally solved by Tarski. Some logicians complain that this is stylistically undesirable, but that's really it. No revenge self-referential liar can break the solution. "then how do you explain the wide variety of non classical logics that do just that?" Non-classical logics, deny the LEM usually which is only "1 law of logic", that's the first thing, its not the entire laws of logic. The second thing, is that non-classical logic all have the same problem that classical logic without Tarski suffers from, I.e revenge liars, so you don't really gain anything, unless you posit the Tarskian Hierarchy and retain classical logic. "As noted above, there background assumptions are not mine." Yes they are yours, that's why they are implicit. In any case, saying they are not mine, doesn't really gain you anything. You have to assume something in order to prove a result. There is no such thing as a proof without assumption, it requires premises. What your doing is like committing a crime with a weapon, then claiming the weapon is not yours. Its totally irrelevant.

[@ElectricQualia]

There is no such thing as an argument without beliefs. There is countless background assumptions in this argument in the vid, 1- that the laws of logic are so and so according to so and so, 2- that inconsistent knowledge is not knowledge 3- self referential statements are well-formed 3- truth can be defined from within a well defined language 4- doxatic voluntarism (agents are free to change their beliefs) ....etc In fact every proposition an any argument can be construed as a belief, even if you claim its not yours, then its a belief about beliefs lol sorry there is no escape You can claim it isn't me who is saying "we can't hold knowledge with contradictions", well but you believe OTHERS can't or shouldn't hold knowledge with contradictions, so its still a belief. Even the conclusion is a belief, "we should find better logical systems", well that's a belief which contains many more background beliefs (better logical systems are possible or worth looking into).. Moreover there is the argument that suspending judgment on everything, is impractical and unpragmatic

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

ElectricQualia There's a number of problems with your argument. First, clearly an argument can be made without beliefs, because arguments do not require a person to make them. Propositions can have meaning without a person to make them. 1 Note that the laws of logic are assumed in the first line of the proof, so they are eventually discarded just like the other assumptions. That's the way a reductio (or indirect proof) works. 2 Note also that the skeptic is not making their own definition of knowledge, they are using those provided by others. If you have another definition of knowledge feel free to offer it. 3 if you want objection to the "well formed" argument look here: kzbin.info/www/bejne/qpTVY4irf86oq5o or here kzbin.info/www/bejne/g6Svgn59msSUn9k 3 (again) Once again, it is others that make this assumption, I'm just showing that this assumption is problematic. That's just what a proof by contradiction does. How do you define truth? 4- I never said that you should change your beliefs or have the ability to, it just seems to me that I have none and I am still able to argue. "In fact every proposition an any argument can be construed as a belief, even if you claim its not yours, then its a belief about beliefs lol sorry there is no escape" In this respect, I will agree, but clearly this is a straw man (kzbin.info/www/bejne/emSUY6aph8uKg6M). The argument is not supporting the claim that arguments can be formed by statements that no one accepts, but rather statement that the arguer does not accept. "You can claim it isn't me who is saying "we can't hold knowledge with contradictions", well but you believe OTHERS can't or shouldn't hold knowledge with contradictions, so its still a belief." I do not claim that knowledge or beliefs with contradictions are problematic, it just seems to me that others do. I'm not saying that they need to change their beliefs if they arrive at contradictions, they just often seem to feel that they should. "Even the conclusion is a belief, "we should find better logical systems", well that's a belief which contains many more background beliefs (better logical systems are possible or worth looking into)." Once again, it's just a recommendation for those dogmatists that don't like contradictions, not a belief on my part. "Moreover there is the argument that suspending judgment on everything, is impractical and unpragmatic" Check out the video on how to live as a skeptic kzbin.info/www/bejne/eGevoohmZsmAq5I. I seem to live fine without beliefs.

[@ElectricQualia]

Carneades.org Greetings again, I'm a new subscriber btw, so just bear with me "because arguments do not require a person to make them" Yes they do, give me 1 example of an argument existing in a vacuum made by no one? "Propositions can have meaning without a person to make them." Meaning is semantic, which requires a model theoretic interpretation , so by definition it needs some agent choosing an interpretation over an other. Now Syntax can exist without a person making it, but syntax is insufficient to make any argument short of a tautology. "1 Note that the laws of logic are assumed in the first line of the proof, so they are eventually discarded just like the other assumptions. " Believe me I know, but that doesn't mean you are making an argument without beliefs, or that you yourself aren't making those arguments. Obviously you have beliefs and you are as an agent making some form of argument. You are making an argument that other's arguments are bad or erroneous or should be discarded, suspended or whatever, that's still an argument made by you, not by the invisible nothing. The indirect proof just means that it proves something using a negation of the proposition to reach a reductio thus indirectly proving the negated proposition, as opposed to a direct constructive math proof. We all know this, but it doesn't follow that the agent making the proof, indirect or not, is making it without beliefs. This is a non-sequitor. " If you have another definition of knowledge feel free to offer it" That's not the point, the point is that you have some background assumptions or beliefs, which goes against your claim that your making an argument without beliefs. You might be trying to say that you are not making an argument with "direct beliefs" , meaning 1st order beliefs about propositions not involving other agent's beliefs, or beliefs about beliefs. But even this fails, as I have shown the background assumptions of yours, like the def of knowledge for ex, are "direct beliefs" . So the claim the you are making these arguments without beliefs is unpalatable, strictly speaking. "3 if you want objection to the "well formed" argument look here" Your missing the point again, I am saying that's 1 of your background assumptions, I am not arguing for a solution based on "self referentiality is not well-formed" , even though a family of solutions do exist based on this concept. Being well formed just means the formula isn't a string of gibberish and have meaning within a language. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Well-formed_formula In any case, Tarski's solution doesn't rely on this, it relys on the "undefinability theorem" which was more or less proven. I define truth in general, in the Tarskian manner T-schema , though I don't totally exclude other definitions if they are pragmatic, like "fuzzy logic" or many valued approaches. Truth to me is hierarchical, absolute at the highest level of reality and relative in localized perspectives. A topic for another time maybe :) "In this respect, I will agree, but clearly this is a straw man" Well no, you said you are making an argument without beliefs, which is clearly false. You can be more specific and say, I am just provisionally accepting arguments for others while holding some background assumptions to show their thinking is flawed. This is however not an argument without beliefs, that's quite a radical claim. "4- I never said that you should change your beliefs or have the ability to," Well you did say in another video about skepticism, that we should strive for a better explanation or system or whatever while suspending belief, this implies changing beliefs (even if they are about other beliefs or a lack thereof) , and an ought implies a can, so this also implies that we have the ability to change beliefs, id est (doxastic voluntarism). You don't have to say something explicitly to imply it. This is like calling a person a "bastard" and then claiming that "I don't hold a low opinion of that person I just called him a bastard" lol. Well one implies the other, duh. "it just seems to me that I have none and I am still able to argue. " Because you DO have beliefs. A clear one is your belief that "I have none and I am still able to argue. ", well that's still a belief. There is no way out, doxatic vacuums don't exist for active sentient agents. "Once again, it's just a recommendation for those dogmatists that don't like contradictions, not a belief on my part." That's just wordplay, at the very least a recommendation requires beliefs "x is worth recommending" and "it is worth recommending things to audience y". I know I'm sounding like a broken record, but there is no way out, you DO have beliefs. "I seem to live fine without beliefs." As Diogenes of Sinope would say, that's because you still have beliefs. You just believe that you don't. This is an example of a Peculiar Reasoner in doxatic logic for some P, B(p) ^ B~B(p) Which is related to Moor's Paradox, a Peculiar Reasoner is necessarily inaccurate but not necessarily inconsistent. So I guess its not that bad lol Anyhow, rant over Love your channel cheers

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

ElectricQualia Wow. Quite a response. Thanks for subscribing and providing interesting arguments. Here are my thoughts: "Yes they do, give me 1 example of an argument existing in a vacuum made by no one?" If the argument p, p>q, q were to appear written in sand by the movements of a crab or some other random method, it seems that it could still be an argument, and it could still be true. It seems that what you need is an audience to interpret it as an argument. But since the question is whether or not you can make arguments without beliefs, the question of whether or not you can interpret them without beliefs can be set aside. "Meaning is semantic, which requires a model theoretic interpretation , so by definition it needs some agent choosing an interpretation over an other. Now Syntax can exist without a person making it, but syntax is insufficient to make any argument short of a tautology." As with the above statement, note that you can have an argument being interpreted without a mind that created it, or an original interpretation given to it. All that is required is the audience being able to interpret the argument. If all you need is an interpreter, then the arguer does not need to be that interpreter. "Obviously you have beliefs and you are as an agent making some form of argument. You are making an argument that other's arguments are bad or erroneous or should be discarded, suspended or whatever, that's still an argument made by you, not by the invisible nothing." Let's be clear. I am not making the argument that anyone's beliefs are bad or wrong. I am assuming the position of another, and showing them that their beliefs seem to lead to a conclusion that they would not like. I'm not saying that contradictions are bad or should be gotten rid of. I'm simply pointing out that based on what appear to be their beliefs, a result that they would not like can be found. I'm not saying that they should do anything. Their dogma is. I don't have beliefs, at least if you mean by beliefs the common, philosophical definition of propositions that I have assented to. Or at least it does not seem to me that I do. I might be wrong. "We all know this, but it doesn't follow that the agent making the proof, indirect or not, is making it without beliefs. This is a non-sequitor." But it does not follow that they are not either. Prove to me that I believe something, it does not seem to me that I do. "That's not the point, the point is that you have some background assumptions or beliefs, which goes against your claim that your making an argument without beliefs." The point is that I'm not providing the background assumptions, those that I am arguing against are. I'm not providing a definition of belief or of knowledge, they are. I'm just assuming their definition in the first line of my indirect proof in order to match them. "Your missing the point again, I am saying that's 1 of your background assumptions, I am not arguing for a solution based on "self referentiality is not well-formed" , even though a family of solutions do exist based on this concept." Once again its not my background assumptions, but those of my interlocutor. Those that I am arguing against make such claims, I just show that they are problematic. The point is that this family of solutions are the ones that make those background assumptions, I take on such assumptions, and then show that they lead to a contradiction. "In any case, Tarski's solution doesn't rely on this, it relys on the "undefinability theorem" which was more or less proven." As I noted, Yablo's paradox (kzbin.info/www/bejne/iaqnn32opbGLmtk) is a paradox for this hierarchy of truth. It is still paradoxical even with the use of meta languages and is a problem for Tarski's theories. The Liar's Revenge Paradox also raises problems that question the possibility of solving the problem through the use of a metalanguage (kzbin.info/www/bejne/g6Svgn59msSUn9k). "Well no, you said you are making an argument without beliefs, which is clearly false." Prove to me that I have beliefs. Or perhaps our confusion lies in the definition of a belief. I, as I usually argue against philosophers, am taking in my assumed proof the definition of belief most commonly used by philosophers, "Contemporary analytic philosophers of mind generally use the term “belief” to refer to the attitude we have, roughly, whenever we take something to be the case or regard it as true." (Schwitzgebel, SEP full citation below). I simply don't have anything that I take to be true. I don't have anything that I take to be the case. I may have other attitudes towards propositions, but that does not mean that I have beliefs. Surely I can hope that something without believing it. I can consider something without believing it. It is not hard to wonder, desire, speak, type statements without believing them. People seem to do it all the time. All of these are different propositional attitudes from belief. How do you define belief such that one must believe something in order to type it?Take, for instance someone that is playing devils advocate. They make wonderful arguments that they do not believe as they in fact support the opposite position. They don't need to believe what they say in order to say it or make arguments with it. "Well you did say in another video about skepticism, that we should strive for a better explanation or system or whatever while suspending belief, this implies changing beliefs (even if they are about other beliefs or a lack thereof) , and an ought implies a can, so this also implies that we have the ability to change beliefs, id est (doxastic voluntarism)." I'm not sure to which video you are referring. I am sure I did not intend to make a categorical statement, merely offer an observation that if one wants to have a consistent set of beliefs, as many dogmatists appear to, there is a need for a better system of logic to carry those beliefs as the classical one is inconsistent. I'm not making moral categorical statements, merely useful hypothetical ones. "You don't have to say something explicitly to imply it. This is like calling a person a "bastard" and then claiming that "I don't hold a low opinion of that person I just called him a bastard" lol. Well one implies the other, duh." Implication seems a little strong for what you are doing here. It seems that I could respectfully call someone whose title was, say "Edmund the Bastard" a bastard without having any low opinion of him, simply wanting to call him by his proper title. But this is an aside. The point is that simply because someone makes a statement it does not imply that they believe that statement. "Because you DO have beliefs. A clear one is your belief that "I have none and I am still able to argue. ", well that's still a belief. There is no way out, doxatic vacuums don't exist for active sentient agents." Once again, prove it. Prove that I have beliefs. Stating something is insufficient for believing it, unless you think that no one ever tells a lie. Just because I make statements, it does not imply that I believe them. When I say I have none and I am still able to argue, there's no reason to think that I believe that statement. I'm simply attempting to make you understand what it is like to have no beliefs in terms that a dogmatist would understand. "That's just wordplay, at the very least a recommendation requires beliefs "x is worth recommending" and "it is worth recommending things to audience y". I know I'm sounding like a broken record, but there is no way out, you DO have beliefs." You can even act in certain ways without believing that they are the way that you should act. I have no beliefs about a cup in front of me when I am watching television, and yet I take the action of picking up the cup and drinking. Modern neuroscientists (if you believe such people, I, as noted don't, but I don't believe anything) have shown that the brain actually forms thoughts after it takes actions. If this is the case, surely one can take actions without thinking as one has already taken the action by the time one gets around to considering forming a belief. Surely animals can take actions without forming beliefs or thinking that what they do is good. "As Diogenes of Sinope would say, that's because you still have beliefs. You just believe that you don't. This is an example of a Peculiar Reasoner in doxatic logic." The crazy thing is that I don't even believe that. I don't believe that I don't have beliefs. I just state it to try to describe my state to you. Statements are not equivalent to beliefs, and I don't understand why you think they are. This means that I don't fall into Moore's Paradox, though it seems to me to be an interesting one: kzbin.info/www/bejne/h5KYaI2Bg9CWl6c Thanks for the interesting debate, and thanks for watching! Schwitzgebel, Eric, "Belief", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = .

[@ElectricQualia]

Carneades.org Thank you for the response sir. Here I go again: The crab argument is totally hypothetical and counter-factual, so its irrelevant. This is like saying, sure physical objects can exist without mass, just imagine a possible world with a "massless physical object". I am looking for an actual example, if you can give one, my whole objection collapses. It seems you can't provide such an example, though. In any case, lets imagine a crab actually wrote that argument, and play with this idea. There are 2 possibilities here. Either 1- the crab actually made the argument, so he becomes an agent or 2- the crab didn't, but it was accidental in which case you would be suffering from a severe case of apophenia (seeing patterns in randomness), and the argument doesn't actually exist. In neither case is there an argument made by someone. Either someone actually made it, or there isn't an argument just accidental gibberish. The problem is not that your "asking them or not asking them or requiring or not" , the problem is that you believe that you "have no beliefs" which is a very radical statement, that's self-contradictory, I.e you BELIEVE (that you have no beliefs) , this is why you are a doxastic peculiar reasoner. You are not seriously saying your mind is empty of propositions, are you now? Any statement of the English language can be made into logical propositions, you have literally made millions. What you're doing is equivalent to saying "I am not talking" and saying it out loud lol "Prove to me that I believe something, it does not seem to me that I do. " You believe "the internet works" and you believe " I am a new subscriber to your channel" you also believe " you have no believes" , you also believe that "you have just asked me to prove that you have beliefs" ...etc Having a belief in P, does not require you, to believe that you believe P. I.e you can be a doxatic peculiar reasoner. Background assumptions exist implicitly in any argument by the agent making such argument. For example, during the course of this discussion you probably have the background implicit assumption that "I Electric Qualia am not a computer, but an actual human being" , or are you saying someone else was making it but not you?! " Once again its not my background assumptions, but those of my interlocutor. " Not really, no where in your argument does it say others have said that or assumed it. Your argument doesn't address the Revenge Paradoxes like "I am not well formed" or "I am not true"...etc, it tackles a specific instance of the liar. I am not trying to be pedantic, just precise. As I said before the revenge paradoxes and Yablo's paradox aren't a problem for Tarski, they are a problem for OTHER solutions like the ones that reject the LEM or offer a truth-gap solution...etc Tarski blocks any liar because truth can't be semantically defined in a semantically open language. This is the same as Godel's theorem, languages are incomplete but not inconsistent. There are stylistic objections to Tarski from Kripke but they have more to do with natural language rather than pure logic. I'll explain why Yablo's paradox doesn't work for Tarski's solution. This is a simplified version, consider this: S is a statement and L is a formal language (L1) (S1): S2 is true (L2) (S2): S1 is false If S2 is true, then S1 is true, then S1 also false..etc The catch is this, S1 is in L1 and S2 is in L2, either L1 is higher than L2, in which S2 is blocked, or L2 is higher than L1, in which in which S1 is blocked. Voila, the hierarchy prevails. In order to block contradictions, languages stratify. "I simply don't have anything that I take to be true. " The above statement you hold to be true, thus you do have a belief. In other words your belief that you have no belief IS a belief. "It is not hard to wonder, desire, speak, type statements without believing them. People seem to do it all the time." Because they DO have beliefs, they can complain that they don't, but peculiar and unstable reasoning is possible. A human can believe he is not a human, and the universe won't implode. He is still a human though. "for instance someone that is playing devils advocate." Are you saying that you've been playing devils advocate since your were born, and you've never said anything you actually meant?! Do you have a favorite food? or a hobby? the answer will be a belief. "offer an observation" An observation is still a belief, I.e " x is a state of affairs I just observed" . No amount of euphemism , redefinition or semantic juggling will change that. "They don't need to believe what they say in order to say it or make arguments with it. " But they have to believe something, no argument exists in a vacuum of nothing. "I simply don't have anything that I take to be true." Do you hold this previous statement true or false, if neither, then do you hold the statement "the previous statement is neither true nor false" to be true or false? if neither go on ad infinitum until you realize that illogic is illogical, This is a mirror game to the revenge liar lol "there is a need for a better system of logic to carry those beliefs as the classical one is inconsistent" Classical logic is incomplete not inconsistent as per Godel and Tarski. Non-classical logics are also either incomplete or inconsistent. You have to either choose the former or the latter. "I'm not making moral categorical statements, merely useful hypothetical ones. " Which are still beliefs! "a bastard without having any low opinion of him, simply wanting to call him by his proper title. But this is an aside. The point is that simply because someone makes a statement it does not imply that they believe that statement. " Pure arbitrary Semantics wordplay, I could also claim that the "laws of logic" means Mickey Mouse to me, therefore your argument in the vid doesn't hold lol, but that wouldn't be a good objection now will it? Point is, you can imply things, without explicitly saying them. If I saw a woman in the elevator and I went "I want to play with your boobs, kiss you and then fornicate with you" it would be reasonable for the woman to think "he implied having sex with her" right? well a sophist would complain that kiss meant "say hi" and "play" meant "look" and "boobs" meant "my smartphone"...etc but would anyone take that sophistry seriously? certainly not the woman in the elevator. "Once again, prove it. Prove that I have beliefs." I just did. "Stating something is insufficient for believing it, unless you think that no one ever tells a lie." Are you saying you were lying to me, or that you are a robotic computer? or " " insert whatever absurdity that you can think of. Point is , it is reasonable to think that you believe what you just said, otherwise, consider the implications practically? how do you even know that the ppl you are referring to as dogmatists actually believe what they say they believe? They could be lying, or pranking you, or they could be robots or just a figment of your imagination? "Just because I make statements, it does not imply that I believe them. " It actually does, in the defeasible material implication sense. If not, why do you believe anyone has beliefs for that matter? Unless you have a defeater, it remains reasonable and rational to think statements imply beliefs. The reductio ad absurdum of this line of reasoning is non-trivial. I think you are smart enough to see that. "have shown that the brain actually forms thoughts after it takes actions" I am familiar with Benjamin Libet and his experiments, they don't show that beliefs are non-existent or that one can live without them completely. You can have implicit as opposed to explicit beliefs but not "no beliefs" at all. All that Libet showed is that an action can have a decision made unconsciously well before the conscious intent for action. It has little to do with belief or lack thereof. There is also an issue for the veto possibility of the action, which has implication for the neuroscience of free-will, but this is all irrelevant. "Surely animals can take actions without forming beliefs or thinking that what they do is good. " Irrelevant, you are not an animal, your a human. Whether animals can have beliefs or not depends on how evolved their neural system is, but again its irrelevant. "The crazy thing is that I don't even believe that. I don't believe that I don't have beliefs." Which only means you are a doubly peculiar reasoner, which means you are doubly inaccurate lol. "Statements are not equivalent to beliefs, and I don't understand why you think they are." I never said they are in the logical sense, however, it is very reasonable to think that they indicate belief. In other words, they are very highly correlated. In a sense, beliefs are subjective, so only the agent "really knows" if he believe or not. This however is irrelevant to the discussion here, we are talking about each other and about others you refer to as dogmaticsts, to which you ascribe some form of belief. You assumed they believe these things because they state them or act on them in one way or another, yet you apply a double standard when I try to show you also have beliefs. What your doing is equivalent to saying " I am not human" or "I don't exist" . "This means that I don't fall into Moore's Paradox," You actually do, in fact its exactly what you're doing. Id est, you first say " I have no beliefs" then claim "I don't believe I have no beliefs" . Notice the congruity with " its raining outside" , and "I don't believe its raining outside" . This is also highly related to Kant's performative contradiction. Your welcome and nice channel cheers

[@sronicker]

You use the laws of logic to try to prove that the laws of logic are not true, but you can’t do that. You cannot apply what you believe to be false or at least untrustworthy. You’ve cast doubt on the laws of logic, but you haven’t disproven them. You’ve used them, in using them you’ve tacitly assumed that they work, even in attempting to prove that they don’t work. Also, all the “arguments” given are some form of deduction. There’s no room for the possibility of true/false. In other words, there’s no admission of modal concepts. It is possible that the laws of logic are true. Is it more possible or less possible? Your methods want to conclude that they may or may not be true, so we should well, what? Discard them? You don’t use logic when you create these videos? You don’t move from one belief to another belief when creating them? You act as if you believe the laws of logic work. You act as if you’re not a universal skeptic. You’re a hypocrite. Why should we listen to a hypocrite? Also, haha! I also LOVE the answer to Objection V (11:32)! You basically say that NO! Skepticism is beautiful and wonderful and we could develop something better. We’re free. What a load of emotional hogwash. The skeptic does and adds NOTHING in the world of logic/philosophy/thought. The skeptic merely sits back and says, “Well, I don’t believe that proposition.” So what!? The laws of logic don’t have anything to do with whether or not you believe they are true or not. Your attempt at making the laws lead to contradiction falls flat. It relies on the laws working. If they work, then your conclusion is false. If they don’t work then your conclusion is false. You’ve come to an impasse because you’ve talked yourself into one to try to avoid a burden of proof. You want to be skeptical and it’s easy to do so. You want this argument to work, so you make it work, but even in making it work you betray that you aren’t actually a skeptic. If you believe that logic is untrustworthy, even as an exercise it makes no sense to use it.

[@encouraginglyauthentic43]

Your just another pseudo intellectual. I don't need to believe in tools to use them.