On Punishment: A Reply by C.S. Lewis Doodle (HT Part 2 of 2 - Utilitarianism debunked)

[@CSLewisDoodle]

This next doodle may be a bit of a rough ride. This discussion about crime and punishment was published in a law journal, which is only read by law professionals and law students. It is an argument among people with four different areas of study: a Professor and Chair of Medieval and Renaissance Literature (C.S. Lewis); a Professor of Philosophy (J.J.C. Smart); a Criminal Lawyer & Criminologist (Norval Morris - the founder of the 'National Institute of Corrections - USA'); and a Criminal Psychiatrist (D. Buckle). So it may be hard to keep up with! But if you persevere you might find it illuminating. You will need to watch Lewis’ first essay in doodle form to get up to speed with Lewis' original argument ( kzbin.info/www/bejne/rHu8hmOIhbuVjMU ), so that you can understand the critiques of Lewis’ essay and appreciate how neatly C.S. Lewis knocks the props out from under his critics ‘unerringly - one shot to a pigeon’.

[@CSLewisDoodle]

Lewis was very respectful and generous to his opponents. Prof. Smart not so much...

[@CSLewisDoodle]

(4:51) Later publications of this essay always cut out a sentence (shown below in caps) from the original journal due to a transcription error: “Let us suppose (what, I am very sure, is false) that Professor Smart is prepared to go the whole hog. It then remains to ask him [1] why he does so or [2] why he thinks we should agree with him. He of all men cannot reply that ‘salus populi suprema lex’ ['the welfare/preservation of the people is the highest law'] is the Law of Nature; firstly, BECAUSE HE "DOES NOT KNOW WHAT THE LAW OF NATURE IS", AND SECONDLY, because we others know that "the people should be preserved" is not the Law of Nature but only one clause in that Law.” Lewis’ original reply, including footnotes, is found here: drive.google.com/open?id=0B9MmcPqIiEnKMjZSRTY0X3otUW8 More explanatory notes are found in the video description above.

[@CSLewisDoodle]

QUICK SUMMARY OF DR MORRIS AND DR BUCKLE’S ARGUMENT IN THEIR OWN WORDS. MORRIS & BUCKLE: “Herein then lies the kernel of the discussion - Lewis regards reformation [/cure] and deterrence as subsidiary and never as a justification of punishment, and suggests that the Humanitarian Theory of Punishment has erected them into its vital aims. This, we believe, is a perversion of the Humanitarian theory. To us, the vital purpose of the criminal law is *the protection of the community* ... the prime function of punishment must clearly be the protection of that society. (See Lewis’ reply here: 7:21). And the disadvantage Lewis sees, and which is undoubtedly a threat, is the possibility of the abuse of power necessarily given to those aiming to fulfil this purpose. Can the expert be kept on tap and not on top? This risk of administrative abuse of power runs throughout the whole social pattern as we increasingly come to rely on the expert in economics, in town planning, in many aspects of social organization, indeed in every sphere of our corporate life, including that of the detection and punishment of crime. One of the basic problems of our age is to erect effective controls by which we can make use of the services of experts and yet guard ourselves from their potential authoritarian danger. In the field of penal sanctions, because of our traditional awareness of this danger, this protection can fairly easily be guaranteed. *The Criminal Courts have traditionally represented the common man and the common man's view of morality.* The Judges have earned the confidence of the people as unbiased and incorruptible men. The Courts have to hand excellent techniques for controlling the exuberance of the expert in criminology or penology. Let the ultimate control always reside in the Courts, let the expert always be accountable to them, let the criminal always have access to the Court, let *the controls of natural justice which the law has built up* be applicable, and, it is suggested, the tyranny which Lewis foreshadows will not eventuate. (See Lewis’ reply here: 10:01). A test case is given by one of the basic demands of those adhering to the Humanitarian theory: for certain types of criminals the Humanitarians wish to substitute for definite sentences some degree of indeterminacy as to the period those criminals will spend in prison. As Lewis points out, herein lies a real risk of tyranny. The answer is again to be found in the existing courts. These should require the expert to give evidence publicly and subject to cross-examination to substantiate the reasons for his decision concerning the release of the criminal. The prisoner should have the power to initiate this type of enquiry at regular intervals and the onus of proof should never shift from the expert. With child criminals we have abandoned the Retributive Theory quite explicitly, holding that the welfare of the child must frequently be regarded as a major consideration motivating courts charged with sentencing juvenile delinquents. The cost to the community of rewarding the larceny of a few sweets by a child with a punishment exactly equated to that social harm, has proved too expensive to be tolerated...therefore, both for the child's sake and for the community's, it is frequently necessary to reward the delinquent child with a punishment not "justly related", in the sense in which Lewis uses the phrase, to the offence he has committed. (See Lewis’ reply here: 9:00). This concept of "desert" is really the lynchpin of Lewis' article. As he sees it, the idea of the “deserved" or "just" punishment is an acceptance that for each offence, calculated in the light both of the crime committed and the history of crimes perpetuated by that individual, there is a price of punishment known fairly widely throughout the community - that there is, in other words, a price-list of deserved punishments. This may well be a true picture of what is in many men's minds; but it is only true for those people who consider a static situation in crime, who consider only two parties to any crime - the criminal and his victim. Now the contrast with this is the Humanitarian Theory which sees crime as a dynamic situation, not involving two parties, but involving many parties: not only a criminal and his victim, but a whole list of future potential victims who, unless they are protected with the best means at our disposal, are likely to suffer hardship. In arranging this protection, however, the Humanitarian must always remember that it should be related to the extent of current knowledge, and to the fact that the community must be expected to bear some risk for its dangerous and pathological elements. (See Lewis’ reply here: 12:23). We do not go to the extreme of denying importance to the community's conception of a "deserved" punishment. The punishments imposed on criminals serve purposes other than those we have canvassed - they constitute society's official pronouncement of the gravity with which any criminal action is viewed, and therefore assist in reinforcing that community's sense of right. This sense of right, this group super-ego [Freud], must never be exacerbated either by the too great leniency or the extreme severity of any punishment imposed. In other words, the community's sense of a just punishment will create the polarities of leniency and severity between which the criminal law may work out its other purposes. Lewis appears to regard any crime solely as the result of a wrong choice between doing good or doing ill. We do not propose to wander into the morass of the free will-determinism argument, for we agree with Lewis that this is a cause of crime. We do not, however, regard it as the only cause of crime which is to us an extremely complicated moral, physical, psychological, and sociological phenomenon in which the totality of the criminal's inheritance and environment, together with his area of free will, will have causal connection with the crime he commits. To relate punishment to but one aetiological [causal] factor is to minimize the difficulty of fixing a rational sentence.” (See Lewis’ reply here: 12:56).

[@youbetyourwrasse]

It took me 47 minutes to watch and absorb, but I am glad I did and grateful for the opportunity. I love the use of the accent changes to highlight who is speaking. Clever and very helpful. Without God, there would be no Morality. I sleep well knowing it is safe in His hands, out of the reach of mens dirty fingers. *Glory be to God* ((((( PS. I would love to see "Man or Rabbit" portrayed by this artistic genius.

[@vaclavjebavy5118]

I don't mind this second voice over, but I do find it funny how every quotation eh goes 🤓

[@hellie_el]

wow, the depth of the notes in the description and the comments is remarkable!

[@sennest]

😎👍👍 Beautifully read and perfectly illustrated. Interesting idea right now given court cases around the world with different challenges from many things that have transpired. 🙏🙏 thank you very much and blessings on you and your household!!!🎉

[@CSLewisDoodle]

QUICK SUMMARY OF PROFESSOR SMART'S ARGUMENT IN HIS OWN WORDS (bolded comments are those that Lewis quoted in his reply): PROF. SMART: “From the point of view of the legislator, we ask: "Is this the best punishment to assign for this type of offence?" It seems to me that the only way in which this question can be rationally discussed is the utilitarian way: that is by considering the consequences for society of adopting or not adopting the penal law in question. What other type of argument is relevant? Admittedly one could appeal to Scripture, but the New Testament was not intended as a text-book of penology, and some of the penal ideas of the Old Testament are barbarous [Note 1]. Certainly if we knew that God had said that such-and-such was the law we should adopt we should be foolish not to adopt it. But how does God know that it is the best law? God is rational and must have argued rationally to His decision. How else, then, than by arguing in the way we should, if we were rational, that is, in the Utilitarian way? [Note 1: Here are the punishments for three of the most common crimes under the Old Testament’s ‘eye-for-an-eye’ or ‘proportional restitution’ system: A thief was required to return the goods stolen and pay a financial penalty to his victim in accordance to the value of the goods taken or on-sold ( biblehub.com/exodus/22-1.htm ); A man found guilty of common assault had to pay financially for the man’s medical costs and his lost wages until completely healed ( biblehub.com/exodus/21-19.htm ); The public murderer was given the death penalty ( biblehub.com/exodus/21-14.htm ) CSLD. ] PROF. SMART: “There is something else that Lewis might put in the place of Utilitarian argument: an appeal to the Law of Nature [Note 2]. *I do not know what the Law of Nature is.* But I think I know what the use of the expression "Law of Nature" is. It is this: "this is the Law of Nature" = *"this is the rule that ought to be adopted"* , said by someone who wishes to disguise his *own dogmatism* and to conceal the fact that he is either unable or too lazy to search for a rational (i.e. a Utilitarian) justification of the proposed measure. (See Lewis’ reply here: 2:44). [Note 2: The Conscience or ‘Law of Nature’ or ‘Practical Reason’ or the ‘Moral Standard known to all men’ includes: I. The Law of Goodwill towards Humanity Generally. 2. The Law of Special Goodwill towards Specific Persons (Friends, Relatives and Citizens). 3. Duties to Parents, Elders, and Ancestors. 4. Duties to Children and Posterity. 5. The Law of Justice. 6. The Law of Good Faith and Veracity. 7. The Law of Mercy. 8. The Law of Magnanimity and Courage. CSLD.] PROF. SMART: “From a Utilitarian point of view, then, we discuss a measure by asking "Will this measure or will some alternative one tend most to promote the well-being of society?" If the proposed measure is a penal law there seem to be only three ways in which it can be of value: (I) To deter people; (2) To protect society by eliminating or removing criminals; (3) To reform the criminal. The first two of these are by far the most important. It is not always possible to reform the criminal. And I should say that (I) [deterrence] is of greater importance than (2) [protection of society]... It might be argued that punishment satisfies the desire of certain members of the society for revenge. However, the desire for revenge is something which is perhaps better left unsatisfied. It is difficult to believe that society would not be happier if it thought less about revenge. Moreover I do not see how the principle of revenge itself could possibly be justified. "If we adopt the principle 'An eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth' we will make society *happier.* " How? Ordinarily we know what is meant by "the deserved punishment". It is that laid down by law. But how can "desert" have a meaning when we discuss what punishment the law ought to lay down? If we try to apply the idea of desert here we are either driven back on to *Lewis's personal preferences* ("I should like to see murderers hanged", say) or we have to fall back on some crude equation of punishment with amount of damage done: an eye for an eye. Why the damage-retribution equation should be thought a sound principle of legislation I do not know. I do not see how it could possibly be justified. Why should society be happier if we adopt this principle? Indeed it is quite easy to see that society will be happier if we do not adopt this principle.” (See Lewis’ reply here: 4:29).

[@Dominexis]

Note 1, is that directly from Professor Smart? If so, he claims these punishments to be barbarous? As I was reading this, I thought them to be quite excellent personally. The terrible irony here is that, while Smart is attempting to remove elements of his own bias and subjective dogma, he ends up erring on the side of his intuition with regards to "eye for an eye" punishments. While it is the case that Christ superseded the law of "eye for an eye," it is still the case that vengeance is the Lord's, and that He will repay everyone for their deeds. The wages of sin is death. We all die for our sin.

[@QuantumWaltz]

It is fascinating to see here that Professor Smart falls into a pitfall common (in my experience) to those who wish to discredit "Old Testament" legal punishments. The claim is usually that "an eye for an eye" means that the exact act which was perpetrated upon the victim shall be enacted by the court upon the perpetrator - or if the speaker won't go so far as to say so explicitly, it is heavily implied by calling the punishments barbaric in nature (often without enumerating them.) When I was taught the meaning of "an eye for an eye," it was always made clear to me that the intent was "(the value) of an eye for (the loss/taking) of an eye," as outlined in Note 1 above. This structure always made the most sense to me. If you wronged someone, you were to make it right as best as you possibly could, and when you had done so, the matter was considered complete. I can tell you that as a child, it is far better to receive a one-time punishment for a misdeed and be done with it than it is to have your old mistakes endlessly brought up whenever you make a new one. At that point, it feels like you can never escape the mistakes of your past, they're never made up for, the case is never closed. I can easily imagine how this might cause someone to give up on the idea of behaving morally at all. If you can never atone for your sins (or have them atoned for,) then once you make a single mistake in your life you can never live righteously again. Setting aside my own religious and moral perspective, that does not seem like a way to make society happier in the long run, per Professor Smart's own argument.

[@lloydgush]

Interesting how this sort of mentality was refuted in it's inception, yet they still argue it.

[@jsteele07189]

Lewis's response to Dr. Smart's critique turns on the idea that the "happiness of the community" will lead to bad treatment of those outside the community. What if "the community" is defined more broadly, to include *all* humans, including criminals and children, across the whole face of the earth? What if it included animals, or all life-forms, or even "the biosphere" as a sort of general entity?

[@CSLewisDoodle]

Lewis answers that issue below, but also in the chapter ‘The Way’, in ‘The Abolition of Man’. Lewis assumed by “community” Professor Smart meant “human species” (5:44), but that doesn’t change the logic problem for Smart (and all Utilitarians): Why ought humanity to be preserved or made happy? The only possible way he answers that question is by appealing to the conscience or Moral law or Natural law, of doing good to all men. And then, “You cannot do *simply* good to *simply* Man; you must do this or that good to this or that man. And if you do *this* good, you can't at the same time do *that* ; and if you do it to *these* men, you can't also do it to *those* . Hence from the outset the law of beneficence [Law 1 of 'The Law of Nature'] involves not doing some good to some men at some times. Hence those rules which so far as I know have never been doubted, as that we should help one we have promised to help rather than another, or a benefactor rather than one who has no special claims on us, or a compatriot more than a stranger, or a kinsman rather than a mere compatriot. And this in fact most often means helping A at the expense of B, who drowns while you pull A on board. And sooner or later, it involves helping A by actually doing some degree of violence to B. But when B is up to mischief against A, you must either do nothing (which disobeys the intuition) or you must help one against the other. And certainly no one's conscience tells him to help B, the guilty. It remains, therefore, to help A. So far, I suppose, we all agree. (‘Why I am a not a Pacifist’).

[@AdamantLightLP]

I would also argue that you cannot appease all life, or all people. There will always, by the very nature of reality, be outliers. You cannot simply include all things. Even if you did, tyranny of the majority is still an issue.

[@jsteele07189]

Constructive criticism: no need for the voice affect on the quotes from the critics. C.K. wouldn't have done that. (except for "larn 'em," that's funny)

[@CSLewisDoodle]

Yeah, I needed to show that these were not Lewis' own word, but quotes of his critics. I tried saying "quote, unquote" but it didn't really work.