Culture Clash: British and German Military Innovation at War, 1914-18 | Dr Jonathan Boff

This talk by Dr Jonathan Boff was delivered 'live' to an online audience.
The Western Front is often considered a theatre of sterile stalemate. In reality, it formed a crucible of violent military transformation, where two sides raced to adapt to the challenges of industrial war. This dynamic drove a measure/counter-measure race which not only helped determine the outcome of the conflict but also spawned a new form of modern warfare which lasts to this day.
This presentation explores how the British and German armies learned and adapted to the changing character of war between 1914 and 1918, arguing that organisational cultures - and deep understanding of those cultures - were critical to battlefield outcomes and so victory and defeat.
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[@niallfitzpatrick6568]

Excellent presentation!

[@mrmessenger5584]

Simply an American history buff here. But what a fascinating topic, lecture, and discussion. Well done 👏

[@markmcshane9653]

Very enjoyable and insightful, I was busy scribbling notes throughout.

[@martinbarrett3104]

Excellent. Thoroughly absorbing. Thank you.

[@militarymarch3006]

While there is no question that the British Army implemented many innovations during WWI, theorists always measure the efficacy of these innovations (especially compared with those of the Germans) on the fighting in the late summer and autumn of 1918. By this time the German Army was a shell of its former self; fought out, tired, and almost literally starving and with the prospect of facing millions of American soldiers pouring into the war. This is like the United States military (of which I was a thirty-year member), claiming that it's defeat of the Iraqi Army in 1991 proved how effective it would have been fighting the Soviets. It's an entirely different proposition.

[@paulwusteman1094]

Yes- It was the fear of the Americans that did for the Germans. They were paralysed, quaking in their boots, unable to fire a shot. Thank you USA!

[@joeblow9657]

Don't forget that not only was the German Army a husk of itself, the German economy and society was also a husk of itself in large part due to the British blockade and German mismanagement. When communist revolution is an actual concern, that country probably isn't going to keep putting up the best fight. Also, the German army was being rolled up after very heavy fighting. It might've been a different peace if Germany hadn't gone all out to win in 1918 and had opted to use the threat of further attrition to gain a more favourable peace than Versailles

[@datadavis]

It would have been extremely easy for the u.s army to defeat the soviet army in 1991 since it did not exist anymore.

[@alecblunden8615]

​@@paulwusteman1094The "fear" not the reality. The contribution of the US was negligible.

[@jeffbybee5207]

@@alecblunden8615 beleave Paul was being sarcastic.

[@anselmdanker9519]

Thanks for a very insightful presentation on the British Army in WW 1.

[@stephenede-borrett1452]

The German Army is criticised (rightly) that its Staff reported what their superiors WANTED to hear rather than the 'the truth', but surely this is also a criticism of British Army staff reports to Haig which often misrepresented the situation on the ground since Haig disliked 'bad news', was anyone ever "ruthlessly honest" with Haig?

[@joeblow9657]

IMO a lot of historians are just signing on to the trend of saying Haig was competent to counter the old scholarship and is part of a disheartening trend

[@jonsouth1545]

@@joeblow9657 While Haig was far from perfect he was far from the one-dimensional donkey often portrayed every single criticism about Haig and his tactics can be made about Zhukov several times over yet Zhukov is seen as one of the greatest Generals of the 20th Century. In many ways, The Somme is Haigs Operation Mars while the 100 days is his Operation Bagration.

[@gandydancer9710]

@@jonsouth1545 Zhukov's reputation rests on neither of those.

[@johnsowerby7182]

@@gandydancer9710 No, it probably rests on Stalingrad, but the point being made is still valid.

[@johnhanson5943]

Very interesting. As an Anglo-German, the problems of then appear to be very similar to problems of today. Although, today in both countries - as Britain blindly follows a lot of its neighbours and current masters (politically, institutionally, economically and militarily largely based in America). Certainly, the well known problems involved with ‘yes man’ / mechanistic cultures / centralisation / rigid hierarchy / inappropriate operational unit scale / ritual rather than function styles are often the necessary norm in some military organisations. Yet, this same tendency can also be fatal to an effective military sysem and any system. Logic, knowledge, meritocracy, learning, communication, effective delegation, encouraging initiative, intelligent balance, good incentives, the systematic application of effective technology, technical development competence, enterprise culture, operational scale, constructive discipline, high moral and competitive advantage.

[@davemacnicol8404]

The title slide. That cylinder..is that shell catcher for salvage or the actual ammo carrier? Just seems like dirt and stuff would get in there idk

[@rhysnichols8608]

Germany lost due to being heavily outnumbered and crucially out- resourced especially by 1918. The fact a single empire was facing the combined might of the British empire, French empire and the USA on 1 front AFTER fighting the Russian empire for 3 years and sending troops on 3 fronts, was the main factor in Germany’s defeat. No British doctrine or superior tactic decisively won, it was a matter of resources and man power. The German army had performed very well under the circumstances when both sides are viewed objectively Germany contributed more to the tactical development of warfare than the entente powers did during this time. Flexibility and initiative were part of Prussian doctrine since 1813 well before the atlantisist powers

[@Rowlph8888]

t's much easier to innovate, when you have the advantage of blitzing the defending powers, who are in a much more desperate position, with only a few miles between the frontier and Paris, meaning they've got little margin for error, unlike the German position.There was far less pressure on Germany, due to their geographical position and plenty of space, to fall back on, especially when France is the one with the comparable army undertook many months for Britain to start raising a significant army. Germany also had better natural resources and the larger population than France. You cannot use the Russian army size, as if it's impressive for Germany to defend, The against it. Germany got invaded by the Russians, and remember they still deliberately sent 90% of their Army, West, precisely because technologically and in terms of command capability The Brits and the French were known to be far more formidable. Therefore, having been able to make the original invasion decision that the French and the Brits were not able to, and therefore "In not" fighting a desperate defensive action, with little margin of error, for risk, Germany should be expected to have been able to innovate better and The fact that it did not do so convincingly, is a mark against them Ultimately, Germany should have won the war in 1914, but utter incompetence, led to them losing an overwhelmingly advantageous position, having speedily invaded a country distracted by a controversial court case, mainly due to the methodical , dispassionate determined defence, against all the odds, of Joffre, along with the bravery of the French, small British and Belgian armies tenacity. Most

[@WagesOfDestruction]

I was not impressed with the talk as I thought the speaker did not provide enough evidence to back his claims, I would have preferred a smaller topic and more details. Having said that the last question was really good and got me thinking too.

[@lllordllloyd]

A wonderful address by Dr Boff, a favourite author for me. At 25:20 "Whether this happened by design, or by fortunate accident, remains unclear". This is the key question to tell us whether Haig and the higher commanders were excellent leaders, the best of the war and the best available, deserved victors of 1918... or whether they were accidental victors, their sclerotic, outdated methods and chauvinism eventually circumvented by able subordinates, yet still theoretically in command and unsackable.

[@gandydancer9710]

That, he notes, "implementation remained extremely patchy" answers your question to my satisfaction.

[@richardaillas162]

All of the Commanders on the allied front were confronted with problems that took time to solve partly from the Generals initial disbelief that their artillery had not already decimated the Germans and the ineffectiveness of artillery against the wire. The communication and co-operation between British and French more junior Commanders was also a major problem where French and British forces adjoined each other, not solved until the spring of 1918 when Haig agreed to the appointment of a French Generalissimo, a winning strategy to subordinate his command thus enabling an effective overall view to be taken of the whole front, leading to a successful co-ordinated strategy of defence followed by attack.

[@olivierb9716]

and what about others country???

[@andrewblake2254]

re the French Canadians. i would expect that many of them were bilingual and would have no trouble with English, especially at the officer level. So they would not be out of the loop.

[@AN-jp1wg]

Interesting, but wrong on most counts. The British Command was often utterly ignorant of conditions at the front, to the extent that Haig's Chief of Staff, Lancelot Kiggel, burst into tears on visiting the front. "Good God,” he sobbed. “Did we really send men to fight in that?”. Haig constantly overestimated German casualties, and was always opining that the German army was on the brink of a collapse in morale. Ludendorff had been a brilliant student, to the extent that he was placed in a class two years ahead of his age group while at cadet school. When he entered the war academy, he was recommended to the General Staff on the basis of his exceptional talents, and was there put in charge of the all-important German mobilisation plans. Unlike Haig, he was prepared to lead from the front when necessary, and his personal intervention played a vital role in the capture of Liege. Reading his memoirs, it is apparent he was constantly being fed with accurate information from the front, and this was responsible for his constantly elevated state of nervous tension. He promoted talent regardless of rank, resulting in the elevation of such people as Hutier and Bruchmuller to key positions, both experts in modern offensive tactics. Haig on the other hand was obsessed by loyalty. The development of German tactics was, definitely driven by the initiative and enterprise of junior officers.. For more clarity on this read Gudmunsson's "Stormtroop Tactics", and Lupfer's "Dynamics of Doctrine". Lupfer makes the following comments about German tactical doctrine. German successes in World War I demonstrated a thorough process: • Perception of a need for change • Solicitation of ideas, especially from the battlefield units • Definition of the change • Dissemination of the change • Enforcement throughout the army • Modification of organization and equipment to accommodate the change • Thorough training • Evaluation of effectiveness • Subsequent refinement Haig was certainly not the bumbling buffoon of popular imagination, but Germany's defeat was down to the fact that the Central Powers represented an alliance of four countries, and the Allies one of twenty -eight. The Germans were always outnumbered and outgunned. Plumer's vaunted bite and hold operations gained one mile at the cost of fifty thousand men, while Ludendorff's maligned spring offensive of 1918 ripped open the British front, advanced 40 miles in a week and resulted in the capture of 90,000 prisoners.

[@alanrobertson9790]

Highly selective consideration of history. French military did mutiny, British had some small scale mutinies and in 1918 German sailors mutinied and Germany Army stopped advancing at Amiens as loved the supplies. Amiens gains were soon erased. So a belief in possibility of mutiny not unreasonable. "Haig constantly overestimated German casualties" Every side in every war does that, hardly a special characteristic of Haig. Ludendorff had a nervous breakdown in 1918 and was unable to see that economic privation prevented a military victory. In 1918 the allies were no longer nibbling at the front but were making successive gains. "Germany's defeat was down to the fact that the Central Powers represented an alliance of four countries, and the Allies one of twenty -eight". Indeed same mistake in WW2 too. Tactical brilliance hardly compensates.

[@deejay830]

A very unbalanced view

[@gandydancer9710]

Count me unconvinced that the reason German morale collapsed in 1918 had anything to do with a difference between them and the British in "innovation". There didn't seem to be any effort to particularize that in any way, just a lot of assertion without evidence.

[@Chiller01]

Hopefully algorithmic comment helps

[@rexgeorg7324]

Follow the MONEY

[@mrsnewton87]

Maybe not a good comparison but who could be judged as the most useless and interfering the Kaiser or Hitler?

[@alganhar1]

@Son of a Book Keeper When people keep going on about the Soviet oil fields and Hitlers vision they tend to forget one thing. Do you honestly believe the Soviets would not have blown those oil fields if it looked like the Germans were close to capturing them? The Iraqi's did exactly that to theirs. The Soviets would have blown them. As a result it would have taken Germany something like a year - 18 months to rebuild those oilfields, and then they have to transport that oil. Doing it by road would use up far too much of that precious oil simply transporting it, thus the most economical solution would have been a pipeline... which again would have taken well over a year to construct. At best, had the Germans taken those oilfields in 1942, they would not have been pumping oil out of them probably until 1944.... Far too late.....

[@jjquinn295]

@Son of a Book Keeper Or the northern flank of an attack would have collapsed and army group south gets encircled, as happened when they went into the caucuses in reality.

[@hazzardalsohazzard2624]

@Son of a Book Keeper The listening to his generals meme is overstated, but I think there's some truth to it. Hitler was increasingly micro-managing the army as the war went on. I think he was an effective leader when the war went well, but if things went poorly he handled things much worse than most. I think not being a normal politician like Churchill and Roosevelt made things worse, because it would make the Western Allies more risk averse on the operational level and less inclined to overestimate army capabilities. No army in 1940 would have been able to manage logistics across the distances to Stalingrad and the rest of the Eastern Front, but I think the Wehrmacht were worse than most

[@michaelpielorz9283]

Churchill ! (:-)

[@philsphan4414]

@@michaelpielorz9283 Churchill was no painter. Hitler was a painter. One apartment, one afternoon, two coats! Mel Brooks

[@theodoresmith5272]

Wow what a view he has. Lol

[@Rowlph8888]

It's much easier to innovate, when you have the advantage of blitzing the defending powers, who are in a much more desperate position, with only a few miles between the frontier and Paris, meaning they've got little margin for error, unlike the German position.There was far less pressure on Germany, due to their geographical position and plenty of space, to fall back on, especially when France is the one with the comparable army.Germany also had better natural resources and the larger population than France. You cannot use the Russian army size, as if it's impressive for Germany to defend, The against it. Germany got invaded by the Russians, and remember they still deliberately sent 90% of their Army, West, precisely because technologically and in terms of command capability The Brits and the French were known to be far more formidable. Therefore, having been able to make the original invasion decision that the French and the Brits were not able to, and therefore "In not" fighting a desperate defensive action, with little margin of error, for risk, Germany should be expected to have been able to innovate better and The fact that it did not do so convincingly, is a mark against them Ultimately, Germany should have won the war in 1914, but utter incompetence, led to them losing an overwhelmingly advantageous position, having speedily invaded a country distracted by a controversial court case, mainly due to the methodical , dispassionate determined defence, against all the odds, of Joffre, along with the bravery of the French, small British and Belgian armies tenacity.

[@matthiuskoenig3378]

I have to disagree with you. The german military was outnumbered and their resources limited. Germany went into rationing as soon as the war started. The germans were the ones with the most pressure on them, they could not waste resources or men in the same way the entente could in experimenting. The fact the experimenting they did do allowed them to hold off and break through an enemy whose material advantage dwarfed them is a mark of distinction and a mark against the entente.

[@james1x1x1x1]

These boomers are biased, Germans generally liked their King. English generally didn't.

[@tarjei99]

I have problems with this. If the British were innovating, it was accidental. The corps commanders had to be ordered to attend an indirect fire machine gun demonstration. The British even in WW2 had very basic problems communicating and making sure that orders arrived. Hence attacks that went wrong because the different units failed to synchronise their actions. So, no, I'm not buying it.

[@alganhar1]

Communications was, for your information, a problem with ALL sides during the Great War. Land based radios even in 1918 weighed 2,000 pounds and required two lorries to transport them, one for the radio, the other for the battery pack and ariel. Thus in the attack, when reliable telephone communications could not be dug 6 - 12 foot deep to protect the wires at least somewhat from shellfire the only option for communications were runners or pigeons. In these days of instant and global modern communications systems this fact is utterly and completely overlooked by people such as yourself. Even in WWII there are plenty of examples of forces other than British mixing up timings due to poor communications, the British were far, far, far from the only Army in which this was a problem at times. It was aproblem with the US and German Armies as well, the French in 1940 and SOviets in 1941 suffered especially badly, the Japanese communications were often dreadful, Italians the same. This is due to the radios of the day, something YOU may want to look into. They were nowhere close to being as reliable as modern communications technology. Of course, you just cherry picked the information you wanted to present whilst ignoring the very real communications issues suffered by non British forces didn't you? Because highlighting the issues others had would break your perceived narrative. Second, the British innovated only accidentally? What a complete, Biased, bordering on racist load of crap. If the British did not innovate where on earth did the tanks come from? Yes, at first they were used incorrectly, but here is something people like you really need to consider, there WAS no tankcombat manual in 1916, this was a completely new and utterly untested weapons system wiuth unknown strengths and weaknesses. Working out how to best employ it was literally an empty book, the rules had to be written on the fly. Yet, they did it. And, contrary to what people like you seem to believe these tanks were NOT capable of the kind of operations tanks were capable of in 1939. They were slow, even *fast* tanks of 1914 - 1918 barely made 10 miles an hour on perfect terrain. They were relaitively lightly armoured, and they were mechanically unreliable. In one action the British used 378 tanks on day 1, by day 3 they were down to 39 runners, most of the casualties were breakdowns. Tanksof 1916 - 1918 were breakthrough weapons, they had not sustainability in them Operations wise, another thing people like you ignore, little things that are actually important like what are these weapons actually capable of! How about after the first Gas attacks at Ypres in 1915? An Army that could not innovate would not have produced and distributed workable Gas protection within DAYS, not weeks, not months, but DAYS. You only have to look at battles such as the Battle of Amiens to realise just how little sense your idiotic statement makes. The combined arms offensive, and that is EXACTLY what it was, became a benchmark for future armies after the war. You also only have to look at the way in which the Infantry Platoon changed from 1914 - 1918 to also realise how stupid and ignorant your comment was. In 1914 an infantry platoon in the British (and every other army in the world) was a rifle only unit, in many armies it was not even a combat unit but an adminstrative one, the smallest fielded unit in most armies at the time being the Company. By 1918 the British Infantry Platoon was a combined arms unit, fewer men but far, far more firepower. It consisted of a rifle section, a grenadier section, a gun section (built around 2 Lewis guns + crews + 4 ammunitiuon carriers) and a rifle grenade/stokes mortar section (usually rifle grenade), and finally a small HQ Section consisting of the Platoon Officer, his Platoon Sergeant (and second in command), and a couple of runners/pigeon handlers for messages. In addition every man in the platoon carried a spare pan magazine for the Lewis guns.... every. single. one. I could go on even further about British innovation, for example Room 40, the primary code breakers for the Royal Navy. The list is actually extensive, lets look at mortars shall we? Which mortar design went on to form the basis of every mortar design used world wide after WWI? The Stokes mortar, the BRITISH design, in fact the modern infantry mortars used today are based on the Stokes design. You are making your assumption essentially based on racism, you do not like the British so anything they do that might be innovative is obviously accidental. That is a foolish, and frankly stupid way of going through life. So no, the British DID innovate. Contrary to your short sighted and biased statement. They innovated heavily, every side did. An army unable to innovate would not have been able to reorganise its entire Logistics train from the ground up in order to accomodate the new kinds of warfare, yet the British DID do this, arguably the German Army did not do so anywhere close to as efficiently as the British or French did. People such as you disgust me, leave your prejudices at the door and actually learn, or get lost. There is an excuse for ignorance, there is no excuse for wilfully blinding yourself to facts through prejudice....

[@Garwulf1]

I hate to tell you this, but I think you need to read some better books about the war. Pretty much everything you said here is wrong. Check out Peter Hart, Hew Strachan, Holger Herwig, and Nick Lloyd - they'll give you a much better idea of what was going on.

[@Garwulf1]

@@alganhar1 "People such as you disgust me, leave your prejudices at the door and actually learn, or get lost. There is an excuse for ignorance, there is no excuse for wilfully blinding yourself to facts through prejudice...." What the hell? Not to put too fine a point on it, but the popular history understanding of the war is still rooted in the "lions led by donkeys" narrative (Meyer's A World Undone is positively dripping with it) - if the original poster hasn't read anything outside of the popular histories, then the realities of the war revealed by modern scholarship are not only news, but news that directly contradicts everything s/he has read. Correcting the OP is appropriate - condemning them as a racist because they're not familiar with the current scholarship is NOT.

[@Ensign_Cthulhu]

@@Garwulf1 What's this racism thing? Nobody said anything about race. There are many kinds of prejudice.

[@alganhar1]

​@@Garwulf1 Re-read that initial line, which included the phrase 'If the British were innovating, it was accidental.' That literally implies that only the British were 'accidentally' innovating. That is a Bias based on nothing other than race. Period. What else are you supposed to call it OTHER than racism hmm? An assumption based on nothing but race is Racism, period, that is literally the definition of Racism. I am sorry to say, but that particular Bias is not limited to certain demographics or age groups but is a broad human condition. For heavens sake, even the popular histories make note of British Innovations, even those that stick to the idiotic 'Lions led by Donkeys' mantra. So I stand by my statement. Had he fallen into a different Bias I would have called that out also. We all have our Biases, the measure of a person is understanding that and attempting to limit the effect of said Bias upon our thinking. The OP made absolutely no attempt to do that.

[@clydecessna737]

Field Marshall John French spent months at the French HQ during the Battle of Verdun where the French army suffered over 300,000 casualties and the German's suffered a similar disaster. The British then copied this disaster the following year at the Somme. The British Government, General staff and soldiers learned nothing at all. Carthage used to crucify it's failing generals; we promoted them and granted them honors; Haig also got £50,000. In Afghanistan British soldiers copied tactics used by GIs in Vietnam with similar results.

[@davidchambers8697]

Verdun and the Somme were fought simultaneously, not in successive years. I think you have got your battles confused.

[@rhysnichols8608]

Somme was fought 4 months after Verdun started, the planning for the Somme began only several weeks after Verdun started, so your comment is a little harsh, but I agree the plans seemed rather unimaginative and British generals should’ve learned on the job much quicker and been flexing in their plans and learned. They did learn but only after repeating the same mistakes