Vogtle & the Nuclear Renaissance That Wasn't (Part 1)

[@ryccoh]

Why insist on the one hour hard limit? It's quite short for a podcast especially a technical one

[@chriskeefer3930]

Because Im a doctor and occasionally have to go work in the ER lol. I would LOVE to be able to do a sprawling Rogan 3 hours with James...

[@ryccoh]

@@chriskeefer3930 Lol we would like that too. Well okay I thought it was a format choice, can't argue with the ER, that takes precedence of course

[@kayakMike1000]

It's hard enough to keep a straight face while being stupid for an entire hour.

[@happyhome41]

SO looking forward to Part 2, and 3 and . . . whatever it takes. Another FANTASTIC episode. Thank you Messrs James Kressenstein and Dr. Keefer.

[@mikesnyder9474]

Please hurry on the follow-up. Understanding the actual issues affecting the nuclear build delay is critically important. Excellent podcast!

[@chapter4travels]

The actual issues are regulation and reactor design. PWRs will always be expensive.

[@FernandoWINSANTO]

Built on schedule/budget earns 1st Lincoln cent 15 years later?

[@NickGobin]

Thank you, thank you, thank you! I have been wanting a deep, detailed dive into the issues at Vogtle for years, and i find most coverage to be superficial and reliant on anecdotes and spin. A long, detailed, and informed deep dive is exactly what we need, and i cant wait for the sequel parts! And actually, James should write a book about it. There's enough material, and i could see it being a good complement to "How Big Things Get Done" in terms of mandatory reading for any nuclear engineers and project managers in the upcoming nuclear revival.

[@thewiseperson8748]

There are circa 400 nuclear reactors worldwide producing around 500 GW. Last year alone 280 GW of new renewables were installed last year. Within 10 years, the power contributed by nuclear power releative to renewables will be largely irrelevant. Renewables with energy storage can be deployed much faster than nuclear.

[@mrj774]

How much energy storage has been deployed?

[@MaxPower-11]

Your argument is irrelevant so long you as quote nameplate capacities without regards to capacity factor. Oldest renewables ploy in the book. 1MW of renewables available 30% of the time ≠ 1MW of nuclear available 90%+ of the time! Means you have to build three times as much renewable nameplate capacity to match the same capacity as nuclear. Then there’s the fact that the amount of energy storage required to ensure 100% uptime would be insanely expensive and resource intensive (at least using current technology), plus given the much higher required demand for batteries in stationary grid applications to cover 100% uptime would raise the cost of batteries in other applications where they could be be deployed more effectively and where there are less alternatives to fossil fuels, i.e. in transportation (EVs). The reality is that we need _both_ nuclear and renewables in the future energy mix and battery storage should be deployed in EVs as first priority with the goal of making those batteries as inexpensive as possible in order to make EVs more competitive with ICE vehicles.

[@pauldietz1325]

@@mrj774 The same argument was being made against solar and wind. The counter is to point out how rapidly they are growing. Solar and wind were insignificant, until suddenly they became very significant. If I recall correctly, grid connected battery storage is expanding 60% per year. This is a huge growth rate; if batteries are not significant yet, just wait a few years.

[@kalkuttadrop6371]

@@pauldietz1325 The thing is the capacity to expand Nuclear has existed for decades though, had people not gotten scared in the 80s we would be in a better spot

[@pauldietz1325]

@@kalkuttadrop6371 I don't see how that is at all relevant. Having been installed in the past gives nuclear no leg up now. Nuclear is judged now based on the facts in evidence now (particularly cost); it doesn't get credits for past successes. Nor is there some sort of argument from fairness; nuclear is a technology, not a person, so don't anthropomorphize it.

[@daniel-bertrand]

This one-hour program was insightful as to why we no longer can build such large infrastructure projects. It seems we lost the basic notion that "industry" and "civil engineering" operate on distinct sets of rules, logic, liabilities and culture. Golden rule is you do not break ground on anything before having the whole set of blueprints, BOMs, subcontracting, budget, certifications and schedules, ALL LEGALLY BINDING. Just did an experiment submitting "maîtrise d'oeuvre" and "maîtrise d'ouvrage" to an AI-backed translator, both returned the same generic "Project Management". Confusing both missions and statutes is a very bad thing as both had been carefully crafted over centuries precisely to mitigate conflicting interests and get things done accordingly to COMMITMENTS set in stone... as evidenced in the distant or nearer past.

[@elderbob100]

The lesson here is the actual cost of changes to a design. The initial contract must provide for a cost plus provision to compensate fairly the time and materials cost of design changes to the builder.

[@williamgrebenik8876]

Excellent subject examination on Vogtle and US nuclear industry. There should be more post mortem analysis on these industry failures.

[@chrisjohns38]

Hey guys, you do recall that Westinghouse sold the three loop and 1200 MW designs to the French, who then passed their improved designs on to the Chinese consistent with the French globalization ideal.

[@happyhome41]

37:00 “Project management” BINGO ! With large projects, we are taught to mistrust assertions of percentage completion, because commonly 50 percent of the effort remains after “90%” completion.

[@tonywilson4713]

Yeah Project Management where the incompetent and unqualified tell the competent and qualified when they are supposed to get stuff done. Been there, done that, fixed it, told to f*ck-off so others could take credit.

[@Ln-cq8zu]

​@@tonywilson4713I was 40 years in supply chain management working with project managers, I can promise you, the shit comes from higher up the tree for them too.

[@FernandoWINSANTO]

believe it or not, there is a lot of interest in the EPR

[@pauldietz1325]

The "90/90 rule" of scheduling: the first 90% of the project takes 90% of the time, and the other 10% takes the other 90% of the time.

[@ryanreeson9783]

One day a young man wakes up and says to himself "I'd like to save a Nuclear Plant!" Congratulations Chris! Today is a giant day. Thank you.

[@thomasgreene5750]

The main issue at Vogtle/Summer was that they were working down four learning curves at the same time: first reactors of a new design; first use of modular construction; first nuclear new construction starts since the mid 1970s; and first use of Part 52 licensing regulations. Southern Company had the scale and experience to perservere through the learnings and finish. The much smaller SCANA/Santee Cooper organizations. The Chinese had at least one less learning curve to fight down, but by pulling ahead, they bore the brunt of the first build of a new reactor design issues. The Chines now have have eight AP1000s under construction and an additional four approved and in the queue when construction resources break free. The initial construction time estimate for this second wave was four years, ten months. The two lead units, Sanmen 3 and Haiyang 3, are just reaching the halfway point in construction (they both closed up their reactor containments in the last couple of weeks) and they are two months ahead of the original schedule. Building many units of a standard design in a deliberate series seems to be about the only way to make nuclear power an economical choice. A means of selling the power at a predictable price over the long haul is another fundamental enabling condition because the units have high initial capital costs and useful lifetimes measured in decades.

[@wm.scottpappert9869]

Wow ... Excellent interview and discussion Chris and James ... the nuclear power sausage plant, compounded by what sounds like abject lack of efficient supply chain infrastructure, design inadequacy and darkness, segmented and decentralized responsibility and management, list goes on. Looking forward to next several ? followup episodes as this topic might be the most essential I've seen covered on Decouple. Curious James where to look for more written summaries of these types of insight and revelation ? Completely agree that these lessons were necessary and the nuke community should be eternally grateful for the tax payers of Georgia and S. Carolina. Imperative that the lessons not be left as simply that without future (and immediate) build utility. Hardest part has been done

[@Joemama555]

"We have projects, not products"

[@Petriiik]

short version od that podcast: "mismanagement"

[@ninefox344]

Slightly longer version of the short version: Nothing could get started on time because they hadn't finished the detailed design. Now that a plant exists, the next one should go far faster.

[@LoatherHelms-kh9lq]

James is brilliant. I listened to this three times to digest all the content

[@Joemama555]

*** recommended to watch from 1:08:00 to 1:11:00 ish before starting the video from the beginning

[@wheel-man5319]

What I'm getting from this is that since the supply chain to provide the modules didn't exist it had to be created. If that's true, then the next modular reActor should be easier and faster... Am I missing something?

[@kp6215]

Who's the idiot that allowed the subcontractor of the module for ANY projeçt to begin without the full project to go forward because 1981 all System Design people one decision maker NO CHANGE would happen or we were told DO NOT accept the job 🤬

[@chrisjohns38]

The Chinese build time for the long Chinese AP build time also included their pause on nuclear after Fukushima, correct? Which AP was build entirely by Chinese construction contractors? Who in their right mind would hire Shaw???? Who did the mandatory oversight to assure that design (and interface) requirements on the US construction of the modules? That, from my experience, is a critical element of “modular”construction approach. From my 20 years experience with “modular” construction, US fabricators issue a continuous stream of non conformances that require scrapping or design changes so you should go back and take a look at the actual cause of the design changes.

[@antoniahowarth-wass5001]

At last! Thanks.

[@charlesgriffin-sw7jm]

I worked at Vogtle 3 and 4 during this time period and heard no lies told.

[@IronmanV5]

After watching this series I am more convinced that we shouldn't waste public money on nuclear unless the industry can consistently demonstrate the ability to build a financially viable plant with minimal delays and overruns. Considering the progress on solar, wind, and the various grid level storage as far as adoption rates and cost decreases, I am highly skeptical that nuclear will ever be able to compete, except in niche cases.

[@thomasgreene5750]

Perhaps the right way to build the first half dozen of a new desgin like AP1000 is to make a joint venture company of useers, designers and constructors and build and operate them jointly. That wy the learning-curve costs get spread among the many interested parties, the financial strength is available to persevere though the learnings, you get down the learning curves quickly through deliberate repetition, and you end up with a well-developed design, a construction and supply chain that is competent, and a capability to build subsequent units quickly and economically.

[@thewiseperson8748]

The contemporary AP1000 is based on the Westinghouse reactors at Fukushima Dai'ichi. Experience from year 2011 when the tsunami hit shows how utterly appalling the AP1000 precursor design is in practice. The raised nuclear fuel pool at the top of the reactor is an appalling concept. The vertically raised control rods is an appalling idea; they should be gravity fed. The base support for the reactor vessel is appalling such that a melt-through burns about the under-reactor support structure. The criticism can be continued. The Fukushima Dai'ichi reactor is appalling US crappy design technology that is not fit for purpose.

[@pauldietz1325]

Nonsense. The reactors at Fukushima Daiichi were/are BWRs. The AP1000 is a PWR. Totally different beasts.

[@raphaelpenque6081]

With respect to the "consortium" problem you've raised for Vogtle. This is not dissimilar to other industries like Downstream.. Power Plants etc. You will have several vendors and different companies involved with the build of a project

[@tobyw9573]

It appears that designs are "88% done" is a bad measure because the total number of documents and pages and images can change (increase). The measure should be completion by page number. Government inspection and approval should be combined onsite. No way government approval can cost a billion dollars, or any reasonable fraction of a $billion.

[@tobyw9573]

NRC Total budget Authority, FY2022 is a hair over $1B from $900M in 2012

[@mhirasuna]

Even though China did not have an AIA requirement, could the AIA rule affect the designs of the modules that were delivered to China. Westinghouse was designing modules to supply the nuclear renaissance, not just the four NPPs in China. They wanted the modules delivered to China also to work in the USA. We need to know more about the nature of the design changes before we assign the blame.

[@dastankuspaev9217]

How one can even start building without complete design

[@royalwins2030]

That jigar shah show was so aggressive lol

[@NickGobin]

It was great! I still go back and listen to parts of it. But this episode will also be a classic.

[@zawilious]

two words my friend: CORRUPTION and BANKS

[@iancormie9916]

Apologize by providing a refund, build 5 or 10 plants and levelize the costs between the first and final plants. There is no reason to penalize the rate payers in one state because of management and regulatory issues that ballooned the initial plants cost.

[@tobyw9573]

Nuclear development incrementally frees China from dependence on foreign carbon-based energy fuels.

[@andrewwilgress4100]

Planned cost run over's to make them rich. Contract's encourage these screw up's because it makes them more money.

[@hanshyde9108]

"The industry created some really nice fairy tales about and why it ultimately wasn't the industry's fault. It was everyone else's fault." BINGO! And instead of lessons learned (that there was no reason they should not have already been learned prior to Summer & Vogtle starting), the industry & advocacy is again back at blaming everyone but themselves! Enough with blaming the change of perspective on natural gas for the collapse of the value of new nuclear power plants. The same utilities that filed the COLs and were interested in new reactors were also, 1) already operators of NPPs, 2) already operators of coal plants, 3) already operators of natural gas plants. They new the economics of them regardless of whether gas was high or low, and what they really did was look at Summers & Vogtle and say paraphrased, "ok, here are your claims regarding modularization and buildability on time and budget, show us. aka prove it, don't just promise us." No offense, but just because neither of you were in the utility space prior to boondoggles of both Summers & Vogtle (and distantly the EPRs) having already manifest themselves terminally, doesn't mean they didn''t happen or it wasn't something fully predictable and something utilities execs were looking at closely and hoping for a different outcome than what would prove out to be the case. So now back today... what is the current narrative being spread by the nuclear fan bois and girls? The only way to get nuclear moving is to get rid of NRC regulators that are anti-nuclear!!! So once again, it is someone else's fault, almost like clockwork and there is once again no acceptance of internal failures and discussions of how the industry needs to clean house internally!

[@chrisjohns38]

Yeah, it drives me nuts that everyone is now blaming NRC! No one is stopping an applicant from submitting both parts of a two part application, for example. There have been periods when NRC wouldn’t approve fully compliant 10CFR71/72 applications for political reasons(to jam up the backend of the fuel cycle).

[@kennethferland5579]

Yep, the favorite is to just blame the Hippies in some form.

[@andrewwilgress4100]

Why would anyone want this material under pressure? Move forward, RND molten salt

[@Ln-cq8zu]

We are going to need both, since according to the experts we reached peak oil in 2018 (at least the easily attainable peak oil)

[@thewiseperson8748]

This video allows people to appreciate just how economically unviable, problematic, dangerous and environmentally dangerous nuclear fission technology is in practice. Clearly, nuclear should be abandoned and the move made to renewables as soon as possible. Geothermal is much more reliable and provides constant baseload power without the radioactive risk.

[@chrisjohns38]

The 2 part license approach is a joke. Any reputable organization will complete the design sufficient to build and get both licenses simultaneously. I see Westinghouse as the wide open failure as described by your podcast.

[@dastankuspaev9217]

Should have built esbwr instead.

[@davidwilkie9551]

I'm definitely overreaching my level of competency, but not that of a Nuclear Engineer maybe, to review a parallel coexistence assessment of the standard conventional education from another totally aligned POV, ie QM-TIME Completeness Holographic Nucleation. To the Singularity-point, the idea of Virtual Work taught to Engineering Students, Mechanics 101, correlates with the other Newtonian Laws of static/dynamic motion in the Fluxion-Integral Calculus of Logarithmic Time Duration Timing Conception holistically. By which practical revision of basic knowledge, most of the deliberately ignorant politics of presumptions around fossil fuels inevitability can be upgraded to full conscious awareness of QM-TIME Completeness here-now-forever Actuality and the threats made by inhuman murdering animals using nuclear weapons to menace the planet and keep us and it unhealthy.

[@chapter4travels]

For there to be a renaissance, nuclear has to be cheap, and high-pressure/low-temperature water reactors will never be cheap by their very design. (Never) A nuclear power plant needs to look just like a natural gas plant (85% identical) with the only difference being the source of high-temperature/low-pressure heat. That source doesn't need expensive forgings and gigantic, air-tight containment structures. This would be adopted by every Western country in the world. Now swap out the very expensive steam turbine with a Brayton cycle generator and you have a global renaissance where every country abandons coal for nuclear. PWRs are infinitely better than low-density/intermittent/weather-dependent/location-dependent/time of day-dependent/season-dependent wind and solar. PWRs should be built to replace coal in rich countries when those PPs wear out, but they are not the basis for a renaissance.

[@jthadcast]

doomed complexity

[@elderbob100]

Why must everything nuclear be related to your own experience? Can't you objectively analyze something without personalizing it?