Defending Nominalism | Dr. Kenny Boyce

Do numbers, propositions, and universals exist? Dr. Kenny Boyce doesn't think so. In this video, he defends fictionalist nominalism against objections.
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OUTLINE
0:00 Introduction
2:32 Abstract Objects, Realism, & Anti-Realism
19:48 One Over Many & Objective Resemblance
1:05:01 Truthmaking & Correspondence Theory
1:14:38 Abstract Reference & Ontological Commitment
1:21:15 Mathematical Discovery
1:23:21 Propositions & Communication
1:37:18 Indispensability Arguments & Science
1:46:24 Self-Defeat & Fiction-Preservation
1:51:49 Conclusion
LINKS
Here's the document we prepared for the discussion! drive.google.com/file/d/1YPKD...
God and Abstract Objects Playlist: • God and Abstract Objects
Kenny's PhilPeople profile: philpeople.org/profiles/kenne...
Website: www.josephschmid.com

[@tbcop9898]

William Lane Craig joined the chat.

[@Hello-vz1md]

Joe should invite WLC for discussion If Cam (capturing Christianity ) Request WLC to come on Joe's channel then it will be great

[@supremeagnostic516]

As a mathematician, I instantly and without hesitation, disagree with everything he says....But as a Philosopher, I take him very seriously, he makes a very robust case for his position. It's a pleasure to listen to him.

[@MajestyofReason]

I have four things to say in response: (1) your username is utterly amazing; (2) your comment seems to me spot on; (3) it’s wonderful to hear that the video served you🙂; (4) much love❤️

[@david-hogarty]

I agree it's fascinating. For me his argument against mathematical truth is self-defeating: kzbin.info/www/bejne/fIa1q4Wipdmgn5Y:22:54 . Roughly, mathematical discovery is not 'real' because it's only logical discovery. But to a mathematician, mathematics and logic are two different lenses into the study of possible structures, and the logical discovery he appeals to, namely the structure of valid inference, is itself an abstract universal (though I would argue a fundamentally unknowable one) that underpins his argument.

[@glof2553]

I'm more of a Platonist but to be honest I have not heard many rigorous defenses of nominalism. Looking forward to listening. Thanks!!

[@WorldviewDesignChannel]

Very satisfying! Kenny and I used to discuss this in grad school, but I was curious how he might respond to my more recent attempts to break his view. Low and behold, you raise my very objections, and I got to hear his replies! Well, *thank you*!

[@WorldviewDesignChannel]

In case anyone is curious, my own reply to his replies is that, first, they are dialectically flawless, and second, speaking of flatfooted rejoinders, I take myself to be *directly acquainted* with their falsity. :) (Like I'm acquainted with certain quantiles, or my favorite color...)

[@CMVMic]

Lo* and behold lol Regarding your reply i.e. his replies are dialectically flawless, and second, speaking of flatfooted rejoinders, I take myself to be directly acquainted with their falsity. Are you making an argument from intuition against Nominalism?

[@MountAthosandAquinas]

I step away from listening to videos for a bit and come back to hear your voice is deeper. Not that it wasn’t already plenty deep in the realm of philosophy. Looking forward to listening to the whole episode! I personally think Nominalism is untenable but always welcoming of new arguments.

[@sentienteudaimonist]

Amazing interview! Both of you are extremely knowledgeable

[@OriginalWinProductions]

A discussion between Kenny Boyce and Scott Berman in the future, if you could arrange it, would be really illuminating.

[@redbearwarrior4859]

I have yet to watch this video. But my man Dr. Kenny Boyce is a fellow board gamer! Just for that I'm going to embrace fictionalism.

[@JohnSmith-bq6nf]

I thought you would be out promoting your new movie, but you still have time to make philosophy videos. You have good time management skills.

This was really good, Joe! Thanks for this. I disagree with Kenny so vehemently, but he is really sharp and a generally cool guy. I can even forgive him using a D&D reference.

[@Oners82]

100% agree with Kenny! Nominalism just seems so obviously true to me I find it hard to believe that anybody even thinks there is a problem to be solved! If we have a red cup and a red pen then they just resemble each other - the idea that a third entity needs to be invoked that they both resemble just seems silly! Photons are just reflecting off the objects at particular wavelengths that look the same colour to us, and there is no need to postulate the existence of "redness" as a universal to explain this!

[@anglozombie2485]

why do you disagree?

[@derekg5563]

​@@Oners82 I mean, I lean towards nominalism myself, but if you really don't see how there could be problems with which to deal when you are just relying on two red things resembling each other, you're just an idiot. Two things that immediately come to mind are the following: 1. That we can seemingly consider the "redness" in isolation from the object - that we are not just comparing red objects to each other in our musings, but are considering what it is about these objects that makes us call any of them red. In fact, you could have just one red object in the world, but could still imagine what it would be like for other objects to be this color. Perhaps you would say that you are just imagining resembling objects, but this seems a bit weird, because if say there is a red brick, and in your mind you imagine a red ball (a resembling object in terms of color), you are introducing a lot of unnecessary things into this, as the fact that the red ball is a ball is irrelevant to the property you are trying to identify. If you truly understood redness, you would not need to think of a ball, or any object's features that are unnecessary and superfluous to that of redness, but would be able to get deeper and deeper into the real essence of it. It seems reasonable, for example, to expect people to be able to create definitions without relying on extensions, but by using intensions. So if I ask you what pain is, you could explain it in ways beyond simply listing painful things, such as getting stabbed, breaking your bones, being burned, etc. In fact, such a definition, beyond just being in a sense incomplete, also, arguably, isn't even fully accurate to the extent that it _is_ complete, because not everyone would necessarily find a burn, or any of those things painful, for example if their nerves or something were messed up such that they don't send pain signals to the brain and hence don't feel anything. An intensional definition that doesn't rely on examples would be able to say something useful about this, that these painful things are considered to be such because of the unpleasant sensations that generally arise from them; therefore, if someone can't feel the sensations that usually arise from being burned, then that is why being burned in that particular case is not painful. The examples also contain things about them not essential to pain - for example, with breaking a bone, the actual fate of the bone afterwards is not necessarily relevant to pain - only the part that motivated the body to send pain signals to the brain (or however it works, as I am more of a philosopher than a biologist). 2. Bertrand Russell shows an infinite regress problem with Resemblance Nominalism that is well known. For example if object a resembles object b and object a also resembles object c (I mean this to be a general form of a proposition such as, "object a and b are both red, and object a and c are both red"), then the resemblance between object a and object b resembles the resemblance between object a and object c, and the resemblance between object a and object b also resembles the resemblance between object b and object c, which itself can only be explained by a further resemblance. It seems that the resemblances in this form of nominalism must themselves rely on resemblances, and it seems that, unless you assume from the beginning that resemblances exist, there is no reason to be convinced at any stage, for the unexplained resemblances to be explained by other resemblances that are also unexplained will just replace the preceding problem with one of the same type on the next stage. With certain forms of nominalism you are often at risk of stating something that is just incoherent, even if it looks like it is pointing something out. The meaning of things resembling each other is not as clear as it may seem, at least if you only limit yourself to explaining them in terms of further resemblances. There are different forms of nominalism, and it might be possible to deal with the issues of it; moreover, platonism has many problems as well, and there is certainly a burden that comes with postulating ontological objects. However, if you just think you are picking some simpler looking way of describing things so as to just easily sidestep the problem, you're a moron. You essentially have given yourself tools for combating the problem, but instead you are just flashing those tools to give yourself license to ignore the problem. It's the difference between someone preparing for a battle and fully ready to actually engage in it, versus someone who is not actually willing to fight, but prepares for battle as a bluff in the hope that the enemy calls off the battle upon witnessing your preparation.

[@Oners82]

@@derekg5563 Is there any need to be rude? I know professional philosophers who also deny that there is a problem so spare me your insults you obnoxious little twat.

[@morgengabe1]

I'd have guessed the debate between nominalists was the content of a "realm of forms". In that sense, I expected nominalists to prioritize semiotics, as platonists with semantics.

[@landon5105]

This was great!

[@STAR0SS]

About the bridge example, it seems to me the fictionalist account is closer to what actually happens. An engineer will not say "the bridge will stand" but "according to the model the bridge will stand", and it's clear for those involved that the model needs to be carefully crafted for it to stands in the correct relation with the bridge (since indeed models often fail). That said I'm not sure I really got the argument to begin with...

[@STAR0SS]

Is there any issues with using a correspondence theory of truth for concrete objects and a coherentism approach for abstract ones ? to me it seems quite intuitive that when I say "the sky is blue" I mean something different that when I say "one plus one equal two" and thus I wouldn't expect that the what makes these two true is the same thing. For 1+1=2 it's that it's logical coherent with the axiom of mathematics or something of the sort, while for the sky is that it corresponds to an mind-independent blue sky.

[@helsharidy123]

That's how I think of it as well.

[@mistermkultra3114]

It would be interesing a debate/conversation between Jenny Boyce and James Anderson ( or Alexey Burov )

[@Oners82]

100% agree with Kenny. Nominalism just seems so obviously true to me I find it hard to believe that anybody even thinks there is a problem to be solved! If we have a red cup and a red pen then they just resemble each other - the idea that a third entity needs to be invoked that they both resemble just seems silly! Photons are just reflecting off the objects at particular wavelengths that look the same colour to us, and there is no need to postulate the existence of "redness" as a universal to explain this! However clearly not everybody shares this intuition, but to me it just seems obvious.

[@ErnolDawnbringer]

Still 2 objects

[@Oners82]

@@ErnolDawnbringer So what? That in no way addresses what I said, you are just stating the blatantly obvious for reasons unknown...

[@crushinnihilism]

Im a Platonist. It just seems so obviously true that I can't believe anyone takes nominalism seriously

[@Oners82]

@@crushinnihilism I know you are being sarcastic and trying to parody me, but your sarcasm doesn't address the issue I was raising. Why do 2 red objects require a universal in order for them to resemble each other? Why can't they just look similar? Are you not just pushing back the problem one step? Besides which, platonistic forms such as "redness" have no actual colour as they have no physical properties whatsoever, so it seems to be an explanation lacking any merit. I am yet to hear a platonist adequately answer the objections of a nominalist, and no, sarcasm does not constitute a defence of your position.

[@crushinnihilism]

@@Oners82 to be fair, I have yet to hear a nominalist show how they get to an external world filled with objects. Were talking about redness. Thats a mental quality. The nominalist has no account for qualia

[@patricksee10]

Is the correlation between common observations about the colour red and the matching electromagnetic radiation spectrum value a mere coincidence?

[@adriang.fuentes7649]

Hey Joe, what Peter van Inwagen's book do you recommend? I am looking for a good platonic book and a good nominalist view (I personally tend towards some form of conceptualism).

[@MajestyofReason]

Check out our recommendations at the end of the video❤️

[@adriang.fuentes7649]

Thank you Joe. I asked before I finished the video, so sorry😅 My english is bad for catching names. Could you write the book he said that makes a good summary of the prior two? Also I make the question again about a recommendation of a Peter van Inwagen book. He named a paper but I am kinda old school and generally prefer to know an author by one of his books. Thanks a lot. You're awesome!

[@MajestyofReason]

@@adriang.fuentes7649 Much love

[@MondAgreen]

This seems to align perfectly with Dr. Lance Bush's ideas on folk metaethical indeterminacy and a lack of commitment to the ontological nature of abstract concepts/entities: morals, maths, etc. in everyday speech.

[@MondAgreen]

Also, many of Dr. Daniel Linford's ideas about scientific anti-realism. I definitely favour some form of constructive realism (didn't wait until end of the video lol)

[@cuthip]

Well Tony Stark is an alcoholic, so they very well may have mentioned his liver

[@goclbert]

Of course Joe waits for the dislike bar to go away to make the heel turn to nominalism, SMH.

[@MajestyofReason]

You’ve revealed my plan…

[@slamrn9689]

Boiler up!

[@maxmax9050]

The moment you grant objective resemblance, you presuppose shared intrinsic sameness. I don't percieve the Aristotelian framework as asking for anything more or less, so if you accept the above, you should be a moderate realist about universals. Wouldn't the nominalist have to grant that there is no commom F-ness, but that the two objects merely resemble eachother? It would have to be mere resemblance without intrinsic samness, which is an exteme particularism about features that seems incoherent.

[@MajestyofReason]

“Shared intrinsic sameness”, however, is ambiguous; it could mean that there is some positive ontological item that the distinct particulars x and y share; or it could mean that x is F, and y is also F, and x and y are each intrinsically F. Here, the same predicate “F” is truthfully and intrinsically satisfied by both x and y, and so on that sense, both x and y are intrinsically the same. Eg, both are red (in the same sense), and they’re intrinsically red; and so there’s a sense in which they enjoy ‘sameness in intrinsic character’. So the fictionalist nominalist doesn’t deny that; they only deny that this sameness in intrinsic character entails that there is some single positive ontological item (eg, some property) shared in common between x and y. So I don’t quite see any incoherence here

[@maxmax9050]

@@MajestyofReason I think I grasp what you are saying. Although, at the moment "positive ontological item" strikes me as ambiguous as well, or at least pushes the question back to the metaphysical status of what a property is. Let's say F = being red. What is the difference between saying redness is a "positive ontological item" possessed in common between x and y, and red is nominal, though of both x and y? Because in one sense, I guess I really would say I am a nominalist then, but I also think redness is a substantial and actual characteristic of x and y that they really have. Isn't the point of moderate realism to deny that the relation of redness to x and y is not that of some transcendental object, but is merely a form, shape, or characteristic some substance possesses of itself?

[@jeffreyscott4997]

"Abstract Object". Surely, one could deny, or affirm, the existence of abstract objects only if one grants the coherence of the notion of the objectness of the abstract. That is, since the notion combines the concept of abstractness with the concept of objectness, is it not premature to question the existence or nonexistence of it, before questioning the objectness or none objectness of the abstract. That is "Abstract exists (mind independently) but not in the form of 'objects' (ie. no subclass 'abstract' of the class 'object')" seems a coherent position to me. And thus Platonism vs. Nominalism seems a false dictomy. The agreement between them on what objectivity would consist in with regard to "Abstract" seems questionable.

[@Daniel-cz9gt]

What does "exist" mean in the context of abstract objects?

[@Daniel-cz9gt]

in regards to idealizations made in science it seems more like a feature of comprehension rather than a refrence to some external thing.

[@BlueEyesDY]

I think the reason Platonists get it so wrong stems from the fact they think the sentence _the cup is red_ is a statement about the cup; it’s not. It’s a statement about the speaker’s perception of the cup.

[@crushinnihilism]

The cup itself is also about perception. What is the cup outside of perception?

[@CMVMic]

​@@crushinnihilisma substance in relation to one's perception

[@crushinnihilism]

@@CMVMic begging the question.

[@CMVMic]

@@crushinnihilism how so

[@CMVMic]

@@crushinnihilism how so

[@Paradoxarn.]

I'm not sure if I accept the claim that we just have to accept some brute facts in our ontology (or bruteness in our worldview more generally). For example, I reject both foundationalism and coherentism in epistemology in favor of what might be called "infinitism" where justification of knowledge lacks a stopping point and is never complete. Instead justification of knowledge can always be deeper. In the same way one might never be able to describe a complete metaphysics but it doesn't follow that one should stop wherever one has arrived at the simplest possible ontology. Of course it is impossible in practice to endlessly explicate a metaphysical approach such as Platonism but just means that one should accept that one has an unfinished metaphysical model instead of taking certain facts to be intrinsically brute. I hope that makes sense.

[@CMVMic]

Here are two arguments: (1) for brute facts and (2) against infintism (1) Existence is a brute fact. 1. Existence is defined as the totality of what exists. Assuming platonism, this encompasses all things such as substances, events, properties, and any other conceivable entities or phenomena. 2. Explanations, by their nature, are events or processes that provide understanding or reasoning about phenomena. They must be grounded in substances, as they are not self-sustaining entities but rather dependent on the elements they seek to explain. 3. If explanations are not events grounded in substances and yet exist, they become part of the totality of what exists. This inclusion in the totality of existence raises a critical issue: anything that is part of the totality cannot explain the totality without being self-referential. 4. A self-referential explanation, one that attempts to explain itself as part of the totality it seeks to explain, results in an epistemic circularity. It is an epistemic possibility but does not establish an ontological fact, as it fails to provide an external standpoint or foundation. 5. Since any explanation that is part of the totality of existence cannot explain the totality without explaining itself, and self-explanation is insufficient for establishing ontological truths, this leads to an impasse in seeking an ultimate explanation for existence. 6. Consequently, while existence can have explanations in parts, the very existence of these explanations, and by extension, the existence of everything, must be taken as a brute fact. A brute fact is something that does not have an explanation outside of itself; it simply is. Therefore, the existence of the totality is a brute fact - an ontological reality that does not have and does not require an explanation beyond itself (2) A - Infinitism as an Actual Infinite is incoherent P1. For this concept to be epistemologically possible or valid, it must first be established as metaphysically possible. P2. Due to the finite nature of human cognition, it is impossible to establish the metaphysical possibility of infinitism, as this would require comprehending or verifying an infinite concept. P3. Human cognition is inherently limited and cannot fully grasp or empirically verify the concept of an actual infinite. P4. Since it is impossible to establish infinitism as metaphysically possible due to the inherent limitations of human cognition, and given that epistemological possibility depends on metaphysical possibility, infinitism must be considered false. P5. The concept of an actual infinite inherently involves a paradox, as it proposes an unbounded existence within the context of known boundedness. P6. The inability to establish the metaphysical possibility of infinitism directly impacts its epistemological validity, rendering it not just unverifiable but also logically incoherent within our framework of understanding. C. Therefore, given the link between epistemological and metaphysical possibility and the limitations of human cognition in establishing metaphysical truths, actual infinites must be considered not only unverifiable but also false Defense of p1 - an event's potential for infinite occurrence must be demonstrable, not just speculative. Epistemological possibilities should have a foundation in what is potentially real or true. If a concept contradicts what is metaphysically possible (i.e., what can exist or occur within the bounds of reality), then it lacks a necessary basis for being considered a true or knowable possibility. (2) B - Infinitism as a potential infinite is incoherent P1. Justification is a cognitive event grounded in human cognition. P2. All cognitive events, including justification, are grounded in brains, which have limited capacity and a finite existence. P3. All human brains, and by extension, the cognitive processes they support, cease to function eventually due to biological limits. P4. Given the finite lifespan of brains, the cognitive event of justification cannot continue indefinitely or infinitely. C. Thus, within the context of human cognition and its limits, epistemic infinitism, as a process or event, is metaphysically impossible.

[@Paradoxarn.]

@@CMVMic These are interesting arguments but I feel the need to point out some issues with them and present some objections. I will go though them in reverse order. There are two major problems (and several minor problems) with argument (2) B, that Infinitism as a potential infinite is incoherent. The first problem is that the argument is invalid, the conclusion does not follow from the premises. To say that epistemic infinitism is metaphysically impossible, you would have to show that it is non-actualizable in every possible world. Your argument, at best only shows it to be non-actualizable in the actual world, but not in other possible worlds. The second problem is that P4 is extremely dubious. While each brain might have a finite lifespan, it still seems more than plausible that the relevant information can be transferred from one brain to another, allowing for the cognitive event to continue after the death of the first brain. Repeat this and one could continue this potentially forever. The minor problems are the following: 1. Justification can be grounded in non-human cognition. For example, in alien cognition or in the cognition of sentient AI. Your first premise needs some revision. 2. The claim that all cognitive events are grounded in brains is controversial. If there exists non-material thinking entities or AI capable of cognition, then your second premise if false. 3. While brains, as far as we know, have a limited lifespan, it might be possible to extend the cognitive processes in them after the death of the brain. For example, one could create a computer or AI which continues the cognition of the deceased brain. Alternatively, new medical technology might be able to extend the lifespan of the brain indefinitively. This casts some doubt on your third premise. Moving on, to the argument that Infinitism as an Actual Infinite is incoherent. This argument suffers from the fact the the first three premises are false. P1 is false because epistemic possibility does not require metaphysical possibility. We know this because the existence and non-existence of a necessarily existent deity are both epistemically possible, while only one is metaphysically possible. P2 is false because comprehending or verifying an infinite concept is not required to establish the metaphysical possibility of infinitism or anything else. For example, the (actual) infinite is already comprehended by mathematicians using concepts which are compatible with the finite nature of human cognition, thus showing that it is possible to comprehend something infinite without an infinite concept. It follows that P3 is also false. If P1, P2 and P3 are false, then P4 and P6 are also false. P5 is also false, although I suspect that you meant to speak about "The concept of an actual infinite" with regards to knowledge or explanations. If you mean the concept of the actual infinite generally, then it does not propose an unbounded existence within the context of known boundedness. Finally, the argument that Existence is a brute fact. This is quite an impressive argument, yet there are several possible responses. The first is to embrace self-referential or circular explanations. The claim would be that such explanations are able to avoid any impasse in explaining the totality of existence. The second is to appeal to infinitism, which would avoid circularity by instead embracing an infinite regress of explanations. The third is to deny that explanations always are fully a part of all that exists, to say that some explanations either don't exist, partly don't exist or are undefined in terms of whether they exist or not. There is more that could be said about these responses but this is long enough already.

[@CMVMic]

​@@Paradoxarn. ~ These are interesting arguments but I feel the need to point out some issues with them and present some objections. Response: Thanks for engaging. Your feedback already seems to demonstrate a high esoteric level of philosophical rigor. You have presented very satisfying rebuttals. Hopefully, this doesn’t end in a stalemate. ~ There are two major problems (and several minor problems) with argument (2) B…. The first problem is that the argument is invalid, the conclusion does not follow from the premises. Response: My argument is not invalid. Your argument is a strawman. Premises (P1 to P4) are specific to human cognition and its biological limits in the actual world, not in all possible worlds. Not every argument has to apply universally to all conceivable scenarios to be valid within its specific context. ~ To say that epistemic infinitism is metaphysically impossible, you would have to show that it is non-actualizable in every possible world Response: This can also be considered a non-sequitur. If there is only one metaphysically possible world, then your statement is not necessarily true since my argument has to do with metaphysical possibility, not epistemic or logical possibility. Can you prove there is more than one metaphysically possible world? ~ The second problem is that P4 is extremely dubious. While each brain might have a finite lifespan, it still seems more than plausible that the relevant information can be transferred from one brain to another….. In your hypothetical scenario, how is forever being defined? Additionally, it seems your argument doesn’t follow since it must first be proven that there is an entity can and will carry on such a process infinitely into the future, rather than simply stating a hypothetical scenario. If cognitive processes are dynamic, then by their very nature, they entail change and, consequently, an inherent finitude. How would you go about justifying this is metaphysically possible rather than strictly logically possible and especially without presupposing infinitism? This seems like a very heavy burden to bear. Hopefully we can agree strict logical possibilities do not entail metaphysical possibilities. 1. ~ Justification can be grounded in non-human cognition. Response: I agree justification can be grounded in AI but saying this still doesn’t prove that a potential infinite is metaphysically possible since at every moment only a finite time would have elapsed. For this claim, you will need a further argument that aliens or AI can exists infinitely into the future. Every medium, whether biological or technological, is subject to some form of limitation, be it degradation, technological obsolescence, or energy constraints. While technology can extend certain processes, it is still bound by the laws of physics and the limitations of materials and energy. There is also the issue of entropy inherent in physical systems, which suggests an eventual end or transformation, maintaining the finitude of these processes. The burden of proof lies in demonstrating that any such medium can surpass these inherent limitations indefinitely. 2. ~ The claim that all cognitive events are grounded in brains is controversial. If there exists non-material thinking entities or AI capable of cognition, then your second premise if false. Response: My second premise doesn’t depend on restricting thinking entities to humans. I grant that aliens and sentient AI are possible once it can be shown that those alternative are metaphysically possible. Also, the claim that there are non-material thinking entities itself requires justification which seems like special pleading. 3. ~ While brains, as far as we know, have a limited lifespan, it might be possible to extend the cognitive processes in them after the death of the brain..... This casts some doubt on your third premise. Response: I believe this was previously covered in point 1. The claim that technology or any other discovery can extend the lifespan of the brain indefinitely also requires justification, not just speculation.

[@CMVMic]

@@Paradoxarn. ~Infinitism as an Actual Infinite is incoherent…. P1 is false because epistemic possibility does not require metaphysical possibility. Response: P1. For this concept to be epistemologically possible or valid, it must first be established as metaphysically possible. Incase you saw for “a” concept… this was amended to be more restrictive. However, I believe that epistemic possibilities depend on metaphysical possibilities. This premise ensures that our knowledge claims are not only internally coherent but also consistent with the fundamental nature of reality, thus avoiding the epistemological errors that arise from entertaining fundamentally impossible concepts. It underscores the importance of empirical verification, aligning with modern philosophical discourse that seeks to bridge empirical science and philosophical inquiry. By grounding epistemological possibilities in metaphysical ones, we ensure that our beliefs and knowledge claims are logically sound and practically applicable, avoiding contradictions and aligning our understanding and actions with what is potentially real. This approach not only strengthens the logical foundation of our beliefs but also enhances their practical implications, guiding actions and decisions in a manner that is consistent with the potential realities of our world. ~ ....the existence and non-existence of a necessarily existent deity are both epistemically possible, while only one is metaphysically possible. Response: I deny this premise. Why should we think the existence of a deity is epistemically possible? As an ignostic, you will have to provide a coherent definition of such a being until then the statement would be meaningless. Please elaborate. While some concepts might be epistemically conceivable, their practical relevance and applicability often rely on their metaphysical grounding. ~ P2 is false because comprehending or verifying an infinite concept is not required to establish the metaphysical possibility of infinitism or anything else….. Response: P2. Due to the finite nature of human cognition, it is impossible to establish the metaphysical possibility of infinitism, as this would require comprehending or verifying an infinite concept. P2 and P3 in your argument might be referring to the empirical verification or full existential comprehension of infinity, which goes beyond abstract mathematical conceptualization. In this sense, the ability to handle infinite concepts in mathematical theory doesn't necessarily equate to fully grasping or verifying the metaphysical possibility of infinity in a broader existential sense. As far as we know, comprehension or verification is itself a finite event. Even if I grant that it is possible to comprehend such an abstract concept, it doesn’t necessarily make the concept coherent. For e.g. We can comprehend non-existence as a concept, but we cannot verify it is a metaphysical possibility. Non-existence is a relational concept and thus, it is a cognitive event, not an existent thing in and of itself. Therefore, the concept of non-existence is very much like the concept of an “actual” infinite. It is a cognitive event but not something that happens in reality. As I explained prior, an actual infinite is an event that is both bounded and unbounded, and thus, contradictory. The concept of non-material thinking entities, while theoretically possible, still lacks empirical evidence. For this argument to hold weight, there would need to be a demonstration of such entities' existence and their capability to perform cognitive functions beyond the finite constraints observed in known material entities. So your main arguments seem to hinge on special pleading or postulating that strict logical possibilities entail metaphysical possibilities which I would argue is a potential category error and non-sequitur. ~ If you mean the concept of the actual infinite generally, then it does not propose an unbounded existence within the context of known boundedness. Response: How so? Please define what an actual infinite means to you. ~ The first is to embrace self-referential or circular explanations…. Response: Yes, one can embrace self-referential or circular explanations, however, if explanations are events grounded in substances, then it cannot by definition, exist independent of the substance it is grounded in. Circular reasoning, or begging the question, occurs when an argument's conclusion is used as a premise to justify itself. Even we embraced a form of holistic coherentism, this would just be a foundationalism in disguise. What makes holistic coherentism the correct method to establish existence? The claim that justification can be holistic is also a foundational claim. Evidently, the only horn of the trilemma which doesn’t encounter the problem of the criterion is foundationalism since it isn’t necessarily grounded in another cognitive event. Therefore, when applying the problem to the trilemma and vice versa, we show that infinitism and coherentism cannot justify itself without simply asserting that it is. Response: The real problem is that justification is an event since it is dynamic in nature. Even if we claimed an A theory of time was false, and it was illusory, you still need to explain why the illusion itself isn’t static. Therefore, events must be grounded in that which it is not such as in a spatial substance. Thus, substances are ontologically prior to explanation, especially if explanations presuppose existence. If there is an emergence of new temporal parts from prior ones, it supports the A theory of time. If endurantism is true, this would also require empirical evidence to suggest the actual existence of physical processes that are potentially infinite ~ The second is to appeal to infinitism, which would avoid circularity by instead embracing an infinite regress of explanations. Response: Yes, I agree which is probably why I should have laid out my argument against infinitism first. It was only because you first claimed “I’m not sure I accept the claim that we just have to accept some brute facts in our ontology” for which you have not presented any reason. Sure, you reject foundationalism and coherentism but you inadvertently, don’t. Since if you did, your first argument against brute facts would fail since self-referential explanations is an example of coherentism, and the claim that infinitism is the correct approach to justification is itself a foundational claim. So a defence of both infinitism and coherentism relies on foundationalism, if not you will have to demonstrate that you can justify infinitism, infinitely rather than simply claiming you can. ~ The third is to deny that explanations always are fully a part of all that exists….. Response: Explanations either exist or they don’t exist. There is no in between. If platonism is false, which was assumed true from the beginning, then it is not part of the totality of existence and thus, existence would also be a brute fact. ~ There is more that could be said about these responses but this is long enough already. Response: Unfortunately, these discussions tend to become long. However, I am looking forward to your responses and any additional comments you want to make in your defence. Quick suggestion: In the interest of character limits, please quote the first sentence of my argument and then provide your response so that it is easier to identify the context of your contention without it becoming too wordy. Hopefully, we can limit it to one comment each going forward.

[@Paradoxarn.]

​@@CMVMic In order to limit the length of my responses I will not respond to every point you made, I will also adopt your excellent suggestion, although sometimes I will also quote a relevant sentence. "My argument is not invalid. Your argument is a strawman." Response: If my argument is a strawman, then it was not intentional. I'm simply used to the terms you used, such a metaphysical impossibility and epistemic possibility, being defined and understood in a different way than you seem to use these terms. For example, I'm used to metaphysical possibility being defined in terms of possible worlds. According to that definition, something is metaphysically impossible if it fails to exist or be true in every possible world. If you are indeed using these terms in some other way, I would ask you to explain what you mean so I can understand your argument better. "This can also be considered a non-sequitur. [...] Can you prove there is more than one metaphysically possible world?" Response: I probably cannot prove it in a strict sense. With that said, if your argument requires there to be only one possible world in order to be sound, then it seems like the burden is on you to show that there in fact is only one possible world. Otherwise your argument rests on baseless conjecture. Furthermore, if your argument rests on this presupposition and it isn't stated in the premises, then your argument, as it is presented, is logically invalid. "In your hypothetical scenario, how is forever being defined?" Response: It is defined as never ending or continuing infinitely into the future. It seems we might disagree on who is required to show what here. Certainly, I don't expect you to be convinced by hypothetical scenarios, but if they seem possible you need to show why they are impossible or improbable, otherwise your premise has an undercutting defeater rending it unjustified to believe in. You argue that "If cognitive processes are dynamic, then by their very nature, they entail change and, consequently, an inherent finitude." However, merely because they are changing and are finite in some respects, it doesn't follow that they are changing and finite in every respect. The universe might be changing and finite in terms of time but not in terms of space. The question is if cognitive processes are finite in terms of time and your argument relies on you being able to show that it is. "P1. For this concept to be epistemologically possible or valid, it must first be established as metaphysically possible." Response: I think I understand better where you are coming from. However, I believe you are fundamentally mistaken about the nature of epistemology. Epistemology isn't only about knowledge, but also about ignorance. In order to understand the world, especially from a philosophical perspective, we must be able to entertain concepts and questions which haven't been established as possible and coherent. If we limit our thinking to only that which is known to be metaphysically possible, then we limit our ability to discover new truths. "I deny this premise. Why should we think the existence of a deity is epistemically possible?" Response: Let me start by providing some coherent definitions of "god": 1. A being/person which is extraordinarily powerful and good. 2. A being/person which is worthy of worship. 3. A being/person which created the rest of reality. 4. A being/person which is more powerful than any other and which power cannot be limited, usurped, reduced or overcome by any other entity. 5. A being/person which is more good than any other and which goodness cannot be limited, usurped, reduced or overcome by any other entity. 6. A being/person which is the source of all moral obligations. Obviously these can all be combined or modified in a various ways, and while you may feel that some aren't relevant, I doubt that all can be considered incoherent. Now I will explain why we should think that an entity corresponding to one or more of these is epistemically possible. To begin with, there is evidence that such a being exists. This evidence is presented in many of the theistic arguments. It follows (from a coherent definition and the existence of evidence) that the subjective probability that a god exists cannot rationally be 0. Thus a deity is epistemically possible. Here's another argument: We cannot be 100% certain that the claim "God exists" is incoherent or meaningless. It is thus rational to assign some credence to the claim that "it is possible that the claim 'God exists' is coherent and meaningful". If it is possible that the claim 'God exists' is coherent and meaningful, then it is epistemically possible that God exists. "Yes, I agree which is probably why I should have laid out my argument against infinitism first. [...] Sure, you reject foundationalism and coherentism but you inadvertently, don’t." Response: I should have made clear that while I mentioned circular explanations as one option, I don't actually think they are possible. I mentioned it because others might make that objection to your argument and I thought you should be aware of that. If I understand you correctly, you argue that infinitism and coherentism both reduce into foundationalism since they cannot have ultimate justification unless one appeals to a foundational claim. I disagree. According to infinitism, infinitism can be justified by A which in turn is justified by B which is justified by C and so on. If you say that infinitism is false unless there is a foundational claim F which justifies infinitism, then you are denying the existence of G which justifies F. But according to infinitism there are no foundational claims and no ultimate justification. To require infinitism to have an ultimate justification is to beg the question against the infinitist. Your demand that I instead "demonstrate that you can justify infinitism, infinitely rather than simply claiming you can" is not enough to save your argument. If your argument depends on infinitism being false and you cannot demonstrate that infinitism is false, then you haven't demonstrated that your argument is sound.

[@craftexx15]

1:24:30 As a native German I commend you both for your pronounciation and assure you that you don't have to be sorry for that.

[@KHABIB-TIME]

“Allah Almighty says: Whoever comes with a good deed will have the reward of ten like it and even more. Whoever comes with an evil deed will be recompensed for one evil deed like it or he will be forgiven. Whoever draws close to Me by the length of a hand, I will draw close to him by the length of an arm. Whoever draws close to Me the by length of an arm, I will draw close to him by the length of a fathom. Whoever comes to Me walking, I will come to him running. Whoever meets Me with enough sins to fill the earth, not associating any partners with Me, I will meet him with as much forgiveness.” Prophet Muhammad (pbuh)

[@jmike2039]

Just starting the show, but what would you say are the best arguments for realism? Curious how you ended up leaning on that side

[@MajestyofReason]

I find indispensability arguments plausible; I also find arguments to the effect that nominalists cannot state their views without committing to universals plausible; finally, I find several arguments for the existence of propositions plausible, like those developed by Josh Rasmussen in some of his published articles and books as well as some of those developed by Trenton Merricks🙂

[@jmike2039]

@@MajestyofReason interesting, would love to see a video of you going in depth on that. Im really enjoying the conversation, ive always leaned towards nominalism but there are some great considerations i have towards realism lately

[@vincentiormetti3048]

@@MajestyofReason I think a video where you just laid out your views on theism and metaphysics more broadly would be really cool, even if it's just a fun video or a livestream q&a with opinions outside your field of expertise.

[@Hello-vz1md]

Joe can you tell Cam to request WLC for coming to this channel for discussions

[@jameymassengale5665]

Do triangles cause the number 180: to exist?

[@azophi]

lol. To be clear, no. We define those. No more than it causes pi to “exist” (because 360 degrees is really just made up and so is the 2pi radians) Because … yeah. I’m not sure there is an “essence of triangle” other than what we define it as .

[@odd8716]

@@azophiwe don’t define PI. If you’re talking about the symbology sure. But Pi has been around since ancient Egypt. They surely didn’t use Arabic numerals The rest of your comment misses the point entirely.

[@dubbelkastrull]

4:15 bookmark

[@etincardiaego]

I am amazed that this medieval debates are being continued. The analytical metaphysics turn in analytic philosophy was horrendous. The neopragmatists and even the post-structuralists make a lot more sense by rejecting metaphysics altogether

[@MajestyofReason]

idk man, science is pretty cool; and mathematics, reference to mathematical objects, and universals (e.g., predator, selection pressure, noble gas, etc.) all seem indispensable to science. This arguably gives us good reason to believe in such things. This is no more 'medieval' than the scientific realism debate [i.e., about whether our theoretical and unobservable postulates, which are indispensable to science's success, should be treated as real]. Whether the indispensability argument succeeds, ofc, is a separate question :)

[@etincardiaego]

@@MajestyofReason Pfff. I also find that debate pretty barren. I would really like a video tackling anti-metaphysical stances like Rorty's, Bas van Fraassen's, etc. I think it is a first necesary step knowing if metaphysics is just talking nonsense

[@MajestyofReason]

@@etincardiaegoi may potentially make such a video in due course! I find BvF’s work enjoyable and respectable

[@etincardiaego]

@@MajestyofReason Oh, that would be amazing!

[@naturalismobr]

@@MajestyofReason great. Do it. You could try to mention Rorty en passant just for the media hype.

[@patricksee10]

All the worlds a stage and all the men and women in it merely players. Fictionalism in a sentence by W Shakespeare?

[@mistermkultra3114]

BTW Spiderverse Is true

[@jameymassengale5665]

Joe, you should go into law. LOL Descartes put it this way, there are wings and there are horses, but it doesn't follow that a pegasus exists. Your on the cusp of really grasping Descartes but your too focused on the METHOD, get his companion to METHOD, the MEDITATIONS. I think there are seven, anyway, it's not new age, one, if I remember right, is watching a candle melt and analyzing the properties of change to develope an intuitive understanding of calculus on the coordinate plane. REALITY for him is that coordinate world which you superimpose on the outer world and on the inner world. Close your eyes and imagine something, see it moving in the coordinate field of imagination you can assign properties and values to thoughts, and watch numbers changing as another dimension in the field.

[@CMVMic]

Platonism is obviously false. For platonism to be true, one must engage in categorical errors and existential fallacies.

[@KHABIB-TIME]

“Take advantage of five before five: your youth before your old age, your health before your sickness, your wealth before your poverty, your free time before your busyness, and your life before your death.” - Prophet Muhammad ﷺ

[@odd8716]

>no elaboration

[@christophernodvik1057]

Cool, I think lol

[@christianschweikert9169]

I think that mathematical statements are true, not just by convention we humans make, but because of some kind of reality. But what could that reality be except abstract objects? If abstract objects do not exist and mathematical statements are true, what is it that makes these statements true?

[@MajestyofReason]

I asked Kenny precisely these questions in the truthmaker and correspondence theory section! ❤️

[@BradSandoval]

Why not just think that mathematical statements are only true by human convention? I see math as an idealized abstract concept that exists only in our mind but has its foundations strongly grounded in our physical world (ie the concept of numbers mentally mirrors real physical objects and behave the same way like you can add them together or multiply them. That’s why they seem so “real”. When abstract rules/truth in math allow us to make predictive models of the physical world it’s because those rules must are probably mirrored in some sort of physical reality about the world we live in. That’s how I currently see it anyway!

[@jameymassengale5665]

STUDY OPTICS because your philosophizing about what you SEE.

[@dominiks5068]

platonism ftw

[@eenkjet]

To deny abstract objects exist is to deny spacetime does not exist. P1 Spacetime objectively exists P2 Spacetime's ontology is geometric (pre-geometic seamless manifold) P3 Geometric objects are mathematical objects P4 Mathematical objects are platonic objects. C Math objectively exists. Read: Godel's Incompleteness Theorems and Platonic Metaphysics, Aleksandar Mikovic

[@acemxe8472]

“To deny abstract objects exist is to deny spacetime does not exist”. Can you elaborate?

[@jameymassengale5665]

IF YOU FOLLOW MY OTHER COMMENTS, the bible will help you the most because Hebrew prophets contemplated GLORY kavod or shekinah, which are particle and wave respectively, that are YHVHJESUS SEEN in the world and the mind or CONSCIOUSNESS which is the WIND/RUACH of BEING DOING. If you learn to follow this, you will see that Paul and John considered Plato and the greeks immature.

[@kleenex3000]

The assertion of the particle-wave dichotomy is solved by assertion that the Photon is neither, bczu it is, per se = as such, it-self, on its own, in its right, the quantuim (smallest unit) of an action, namely a communication between two electrons, one of the giver-object the other of the taker-object. The Photon per se (=s.a.) does, in other words, not exist. When we (taker) see an object (giver) Electrons in us communicate with electrons of the object. We see thelobject, not the light.

[@kleenex3000]

The Holy Bible does NOT help you, on this occasion. It does not mention subatomic particles (such as electrons) and not atoms, let alone molecules, let alone cells.

[@albertmanana4605]

comb your hair

[@landon5105]

This was great!