Economic Duress | Contract Law

[@thelawacademy1]

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[@destinywest8638]

How very interesting. Thank you for the videos. I really enjoy the channel. Videos are appreciably constructed in a simple and easy to follow manner that the public especially can benefit from. The information concerning different types of duress seems pretty straightforward, for the most part. Some things, however, are less clear to me. On a related question to the video. If you would be so inclined. How does the introduction of certain relevant clauses affect these types of situations? As, consider what is known as the grandfather clause. How does one approach a situation where, one party, let’s say, the employer signs a contract with the employee, as part of their hiring process, or, simply, in the case of an merger, or acquisition, issues claims to the relevant parties, as the new employer, that they formally intend to respect the terms as contracted by the merged or acquired interest, and which were negotiated previously, and to grandfather in such an extant contract as opposed to the creation of new contract. When this happens, how does this find itself interpreted in the literature and more generally, by professionals, typically is it treated very differently, do you know, from one to another jurisdiction, internationally, or according to any other discrimination? For, certainly, I imagine, the clause being not so young, and also, being not so common, but still a regular enough occurrence to attract attention, it seems an interesting issue certainly and which may have attached possibly the feature of some study in case law which may illustrate the precedent for dealing with these kinds of situations. Does any case law exist and which looks at the grandfather clause, is another question? Another question, still, if you would be so kind. How does one address the question of existing, or newly implemented policies when these policies are constructed in a way, perhaps even very innocently, that come into conflict with clauses already considered in my earlier comment? For, suppose, and it is already implied I assume, given the nature of the relationship, that an employer has and reserves the right to make such changes to the corporate policy as they see fit. Of course this is true, one must assume. Or, perhaps I am wrong, here. Anyways. Yet and imagine the borderless kingdom that envisions so empowered a legislator as can and seeks by the use of such vague language and blanket authority to spare not a breathe of hope to the employee that his or her safety lives unassailed in the strong and capable language negotiated by them at the time of their hiring, or adopted contracts, besides, also which deserve no less protection, which are the documents most which act to secure the weaker worker from the officious power of corporate leadership, see and turn pale aught ever they are made to hear its possibilities threatened. However, I know not where to place the flaw in the assumption that an absolute authority even to enact harmful policy gives not who stands in, but who casts the shadow, the false impression of plenary power, so that, in situations where, certain advantages being not any longer on the table, because once settled, and which the employee has access to, for whatever reason, all of which seem to violate the enshrined principles of some standing contract, can, on a whim, be made back on the table, and in less beautifully arranged columns, it should be observed, seems a bit of a stretch, even to the most charitable reasoner. In some cases, it must be taken for granted, of course, the power of the employer. And for it is to the entitlement of the offerer, to do so, as ‘the company, in keeping with the highest of privileges to its own self entrusted, so it considers company leadership free, whenever and completely, with or without the pageant of achieving local publicity, to enact and determine the course of the affairs of all policy for the corporation’. Or, to say another way: the employer acknowledges what is their right at any time to dispatch with, or introduce new policies and by which course of action is not necessarily and cannot be the expectation of employees, whether affected or not, either directly or no, to be involved in these discussions, where and when they occur, is the legitimate right of the company. What about this legitimacy? In such a declaration, is there anything wrong, or very controversial, here? Certainly companies, it seems somehow reasonable, just so long as whatever policies on proposal conform to the justifiable and objective standards of an scrupulous and decent society, can be brought forward, at no particular or very convenient time. Nor is it the obligation for the employer to entertain the employee by making them privy to the implementation process in each and every case. And yet, the situation does occur, however, when, as already eluded to, clauses like the grandfather principle - a certified protection against changes material and substantial to contracts terms - comes into conflict with newly established or desired policy. What happens in situations, or is there in the literature any examples when changes to policy can supplant or take priority over, replace or annul the statutes or principles observed in the grandfathered terms. - Which, it begs the associated question, is the grandfather clause local, like the second amendment is local to America, or is it recognized globally, after the manner of some natural rights, like the right to self defence, and so has guiding it some universal position or wording that persons can point to? Up to this point, I have not seen very much in terms of clearly set or well defined standards. Does this follow? Fifthly, especially when the policy does not conform with the decency spoken about in the above-mentioned sentence, like in situations, perhaps, where, as part of the consideration of the agreement, it maybe, that that which is being offered is a work-for-money reciprocity the monetary terms of which having been settled in the first contract, still extant, is already possessed, but which arrangement now is being re-offered, only, this time, at a lower or less valuable rate or anemic benefit, with the addition of the dubious justification that it will balance out since compensatory adjustments have been considered (so as) to alleviate any substantial financial loss. If these notions of the justice of the adjustment are very easily disabused, and can be illustrated (by one party or another) to be false claims, such that, taking out the intentionality and knowledge of the parties enacting said policy, where this achievement obtains, do they retain the right, one, to overwrite or replace with new terms, those pertaining to the grandfathered agreement, and two, when these policies are already obtained, is the offer such as cannot be made, where what is being offered is already possessed by the offeree, and three, when the offer to give what has been already given, and is currently held by the offeree, but proposes this time a not dissimilar production of the possessed arrangement and any corresponding benefits, only for more cheaply, this iteration, and poorer than before - how can these added features - the conflict of and attempted overstepping of policies, the giving objects already possessed, and at a lesser value or benefit - be understood to a person with any legal knowledge? Are these qualifications such as discriminate in favour of one or the other parties given the legitimacy of the described acts, or is it the case that nothing stands out as being particularly alarming in terms of the offer itself, and the treatment of the clause. I do see potentially, as being one of the contributing factors economic duress from the consequence of the enactment of said policies. Do you agree, that this may play in, where the redistribution of benefits already afforded are made at a much lower number? Any insight here would be instrumental in helping me to better understand the nature of the grandfather clause, its influence in action, and how traditionally in contract law it has been dealt with. I am really struggling with the detail of the conflict of the two policies, and which seem antagonistic to each other. The one grandfather clause, saying that it cannot, the other policy saying that it can at any time, change the terms of the rules of the corporation. This is one thing, and where no experiment to test its influence is made, so we should not perhaps have any reason really to fear the potential repercussions. Yet, when the former policy is better than at risk, but comes under assault actually to be even slightly violated by the introduction of new policy, does one over the other take a certain lead, in such circumstances; the grandfather terms, say over the establishment of new conflicting terms? I recall from your other video, a discussion about the benefit of parties and who are the last to make their forms known, or submitted, - see Battle of the Forms, I think. Is there a certain manner for deciding the assertiveness of one over the other claim, according to temporal factors, as was suggested in that video, specifically, or is it simply how the constitution is a primary document, front-facing and with superseding powers of the highest priority, that all other policies are to take place operationally within the framework as and according to its determination, that no laws may be considered acceptable which do not conform with the statutes as outlined in that particular document? Thank you for taking my comments. Any response would be greatly appreciated to better know how these issues may stand the test of certain clauses, and whether things already given in contracts of vitality, can be re-produced, as part of a new offer, for less value, whether this seems a reasonable practice, and how legitimate is it as a thing to consider when studying contract law?