Feser's Aristotelian Proof: An Analysis

Stage one of Feser’s Aristotelian proof reasons from the reality of change to the existence of a purely actual actualizer. In this video, I critically evaluate the argument.
Like the show? Help it grow! Consider becoming a patron (thanks!): / majestyofreason
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This video is based on:
Schmid, J.C. Forthcoming. “Stage One of the Aristotelian Proof: A Critical Appraisal”, Sophia. Link: philpapers.org/archive/SCHSOO... [The abstract should say 'this question' lol]
Also: Here's a supplemental document to the video in which I level yet another criticism toward the Aristotelian proof -- namely, that it seems to actually entail existential inertia. Link: drive.google.com/file/d/1A79x...
Outline
Intro and Outline 0:00
Aristotelian Proof 1:38
Dialectical Context 15:35
Premise Seven 20:36
Per Se Chains 40:50
CP and Existence as Stasis 1:02:23
A Tension 1:04:32
Purely Actual 1:07:48
Changeable Necessary Beings 1:21:46
Responses 1:23:56
Concluding Remarks 1:36:40
Existential inertia links, for those interested:
(1) IJPR paper: philpapers.org/archive/SCHEIA...
(2) Response to Hsiao and Sanders: majestyofreason.wordpress.com...
(3) A User’s Guide: • Existential Inertia: A...
(4) Response to Intellectual Conservatism, Part 1: • Existential Inertia De...
(5) Response to Intellectual Conservatism, Part 2: • Existential Inertia De...
(6) Response to Nemes: majestyofreason.wordpress.com...
(7) Response to RM and HoH: majestyofreason.wordpress.com...
(8) Response to Thomistic Disputations: majestyofreason.wordpress.com...
(9) Discussion with Oppy: • Dr. Graham Oppy on the...
(10) Covered in sections of this post: majestyofreason.wordpress.com...
And the usual links:
My book: www.amazon.com/Majesty-Reason...
My website: majestyofreason.wordpress.com/

[@markbirmingham6011]

My 3 favorite Joe Schmid jokes: 1. Joe is the byproduct of effective ADD treatment and optimal parental love. 2. Coffee takes Joe Schmid in the morning. 3. Joe Schmid had a mystical experience. The mystical experience now identifies as agnostic.

[@MajestyofReason]

Lololol

[@erik424]

Wow, this stirred up my thoughts in just the right way. Great job, once again!

[@davidlopez-flores1147]

Hey Joe! Sorry, I know this isn’t related to the video topic, but have you ever considered doing a video breakdown of the analytical vs continental philosophy debate?

[@Kvothe3]

Great video. How do you feel about turning these into a podcast? I know your art is almost indispensable but perhaps we could try it out.

[@MajestyofReason]

Wonderful question! I'm reasonably sure that I'll be turning them into a podcast at some point in the next few months. I have some friends who are willing to help me do that, but we just need to find time when we're all available :)

[@Gunlord]

Great video Mr. Schmid, though as a note just clicking on the link to your patreon gives an error, I had to copy and paste it to get there.

[@MajestyofReason]

Thank you!!! I’ll try to fix this🥰

[@TheProdigalMeowMeowMeowReturns]

Joe, Feser has replied to your article on this topic! I was really hoping he would address your and Mullins’ critiques of divine simplicity, but I still appreciated him addressing your critique of the Aristotelian argument. Have you read it?

[@MajestyofReason]

My very lengthy blog post response to his blog post is already under construction and is about 55% complete. It should be posted tomorrow or the following day❤️

[@TheProdigalMeowMeowMeowReturns]

@@MajestyofReason Hey Joe! Thank you. By the way, I am glad that you quoted me as being one of the persons curious about Feser’s thoughts on your critiques. To be sure, I have a lot to learn and often make silly blunders. My screen name doesn’t help either. But I’ve spent MANY years carefully studying natural theology. I’m no Dawkins-esque “skeptic.” I’m a struggling agnostic who absolutely hates being unsure. And don’t get me started on the issues that apologists ignore (eg they usually ignore the top thinkers in Christ-centric universalism). But I’m not opposed to Classical or even neoclassical theism (and btw, WLC needs to stop identifying as a classical theist and stop getting so easily insulted by the label “theistic personality” given the intentions behind those who use the term…). In fact, on some days classical theism seems very plausible to me. I was very vocal in wishing Feser would engage your and Mullins’ work on DDS, but also on this issue as well. Not to troll (although I do have trolling moments), but because you, Mullins, and Oppy have been the most worthy critics of Feser’s work. (Yes, I know Feser engage Mullins on DDS. But that was ages ago and Mullins and Schmid have offered more since that time). I was confused by Feser’s ability to update his blog and reply to other people, often in detail, and yet somehow not have time to look into the more recent works by you and Mullins, although in retrospect I may have been hasty given Feser’s forthcoming reply to Oppy. Anyway, I respect all of you guys, including Feser. A lot, actually.

[@MajestyofReason]

@@TheProdigalMeowMeowMeowReturns Thank you *so* much my man. I read your whole comment and cherished it. You're a wonderful part of the MoR community.

[@ob4161]

@@MajestyofReason Thanks Joe as well for including a picture involving my comment (in your recent blog post). I am torn since I think Feser is right with respect to some things and you with respect to others. One question I had was with respect to the charge of incoherence on your part. You say that Feser, too, makes an incoherent claim that the matter's _potential_ to exist as water is being _actualised_ and that this is (thus) no less incoherent than your own. But this response seems mistaken. It's not incoherent to say that a potential is being actualised (since change does occur very often); but it does seem incoherent to say that a _potential_ is _actual,_ since there's a real distinction between potentiality and actuality. Take the hand/stick/stone analogy. In the scenario, the stick's potential for movement is being actualized by the hand; it's not incoherent to claim that the stick's _potential_ for movement is being presently _actualized,_ since the stick is potential and actual in different respects: it is potentially moving _qua stick_ (on its own), and actually moving _qua together with the actualization by the hand._ I think that's what Feser was getting at with the water. It seems, though, that it would be incoherent to suggest that the stick's _potential_ for movement is presently _actual,_ since it would then be both actually and potentially moving in the same respect. So I don't really understand why you think Feser's proposal is incoherent (or as incoherent as yours).

[@MajestyofReason]

@@ob4161 I’m quite exhausted from the post so I can’t speak much about this right now. The reason behind my point there - that Feser’s own characterization on p. 26 is similarly incoherent - is a bit complicated. The reason begins by noting that “is actualized” is ambiguous. It could mean a non-causal sense of “is actual”. But that lands in the incoherence. But maybe it means a causal sense of “is causally brought to actuality”. But in that case, my first criticism precisely stands: Feser problematically parses the manner in a non-neutral way. Moreover, Feser himself seems to disavow a causal sense in his blog post, leaving me to conclude that this isn’t the sense in which he uses the term. So, I don’t think Feser’s new way of parsing the situation, in his blog post, is incoherent; rather, I was focusing on what he says on p. 26 and making a dilemma: it’s either a causal or non-causal sense. But the former vindicates my original point and also contravenes Feser’s disavowal of an automatically causal sense of the word. So, it seems we should conclude that it’s the non-causal sense. And it is this that lands us in the incoherence. Finally, I would also emphasize that even if my point there fails, I have a variety of other responses to Feser’s charge of incoherence, one of which is to alter my usage in precisely the way Feser’s new conjunctive usage does. 🙂 Thanks for your comment my man! I hope I didn’t misunderstand it. I feel exhausted and a bit blurry-minded after finishing the post. Been a really rough few days❤️ You, too - like meow meow meow - are a wonderful part of the MoR community.

[@omaribnalahmed5967]

Thomist before the video: no you didn't understand aquinas works.

[@davidcoleman5860]

That's my impression as well. To be certain, he seems to be trying hard to get the argument right, but he misses key elements which causes him to draw incorrect inferences therefrom.

[@ob4161]

@@davidcoleman5860 What key elements does the author (of the video) miss?

[@davidcoleman5860]

@@ob4161 I would have to write a book to properly document all the issues I'm hearing from Schmid, so I'll just highlight one of them (which will be long enough). Schmid assumes _arguendo_ a _per se_ causal series and critiques it with the objection that it does not result in a being of Pure Act. He says that it can only show that a particular effect has a particular cause which is not necessarily the cause of all causes. Moreover, since the particular cause can be caused _per accidens_ (as shown by his diagram), theists err by making an unwarranted assumption or leap from proximate to ultimate. Schmid's analysis is wrong on several accounts. Aquinas' hand that moves a stick that moves a stone is for illustrative purposes only (to get the reader to conceptualize the difference between efficient and derivative causality). When somebody asks what illumines your back porch at night and you reply that it is the moon, you'd be correct in one sense and incorrect in another because though the moon has the capacity to reflect light, it cannot produce it. Positing another moon doesn't tell us what is producing the light and even positing an infinite number of moons can never explain the light because all a moon or moons can do is borrow light from another source, not produce it. Now, in fairness to Schmid, he sees this, at least for argument's sake, and he would, no doubt, respond by saying that the first cause is the sun, and since the sun is not Pure Act, the proof fails. Moreover, he could also answer that the first cause of the hand moving the stick is the human mind and since the human mind resides in a human being, and since a human being is clearly not Pure Act and is also the result of a _per accidens_ series, the proof fails. But this is where he misses the point. Though the sun is the proximate first cause of the essentially ordered series, it too is "moved" by its molecules, which are, in turn, moved by their atoms, etc. And the reason each link can be a borrower in this series is due to its capacity to have a potency actualized by another. The moon's potency to reflect light is actualized by another moon whose potency to reflect light was actualized by another moon....until we get to the sun. But the sun's potency to generate light is actualized by it's molecules whose potency to actualize the sun is actualized by it's atoms. Thus, the "simultaneous" movement can never be explained by the continued appeal to components of the series whose potency is actualized by another. The series can only terminate in something devoid of any potency. It is thus irrelevant that the sun itself is the product of an accidental series or that a human being is likewise the product of the same. Against this, Schmid would insist that he indeed concedes for argument's sake that the first cause may be purely actual as to a particular series but not _in toto_ . However, this doesn't work. Any being having passive potency cannot be Pure Act by definition and must be an act/potency composite. The very existence of every being possessing potency is at every moment dependent on something actualizing it. It could have no causal efficacy whatsoever if it were not caused to exist which is what is entailed by asserting that its being is an act/potency composite. And if its being cannot be caused to exist, that can only mean that there is no potency to actualize. We thus conclude that the efficient cause is Pure Act, not just as to a particular series, but purely actual as to its essence (its essence is to exist). And thus, the causal series ultimately points to existence. The movement in every essential chain is actual because its parts are actual, so existence grounds all movement. Thus, every link which borrows movement is borrowing existence. Existence is imparted to it which of course means that each link has existence whereas the First Cause IS existence. Since the First Cause cannot borrow existence, as Pure Act, the first cause is existence itself or being itself because its essence is to exist (while every other "being" is a composite of essence and existence). Pure Act is then equivalent to pure BEING or pure EXISTENCE. As Being Itself (pure actuality) it cannot have further being added to it. Thus, all essential causal series terminate in BEING which makes it the efficient ground for all composite beings. And this is where the Thomist term "convertibility of the transcendentals" comes in. The "ultimate" is being, one, good and true. Each adjective is convertible with the other and defines all existence in some sense. Arguments asserting that there can be more than one Pure Act will have to introduce class distinctions which necessitate an act/potency composition which of course means that pure existence isn't pure existence and is thus cannot qualify as a second God. If you have Pure Act 1 (PA1) and Pure Act 2 (PA2), then you would have a class of beings called "Pure Act" which share a common essence but are differentiated by distinct attributes which of course makes each "Act" a sort of genus/species or essence/existence composite which reduces to act/potency. In other words, the argument that a simple being isn't simple is a contradiction. Thus, PA1 & PA2 would need a ground for their composition (or their potency being raised to act) until you get a ground for both which is absolutely simple and unique. Thus, Schmid, who has apparently read Aquinas, Feser, etc., appears to miss critical nuances which lead him, in my estimation, to critique the wrong argument.

[@MajestyofReason]

​@@davidcoleman5860 I would have to write a book to properly document all the issues I'm hearing from Coleman, so I'll just highlight one of them (which will be long enough). “Schmid's analysis is wrong on several accounts. Aquinas' hand that moves a stick that moves a stone is for illustrative purposes only (to get the reader to conceptualize the difference between efficient and derivative causality).” Sure; I have not disagreed with this “When somebody asks what illumines your back porch at night and you reply that it is the moon, you'd be correct in one sense and incorrect in another because though the moon has the capacity to reflect light, it cannot produce it. Positing another moon doesn't tell us what is producing the light and even positing an infinite number of moons can never explain the light because all a moon or moons can do is borrow light from another source, not produce it.” Sure; I have not disagreed with this “Now, in fairness to Schmid, he sees this, at least for argument's sake, and he would, no doubt, respond by saying that the first cause is the sun, and since the sun is not Pure Act, the proof fails.” That’s not what I would say, however. I would say that the relevant causal power or property of the series is illumination, and that we have only arrived at something which can cause other things to be illuminated without itself having to derive this property or power from without. This doesn’t entail that the proof fails. It just shows that an example of a per se chain arrives at a relatively mundane ‘first mover’ of that chain. This doesn’t entail that the proof as such is a failure. “Moreover, he could also answer that the first cause of the hand moving the stick is the human mind and since the human mind resides in a human being, and since a human being is clearly not Pure Act and is also the result of a per accidens series, the proof fails.” Cf. my response above “But this is where he misses the point. Though the sun is the proximate first cause of the essentially ordered series, it too is "moved" by its molecules, which are, in turn, moved by their atoms, etc.” First, in my video [or at least in my First Way video; I forget which one] I explicitly recognize that the sun [more accurately, whatever the toy example of a mundane first mover was], while first in one series, may be second in tons of other series. In fact, that’s precisely the engine of my criticism. Second, I have addressed this appeal to constituent parts as alleged causes. First, this series is a series of constitution, not of efficient causation. Second, upon tracing the series down to a first member, we would only be able to arrive at a not-further-composed constituent part of something. But God is not a constituent part of anything. Third, parts of substances exist only virtually and hence only in potency, and hence they cannot be efficient causes of their wholes, since only that which is actual can be an efficient cause. Fourth, substantial wholes are more fundamental than and ontologically prior to their parts under Aristotelian views of substances, and hence substantial wholes cannot be efficiently caused by their parts (since then they would not be more fundamental to and prior to them but would instead be posterior to them). “And the reason each link can be a borrower in this series is due to its capacity to have a potency actualized by another. The moon's potency to reflect light is actualized by another moon whose potency to reflect light was actualized by another moon....until we get to the sun. But the sun's potency to generate light is actualized by it's molecules whose potency to actualize the sun is actualized by it's atoms. Thus, the "simultaneous" movement can never be explained by the continued appeal to components of the series whose potency is actualized by another. The series can only terminate in something devoid of any potency.” This is a non-sequitur. Notice that you claimed that the movement cannot be explained by continued appeal to components whose potency is actualized by another. Even granting this, though, this ONLY entails that the first member of the series is such that it doesn’t have a potency actualized by another. That doesn’t mean it *has no potency whatsoever*. It only means that *if* it has potencies relevant to being the first member of the given series, then those are not actualized by another. It could easily have potencies that have nothing to do with its status as first member of the series; or it could have potencies that are simply not actualized by another [remember, your comment only concluded that the entity doesn’t have a potency actualized by another. This doesn’t entail that it doesn’t have potency; it could have potency which is simply not actualized by another.] It’s the same mistaken inference [more accurately, cluster of inferences] that I addressed in my First Way video and that Scott MacDonald hammered home in his paper “Aquinas’s Parasitic Cosmological Argument”. Merely from the fact that the member is unactualized in respect of the causal power or property of the series, it doesn’t follow that it is *unactualizable* in that respect. And even if it were unactualizable in that respect, it’s an open question whether it has potencies in *other* respects, unrelated to its status as first member of the given per se series [indexed to a given causal power or property]. This underlines yet another point: namely, that your comment here is running roughshod over the well-known fact that per se series are indexed to a specific causal power or property. E.g. a per se cause of light, or motion, or heat, or existence, or unity, or whatever. The first member of any given per se series, then, need only be unactualized in respect of the causal power or property of the series for which it serves as terminus. Nothing is implied about whether it has other features which are actualized in other per se chains, or whether it has other features in potency which are unactualized simpliciter. If you like, I would encourage you to check out my chapter here where I bring these issues to light in greater clarity and rigor: drive.google.com/file/d/1ePD4zKGQsV9FV4QZCYA-YFItVI9fKGue/view?usp=sharing “Against this, Schmid would insist that he indeed concedes for argument's sake that the first cause may be purely actual as to a particular series but not in toto . However, this doesn't work. Any being having passive potency cannot be Pure Act by definition and must be an act/potency composite.” But the *very question at issue* is whether the first cause is pure act. Yes, any being with passive potency isn’t pure act. The very question at issue, though, is whether the first cause is pure act *simpliciter* or whether it is simply actual-yet-unactualizable only in respect of the causal power or property of the series in question [and, hence, ‘locally purely actual’, i.e., devoid of potencies in respect of a given causal power or feature]. “The very existence of every being possessing potency is at every moment dependent on something actualizing it. It could have no causal efficacy whatsoever if it were not caused to exist which is what is entailed by asserting that its being is an act/potency composite.” I don't see any reason to think this is true -- and certainly no justification given in the comment. Plus, it is prima facie false: there are whole hosts of ways to explain the existence of an act-potency composite that don’t adduce an extrinsic cause. See my video on arguments for CT [part 1] for some of these. [And see, especially, the Neo-Platonic proof section of the video and-in particular-the link to the free chapter of my book on the Neo-Platonic proof in which I explore a number of such explanations. This chapter is a version of a minor revision decision on a paper of mine at the European Journal for Philosophy of Religion. Hopefully it will be accepted within the next few weeks or months.] “And if its being cannot be caused to exist, that can only mean that there is no potency to actualize.” All that follows is that its *existence* has no potency to be actualized. It could have existence-unrelated potentials that are actualized [e.g. the Neo-CT God’s existence has no potency to be actualized, but yet the Neo-CT God is not purely actual; he has potential, for instance, to go from knowing it is now 11:59 to knowing it is now 12:00. None of this implies that the Neo-CT God’s very being or existence is a potency being actualized by another. For the relevant potency is wholly unrelated to the very substantial being or existence of the Neo-CT God.] “We thus conclude that the efficient cause is Pure Act, not just as to a particular series, but purely actual as to its essence (its essence is to exist). And thus, the causal series ultimately points to existence. The movement in every essential chain is actual because its parts are actual, so existence grounds all movement. Thus, every link which borrows movement is borrowing existence. Existence is imparted to it which of course means that each link has existence whereas the First Cause IS existence. Since the First Cause cannot borrow existence, as Pure Act, the first cause is existence itself or being itself because its essence is to exist (while every other "being" is a composite of essence and existence).” Sure, you might be able to “conclude” to this if you just make an unjustified assertion that any act-potency composite whatsoever must be efficiently caused by something else to exist. At least in this context, though, it was just that: an unjustified assertion.

[@MajestyofReason]

@@davidcoleman5860 “Arguments asserting that there can be more than one Pure Act will have to introduce class distinctions which necessitate an act/potency composition which of course means that pure existence isn't pure existence and is thus cannot qualify as a second God. If you have Pure Act 1 (PA1) and Pure Act 2 (PA2), then you would have a class of beings called "Pure Act" which share a common essence but are differentiated by distinct attributes which of course makes each "Act" a sort of genus/species or essence/existence composite which reduces to act/potency.” Here are my responses: First: It doesn’t follow from the fact that each is purely actual that they together comprise a single class or genus. Some predicate can be true of x and true of y without there being some overarching genus or class to which both x and y belong. [Consider, e.g., the predicate ‘non-self-membered’. This is true of multiple things. But there cannot be some overarching genus or class of non-self-membership-hood. For this genus/class is then either a member of itself or it’s not. If it’s a member of itself, then it is among the things that are not self-membered. But then it is both a member of itself and not a member of itself, which is absurd. But if it’s NOT a member of itself, then the predicate ‘non-self-membered’ is true of it, and hence (per the assumption in question, i.e., the assumption that a predicate P true of x and y entails that x and y belong to the P-genus/class) it must be a member of the class of non-self-membered things, i.e. a member of itself. So, it it’s NOT a member of itself, then it’s a member of itself. Contradiction. Therefore, our original assumption is false: the mere fact that some predicate is true of x and y does not entail that there is some overarching genus or class to which both x and y belong.] So, something more is needed to show why purely actual beings fall under one genus or class merely from the fact that ‘purely actual’ is true of both of them. Second: In fact, suppose we think that being a member within a class/genus is incompatible with being purely actual. Then, we could just as equally argue, on this basis, NOT that there cannot be two or more purely actual beings, but instead that if there WERE two or more purely actual beings, then they wouldn’t all jointly comprise some overarching genus or class. Third: The argument assumes that falling under a common class or genus entails sharing one-and-the-same essence. No justification is provided for this assumption. Fourth: The argument seems straightforwardly incompatible with Trinitarianism: ‘Arguments asserting that there can be more than one purely actual divine person will have to introduce class distinctions which necessitate an act/potency composition which of course means that these purely actual persons aren’t purely actual, which is absurd. If you have purely actual divine person 1 (PADP1) and purely actual divine person 2 (PADP2), then you would have a class of things called ‘purely actual divine persons’ which share a common essence but are differentiated by distinct attributes-which, first, entails that they are composites, since they have differentiations in terms of distinct attributions-and, second, makes each "Act" a sort of genus/species or essence/existence composite which reduces to act/potency.’ As a very, very busy bee, I cannot guarantee that I will respond further. (In fact, I probably cannot respond further, given that I have papers and books to read, papers to write, R&R's to return, referee reports to do, a summer course to study for, as well as familial obligations.)

[@shobhanemmanueljameskumar8507]

Joe, what happened to Elephant Philosophy's channel? I couldn't find it on KZbin

[@MajestyofReason]

He emailed me the other day; from what I can gather, he needs a break from the chaos of social media etc. He hasn’t updated me (yet) about the status of his channel going forward, though. It could potentially be a temporary deactivation; but we shall see as time progresses! I believe he probably over-worked himself making three videos a week and wants to take his hiatus/break seriously 🙂

[@CMVMic]

I don't buy into his false dilemma i. E. a chain is either infinite or has a beginning? The members of the chain can be finite but the casual sequence is cyclical. Also, a member of the chain may not have potency in solidarity but potency in combination. What exactly do you think is the strongest argument against a cyclical casual chain? Also, what is your view on the nature of motion or change? Is it emergent, absolute or an illusion?

[@MutohMech]

He addresses the impossibility of causal cycles in Aristotle's revenge

[@CMVMic]

@@MutohMech ok il try to read up on it. Do you think his argument is successul, if so can you explain why?

[@MutohMech]

@Actus Purus although it's a book on philosophy of science, Feser delves a lot on all kinds of causality, precisely because a huge chunk of his argument is that Aristotelian causality is the best way for us to understand the natures of things. Anyway, you did make me notice that OP is talking about a per se cycle rather than a per accidens cycle, and Feser deals more specifically with the latter than the former. You explained it succinctly enough

[@CMVMic]

@Actus Purus Thanks for the response. So in the case of self-causation, I think it would be the same self causation that Spinoza champions i.e. causa sui. Spinoza also presents great arguments for necessitarianism so I dont see why one should accept that members in a metaphysical chain should be contingent. Also, one can simply hold to a type of metaphysical foundationlism or metaphysical coherentism similar to the type used by proponents of an uncaused cause. Also, I think it is only contradictory if we assume every member of the chain is dependent on a prior member for its actualisation, which needs not be accepted. The chain can be ontologically independent. I would even go one step further, how can any member cause another? What would initiate the first change? If motion were emergent, then it would be a case of being emerging from non-being which violates ex nihilo nihil fit. Assuming a causal chain requires a first member for its existence, seems to be the error with Feser's argument. The bootstrap paradox does not really present a problem. For eg. Let's say there is a chain of trolleys that moves, the only way to assert a contradiction would be to assume that each trolley is dependent upon the motion of a previous trolley. However, the nature of motion need not be emergent, it can be fundamental/absolute. Thus, all trolleys can be in motion necessarily. If motion is absolute, then the curvature of space can also affect the momentum and the relativity of change among objects. If change is defined in terms of events, then a cyclical causal chain can be a sort of static event, where all members (mereological parts) are simultaneously actualised, just as the totality of everything is actualised. Also, I think time is an illusion, and multiple events can be mind dependent divisions of a single event, one without boundaries.

[@demergent_deist]

With this whole topic it came into my mind that in the Thomistic world view potentials in the strict sense possibly exist only in our heads idealiter, thus are there only in relation to our mind. Because the Thomistic God does not create the world by actualizing a potential situated in front of him (or in him), but by creating substances directly ex nihilo. But every substance as a whole is, at every instant in which it is created, completely in actuality. We infer only a potentiality within the substance, because we cannot grasp the continuous process of re-creation. At the deepest ontological bottom, the world possibly always makes a transition from act to act. Besides, if there should be a real difference between actuality and potentiality, then it is not enough if God only "holds" them very close to each other or next to each other. He must unite them (elimination of their heterogeneity to each other), by which, however, only the actuality can remain in the unification, otherwise there would be no world with identity (no entity without identity). These thoughts of mine fit better to the Aristotelian principle that a cause can only give what it has itself. God as pure actuality can give only actuality. But if we keep all these thoughts in mind when looking back at the Aristotelian proof, then this proof seems very questionable all at once. I argue with potentiality, although in retrospect it does not really exist. It would be an argumentative collapse. Probably my interpretation is completely wrong. But perhaps nevertheless at least interesting for one or the other here.

[@Lerian_V]

If you don't mind me asking, have you listened to Bishop Barron's clarifications on the Divine Simplicity in a Symposium he had in 2018 with William Lane Craig?

[@MajestyofReason]

I watched that a while back, yes🙂

[@Lerian_V]

@@MajestyofReason Ok, cool. One more question: are you making any effort to commit to a religious view and instantiate it, or do you feel like it's going to infringe upon your freedom to play around with different ideas?

[@MajestyofReason]

@@Lerian_V good question! As an agnostic, I don’t think my evidence warrants a commitment to a religious life. Though, I study, think about, and write on philosophy of religion every day. For more on how I navigate agnosticism, check out my video on why I’m agnostic❤️

[@Lerian_V]

@@MajestyofReason Thanks for the reply. I will check it out.

[@nowonder6086]

I read Feser's book a couple years ago, and I made some of the same criticisms that you've since published. In particular, I took issue with his inference to a fully actual being. To me, it was so clearly a non-sequitur, and I said as much to the person who recommended the book. I pointed to page 66 and said his response doesn't make sense for the reasons you articulated in this video. I similarly considered his fourth and seventh premises to be unjustified for failing to rule out plausible alternatives. But I never wrote any of this down, let alone try to get anything published. I pessimistically assumed that I, as a mere M.A. student, must be misinterpreting Feser somehow, and figured that I would get around to revisiting his book. Lesson learned. Anyway, you're a total natural at this. I assume you'll be going to grad school somewhere, and I look forward to seeing what else you publish. I hope that Feser himself gives your work another chance, since I don't think his last blog post was particularly fair to you. Maybe once you have your book published through an academic press.

[@MajestyofReason]

You are an absolute legend. This is my favorite comment I’ve read for a long, long, long time. ❤️ It’s awesome to read all of this. Feser’s inference to pure actuality struck me as so frustratingly and blatantly incorrect, and so it’s nice to see others who share my frustration here haha. I’m also guessing you saw my two blog post responses to Feser’s two blogs where he engaged with my work. His blog posts were pathetically condescending, utterly confused about the dialectical context and what question-begging actually is, and extremely uncharitable in terms of their demonstrable misrepresentations of me. They made me lose respect for him. (Not that I had the greatest of respect for him in the first place, but set that aside.) In any case, I actually take both his blog posts into account and respond to their central ideas in the scholarly book manuscript that’s currently under review. Review takes a longgggg time, but I’m super excited for it. Anyway, I’m happy to see you here, and I’m happy you’re part of our community here! When/if my book gets accepted, you can PM me somehow (either on FB or via gmail) and I can send you the pre-print manuscript🥰

[@nowonder6086]

@@MajestyofReason I am extremely grateful that you have the confidence to just, you know, put your material out there for criticism. I had what I considered a good objection, but sat on it out of fear of rejection. Well, I told my Thomist friends and family that I couldn't find any basis for his inference to a purely actual being, but hesitated to commit to that in writing. You've taught me a valuable lesson, to have the courage of my convictions, and I thank you for that. I've read through all four of these blog posts and it's hard to say what went wrong other than that he's not taking you seriously. I mean, his initial blog post starts out with a loose accusation of "sock puppetry" when it shouldn't have been hard for him to Google your name and see that you have 5,000 subscribers. His blog post goes on to accuse you of begging the question every time you have a view that isn't his view. His next blog post proceeds to say something along the lines of, "I'm aware that Schmid has published a 40k word rebuttal, but reading it isn't worth my time, so I'll read something shorter and respond to that instead." This condescending dismissal is exactly why I've decided not to enter the KZbin ring until I finish a doctoral program or die trying. It's unfortunate, to say the least, because I thought your (perhaps overly long) blog post was thoughtful and well-stated. You would think that Feser would just be happy to see smart people taking his work seriously, but apparently unless you're Graham Oppy you aren't worth his time. I'll definitely take you up on the manuscript offer. I'll purchase it when I am able to do so, but honestly, teaching at a community college isn't paying the bills much better than student loans were.

[@davidcoleman5860]

@@nowonder6086 In Feser's defense, he is extremely busy and had previously never heard of Schmid. And as you imply, Schmid's verbosity is on the steroid level. That is not to say that what Schmid argues is worthless. It's simply that Feser had to carve out time to reply, and he only replied because several of his readers were begging him to. He doesn't have time to read _War and Peace_ every time he interacts with Schmid. If Schmid really wants a conversation with Feser, then he needs to choose his targets wisely and truncate his replies. He can always elaborate as the dialog develops, but when an extremely busy man sees 40K replies, he'll have better things to do. And if you're as careful a reader as you'd like Feser to be, then you should know that you're completely misreading what Feser was saying about sock puppetry. He never accused Schmid of being one. He's been hit with sock puppets before and he initially thought that this might be more of the same (again, due to the fact that he never heard of the guy).

[@nowonder6086]

​@@davidcoleman5860 My point is that even a loose accusation, directed at nobody in particular, was a dig at Schmid -- as if to say that he found it hard to believe that Schmid has that many "adulatory" fans. Feser postures like the grownup doing important things, belittlingly says that the apparent interest in Schmid appeared to be sock puppetry, and finally states that he's been pestered enough that he'll take a look regardless of the apparent sock puppetry. Read it again. Feser's next sentence after the undirected accusation includes the phrase, "in any event." The "in any event" sure makes it look like he's still leaving it as an open question how much of the apparent interest in Schmid is genuine. I believe, if you read my comments "carefully", as you put it, you'll see I already accounted for all of this. Rather than "completely misreading" what Feser wrote, I correctly said that Feser throws out a loose accusation directed at nobody, rather than saying he directly accused Schmid. Contrast that with my very next sentence, where I say explicitly that Feser accused Schmid of begging the question. Besides, later that week Feser is still discussing sock puppetry in the comments section of his second (and final) blog about Schmid: "I wondered aloud whether he was behind the sock-puppetry...I did not assert that he was behind it." I don't know why he's treating this as an investigation about the individual responsible for a thing that's totally, for sure, 100% happening. Schmid might just have 10-20 fans responsible for all of the adulation. In any case, if Feser doesn't think Schmid is responsible, then Schmid doesn't have any control over what his fans are doing, so Feser should probably not set the tone of their discussion with something so irrelevant. It served no purpose except to show who's important and who's not. Speaking of which, Feser is certainly a busy guy. He has a big family to take care of, community college classes to teach, and tens of philpapers citations check on. Then again, all of us who aren't trust fund kids are busy, too. He can use that as a reason to choose to ignore any blog posts that he wants. However, his criticisms of Schmid are uninformed as a result. That's too bad. He'll come around to reading Schmid's arguments once they are turned into published books and articles, and I'm sure Feser will once again point to any areas of disagreement and say, "That's question-begging!"

[@davidcoleman5860]

@@nowonder6086 So, while you acknowledge that Feser did not directly accuse Schmid, you nonetheless insist that he dug at Schmid in a "loose" way. I don't see that at all. Feser simply stated that he initially thought that was going on given the fact that it occurred in the past. It is irrelevant entirely how many fans or followers Schmid has. Feser never heard of him until recently. And if Schmid's arguments are so formidable, then focus on them rather than the alleged besmirching of Schmid. As I pointed out on Feser's blog, all Schmid had to do (if he felt a reply were necessary) was simply deny the matter and be done with it. So, yes, I feel you completely misread Feser or are looking for something to complain about. And since you mention Feser's second post, here's what he said: "Yes, and just to be clear, I do not claim that and have never claimed it. Moreover, Schmid has said that he has nothing to do with it, and I take him at his word. "Unfortunately, Schmid has now quoted a private email of mine to a third party from a few weeks ago -- despite initially refraining from doing so precisely because it was private and I did not give him permission to quote it! -- in which I wondered aloud whether he was behind the sock-puppetry. And it is hardly unreasonable at least to wonder whether he was behind it, in a private communication. "But as Schmid himself admits, even in that private communication I did not assert that he was behind it, and I certainly have not done so publicly. (That didn't stop him from going on literally for over 1,000 words about it, when a simple "Wasn't me" would have sufficed!)" And as to published works, that was primarily what Feser replied to anyway. As he stated: "Well, no offense to Schmid - who seems like a nice enough guy, and an intelligent one - but I’m afraid I can’t spend the rest of the summer, or even the rest of this week, reading and responding to this mountain of material. And if I’m going to choose something of his to read, I have to say that a rambling and largely off-topic 40,000-word blog post banged out over two days doesn’t seem the most promising candidate. So, it seemed to me that a workable compromise would be to press on with what I had thought to do before he posted his reply, which is to read and comment on the other of Schmid’s two published academic articles, “Existential inertia and the Aristotelian proof.” Since the notion of existential inertia seems to be at the core of our disagreement, and since I take it to be a reasonable assumption that this article contains Schmid’s most rigorous presentation of his views on that topic (and that his latest blog post presupposes the article in any event), I take that to be a reasonable way to conclude our exchange for now. Fair enough?"

[@JohnSmith-bq6nf]

What do you think about feser second proof Augustinian proof?

[@anglicanaesthetics]

I think Feser would disagree with your framing of premise 7, no? He would probably want to say that the actualization of S’s potential for y presupposes a prior actualizer A. 8, then: Any Sy (=S’s potential for y being actualized) has some prior actualizer A 9: If Az (A’s potential for z is actualized), then it requires a prior actualizer or is itself an unactualized actualizer In other words, it doesn’t seem to me that the proof is trying to demonstrate that S’s *existence* depends on A. That’s why Aquinas framed the proof so that it could work with an eternal universe. But rather, it’s trying to show that at the head of the chain of changes lies something that starts the chain and doesn’t itself have some prior element which starts it’s starting the chain. Now, I don’t think the proof is successful in demonstrating monotheism or a mono-causal first element (since perhaps there are multiple unactualized actualizers that start chains of change in the universe). But it does seem that Feser can plausibly argue that there is *at least* one unactualized actualizer which starts the chain of changes in reality

[@davidcoleman5860]

Very good! Thomists recognize myriad first movers in the proximate sense, as in Aquinas' hand-stick-rock example. The argument for monotheism is articulated by Aquinas elsewhere with respect to the metaphysics of being and the implications of Pure Act. Moreover, though there are myriad proximate first movers, each of them are also moved existentially in the conservation of their form/matter or essence/existence. Thomists argue that all composites are in potency to their conservation as well as their actuation. Thus, the necessary stopping point is something non-composite, which means that it must be devoid of existential potency.

[@aquinasadefenseforgod1254]

I haven't seen any response to the real force that forces every form out of existence, except maybe the proton. This is half-life. All objects have a half-life. This means they all decay. Although we haven't seen the decay of a proton, we have of electrons, and electrons are necessary for all atoms to exist. The half-life of an electron is very long, but it will decay. The proton cannot account for the persistence of the electron because there is no relation, so it does matter if protons have no half-life, although, they most likely do. This means that we cannot simply state that electrons just persist. There needs to be an explanation for how it persists despite its half-life pushing for its decay. Feser offers such an explanation. EIT does not.

[@MajestyofReason]

This is mistaken. First, I’ve already shown in countless places that it’s simply false that EIT offers no explanation of persistence. I offer five different explanations in documents linked in my blog post “Feser on Schmid on the Aristotelian proof”. They are: no-change accounts, transtemporal accounts, primitive necessity accounts, objectual necessity accounts, tendency-disposition accounts, and law-based accounts. Second, I’ve already addressed radioactive decay in countless places elsewhere. See the link in the aforementioned blog post where I address the objection from radioactive decay. Plus Oderberg (2014) has already addressed it, too, and I already addressed it in my IJPR paper.

[@MajestyofReason]

To explore these further and not make claims I have already addressed at length elsewhere, I highly recommend reading my two lengthy blog post responses to Feser. And, in particular, check out the documents linked in the first of these lengthy blog posts (entitled “Feser on Schmid on the Aristotelian proof”. In particular, check out the portion of the blog post where I write this: “I precisely articulate EIT in this document under various spacetime structures. Metaphysical accounts of inertial persistence are explanations of objects’ persistence that are inertialist-friendly (i.e., under which EIT is or can be true). Here are documents wherein I develop numerous such metaphysical accounts: (a) tendency-disposition accounts; (b) transtemporal accounts; (c) law-based accounts; (d) necessity accounts; (e) no-change accounts. I explain some motivations for EIT here. I address the principal objections to EIT in the literature here.”

[@aquinasadefenseforgod1254]

I do not see how there could be a difference between purely actual and unactualized actualizer. If it is an actualizer then it is existing. If it is unactualized, then it is always existing, i.e. eternal, unless one thinks it is possible to be unactualized if it came into being spontaneously. If it is eternal, then it is not possible for it to have any potentials, for any so-called potentials would always be actual. It would be like saying that an eternal running man had the potential to run. He could not ever have had the potential to run because he is always running. And he could not have any potentials to stop. So an eternal actualizer cannot have potentials, not even accidental ones. An eternal being could not go from knowing it is 7:27 to knowing it is 7:28. If it were possible for it to have the potential to learn more knowledge, then giving eternity, it would have already learned it, thus it must always know all potential knowledge. Also knowing is an act, and act is the same as its existence, so it cannot be accidental.

[@MajestyofReason]

It doesn’t follow that it’s eternal from the fact that it’s unactualized. See section 8 of this: drive.google.com/file/d/1vJ4UVr70lGxn4nhMhtgXzeBUKtz71Ocx/view

[@aquinasadefenseforgod1254]

@@MajestyofReason I read all of section 8 and more. I did not see anything that would suggest an unactualized actualizer could be anything but eternal. From section 8 (Consider, for instance, a necessarily actually existent fundamental particle. This particle has no potentials pertaining to its very being or existence-it is necessarily actually existent, Either it came into existence or it did not come into existence. If it did not come into existence, and it is necessarily actually existence, then it is eternal. The other option is that it came into existence. If it spontaneously came into existence, I do not see how one could argue that it is necessary. I would love to see how an unactualized actualizer can come into being and be necessary. If it is not necessary, then it is not even worth considering. Maybe someone in the comment section will have a good answer to this.

[@MajestyofReason]

@@aquinasadefenseforgod1254 Thanks for your comment! The first problem here is that ‘unactualized’ doesn’t entail necessarily existent [which is the bridge by which you seem to be going from unactualized to eternal]. There are whole swathes of explanations of S’s existence at t that do not require some actualizing, sustaining cause of S at t. And such explanations don’t at all entail or require that S is a necessary thing. I explain some of these explanations in depth in my two blog post responses to Feser. I also have a blog post coming out in early August discussing many such explanations in depth. I’ll give you special access to the blog post early, which you can access at the link below. The section wherein I develop such explanations is Section 5. :) drive.google.com/file/d/1mspSFRn27s_wB1dUudRsn4nLFRB2NT57/view?usp=sharing That, then, is my first response: S’s being unactualized at t doesn’t entail that S is necessary, and hence we cannot go from necessity to eternality here. Second, parts of Section 8 are indeed relevant to the inference to eternality. How I flesh this out depends on which reading of the causal principle we take. Let’s consider the first reading. Here is the portion of the chapter that is relevant to the inference from ‘purely actual with respect to its existence at t’ to ‘purely actual simpliciter’. I will explain below why this shows that the inference from ‘purely actual with respect to its existence at t’ to ‘eternal’ doesn’t work. “Now, to say that a hierarchical chain of causal actualizations of substances’ potentials for existence at a given time t cannot descend infinitely is to say that the first member of this chain is not caused to exist at t. Call this first member ‘a’. Now, there cannot be a range of potentials only one of which can be actualized when it comes to the very existence of a at time t, since then a would require a cause of a’s existence at t. But a’s existence is not caused at t. Hence, a has no potentials pertaining to its very substantial being or existence at t. Hence, the substantial being or existence of a at t is purely actual-devoid of a range of potentials (e.g., parts of a that could constitute something else, or else potentials for a to cease at t, or whatever).” But (2), below, doesn’t follow from (1): (1) The substantial being or existence of a at t is purely actual. (2) The substantial being or existence of a is purely actual simpliciter. “For all Feser’s argument shows, a’s explanatory role is wholly indexed to time t. In order to be the uncaused terminus of the hierarchical chain of existential dependence at t, a need only be independent at t. And since a’s having potentials pertaining to its substantial being or existence at t would entail (per the first reading of CP) that a is dependent at t, it follows that a is purely actual with respect to its substantial being or existence at t. But nothing follows about a’s substantial being or existence at times other than t. There is simply nothing in the first reading of the CP or in what Feser says in the quoted passage above that rules out a being the purely-actual-with-respect- to-its-substantial-existence terminus of the hierarchical series at t but some other thing, a*, being the purely-actual-with-respect-to-its-substantial-existence terminus of the hierarchical series at (t+1). And nothing in Feser’s proof rules out a having some potential pertaining to its substantial being or existence at (t+1). In that case, a would not be purely actual with respect to its substantial existence simpliciter. And so (2) does not follow from (1).” This clearly blocks the inference to a’s eternality. For if a’s substantial being *at t* is purely actual-e.g., a’s parts have no potential *at t* to compose something different, or be absent from reality *at t*-a’s substantial being *at some time other than t* might very well *not* be purely actual, in which case its parts might have the potential to compose something else *at that other time*. And so a wouldn’t be eternal in this scenario despite being unactualized (and, indeed, purely actual) *with respect to its substantial being at t*. Similar points apply to what I say regarding the inference from (1) to (2) and from (2) to (3) regarding the second reading, and so I won’t discuss those here.

[@MajestyofReason]

@@Bowen12676 I’m on vacation rn, so I probably can’t go back and forth, but I’ll respond to the first comment here. Thanks for it! First, you claim: “Being generated involves the actualization of some potency for existence” This strikes me as false. Coming into existence cannot involve the actualization of some potency for existence, since there is no substrate in which the relevant potency could inhere. This is why coming into being is regarded by Aristotelian-Thomistic thinkers as not an instance of change. To draw out this point, consider the first thing O that came into existence, which there will be such under one tenet of the traditional understanding of creation ex nihilo. We can ask: in what does the relevant potency inhere? It can’t be God, since God is purely actual, devoid of potency. (Q: could it be God’s active potency? A: no, since (i) active potencies are a kind of actuality (Cf. Feser 2014), and also (ii) the relevant potency is causally actualized, but nothing of God’s could be causally actualized under CT.) But nor can the relevant potency belong to O, since O is precisely nothing prior to O’s existence, and hence the relevant potency doesn’t inhere in O so as to be brought to actuality. To put it differently, potencies presuppose prior actualities in which they inhere; but then O must already be actual in order for the relevant potency to inert in O. But in that case, O’s actuality is not *resultant* from O’s potency bringing brought to actuality, since O’s actuality is entirely *prior* to the relevant potency. If you’re curious, I develop this thought more (which was spawned by a CTist ‘internet friend’ of mine, by the KZbin name of Actus Purus) in my chapter linked above (Cf. My first comment reply to the other dude.) You then say “something cannot lose its potency for existence once actualized”, after which you give an example of a 3-liter cup. I don’t find this plausible. Suppose we grant (which, as I’ve argued, we shouldn’t) the legitimacy of talk of something’s ‘potency for existence’. You only considered an *accidental* property of the cup, namely, an accidental property to be 3-liters full of water. But consider a case where the relevant property (‘property’ broadly construed) is an *essential property*. Suppose we have an electron with an essentially negative charge that begins to exist. Now, before the electron begins to exist, it isn’t actually negatively charged. Presumably, then-assuming the legitimacy of speaking of potencies for features even prior to the thing in question exists-it is therefore potentially negatively charged before the electron begins to exist. Once the electron begins to exist, it is instead *actually* negatively charged. But the electron cannot lose this feature in the sense of existing without it. So the electron, once existent, doesn’t have any potency to be anything other than negatively charged. And thus given any moment at which the electron exists, it has no potency, at that moment, to be anything other than negatively charged. And in this case, it doesn’t have a range of alternative potentialities which might be actualized in the relevant respect, in which case Feser’s Aristotelian proof causal principle-as he recently articulated in his blog post response to me (and which I called the “fist reading” of his causal principle - Cf. majestyofreason.wordpress.com/2021/07/04/feser-on-schmid-on-the-aristotelian-proof/ )-would be inapplicable to the electron’s being negatively charged at the given moment we are considering. Now simply replace “electron” with “unactualized actualizer” and “negative charge” with “existence”, and we’ll be able to conclude that precisely because existence is essential to the unactualized actualizer, assuming it exists at time t, it *doesn’t* have any potential not to exist at t (just as the electron had no potential, at the moment we were considering, to be anything other than negatively charged), in which case it is purely actual with respect to its existence at t. (Though not necessarily eternal, just as the electron had no potential for being non-negatively charged at time t despite the electron’s not being eternal - before the electron existed, there was in some sense a potential for it to be negatively charged.) Now, one might object that if existence is essential to it, then it cannot fail to exist-it is a necessary being. But that doesn’t at all follow, as it confuses de re and de dicto necessity. (Cf. the second document I linked to the other dude, and in particular see the section on Hsiao and Sanders.) Finally, even granting everything you say in your first paragraph (which, as I’ve argued, we shouldn’t), the argument against EIT doesn’t work. Even if O’s potency for existence at t must be actualized, it doesn’t follow that the explanation of this actualization is an efficient sustaining cause of O’s existence. There are whole swathes of inertialist-friendly explanations of O’s existence (ie, the actualization of O’s potential for existence) at t (for any non-first time t of its existence) that make no reference to sustaining causes. See Section 5 of the second google document I linked to the other dude. (I linked it in my last comment to him immediately before your comment.)

[@copernicus99]

Joe, you are brilliant, but not always grok-able to mere mortals. Would you be able to present Feser's various arguments in pictorial form, e.g., as a flowchart, and show within the flowchart where problems or alternatives arise? That would be super helpful for this (primarily visual) learner. Thanks for all that you do to sanitize the philosophical air of misguided ideas!

[@nabilrady6767]

Are you gonna make a video about the naturalist explanation of the universe ?

[@MajestyofReason]

Potentially!

[@educationalporpoises9592]

@@MajestyofReason Potentially or actually?

[@veridicusmaximus6010]

Does not an actualization (change of potential) entail stasis (presently actual) when Feser asks the question in accordance with - P:7. What keeps an actualization (change of potential) in existence at any moment? Is anything actually in stasis?

[@davidcoleman5860]

Anything actualized is composite, and all composites are in potency to their conservation.

[@Jesse_Scoccimarra]

Hey Joe, I was going to watch one of EP's videos and I realized that he deleted his channel, is he alright? Is something going on? Thank you.

[@MajestyofReason]

He emailed me the other day; from what I can gather, he needs a break from the chaos of social media etc. He hasn’t updated me (yet) about the status of his channel going forward, though. It could potentially be a temporary deactivation; but we shall see as time progresses! I believe he probably over-worked himself making three videos a week and wants to take his hiatus/break seriously 🙂

[@Jesse_Scoccimarra]

@@MajestyofReason alright, thanks for telling me Joe, I also saw that he was in debates in discord and that's also probably stressful, I hope he gets better, thank you

[@SanctusApologetics]

Even though im a Thomist, your jokes were top tier I can’t lie 😂

[@metatron4890]

Can a timeless cause create and sustain an ever changing effect?

[@davidcoleman5860]

Yes.

[@tffvn4492]

Joe, are you more of a Plato or Aristotle fan?

[@goldenalt3166]

You seem to assuming a kind of "epistemic inertia". Where i find these theist arguments seem to assume a per se sustenance version of epistemic justification.

[@consciousphilosophy-ericva5564]

I recently reached out to one of Feser’s Facebook fan pages for an interview, and they contacted him, but he is busy at this time. A lot of people in the comments are acting as if Feser is busy to get out of pressing challenges. However, I don’t think this is remotely the case. Feser can hold his on quite well; he is certainly more than capable of responding to any objection I’ve ever heard thrown at him.

[@whatsinaname691]

The dude argued with Graham Oppy for like 3 hours on 2 separate occasions. That’s the exact opposite of cowardice.

[@MajestyofReason]

@@whatsinaname691 Correct. I don't know if anyone is saying he is a coward, but he most certainly is not. He's a busy scholar and deserves our respect as such :)

[@Oskar1000]

One issue I often have with philosophical argument where you take a definition and try to derive entailements is my worry that the definition is ever so slighlty wrong. It is so slightly wrong that it's hard to critique it, if you say "I don't believe in causality" or "the PSR" or "knowledge" you sound stupid, because you think the definitions are 99% correct. It's just not quite the whole truth for you.

[@goldenalt3166]

30:25 "c.f. Next slide" proof that we can cite future things. :)

[@MajestyofReason]

Decisive proof!🙂❤️

[@goldenalt3166]

12:12 One might argue that this is exactly the system we have.

[@MajestyofReason]

It does seem as though we have infinite borrowing and infinite debt… lol

[@plasmaballin]

It seems to me that Premise 7 is not just unjustified, but transparently false. If we accept the definition of change given in Premise 1, then S's potential for existence cannot be actualized at any moment except for the moment when S first begins to exist, since the actualization of said potential is equivalent to S going from nonexistence to existence. If S is merely continuing in existence, there is no change involved, so, by definition, there cannot be an actualization of S's potential for existence.

[@TheProdigalMeowMeowMeowReturns]

I want Justin Of Unbelievable to moderate a debate between Feser and Schmid. It would be more fruitful than Feser vs Ahmed.

[@ob4161]

YES! I was just thinking that the other day. Hopefully they'd get rid of the ads in such a debate.

[@MajestyofReason]

I was thoroughly unimpressed by Ahmed’s responses. Cameron Bertuzzi reached out to Ed today to ask if Ed wanted to have a discussion. Unfortunately, Ed is limiting his social media engagement for the time being because he is working on a book, I think, on philosophical arguments for the immateriality of the intellect. So he is busy

[@TheProdigalMeowMeowMeowReturns]

@@MajestyofReason I’m still annoyed at him. You can’t make me not be lol

[@TheProdigalMeowMeowMeowReturns]

@@MajestyofReason but thank you for the update 🙂

[@TheProdigalMeowMeowMeowReturns]

@@ob4161 Yes, the sheer quantity of ads is really the strongest argument against the existence of a loving God

[@nickolashessler314]

Forgive me if I'm misunderstanding Feser's argument, but how does its conclusion move beyond the presuppositions of the argument in any way? It seems like he presupposes that potentiality and actuality exist, goes through the premises of his argument, and concludes that one thing that just is potentiality itself exists and something that just is actuality itself exists. So it doesn't seem like the argument goes anywhere. Am I missing something?

[@davidcoleman5860]

Actuality merely means something that's actual or real. Feser is a realist, and he elsewhere defends realism (see his _Aquinas_ and _The Last Superstition_ ). And all "potentiality" means is the capacity for change. Note, the argument does not begin with the assumption that _everything_ changes; it merely states that based on observation _some things_ change. And since a "thing" must be actual, if it changes, then it is both in actuality as to what it is and in potency to what it is not. Thus, two fundamental principles of being must be in place for something to change: act and potency. I don't see any presupposition here, except of course realism.

[@nickolashessler314]

@@davidcoleman5860 I'm not disputing the inference to the idea that changable objects are composed of act and potency. I'm questioning the soundness of the inference from something that just is pure actuality itself, which follows trivially from realism, to an unmoved mover, the existence of which seems far less trivial. It could be that I'm not conceptualizing what the unmoved mover is supposed to be correctly.

[@davidcoleman5860]

@@nickolashessler314 Forgive me for misunderstanding your post., and I beg your forgiveness if I get it wrong again. Pure Act is existence itself with no passive potency. "Pure" in this sense, means without any admixture of potency. And since "moved" in a Thomistic sense is "change," then Pure Act, by definition, is unmoved (unchanged). Contra Schmid, I believe a _per se_ causal series definitely leads to an unmoved mover or Pure Act.. His objections, thus far, are entirely unpersuasive. If that's where your conceptual issues are, perhaps you can elaborate. Regards.

[@nickolashessler314]

Thank you for clarifying that. I guess I should clarify my concern with the argument. Feser needs to assume realism in order to argue that the first premise true. Otherwise, it doesn't make sense to say that change is a real feature of the world. (To be clear, I have no inherent problems with assuming realism in a metaphysical argument.) Realism by definition entails the existence of actuality itself. Since Feser speaks of objects having actuality rather than of actuality being defined as something that is real or actual, I think it is safe to infer that there is a concept of pure actuality being assumed as well. Then, in premise 14, Feser finally concludes that a purely actual actualizer exists. He identifies this purely actual actualizer with pure actuality itself. Since one of the starting assumptions of his argument appears identical to the conclusion of his argument, it appears that the proof just becomes trivial; any argument for realism, our starting assumption, just is an argument for the purely actual actualizer, so the rest of Feser's Aristotelian proof just seems superfluous. Please let me know if I have expressed a misunderstanding of any part of his argument here.

[@davidcoleman5860]

@@nickolashessler314 Thanks for your reply. I don't see where Feser presupposes Pure Act at the beginning of his argument. To me, he simply states that change is a real feature of the world which is an actualization of a potency (the making of something real) and that potency cannot be raised to act except by something already in act which of course leads us to say that change is caused by something actual, etc. What is presupposed (via the progression of the argument) is that something in act is either pure or composite and if the latter, its actualization must be grounded in something actual. It is only when we see that this is a _per se_ or hierarchical series that Pure Act emerges. I very much tend to be a "show me" kind of fellow, so I had a ton of questions when I began to seriously investigate classical theism. In turn, I encourage my students to have a healthy skepticism about matters as complex as this. I am of the opinion that only through investigative labor will key concepts "stick" in the mind and thus broaden one's understanding of a subject.

[@ob4161]

Have you seen Feser's response to Oppy's paper? I haven't yet read it, but it might have some further points of relevance to your criticisms.

[@MajestyofReason]

I have! I made a blog post with my comments on it. In short, I think Feser does well to criticize Oppy, but none of Feser’s criticisms do anything to respond to my criticisms. Here’s my blog post-I think you’ll be served by it❤️🥰 majestyofreason.wordpress.com/2021/08/06/comments-on-feser-on-oppy-on-thomistic-cosmological-arguments/

[@ob4161]

@@MajestyofReason Woah -- that was insanely quick. I'll take a look.

[@hhstark8663]

Can you say that pantheism have *less* philosophical evidence than both atheism and theism? Since the "war" in philosophy is mainly between atheism and theism. The question has nothing to do with the above video.

[@demergent_deist]

I don't think there is a "war" in the philosophy of religion between theists and atheists. Things are rather more sober there. I think most philosophers, especially outside the philosophy of religion, are mainly pantheists in some form, panentheists or skeptical agnostics.

[@goclbert]

That's just because our culture predisposes people to thinking in terms of monotheism and atheism. As most philosophy of religion people come from Abrahamic backgrounds, it is the only kind of God they legitimately consider.

[@TheBookgeek7]

I'm sorry I was so autistic in the side comments thing! I just want things to be thoroughly logical so... Anyway, Good video, Joe! I think I agree with the main point- though I am both a thrust and a Classical Theist: Feser doesn't sufficiently establish his argument for those who would disagree with him. It seems to rely on his rejection of existential inertia- which he should establish AFTER he argues for a necessary being, not BEFORE hand. Oh well.

[@MajestyofReason]

No need to apologize! Much, much love ❤️❤️❤️

[@TheBookgeek7]

@@MajestyofReason Thanks! You're a sweet dude! I think I might have chased everyone out of the chat, though...

[@williamlight2393]

you can hear joe slowly losing his mind in this video XD 1:21:48

[@CMVMic]

Very funny! I suppose it was just a corky reference to the song Changes by David Bowie

[@TheologyUnleashed]

What's a Morean criticism

[@whatsinaname691]

The conclusion is wrong, so at least one premise has to be, or there are missing steps.

[@TheologyUnleashed]

@@whatsinaname691 is that like saying "any argument against free will will rest on premises which are less obvious then is the existence of free will?

[@loveandideas7826]

Hi, you should do shorter videos. I mean something like 'short' series on different topics.

[@MajestyofReason]

I hope to do something like this in the future!!! :)

[@nathanroush8918]

Joe, I think you need to listen to Dr. Ed Feser’s explanation of why accepting the PSR has to be either a full acceptance of the strong PSR or a denial of it altogether and radical skepticism. Even though you didn’t bring up existential inertia directly in this video as an objection to the Aristotelian Proof, it is obvious that many of your objections are tied to same reasons you consider existential inertia to be a possible option. Ed Feser would argue that the strong PSR is why you need a fully actualized being with no potential whatsoever. He also explains why its an all or nothing choice with the PSR. I would be curious to here you respond to those points. Also I can’t tell, but would you say that you consider “becoming” to be more fundamental than “being” metaphysically?

[@MajestyofReason]

Thanks for the comment! I (tentatively) accept the full-blown PSR that every contingent fact has a non-circular explanation. I’ve been convinced by Pruss and Rasmussen’s book that there is at least one foundational concrete metaphysically necessary object. Nothing in my video relied on denying the PSR, and existential inertia in particular doesn’t deny the PSR at all, since there are existential-inertia-friendly explanations of persistence. I canvass some such explanations here: majestyofreason.wordpress.com/2021/02/02/response-to-hsiao-and-sanders-on-existential-inertia-and-the-thomistic-contingency-argument/

[@MajestyofReason]

Finally, Feser doesn’t show that the PSR leads to a purely actual being, as I explain in this video as well as my video on Aquinas’s Third Way.

[@ob4161]

The problem, though, is that a strong PSR which focuses on contingent propositions (like Pruss's account) is compatible with past states explaining present ones; for it will be propositions _about_ the past events that explain contingent propositions about a substance's here-and-now existence. Feser's account of PSR focuses on concrete entities rather than propositions; and so on his account some concrete entity must explain a contingent substances' here-and-now existence. But one who holds to a more rationalist PSR need not accept this.

[@MajestyofReason]

@@ob4161 I think you’re correct in one sense, but I would add some stuff. In particular, most philosophers think that there are transtemporal relations, ie relations between things at different times. Given this, I would argue that it’s plausible, in principle, that a concrete objects’ here-and-now existence is explained by a transtemporal explanatory relation (eg a causal relation, say). In particular, the object at the immediately temporally prior moment can explain (causally, say) the object at the present moment. And this doesn’t rely on a more rationalist PSR. Finally, I will add that explanations even if concreta need not be causal. (Indeed, this is entailed by a universal PSR, since the necessary foundation will be a concrete object with an explanation but no cause.) So, I would argue that the present existence of a concrete object could be explained by a whole host of things: some tendency or disposition; the nature of states of stasis; laws of nature; and so on. I actually have a paper under review with a philosopher of physics friend of mine on different inertialist friendly explanations of concrete objects’ persistence (and, hence, their existence at non-first moments). Once it’s accepted I’ll prolly make a video on it🥰

[@nathanroush8918]

@@MajestyofReason Thank you for the reply I will definitely check that out. I just watched the Feser/Oppy discussions on this. Oppy seemed to be saying that he believes that the debate should have really transitioned to a debate about the theories as whole and their merits as opposed to about individual premises in the particular argument. Im guessing you would agree with that based on other videos of yours I have watched. I don’t think Feser quite got that was what Oppy was saying, but I don’t believe he would agree that was the only way productive conversation could be had even if he did. If you debated Feser it is surely to just end up in the same place it did with Oppy which is stuck at the act/potency understanding as it related to the PSR. Feser is not going to grant that the act/potency view of Oppy is really coherent, which is needed to keep existential inertia as being a live option. I hope you do talk with Feser eventually, but just know your unlikely to get a theory vs theory discussion. You will inevitably end up in the same place as Oppy/Feser did. I would love to hear a discussion though between you two on the act/potency issue specifically from the get go, and at the most fundamental level so we don’t have to beat around the bush for the first hour of the discussion haha. I think there is more that could unpacked there if there was more discussion/understanding of each sides view so better examples and implications of each other’s understandings of act/potency could be unlocked. For one I would like to hear from your side the actual proposing how some kind of fundamental particle/simple/field could actually not be composite. How it exists in time and space and not in principle be composite. Pick the strongest example even if wouldn’t want to be held to only that in practice and discuss that example from the start (no chairs). Just some thoughts.

[@adamhoehn886]

U gotta have a discussion with feser

[@JohnVandivier]

Pay up, I need a protein bar

[@OriginalWinProductions]

The author of this video didn't read enough Aquinas.

[@OriginalWinProductions]

Please note, I am being sarcastic.

[@demergent_deist]

Your neutral reformulation of the seventh premise is clever and very convincing. By the way, isn't the basic problem of Thomists, like Feser, that they can see things either only as totally dependent (the universe) or only as totally independent (god)? Nothing in between. In my opinion, that is a very one-sided view. A semi-independence of things makes the most sense to me. For obviously things can both causally compel others and be causally compelled by them. The Thomists also seem to be approaching a Far Eastern view. Like: There is no spoon, there are only its conditions of existence (the spoon would be identical with the sum of its conditions), and these actually don't exist either, only their conditions of existence do and so on. And some meta-language won't be able to talk the spoon into reality. I mean, I can only pretend that the spoon really exists, as if it existed (in and of itself).

[@legron121]

For me, Feser's argument fails immediately at the "act/potency distinction". Yes, of course, there's a difference between the way a thing _is_ and the way a thing _could be._ No reasonable person should disagree with that. But Feser spins that into a distinction between two literal _components_ of a thing - a component called "actuality" and another component called "potentiality". He simply doesn't justify this distinction in his book.

[@kylealandercivilianname2954]

You're going to drop the existential inertia nuke!!!!!!!!!

[@MajestyofReason]

Ha! Actually, my recent paper linked in the description explores ways of criticizing the Aristotelian proof that are independent of existential inertia. I think it’s especially significant if the argument doesn’t work wholly irrespective of existential inertia-as I argue in my Sophia paper!🙂

[@MajestyofReason]

Also, I'm sure you already saw this, but I think the Aristotelian proof might actually entail the truth of existential inertia [I know you sent me an image of an argument along these lines some weeks back]. Cf. this document docs.google.com/document/d/1hyRv1ub5rFHgH3vItukqq7x5i2Fxf9khDnvNs0oK0Ws/edit?fbclid=IwAR3hjMncNy0IcY-4dG8S3P7_vLzC6pI8biGtI0Vp1bz3HtZ15bt04UYqotI

[@MajestyofReason]

@Actus Purus Hey my dude! Thank you *so* much for your comment :) So, my sole aim in that document was a conditional argument: *if* we grant the success of the Aristotelian proof, *then* EIT seems to follow. Now, I think you are right that Feser's Aristotelian proof is problematic w.r.t. actualization of something's potential for existence [and I do make that point in the paper :) ]. And, by the same reasoning, perhaps the inference to EIT in the document I shared above is problematic w.r.t. actualization of something's potential for non-existence. But we have to remember that I am only concerned with the conditional claim, and hence if the Aristotelian proof *itself* treats actualizations of potentials in this problematic way, it is legitimate to use its own assumption here against it. And if we reject the inference to EIT on this basis, I think we should similarly reject Feser's Aristotelian proof on the same basis. So, basically, it's a dilemma: Either accept the Aristotelian proof and, consequently, EIT, or else reject the inference to EIT but only at the expense of rejecting the Aristotelian proof. But perhaps there are ways to avoid your criticism. For instance, perhaps we can run the argument in terms of *claims* or *propositions*. In particular, it seems plausible that all the motivations for Feser’s causal principle equally well support the following principle: whenever a proposition P changes in its truth value, there is an explanation [for that change] reporting either (a) that something already actual causally brings about P’s worldly correlate [in the case of P’s changing from false to true] or (b) that something already actual causally removes P’s worldly correlate. Let’s call this principle ‘Bob’. Bob is extremely similar to Feser’s causal principle, since Bob says that changes in propositions’ truth values require causal explanations that either bring about or remove that to which the proposition corresponds. Now we can let P be the proposition , and suppose P is true at t. By Bob, P can only be false at any t* [where t* > t] if something already actual causally removes P’s worldly correlate. But P’s worldly correlate is O [or O’s existing]. So, P can only be false at any t* if something already actual causally removes or destroys O. Hence, if nothing already actual causally removes or destroys O between t and t*, P remains true from t to t*. But for P to remain true from t to t* entails that O persists from t to t*. So, if nothing already actual causally removes or destroys O between t and t*, O persists from t to t*. And that, it seems, is just EIT. Those are my responses for the moment! :)

[@MajestyofReason]

​@Actus Purus So, I appreciated your objection so much that I included a section on it in my chapter on the Aristotelian proof. [I haven't spell checked it yet] Here is what we say [I am potentially co-authoring the book with a philosopher of physics friend of mine, so I've made it 'we' and 'our' etc.] One objection to our argument above runs as follows. Recall one of the central claims of the argument: for O to go out of existence at some arbitrary t* (such that t* > t) is for a change to occur-it is for O’s potential to cease to exist to become actual. But surely if change is the movement from potentiality to actuality, then ceasing to exist cannot be a change-non-existence is not a state of actuality. That is, a ‘potential to cease to exist’ is impossible since ceasing to exist (or non-being) is not some actuality to which O’s potency could point. Ceasing to exist simpliciter is not a change in the relevant respect (a potentiality becoming actual). This, in essence, is the same (or at least a similar) problem we identified in the previous section afflicting Feser’s Aristotelian proof. Prior to S’s existing, it cannot have any potentials, including a potential for existence. Naturally, then, its potential for existence cannot be actualized. But by the same token, posterior to S’s existing, it cannot have any potentialities or actualities, including a potentiality for or actuality of non-existence. Naturally, then, its potential for non-existence cannot be actualized. We make four responses to this objection. First, our argument’s intended conclusion is conditional: if we grant the success of the Aristotelian proof, then EIT follows. Now, we did argue in the previous section that Feser’s Aristotelian proof is problematic with respect to the ‘actualization of something's potential for existence’. And, by the same token, perhaps the inference to EIT is problematic with respect to the ‘actualization of something's potential for non-existence’. But we are only concerned with the aforementioned conditional claim. Hence, if the Aristotelian proof itself treats actualizations of potentials in this problematic way, it is legitimate to use its own assumption against it. And if we reject the inference to EIT on this basis, we should similarly reject Feser's Aristotelian proof on the same basis. So we can interpret this section’s argument as a dilemma: either accept the Aristotelian proof and, consequently, EIT, or else reject the inference to EIT but only at the expense of rejecting the Aristotelian proof. Neither option looks particularly attractive for defenders of the Aristotelian proof. But-and this is our second response-perhaps there are ways to avoid the objection at hand. For instance, perhaps we can run the argument in terms of claims or propositions. In particular, it seems plausible that all the motivations for Feser’s causal principle equally well support the following principle: whenever a proposition P changes in its truth value, there is an explanation (for that change) reporting either (i) that something already actual causally brings about P’s worldly correlate (in the case of P’s changing from false to true) or (ii) that something already actual causally removes P’s worldly correlate. Let’s call this principle ‘Bob’. Bob is extremely similar to Feser’s causal principle, since Bob says that changes in propositions’ truth values require causal explanations that either bring about or remove that to which the proposition corresponds. Now let P be the proposition and suppose P is true at t. By Bob, P can only be false at any t* (where t* > t) if something already actual causally removes P’s worldly correlate. But P’s worldly correlate is O (or O’s existing). So, P can only be false at any t* if something already actual causally removes or destroys O. Hence, if nothing already actual causally removes or destroys O between t and t*, P remains true from t to t*. But entails that O persists from t to t*. So, if nothing already actual causally removes or destroys O between t and t*, O persists from t to t*. And that, it seems, is basically EIT.[Footnote #1] Third, it seems plausible that we could use ‘possibility’ instead of ‘potentiality’ to run the argument. For even if there is no potentiality for O’s existence/non-existence in the sense of some disposition pointed towards an outcome that can be manifested or elicited when exposed to a relevant stimulus, it seems plausible that we can nevertheless legitimately speak of the possibility that O ceases to exist. And, plausibly, the same motivations favoring CP equally favor the principle that when possibilities that are not actual from [t’, t) are actual at t (such that t’ < t), something already actual causally brings about the possibilities’ actuality at t. This principle will equally facilitate the inference to EIT. [Footnote #2] Fourth, it seems plausible that we can infer EIT employing the notion of ‘Cambridge change’, which (as we use it) refers to a change in the predicates satisfied by S without any corresponding gain or loss of S’s properties (whether intrinsic or extrinsic properties). In particular, we can focus on the predicates ‘is such that O exists’ and ‘is such that O doesn’t exist’. We can then consider changes to the extensions of such predicates. O ceases to exist just in case the potential for the first predicate’s extension to be empty becomes actual (else: the potential for the second predicate’s extension to be everything becomes actual). Since-per CP-every potential that is actualized requires something already actual to cause this actualization, and since the only plausible way to cause the relevant change to the predicate(s) is to cause O to cease to exist (i.e., to positively destroy O), we can infer the truth of EIT just as before. Footnote #1: Could Feser use a similar response to fend off our objection from the last section? It doesn’t seem so. For in Feser’s case, Feser is concerned with the actualization of O’s potential to exist at a particular time. But, plausibly, no change occurs at a single time. Change takes time (even if the former is more fundamental than and grounds the latter). At a particular time t, then, any proposition P is either true or false. There is no change of truth values at t exactly, and hence Bob is inapplicable here (since its antecedent isn’t satisfied). One might think that Feser could focus on some time t’ earlier than t at which O exists and then find some proposition regarding O’s existence (at t) that changes from t’ to t and thus requires (per Bob) worldly-correlate-causal-actualization. (We are focused on some t’ at which O exists rather than at which O doesn’t exist because even proponents of EIT tend to grant that comings-into-being require external causes. We are concerned instead with O’s persistence once O exists, and hence the earlier-than bound we are considering should be one at which O does, indeed, exist.) But there doesn’t seem to be any good candidate for such a proposition. If the relevant proposition is the (presently) tensed proposition , then this doesn’t change truth value from t’ to t, since at both t’ and t (respectively) is true. If the relevant proposition is the tenseless proposition , then this, too, doesn’t change truth value from t’ to t, since tenseless facts about what happens at times are fixed/permanent/unchanging. Footnote #2: Once again, we can ask whether Feser can use a similar response to fend off our last section’s objection. And, once again, it doesn’t seem so, precisely for the reason articulated in the previous footnote. For the principle in the main text, like Bob, requires the passage of time, unlike Feser’s demand for a sustaining actualizing cause at a particular moment.

[@CMVMic]

@@MajestyofReason you should rly consider a debate with William Lane Craig!

[@Chosidchosid770]

Many thoughts, but one I wanted to comment on was that you argue that a whole can precede the concept of a part and , in fact, does so in such instances as saying "My kidney" whereby you as a whole need to be postulated in order to talk about a part of you called a your kidney. This doesn't sound right to me. Let's compare this, for simplicities sake, to a chair. As analogous to your example, we can speak about the chair's leg, lets say. This, in your view, is proof that a whole can be prior to a part. But this seems to be a subtle switch of senses. First, the chairs leg prior to its forming the chair was not the chairs leg. It was merely a part, some nicely crafted wood maybe. After the whole was formed you then pointed to a piece of the chair and said "the chairs leg", but this is only a sectioning off in thought, in actuality it is still participating in the whole of the chair, and in actuality the part was needed before the whole in order to form it. Actuality really only being the only thing that matters here. Secondly, to go back to your original example, "my kidney" is really nothing more than word games. Replace my with "of" the kidney of Majesty of reason, the steering wheel of the car, the leg of the chair, and you will notice the problem all but vanishes. All we have done is isolate a part of the whole and focus in on it as it functions for the whole. I'd also add that your example gets into the question of if you are your body or own your body. If the you that owns the kidney is not the kidney then there is no whole that is prior to the kidney such that the kidney is a part, as well as whether owning yourself is coherent etc.

[@davidcoleman5860]

Exactly, Elliot. Schmid is very smart, but it's stuff like that wordplay that is head-shaking.

[@CMVMic]

There is nothing that necessitates parts being prior to a whole. Sure, the example of a chair may seem like a good one but it misses the larger picture i.e. A substance monism could have a cyclical structural process of being unseperated and yet, seemingly seperated. This could be the case if motion is fundamental/absolute. Also, If time is an illusion, the totality of substance cannot both be one and many at a point in time because time does not exist. So using an A series semantic linguistics to find a contradiction in postulating the totality of everything as both one and many is unfounded. My question to you all would be do you think motion is emergent, absolute or an illusion as Parmenides would argue?

[@davidcoleman5860]

@@CMVMic It seems your objection is grounded in the competing templates of time and monism. Recall that Schmid assumes several premises of the Aristotelian proof _arguendo_ in order to show that its conclusion does not follow. It is thus legitimate to counter Schmid that his rejection of the ontological primacy of parts over the whole is misguided.

[@Chosidchosid770]

@@davidcoleman5860 My example for simplicities sake made use of of some time dependent differences for sake of clarifying conceptual distinctions, but the point im making, as you rightly said, is valid for the ontological status (in other words even if the chair popped into existence at once with no part preceding the whole in time). I'd also note that subscribing to the view as the objector has of there being "seeming distinctions" but not real ones is really just to say there are no parts and only wholes. That hardly answers, as opposed to avoids, the question of well if there were parts could they come after wholes. Nonetheless, such speculation is irrelevant as, again, you rightly said MoR's argument was arguendo aristotelian proof.

[@davidcoleman5860]

@@Chosidchosid770 Good words, Elliot.

[@kylealandercivilianname2954]

Bro you just love to destroy classical theism.

[@Backwardsman95]

This is word salad, jk. Grant me your dialectical wisdom lol

[@MajestyofReason]

Much love❤️