Five questions about the Boeing 737MAX!! - Answered

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During the last few weeks I have received A LOT of questions about the Boeing 737MAX. In this video I have decided to answer the 5 most common questions so make sure you watch the whole video.
Now, I want to stress that the views shown in this video are purely MY OWN and do not represtent anyone else.
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A special thank you to the channels that were featured in todays episode. To se the whole, fantastic videos, use the links below
Boeing (MAX noise certification and Display)
• Shhh... Boeing's New 7...
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Runwaymap (Aero expo Freidrichshafen)
• AERO 2018 - 26th AERO ...
Boeing (KC 46 First ever tinkering mission)
• Boeing KC-46 Tanker’s ...

[@Chances1957]

As an avionics engineer for 31 years, I am absolutely appalled that the MCAS system depended upon a single Alpha Vane sensor. All flight critical systems must be dual redundant in function. In a 21st Century designed aircraft this is inexcusable. There are NO EXCEPTIONS TO THIS RULE.

[@WakeUpAmerican000s]

Chances1957 - I am also appalled that the design doesn't provide for a feedback loop from the current stabilizer position to the MCAS so that this bit about repeated and cumulative movement of the horizontal stabilizer can be better controlled. That is, if the stabilizer is already moved to a 3 degree nose-down correction due to the first MCAS activation, the MCAS should be aware of that before any attempt to move the stabilizer further, especially if there are signs that the crew is fighting the MCAS.

[@Chances1957]

WakeUpAmerican000s I absolutely agree with your comment. Certainly as a design engineer I would have implemented your suggestion otherwise you will arrive at the situation we have witnessed. Thanks!

[@Chances1957]

Dmitri Kozlowsky MCAS May be dependent upon TWO sensors after the recent modifications, but it was only dependent on one sensor at the time of the two crashes!

[@Sky360Phoenix]

@@Chances1957 Is it true that the MCAS alternates between the AOA sensors each time it is switched on & off? Somebody mentioned this in another video.

[@Chances1957]

@@Sky360Phoenix I am not aware of this. As far as I am aware, the unmodified system relied on just one AOA sensor - pathetic really!

[@Divine_Evil]

Hey Petter, as a Verification Engineer of Embedded systems. I simply cannot fathom, how the guys who tested/verified the MCAS system did not ask the question, what will happen if we have a mismatch in the alpha veins or if 1 or both pilots are applying manual counter trim... or if the trim wheels are held with X speed that they are supposed to... In my line of work, we always ask ourself, what will happen if such an input misbehaves. I cannot fathom what the Engineers that tested and missed this are feeling. People died... if I was working on the MCAS... thank god I am not.

[@MentourPilot]

Yeah, it will stay a mystery

[@gordonlawrence4749]

Agreed any system analyst would have asked the same.

[@Joaking91]

Im sure that your colleagues werent the ones that called the shots.

[@Divine_Evil]

@@Joaking91 You are wrong... our job is to verify the system. Yes we don't design it, or don't set the requirements... but we always ask the questions... why is this like that, what if, how is this etc. From those questions often the guys designing it get a second opinion and they rethink it. P.S. As a good verifier I am always questioning everything. Even if a detailed specification is written, explaining everything. It is written by a human. There is bound to be an error or misunderstanding somewhere. So is every piece of code I work on. You never know how much code is legacy from a previous system. How much of it is new. What quality it is. Etc ...

[@domesticterrorist483]

Ah but MCAS has NOT caused these crashes that we know of YET. Wait for the reports before blaming MCAS.

[@Chances1957]

As I said in a previous video on this MCAS system, there should always be dual redundancy in critical systems on aircraft. There are no exceptions to the rule - NONE!

[@ReflectedMiles]

Control column inputs? They should only be recognized if both pilots are giving identical inputs simultaneously? It could be argued that it might have saved AF447, but it still sounds like an important exception! :-)

[@Chances1957]

@@ReflectedMiles Using two Alpha Vane inputs instead of relying on a single sensor is what I meant by making a system "dual redundant". The planned changes to the software will now require the use of both sensor inputs unless their respective readings differ by more than 5 degrees. Logical!

[@ReflectedMiles]

Chances1957 I understood your reference. I was just pointing out that one exception to redundancy is in the most important sensor inputs of all to the system-control manipulation by one pilot, not requiring two pilots to attempt control of the aircraft at the same time.

[@Chances1957]

@@ReflectedMiles Yes okay, understood. Actually I thought that this was what you probably meant. Thanks.

[@MauroPanigada]

@@ReflectedMiles What's the analogy here? A pilot who goes nuts, or a control column malfunction? Pilots can watch each other, both can realize there's something going wrong with one control column and decide to use the other. The pilots are already the system checking that the control column is working, and that each other (humans) are working and acting properly. Similar mechanisms were missing in the MCAS.

[@Pentium100MHz]

So, instead of copying the MCAS from the military version that works well (uses two sensors, turns itself off if the sensors disagree, turns itself off if the pilot tries to move the nose up), Boeing made a civilian version of the system with one sensor and more difficult to turn off. Even though the aircraft had two sensors anyway, so it's not like Boeing saved money by not installing one of the sensors. This looks to me like the software job was given to an intern or a new employee as a first assignment and it was made very simple - if sensor says AoA is too high (and flaps up, thrust high, autopilot off), trim the nose down, unless the pilot disconnects the trim motors. But yea, the 737MAX is probably going to be the safest airplane after this. If there is another crash due to a design problem (problem with the fix or an unrelated problem), that would be really bad for Boeing, so I think that the whole design will be checked.

[@MauroPanigada]

I really get the bad design part of the story (reading how the MCAS works made me ask myself “isn't this a rookie mistake?”). What I don't get is how was it possible that the pilots of the second crash didn't know. I mean, you pilot an aircraft and you know there was a crash of the same model and some speculation on the reasons of the crash was already out there and the MCAS is mentioned and explained. How come they didn't think of the stab trim cutoff?

[@dks13827]

Dumb American schools.

[@Pentium100MHz]

@@WilliamJones-Halibut-vq1fs From what I read about the "new math" crap (where 3*5 is not the same as 5*3) and forcing the students to strictly follow procedure instead of thinking, then I'd say at least that part is not so great.

[@BrianBell4073]

@@WilliamJones-Halibut-vq1fs. American baseball teams are all best in the World Series though. Can we assume this study was carried out by alt right Americans.

[@tynandouglas348]

@@WilliamJones-Halibut-vq1fs blacks, hispanics, and you?

[@american1911]

Thank you for putting this out. It’s great to hear from someone that actually uses the product.

[@TheSonicfrog]

Considering AOA indicators as "optional" based on your prior experience with AOA sensor/indicators is irrelevant when it comes to the 737-MAX because the critical MCAS system as (fatally) designed depended on those AOA sensors.

[@wildwest1832]

true, but a bad aoa sensor mcas can be turned off. You can easily still fly manually and trim yourself without any MCAS. Maybe boeing put too much faith in pilots diagnosing and handling bad sensors. Its not really a design flaw, but humans getting confused is a tough thing to design for.

[@gopeace755]

@@wildwest1832 well expressed

[@Rob2]

@Wild West that is not really the situation. There is no "just turn off the MCAS and continue as usual"! You can cut out the trim motors but that does not disable only MCAS, it disables ALL automatic and power-assisted trim. (ok there are 2 switches, but not a separate one for MCAS only) So there is no "easily still fly manually". You will have to turn the wheels by hand and you can see in the other video that that is not easy. Remember you not only have to revert the change made by MCAS but also have to perform all other trimming up to the landing.

[@TheSonicfrog]

@@wildwest1832 Worse than a design flaw, Boeing likely committed a criminal act when for commercial reasons they wanted the new 737 version to handle like the old ones. But changes in the new version required an additional system to handle certain flight situations. The development of that system and the safety analysis of its implications were rushed through. Pilots were not informed of it and not trained to counter its failure.

[@dheyes803]

Mentour, your videos make everything much clearer. Your approach to whatever the subject matter is never feels like you are forcing your personal opinion down everyone’s throats. You give factual and very straightforward information based on what has been documented by the various aviation authorities. Some other YT aviation gurus feel that they need to use brute force to drill the subject matters into our heads. I’ve personally found that you teach very well and I hope that you will be recognized for doing a video in the correct manner. As an aside, we can also get to see your hairy kids as well showing that you are human and don’t consider yourself to be at a level above your audience. Great job as always.

[@chex383]

Mentour: I am a big fan of your YT channel, but I have to say that in this video, you really sounded like a Boeing apologist. I understand everyone has biases and you realy love flying your 'Baby' the 737, but I think even you could admit that Boeing made a mistake. Anyway, keep up the good work.

[@auronoxe]

Yes, that‘s my opinion, too. - Boeing knew how to do MCAS correctly, but they did not in the 737MAX - They used 1 sensor for a flight critical system which is not allowed in civil aircrafts - Boeing did not include MCAS in the iPad training, although it changed the behaviour of the plane like NEVER before - Boeing did inform the FAA in a wrong way about how much the MCAS can interfere So overall, the reason for all this seems to be to avoid that the authorities order a simulator training. Which would have made buying this plane more expensive. And Boeing would have lost more orders to the better A320. Overall Boeing deliberately (!) cut short on quality. There is NO excuse for this. It is always possible for engineers to make an mistake. This was no mistake. It was deliberate action to only use 1 sensor and not mention the all new system in the training. Mentour: I find it strange that in the video that fact that 2 planes crashed is not taken into consideration when talking about if Boeing did well and if that plane is safe to fly. One could think you talk about the theoretical case that something with MCAS could go wrong. It went terribly wrong. Boeing will have to pay for this in several ways. Because it was no a „fault“, it was a „fraud“.

[@drock5407]

Calling it fraud is just silly. You sound like you work for Airbus. @@auronoxe

[@auronoxe]

No, I don‘t. I‘m an engineer in healthcare. If our company would know about a SW error that could kill or just even hurt hundreds of patients again (!) anytime, we would stop our systems to be used by customers immediately. If we wouldn‘t our company would be closed by the FDA and the EU authorities and someone would end up in jail. Safety critical sub-systems/interfaces/... need to be made error prone TWICE in our business according to regulations. That‘s exactly what Boeing didn‘t do, although this is done for life critical systems in planes, too - normally ;-)

[@michailbelov6703]

@@drock5407 He is a realist. I fully agree with him. Boeing screwed it utterly and completely, and I am very confident that criminal charges can and will be brought against them, and it will be succesful, unless they can evade it due to jurisdictional issues. The only unfortunate thing I see here that Boeing did not crash in the USA... Prosecuting them would be much easier.

[@AleksandarGospic]

You are absolutely right, Mentour sounded like PR person for Boeing. He said plane would be thoroughly tested by FAA and other agencies to make sure it is completely safe for you and me! Yeah, wasn't it 'thoroughly tested' to be licensed and yet we are here. They certainly knew this is flawed plane and they didn't even tell the pilots about MCAS, which was also flawed, but they still sold and delivered it, and now 350 people are dead. If this is not a shady business, to avoid using stronger but more realistic word, I don't know what is.

[@TheKatava]

Fantastic as always. Love the way you explain everything in layman’s terms. Keep up fantastic videos!

[@MentourPilot]

Thank you! I’m happy you like it!

[@gabrielejonte4620]

Looking forward to seeing you at the Aero Expo in Friedrichshafen! 🙂

[@Jjengering]

Never can get enough of that mentour theme tune :) Thanks for answering my question on live stream. I may come and see you in Germany I am thinking of riding my motorcycle from the UK there.

[@BelusTraveller]

2 planes down breaks my heart, I really hope they make it right for the lost lives. I have flown on the max more than once. SAFE TRAVELS,

[@SagaciousFrank]

They will make it right only for their profits which might be compromised as a result. They thought they'd get away with it, but not after the second one went down. Sociopathic Dennis Muilenburg didn't end up out of pocket.

[@brianheffernan8982]

I just found your channel and I really enjoyed it.

[@michaelcrossley5661]

I’ve been waiting for this one. Thanks mentor!

[@MentourPilot]

I hope the answered were to your satisfaction.

[@michaelcrossley5661]

Mentour Pilot always! You’re doing a great job of educating me. Thanks again!

[@dunxy]

Really enjoy and learn a lot from your content, thank you! A great help for my simming! Lots of hours flying warbirds but just getting into airliners of late and theres so much to learn but i am having a great time, made my first butter landing using ils in a 747 this morning and it was great! Hand flown a fair few "ok" but it took me a fair while to understand these fancy autopilot systems.

[@twiki1559]

No comment other than I really enjoy your videos. I've learned a lot. And I have zero involvement in the field of aviation. Good job sir.

[@StevenBanks123]

You are being very kind to Boeing. They are paying a price that they well deserve to pay.

[@jessfucket]

*> They are paying a price that they well deserve to pay.* No, 384 souls paid the price. The rich execs don't pay ANY price unless their wives and kids die screaming and crying when their airplane falls out of the sky.

[@StevenBanks123]

Luxi Turna sad but true

[@Halli50]

I see the lack of AOA sensor redundancy as a severe design flaw, especially since the second AOA sensor was installed, anyway. To keep knowledge of the MCAS system from the pilots just to reduce conversion training costs, however, verges on being criminal negligence.

[@k53847]

The criticality of the system was high enough that it should have required redundancy by FAA policy per the Seattle Times report. How it does not have redundancy and still got approved is apparently not yet available. I suspect the FAA and DoJ are looking at that pretty hard.

[@henrydelana9317]

Boeing provided data from NG flights that demonstrated the required performance for prevention of engine-driven pitch up. Since the FAA had no responsible representatives present at Boeing they accepted the data as proof of performance for the augmentation required for the new engines. Only Boeing and the FAA know why Boeing's proposal to use only one AoA sensor for what was to become MCAS was accepted as sufficient. We know why Boeing did it. It was all about the "less than an hour train for the new certification" sales pitch. It takes a very strong CEO to face the facts and say NO.

[@daffidavit]

@@henrydelana9317 Speaking of CEOs, the one from Ethiopia Airlines ought to have his tail set on fire. He allowed a 200-hour pilot to sit in the right seat. That's no better than having a single pilot in the left seat and one of the passengers from the back sitting in the right seat who just got his private pilot's license. As Capt. Sully said: "It's abhorrent" to have a 200-hour pilot as a crew member. The CEO was trying to save money by getting young eager guys to build hours at the expense of the 180 people who died due to lack of education. The fact that the prior evening flight crew experienced the same problem but didn't advise the following crew really burns me up. Luckily, the crew the night before had a pilot sitting in the jump seat who knew about the two trim cutoff switches. Otherwise, the disaster would have happened a day earlier.

[@Halli50]

@@daffidavit, you are confusing the Ethiopian and the Lion Air crashes. The Lion Air aircraft had the same problem on the previous flight, spotted and solved by the jump seat pilot. The problem WAS written up and the AOA sensor replaced before the fatal flight, so the failure was most likely in either the wiring or the computer input channel. At this stage in the B737 Max saga, few pilots knew about the MCAS system as it was not included in the conversion training. The Ethiopian 200hr pilot: In the past, it has not been uncommon during pilot shortages to hire pilots with the ink on their CPL licences still wet. This may be rare among major carriers, but this is simply a matter of company policy, which is usually changed to suit the new pilot supply situation, and has been true around the world. There is no indication that this low aexperience had any bearing on the accident, in fact this pilot must have just come out of the rather intensive initial type training on a regular B737 flight simulator, so he was most likely quite competent.

[@daffidavit]

@@Halli50 Thank you. I did confuse the Lion Air flight, so I have to take it back about the failure to advise the next crew on the Ethiopian flight. But I still agree with Capt. Sully, it was "abhorrent" to put a pilot with only 200 hours of flight experience in the right seat. I don't blame the pilot. Any young guy would jump at the chance to be a first officer in a 737 MAX. But the CEO should be held accountable for not training the Captain on the MCAS system, especially since it was known from the Lion Air incident and other NASA voluntary pilot reports that the trim could go into a runaway situation. Finally, the Colgan air disaster near Boston taught us that flight experience can mean the difference between life and death. When there are many people sitting in the back seats, they expect and deserve the best. After the Colgan disaster, Congress made the FAA change its regulations to require all major airline pilots to have at least 1,500 hours. The Captain must have an ATP rating. And if the captain is over a certain age, the pilot in the right seat must also have an ATP. I respectfully disagree with you about a 200-hour pilot coming out of 737 sim training being competent. As Capt. Sully said the crew must act as one. They have to be able to almost read each other's minds and act accordingly when there is an emergency. No 200-hour pilot is that good. The passengers deserved the best pilots not, as Sully said, one pilot and an apprentice. Thank you for correcting me..

[@shaunbarrios1979]

I recently found your channel and just want to say that I love the content that you are sharing

[@TheRaithadean]

Appreciate your insights, as always!

[@DemoEvolvedGaming]

MCAS exists to "save" the plane from stalling when the pilot goes full thrust and pitch up, aka to prevent an unrecoverable stall. However now Boeing has added all these defeats to MCAS it is not likely to actually trigger when it SHOULD. So instead of having the plane crash because the MCAS is forcing nose down into the ground, we accept the risks of having the plane stall out in a climb. All of this goes back to: "Is it a good idea to take a design from 1967, patch on giant engines that require pontoons to move these behemoths forwards and up (and extend the front landing gear) so they dont scrape the runway, and then patch all the flight problems that result" --- INSTEAD of: actually designing a plane which is balanced for these engines in the first place, further back under the wing, with taller landing gear all round, and the right amount of fuselage ahead of the wings. All in the name of profit.

[@henryford2736]

Agree with you 100%. Explains why none of the other Boeing aircraft needs MCAS. Sad thing is they will issue "software fix" and say "have a nice flight." We all know it's not a properly designed and balanced plane for those new engines. It will always be a "dog" to fly with pitch up tendency. They have a chance to fix it now. As you say longer landing gear, move the engines where they should be, modify the wings and generally do a proper fix by balancing the plane better for the new engines.

[@manaoharsam4211]

So do you think 737 Max has a pitch stability issue?

[@DemoEvolvedGaming]

@@manaoharsam4211 MCAS is the evidence that there is some issue at high thrust and high ANU. Airplane weight may also be a factor in this. Such as (either) takeoff (high weight due to having more fuel at start of flight) or more likely during a go-around (an aborted landing of an aircraft that is on final approach) (low weight aircraft).

[@manaoharsam4211]

I agree with you. I find there were a lot of arrogant Engineers at Boeing when I worked there. Also management knew nothing about planes. Just bean counters. when I worked in area of aero elastic instability not one Engineer had a clear knowledge of subject. They were push computer button Engineers. In fact when I went to a professor class I could tell the skill level was very poor of students from all walks and companies . I told everybody be at Airbus or Boeing I am scared to get up on a plane. When companies pay you good I money my approach is do the best job of learning even on your own time in order to do correctly. This is fun work. Some Engineers I worked with they prefer fishing than aerospace. I say leave then.

[@manaoharsam4211]

@@DemoEvolvedGaming is the issue on stability.

[@wranther]

Was nice hearing you mentioned by Juan Brown recently (Blancolirio Channel).

[@ronb.6582]

Finally a voice of reason and expertise on KZbin. There are so many people eager to jump on the lets bash Boeing bandwagon who hardly know one end of an airplane from the other. Keep up the good work. I found your explanations clear, concise, and accurate. I am long retired, but have logged around 25,000 hours in Boeing 727, 757, & 767 aircraft, and am amazed at the rush to judgment of so many uninformed people. .

[@GonteanuPaul]

Thanks, for updating. A wonderful day

[@doug9066]

Some interesting information & facts. Thank you for sharing.

[@TheMrVicist]

Always great videos here.

[@MrHimynameisdanny]

Back in September of last year, I flew on a 737 MAX from Ohio to Phoenix. It was great flight, and confidence I had knowing it was a brand new plane was huge. Who knew all this would happen though. Just greatfull that none of those issues happened on that flight. Still love flying though!

[@sophieacapella]

Excellent video Petter !👌😎 And I loved the puppies bonus at the end 😍!

[@MentourPilot]

Thank you Sophie!

[@jamesrindley6215]

Making a system that can fly the plane into the ground based on one erroneous sensor is negligent, but the worst aspect was keeping pilots in the dark as to the existence of this system. They should have been briefed on it and trained in a sim to recognize the angle of attack sensor failure and practice dealing with it. If every MAX pilot had done this it would be much more likely the crews would react in the right way instead of flying into the ground struggling to understand what's going on while consulting a manual that doesn't list the MCAS system's existence. From what I can see pilots were kept in the dark precisely to avoid the need for expensive sim training. And so it's probably management at Boeing and the airlines that, while not directly responsible for the disasters, they did set up the conditions which led to it. And every one of us who chooses an airline ticket based on price has contributed to those conditions being set up. In the end, there is a certain minimum cost associated with doing things properly.

[@sharoncassell9358]

I flew these aircraft from mar to jun. They were fine but I had my heart in my mouth praying nothing would go wrong. AA uses 737s a lot and loads of people were boarding them. In Some cases you can't choose other brands. The destination is only accommodated by 737s. So you're stuck with it. I tried the train to Fresno . 4 days solid. Bus same thing. Just saying.enjoy the flight. ù can't take a boat.

[@Roholi]

The best aviation channel, bar none.

[@davidoickle1778]

Very helpful information. Thank you!

[@Kinny202]

Amazingly precise explanations!

[@dihydrogenmonoxid1337]

How can you keep your good videos up so active? I mean twice a week is insane. Keep it up. I enjoy them very much. Thank you👍

[@mattesrocket]

I am sure he has at least 2 doubles 😂

[@iBreakAnkles4Fun]

Im trying to figure out how he's been flying jets for 18yrs and he looks about 36yrs old...

[@billyrayband]

That was an excellent update. But Boeing needs to have an independent organization do some serious investigation as to how these very poor design decisions were approved and tested. It appears to be gross negligence. They are going to be sued, there is no doubt about that.

[@kradius2169]

Billy ... Should an independent organization investigate the PAN-PAN component of the 737 MAX story? _

[@billyrayband]

@@kradius2169 My understanding is that procedures were followed on that and resulted in a NTF on a return to service test after landing. Likely the NTF was caused as MCAS alternates on which AOA to use in each flight segment. So it had cycled to the good one after landing and the ground test then checked the good one. Then the next flight it had cycled back to the bad one and crashed. That is just a test procedure problem that is easy to correct, a little late though. But will be changed anyone since update uses both AOAs.

[@kradius2169]

Billy ... How did the pilots of the previous day's flight of the doomed Lyin' Air 737 MAX pull out of their PAN-PAN situation? _

[@billyrayband]

@@kradius2169 They probably don't have recorder data for that event, but I thought they determined through crew interview they pulled the power to the electric trim. In the crashes, they didn't have enough altitude or experience to figure that out. The recorders from both crashes should indicate that is why pilots could not recover.

[@kradius2169]

Billy ... Not enough altitude? I thought the Lyin' Air doomed "pilots" struggled with the plane, fighting valiantly against the flawed Boeing MCAS system, for minutes? How long would you struggle with the cruise control on your car before you tapped the brake or hit the switch? ... Minutes? _

[@RobertHollander]

Great explanation about the angle-of-attack indicator.

[@jordanzader9352]

So refreshing to have a qualified and knowledgeable person talk about this issue.

[@icspawn]

Both Lion Air and Ethiopian crashes' FDR points same software error. Publicly released today.

[@jacobbiton3928]

What do you think will be the timetable for returning the plane to normal service? Thanks for the detailed explanations.

[@mosca3289]

Kudos for tackling these difficult questions.

[@ctbt1832]

Good video well explained. I’m starting to feel a little better about this plane and the safety features and corrections they made

[@cleo6686]

the Ethipoan report is out now. What say you now Mentour pilot? It looks bad. They had no chance to recover at that high rate of speed.

[@JayStClair-mh5wv]

I think your giving Boeing way too much credit. 2 of the main aeronautical engineers who were principle designers of the 737 MAX since have walked away from Boeing over safety concerns over the airplanes air worthiness...On top of that.. There is an American Airlines Senior Captain of their 737 MAX Fleet is on T.V. saying he no longer supports Boeing and had a meeting with top executives at Boeing along with the Pilots Union here in the U.S. and raked Boeing over the coals and insinuated a huge betrayel by Boeing to the Pilots and the flying community. I would really like to hear you comment on this please. Thank You

[@rodgerwiese2790]

I believe that Mentour explained what needed to be said and understood by the flying public and those that are interested in aviation... I believe that those in the media were not capable of explaining in layman's terms what Mentor said very clearly and jumped to conclusions without understanding how planes fly and how pilots fly them.!!!

[@2adamast]

I disagree, he has more conviction (the 737 is a fantastic plane) than knowledge (the mcas is just there to ??)

[@sexynelson100]

disagree.. he's making excuses for boeing

[@cr10001]

There was a very similar circumstance of a safety feature the pilots didn't know about causing an accident with SAS 751. It was a DC-9 (MD-81) and SAS had fitted ATR - Automatic Thrust Restoration - to prevent pilots throttling back too much for noise abatement reasons. As 751 took off, ice came off the wings into the engines, damaging them, the pilots throttled back but the ATR (which they hadn't been told about) overrode them with full climb power, which caused the engines to fail completely shortly after at 3000 feet. They were incredibly lucky and managed to crash-land in a field with no fatalities.

[@cr10001]

Actually I mis-spoke - the ATR selected takeoff power, which is worse (for a sick engine)

[@osbornyap45]

Thanks for the clear explanations, good work always !

[@SanJuanIslandsTV]

Great video. Boeing might equip all aircraft with single-button "PIC Override - Release Automation Controls"

[@emt271]

Great Vid. It's amazing the you an Juan Browne (Bloncolirio) are so similar in your approach. His vid yesterday also talked about the AOA indicator in almost the same words.

[@tatoute1]

same words? because provided by the same source? 8-O

[@ravensrulzaviation]

Ravensrulz says you are always wonderful. Thank you Petter!!!!!!!!!!!

[@Jakodrums]

I'm really happy you are doing this series. I pass my time answering people the same... just a remark, the 737NG (only SOME versions) also has a similar system controlled by the EFS. (FCOM chapter 9.20.11). Inhibit conditions are practically the same as well. Such systems are not new, Airbus has also their own version of stall protection management systems.

[@gordonrichardson2972]

Yes, elevator feel system is an old design on the B737. It is ironic that MCAS was designed because the EFS hydraulics could not cope with the changes in the aerodynamics of the MAX engine nacelles. It is a kludge on top of a kludge, presented as a shiny new aircraft. P.S. A few too many abbreviations...

[@AP-qc9hi]

What I found revealing in your previous mcas video is that after cutting out the stab trim motor, it takes a great effort to manually turn the trim wheel. Imagine being in an extreme pitch down position, with the pilot needing to pull back on the yoke with great force to counter the trim, it seems difficult to manually trim back within the short time allotted before zero altitude. Add to that the alarms blaring, potentially lessened situational awareness with the pilot monitoring pouring through the manual to find the resolution, i dont see how they can recover the stab trim manually at such low altitude.

[@henrydelana9317]

You are very right! It takes two people on the flight deck who can exert strength when required. In at least one case that required strength when the plane was inverted. The Alaska Airlines jet crashed when it's stabilizer failed. All perished.

[@towerrunner496]

@@henrydelana9317 The Alaska Airlines crash was due to poor maintenance on the Alaska's part to cut cost. The jack screw was actually stripped of its threads because they were not greased at intervals that McDonald Douglas put in their manuals. Also, a Alaska mechanic put in for the jack screw to be replaced, and was overruled by his supervisor on his next shift. So no manual use of the trim system would have made any difference in the Super 80 crash. That was improper maintenance of the jack screw that lead to it's failure, and the crash.

[@verveblack]

FINALLY...someone who knows what they are talking about. Well done.

[@frederf3227]

The cutout switches are for when the electric assist is unreliable. It's a misapplication that it is the go to solution for automation logic fault when the physical assist functions just fine. It would be like if there was an ABS logic fault in your car the fix would be to disable the vacuum brake assist. Transparently-operating automation should fail safe and not require disabling powered assist.

[@henrydelana9317]

@@towerrunner496 Hi Tower. Yes you are correct on all points. Did you read the transcripts of the cockpit voice recorder (CVR)? If you did you would have heard the pilot flying coaching the pilot monitoring on a last attempt to flip the plane over prior to impact. Had it worked he might have saved some lives. Unfortunately the pilot monitoring could not reach the rudder pedals while inverted. He was unable to assist in the rollover maneuver that the captain wanted to try. The captain was firmly belted in and able to work the rudder pedals. The first officer couldn't help. Perhaps my choice of a physically challenging experience eluded some. Do you know the name of the Vice President for Maintenance who was fired for this accident? Was you wife and daughter present when the CEO went to Fairbanks for the funeral of a man I knew?

[@ratboygenius]

I like your content. I was hoping you would address the question of whether or not there is ultimately a fatal flaw in the 737 MAX design from putting engines that are too large on an airframe that was designed for smaller engines. It has been suggested in articles about the unfortunate crashes that the MCAS system was meant to rectify an aerodynamic design instability created by the positioning of the larger engines.

[@bgordski]

Bingo!! if a software fix is needed to correct an aerodynamic error the aircraft is unnecessarily defective. What is needed are aerodynamic fences mounted parallel to the longitudinal axis aft of the wing (center of gravity) that will help force the nose down with more nose down pressure the higher the angle of attack. This is an item that is benign at cruise (level flight) and active during climb and descend. What happens if the electrical system gets crowbarred? (massive short circuit)? The FADEC (full authority digital engine controls) engines account for this with their own power source (alternator) separate from the main electrical system. In the above scenario pilots will be busy flying the aircraft with one little battery powered instrument in the dark. MCAS won't work then. I understand the Boeing removed the vortex generators from the wings. These help improve lift at low (stall speeds). If they were needed on the previous B737 what was the justification for their removal from a potentially tail heavy aircraft at low speed?

[@kaikai114]

Great video, i have always thought that the angle of attack is pitch, now i am properly informed.

[@ltfuzz1]

I enjoyed flying the -200 for Western Airlines in 1969- for many years! We had just got them and I was actually an S/O for a time before they agreed to a two pilot crew !!

[@SueBobChicVid]

I love his level headed, rational explanations.

[@gfuterfas]

Sure, I guess. But he pretty much ignores all the dead people from two accidents due to design flaws in the Max.

[@buffdelcampo]

@@gfuterfas So Graham, if you were trying to understand what happened and how to prevent further accidents, what would you do about the dead people?

[@gfuterfas]

@@buffdelcampo Obviously, you can't do anything for the people killed by the accident, and I am a big fan of this channel, but I do think Mentour could express a little more gravity. It's not like an iPhone update that Boeing is releasing -- this likely caused two crashes, and after the first one, they were already working on the fix while allowing their aircraft to fly. They were also apparently allowed to self-certify the safety of these aircraft by the FAA, and I think there should be some outrage expressed. How can he say that he thinks it's one of the safest airplanes in the sky if the certification process is flawed? I heard on the news that the FAA can't afford to hire the necessary people to do the safety certifications, so they allow Boeing to do it themselves, which obviously has a conflict of interest. It's more than just a "PR Nightmare". The sad part is that the grounding of all these planes is costing the airlines (and Boeing) tons of money, so there will probably be a rush to lift the ban on the 737 Max. There's so much pressure to have a hasty update that could still have problems, and the full accident investigations may not even be complete.

[@buffdelcampo]

@@gfuterfas Instead of watching the idiots on the news, dig into this. Do some real research. Most major manufacturers self certify. It's been that way for at least thirty years. So how many airliner designs are self certified? Probably all.

[@hhoebeke1]

Great video, cutting through all the ‘noise’

[@ethanfairweather8736]

I flew on the max at least two times before the second crash and I loved flying in it. Hindsight is always 2020 and what happened is it in the two crashes was extremely unfortunate. Boat crashes were a combination of bad luck and lack of foresight on Boeing‘s part. Despite the rocky start the max has done its job relatively well whenever I have been on board

[@briancork9980]

Oh there they are ...great to see them

[@jerosq1186]

Fantastic videos as always

[@MentourPilot]

Thank you! Glad you liked it!

[@TheBlueye13]

I love your new outro

[@ckutner1]

As always, most informative

[@stevenfullenwider3178]

Thank you for sharing your knowledge with us. The press usually grabs the exciting or writes a story to be exciting. The press also fails to follow through on a story. I am looking forward to learning the cause of these two crashes. The MCAS appears to have caused the crashes, but what caused the system to operate out of control.

[@vernyjm]

I would like to go, but from Latin America it’s quite a trip, would you do a live stream? Bless!

[@Joaking91]

De donde sos amigo?

[@vernyjm]

Joaking Hola, de Costa Rica 🇨🇷 saludos!

[@Paul1958R]

Mentour Pilot/Petter, Great questions, great answers - thank you!! I have so much respect for you as a pilot and your expertise. God bless Paul

[@murraystewartj]

Thanks for this. You have that rare talent for explaining complex ideas in a way that is relevant for industry pros and non-industry enthusiasts (like me) alike. And no doggo this time, so I was able concentrate on you for once (don't get me wrong - you need your sidekick).

[@WRALdirector80s]

Excellent post. Excellent discussion. Professionalism on display.

[@bobbyn5627]

Thank you for your motivation sir

[@MentourPilot]

Thank YOU for watching!

[@bobp1016]

It’s nice to hear a real pilot explaining everything. The news took this story and ran wild. Thank you for giving the facts.

[@verveblack]

How did they run wild?

[@bobp1016]

Have you watched the news? They ran wild because they took the story and started talking about how unsafe the MAX was. Instead of talking with real pilots who fly the plane they just used talking points that were not the whole truth it were flat out false. The new has been reporting how Boeing charged extra for safety equipment. That is not the whole truth. That is how the news ran wild. We need all the facts in a story, not just part of the story.

[@jacklabloom635]

Reporting on two plane crashes within five months on the same aircraft is not going wild. The plane was extremely unsafe, the way MCAS could cause the plane to crash. It has now been documented that MCAS relied on a single input.

[@compulsiverambler1352]

It's nice compared to hearing various aviation experts on the news with more relevant expertise and detailed knowledge of the MAX 8 than pilots who've never even been trained to fly them have? It's not going wild to report the fact that experts are able to foresee situations in which having the AoA disagree light would indeed be helpful to MAX 8 pilots both without this software update and after it. MAX 8 and 9 pilots should have this light so that they know when MCAS is no longer available to help prevent a stall, because in emergencies knowledge that they're more prone to stalling than usual could influence their decisions. Most pilots haven't received the updated MCAS training as most airlines don't have the planes anyway.

[@ReflectedMiles]

@@jacklabloom635 Not especially, at least based on what we know so far. The software did need correction, as items often do in newer models, but when the malfunction occurred, nothing we have seen so far indicates that it needed to be a fatal event. The crews needed to respond to a runaway stab trim event, whatever the cause. That has been standard training on 737s for decades. Other airplanes have similar risks and similar procedures. That is why Mentour Pilot indicated that he had no doubts about the safety of flying the MAX in the future. The media relies on drama and sensationalism and that often means doing less than cautious, accurate, or knowledgeable analysis, not to mention the breathless tones of panic and fear. Spikes in viewership and ad revenue are strong incentives.

[@Maelli535]

Nice to see you give your pals there some TLC at the end, they're soooo patient with you!

[@mukherjeeamitabh3]

The last few seconds of your video was all I was waiting for

[@turbofanlover]

Great stuff as usual. Looking forward to see the MAX back in the skies. :)

[@Chances1957]

Ethiopian Airlines crew in Boeing 737 crash "could not control" jet despite following procedures, report finds!

[@ericbedenbaugh7085]

Read more than the head line, they didn't follow procedures.

[@MVEProducties]

Eric Bedenbaugh yes they did

[@1969bogdi]

Eric Bedenbaugh yes they did! You stupid ufck!!!

[@ericbedenbaugh7085]

@@1969bogdi Read the entire report. They did not!!!!

[@WakeUpAmerican000s]

@@ericbedenbaugh7085 - the Ethiopian crew did follow procedures after three cycles of incremental (and un-wanted) stabilizer movements initiated by the MCAS. The crew turned off both switches to remove power from the horiz stabilizer motor, then attempted to manually change the stabilizer position by using the control wheel in the cockpit, as documented in Boeing's procedures following the Lyon Air crash. Current hypothesis is that because they were also honking back on the stick in an attempt to raise the nose of the aircraft, the limited mechanical advantage of the small stabilizer control wheel in the cockpit used to move the stabilizer was not enough to overcome the extreme forces on the stabilizer of the aircraft which was now exceeding the design limit of airspeed as it dove toward the ground. The crew realized that the frozen control wheel meant a certain crash, so they re-powered the stabilizer control motors, and attempted to use the thumb switches to correct the horizontal stabilizer position, but by then, it was too late. Boeing is in deep doo-doo with this woefully poor design because: 1) dependent on a single point of failure (one AOA sensor) for a critical response (nose-down correction, even at low altitudes) 2) no diagnostic checking of AOA sensor function visible to pilots on aircraft without the optional package to do so (which clearly says that Boeing realized this was necessary, but decided for some really strange reason to charge extra for it) 3) No feedback loop between Horizontal Stabilizer and MCAS - so no matter how 'smart' the MCAS software is, it couldn't tell that the Horizontal Stabilizer was already moved to a dangerous nose-down position before moving it further 4) inadequate manual backup for pilots to move the horizontal stabilizer under several flight conditions (something well known since the 70's - pilots used to be trained for this, but for some reason are no longer trained for it) 5) the "emergency" cut-off switches should provide the option to just turn off MCAS, and not the entire power to horizontal stabilizer motor, so that the pilot can make corrections to the stabilizer position using the thumb-switches provided for that purpose. Older models of the 737 had this - one of the two switches would disable auto-control functions but leave the power to the stabilizer motors "on". Why that option was removed on the MAX will no-doubt be discussed at some length in upcoming lawsuits.

[@gordonlawrence4749]

Just had a thought. I have never been in a glider with an AoA indicator apart from, and this is the absolute truth - a bit of wool about 10cm long selotaped to the canopy at the front end. It's good for detecting stalls too as it starts waving about before you can feel the buffet through the seat of your pants and finger tips on the stick which you feel before an actual stall. I don't think it would work on a 737 though!

[@SilasLabedo]

I get the feeling that two forces counter-acting each other in the way the mcas intervenes is gonna be a structural problem for the 737 max in that if you have a force at the engine point pushing upwards and the horizontal stabiliser at the back pushing downwards, at some point, something in-between the engine point and tail could snap, especially if mcas is gonna kick-in for nearly all the takeoffs since that's when you most often have high engine output. These forces need to compliment each other as opposed to fighting each other so the strain on the structure of the plane are as minimal as possible!

[@drakbar5957]

Great answers with solid explanations. Unfortunately we live in a sound byte era and anything as complicated as aviation can’t be reduced to one sentence. If you want to understand, you must be willing to listen. I found this video to be very helpful to my understanding 👍

[@sssri1122]

But do you understand an aircraft knows when to nose down but not nose up? I find it strange.

[@leexgx]

@@sssri1122 the powered trim System can go faulty witch puts the plane into a nose up or nose down it's why you have to remember off by memory when you have a runaway trim situation, outside of native English speaking seems to be where this issue comes from where they are failing to follow basic runaway trim situation and letting the powered trim crash the plane which is what happened with the Estonia flight and Lion Air they failed to cut trim and was actively fighting the trim system (witch you should never be doing) by pushing trim back up when the system was trimming back down I Believe When Boeing are saying that airlines pilots did not have the correct training they may have been referring to runaway trim situation training which these pilots were failing on (not specifically relating to the MCAS system this is just the runaway trim situation which they should be trained for the last 40 years)

[@currentbatches6205]

@@sssri1122 "But do you understand an aircraft knows when to nose down but not nose up? I find it strange." As Peder mentioned, the MCAS was designed (and required by the FAA) for a very specific instability. If you tried to design counter-control systems for every possible instability, we''d be back to flying affordable by the upper 1%. Spending unlimited amounts of money trying is a fools game. Flying is already the safest possible mode of travel; perfection is not attainable in design or function.

[@JonnyD3ath]

ss sri it is due to the design of the aircraft and engine position. It is described better in another video, the engine thrust has a greater tendency to force the nose up in the max variant, thus this system is in place to counteract this in a specific extreme scenario

[@milantrcka121]

@@leexgx Ethiopia? Otherwise this would have been a third one...

[@igorb6542]

As always - fantastic! Very informative videos!

[@MentourPilot]

Thank you! I’m so happy you like them and find them interesting.

[@just.robban]

You are a true legend!

[@TheMot616]

Fantastic Information Thank you

[@bernardofitzpatrick5403]

Your professionalism is great. Your enthusiasm and love for flying is very evident. Also, anyone who loves animals has gotta be a good guy!

[@jsomiller44]

First question, your response is only partially correct. The AOA display may not be necessary for safety but the disagree indicator is necessary for safety. If you had this indicator before the software upgrade it could have told you to disable the Auto Trim before your plane took a nose dive. Even in the event of emergency the warning light could have pointed you in the right direction to disable the system sooner. Especially if Boeing had told you about the MCAS system and had a procedure that directly told you to disable the electric auto trim if this indicator is on. If they had told the pilots about this system and had a procedure for it many lives could have been saved.

[@ReflectedMiles]

If you are a pilot and have to have an indicator light to know when the trim is running against your input on the yoke, I have zero interest in flying with you. Boeing had warned the Ethiopian pilots about MCAS and reminded them of procedures. Maybe you're right--maybe they needed an indicator. Are you sure you want to go there?

[@bkailua1224]

Again a very well done video about airliners. Amazing the press could ever get anything wrong in reporting on aviation. :) We also do not navigate with iPads but the iPad might have the digital chart on it. Yes pilots use iPads for learning about the aircraft, and before iPads we used paper books, large pictures, movie projectors and overhead projectors to learn about the aircraft. But we still use real aircraft or simulators to learn how the fly the aircraft. I think it is accurate to say that all jet airliners have AOA vanes and AOA is used by the aircraft systems, but pilots who fly the aircraft do not need to have an AOA indicator to fly the aircraft safely. We had the AOA vanes on the 757 and 767 that I flew for 20 years and never had the ability to read actual AOA in the cockpit. We could indirectly have an idea of AOA with some of the indications but could not know what AOA was at any given time.

[@greybuckleton]

AoA sensors are really useful. I have one on my old Q300. Using speed to try and predict stall is not as accurate as aircraft weight is always uncertain and changing. Vs and V2 are more accurately flown using AoA. No you don't need it, but its definitely useful and performs better than inferring from attitude, speed and an inaccurate weight calculated assuming all passangers weigh the same.

[@60trickpa]

Great video and explanation. I wonder why the Lion Air plane was even flying the day after it had troubles and a third pilot has to help control the plane

[@sparkplug1018]

No real mystery there. They identified the issue, and repaired it. To an airline a aircraft sitting not he ground doesn't make them any money, and thats unacceptable to them. Was it fixed correctly? Were the parts used to spec? Why did the pilots not perform the runaway trim checklists? Those are the real questions.

[@nerdydrew6818]

Stay safe Mentor. If you end up flying the 737Max I’m confident your training will keep you, your crew and your passengers safe 👍

[@MentourPilot]

I will be flying it soon and I will sure do my best

[@sebastiannikkolas8497]

@@MentourPilot Congratulations mentour! Wish you all the best and I know you can handle the Max safely. I've seen your simulator training and it was an absolutely wonderful to execute those problems..

[@jwilde801]

I have no doubt that you will be flying safely, because of your experience, m but ALSO because the MAX is already a safe aircraft. You will be flying the safest aircraft in the sky, especially after all the scrutiny after these tragedies. I have no doubt that if you were flying one even before the upgrades, even if you had the same situation, that you would have done your checklist and turned off the MCAS system, and safely landed. @@MentourPilot

[@mikaluostarinen4858]

I wonder if there ever are stall situations, which MCAS can handle, but pilots couldn't. At least they would be rare, I assume.

[@Wunaladreaming744ER]

Hi Mentor! I have never been a fan of the Boeing 737. Still prefer flying the ‘Mad-Dog’ and Airbus. However after looking at your videos, I have a better impression on the 737 system. Do hope to see you flying the 787 Dreamliner one day! Keep up your great videos. :)

[@PRCOM]

@mentour the kc46 refueller aircraft had sensor slats fitted, what they were was like mini doors between the tanks, when one was getting low a slat would automatically open to allow fuel from another tank to flow in and balance it out. Granted it's not really mcas but it's not a job a pilot could do, balancing out the fuel

[@megatech1966]

Very well explained. Subscribed👍

[@dennisdonovan4837]

As Steve Blue has noted (see below - chronologically) … The fact that two AOA (Angle-Of-Attack) sensors were available as part of the design-build is the crucial (and fatal) design flaw in Boeing’s initial MCAS implementation. What ever Boeing’s says (or most telling - doesn’t say) about how safe their revision is, there is no escaping the humbling fact that Boeing and the FAA made an incredibly bad analysis and decision to allow the MAX to fly off the assembly line with a SPOF (Single-Point-Of-Failure) that, as was so tragically demonstrated, caused these airplanes to crash with a total loss of passengers and flight-crew. Just my opinion but … I feel very strongly about this and hope that lessons will learned and things will (hopefully) change for the better. 🙏🏽

[@paavobergmann4920]

Especially regarding the fact that a similar system that uses input from both sensors, plus indication to the cockpit, was already installed in a military airplane, when military and civilian world tend to give slightly different priorities to safety vs. performance. That´s point one. Why there even was the possibility that the pilots did not get to know, there was a subsystem installed that could actually assume trim authority in certain circumstances, and how and when and why it does so, is beyond me. If it is true what sensationalist media tell me. In addition, it would be a nice feature to give some kind of indication to the cockpit that the system has been engaged, so the pilots know what they are dealing with. I fully understand, that de-cluttering the cockpit of irrelevant notifications is a safety feature in such a complex machine, to not distract pilots from flying and let them keep focus and situational awareness. However, my totally uninformed layman´s guess would be, that it would be a nice feature to have at least an LED labeled "MCAS", or, for multiple susbsystem input, "AoA warning, auto-trim engaged", or something like that. If that goes on, the plane essentially says "Listen guys, I feel I need to do something to the trim, because my sensors say, you are about to drop the ball here!", so the pilots would at least know what´s going on, and could react following a) " yes, that´s normal und to be expected right now, please switch off", b) "Oh, woops, we didn´t notice, we were busy, thanks for the heads-up!", c) "thanks for the help, we were getting worried, too" d) "what are you talking about? We are nowhere near the situation the sensors tell you we are in. something seems to be off, stop it!" In principle. If the reports are true. If it turns out after the investigations, that MCAS was actually involved in the chain of events that led to the loss of lives and 2 airframes, that would only strengthen the importance of your point. The possibility alone should be enough reason for concern.

[@q.e.d.9112]

Paavo Bergmann I think that the fact they had installed a safer system on the military version is going to be very costly for Boeing. I visualise multi-billion dollar lawsuits sticking to them like confetti to a bride.

[@paavobergmann4920]

@@q.e.d.9112 probably. But then again, hindsight is always 20/20, and what do I know about planes? Also, military aircraft are expected to pull crazy stunts that commercial aircraft wold never think of attempting, so of course they get all the assistance there is.

[@Stealt707]

Thank you Mentour for this video. Your explanation about how the MCAS installed in military aircraft has more resilience than the single AOA sensors in the 737 Max adds weight to the argument that Boeing overlooked an important quality issue here. Which is to build quality into the engineering process rather than troubleshooting. I agree that we dont know the cause of the accident and we have to wait for the investigations but these 737 Max 8 aircraft in both recent accidents were falling out of the sky, nose dive into the sea and nose dive into the ground killing all passengers. No wonder Boeing has gotten bad press.

[@Stealt707]

@dothemathright 1111 The MCAS system in both the military application and commercial application are used to stabilise the aircraft so they have a common purpose. My point is that building redundancy in to the 737 MCAS is just as critical for passenger safety and preventing airplane crashes that lead to loss of many lives. Thank you.

[@responsez47]

Another Spectacular video!

[@MentourPilot]

Great! So happy you liked it!

[@Danehavenlane]

As a MAX driver myself, what about the stab cutout switches and fly the plane first. There’s been no mention in the press that Lion air had the same problem the day before and they used trim cutout switches, manual trim. Easy to say since I do have the advantage to Monday morning quarter the situation.

[@kradius2169]

Dane ... Holy crap. Like you're the only person so far today & most days lately that I've come across that seems to be aware of the MAGA / free press Juicy Smellitt schwindle being perpetrated against Boeing. Not a single member of the bloodthirsty Boeing carve-up mob that I've challenged knows about the PAN-PAN call the day before the doomed Lyin' Air 737 MAX took a swim ... not to mention the unchanged since Day 1 in 1967 and likely to remain unchanged till 2067 process for a 737 pilot to actually start flying their plane. _

[@TheYoyozo]

I want to accept your endorsement of the 737 Max, however I just don’t believe that Boeing has actually come to identify the problem. Their unwillingness to ground them after the Ethiopian crash demonstrates their intransigence.

[@henrydelana9317]

Boeing identified the problem and started working on fix in 2018. The fix required that they get FAA review. Donald Trump shut down the US government in December. No FAA employee could assist in getting the fix approved while Trump refused to budge. The FAA is culpable, as is the Department of Transportation and it's Secretary who is the wife of Mitch McConnell. If you wish to inform those who are responsible for the Ethiopian accident do please include Elaine Chou (Secretary of Transportation), Mitch McConnell (who refused to halt the government shutdown), and of course Donald Trump whose shutdown materially interfered with the solution that could have saved lives. Please note the use of the term "materially interfered".

[@Rob2]

Having identified the problem and then, after the second accident, claiming that nothing is wrong and the plane is safe to fly, only makes the matter worse for Boeing.

[@henrydelana9317]

@@Rob2 You are correct.

[@henrydelana9317]

@Röhrich Oak It is unfortunate, but there is a lot of history behind what has happened recently. The US FAA has been encouraged by the US Government to hand over regulatory responsibility for airplane certification to the companies involved. The implication was reduced budgets for certification. The FAA caved, and the US Government cut their budget (which had to have the approval of the Secretary of Transportation, a Presidential appointee). This was not Trumps doing. Think of the last Republican President who proposed spinning Social Security out to the private sector prior to the Great Recession (that his economic "let the banks do what they want to do" created). That former Republican President is safe from harm in Texas. Meanwhile Boeing chose to finesse a training dodge that would assist sales. The dodge backfired with the Lion Air accident. With certification already in place Boeing was forced to propose a solution that required FAA certification. The current Republican Administration shut the FAA down for other than "mission critical" functions. The current Secretary of Transportation could have challenged the situation by stating that the FAA team working with Boeing needed to stay on the job so as to prevent another accident. If that protest was made it was kept very quiet. Her husband was assisting the President in holding the FAA hostage. This is not to say that Boeing is not most at fault. Boeing stuck to the "no simulator training required" mantra that their Vice President had pressed to Muilenburg as an important hook for sales. Muilenburg was also getting briefings from legal side of the issue. Any admission of guilt would be used in lawsuits which were sure to come. The Legal Department knew their only best choice was to negotiate settlement out of court. Their worst fear was a class action. So now you know what Muilenburg is dealing with. His sales-oriented solution was blocked by a Republican Administration's obsession with holding the government hostage for whatever reason. The Legal Department told him if you ground the aircraft it will be an admission of guilt. To some it may seem ironic that a Company who gained sole control of the US commercial airplane market could find themselves in such a predicament. A competent manager would never have accepted the Engineering decision to use a single-point-of-failure solution that could put the plane in peril. A competent manager would not have accepted the Sales suggestion that training for the single-point-of-failure was not required. A competent manager does not run the Boeing Corporation. In order to gain the industry's trust Boeing's Board will have to show that the Boeing Company is better than it has shown itself to be recently. They can start by firing the CEO.

[@henrydelana9317]

@Röhrich Oak You are getting dangerously close to the truth.

[@ns81]

Is it slightly disquieting that Boeing didn’t, from the jump, install the same mcas safeguards in the max as in the military 76 variant?

[@couldyourewindplease3653]

My question, can such conditions exist that no matter what happens aircraft will stall and crash because of high AOA and not enough speed alone, regardless if MCAS is there or not? These days companies will do anything to save money, including making pilots climb at max rate to get higher and increase fuel efficiency. And also pilots reliant on software/systems too much making them too bold. And it's not like one can practice stalling a commercial aircraft other than in simulator.

[@ns81]

@@couldyourewindplease3653 Meh - few false assumptions there. First, airplanes can easily outclimb the limits that ATC sets for them. They actually have to *reduce* thrust to keep from level-busting or over-speeding during a climb. I also think it's mostly a myth that airlines will skimp by encouraging practices that directly flirt with safety. ("I need you at level 340 in *minutes* skipper! You Hear Me? You better be climbing like a Bat Out of Hell!") More realistic/less sexy ways airlines try to save are *slowing down* a flight once it's at cruise, in order to optimize fuel burn, and by contracting with code share partners with very low margins who pressure their pilots to fly lots of circuits back-to-back like the Colgan Air pilots. Or by lengthening the time between maintenance as Southwest is reported to have done. But if you tried to climb a 7-3 fast enough to stall it during a commercial flight, you'd have a level bust from ATC and a visit from the chief pilot way before you risked a stall.

[@henrydelana9317]

The answer is the one you might guess first. They saved some money, and booked orders based on a risk. Would you want to fly on a plane that was sold this way? My guess is that Dennis Muileburg wishes he had silenced Sales and told Engineering to embed the dual AoA system and make it fail-safe. He could have done it as CEO. He chose to take the more risky approach. NASA did too when it chose to launch the Challenger. Flying is risky. Some risks can be managed, some cannot. Good companies excel in managing risks. If profit ever becomes the driver risk will rise.

[@simonblunden2151]

I've decided because I have been binge watching these videos and they are so informative that I can now comfortably fly a commercial jet.

[@MentourPilot]

Hahaha!

[@AlexandarHullRichter]

AoA indicators are becoming popular among GA pilots in North America. Since you became a great pilot without one, you won't really ever need it, but some recreational pilots seem to find it easier to use than normal indications. It also sounds important to people who don't fly.

[@citizenblue]

Hey Mentour, quick question. If the alpha vanes are situated along the longitudinal axis of the aircraft but on opposite sides of the fuselage, wouldn't the readouts on the AOA indicator disagree in an ascending or descending turn, or at any pitch attitude other than zero with a given amount of bank angle established (e.g. maintaining a heading in a crosswind)? Love your Channel, would be thrilled if you answered this question in a video! Keep up the good work!!

[@Smingleflorp]

Chris Odom just my non-expert guess: The difference would be slight and predictable. I would assume the program has parameters to distinguish between normal and unwanted maneuvering.

[@noelwade]

Chris - Although the alpha vanes are on opposite sides of the airplane, they're on the fuselage not the wings. Even in a turn the air on both sides of the fuselage should be the same (assuming the airplane is in a "coordinated turn" and is not "skidding" or "slipping" sideways). Realistically, there is going to be some margin for error programmed into the system, so it won't show a "disagree" unless the two vanes mismatch by a certain value or greater (perhaps something like 2 degrees' difference). That would allow for minor variations in calibration, airflow over the fuselage, and things like turbulence to cause momentary discrepancies that won't be so large as to cause a "false alarm" that one of the vanes is reading incorrectly.

[@citizenblue]

@@noelwade Makes sense to me. Thanks for taking the time- it had me scratching my head

[@thinkfaster]

Yes, therefore as Mentour stated, MCAS will not engage if there's an AoA disagree of >5.5 degrees.

[@ekinz7286]

Yes love your videos 👍👍👍 today is my birthday 🎂 expecting your dog to appear any moment😂😂😂😂😂

[@Cubanbeauty]

HAPPY BIRTHDAY

[@MentourPilot]

Happy biiirthday toooo you, haaappyyy biiiiirthday to YOOOOUU!! 🤩🎂

[@ekinz7286]

Mentour Pilot Thank you 😊 😊😊

[@Marcel_Glanzer-Unterscheider]

Happy Birthday @Fun Sisters

[@ekinz7286]

Thank you to all of you😊

[@mansaha9288]

5:08 yeah plane belt attached to adequate parachute would be necessary

[@mikes-bmedic5484]

I would have loved to have become a pilot. I remember as a child being able to go into the cockpit and look at a litany of steam gages and being mesmerised by that and chats with the PIC and the co-pilot. I have to add the LCD screens of modern commercial planes are sexy to look at. It seems to me that glass cockpit has made flying easier and safer. Medically I could never pass the medical tests required for a CPL. I am getting my aviation fix by watching the videos on this channel and thank you for the breadth and depth of what is covered.

[@daviedmond4639]

I would have called this the top 5 questions I don't want to be asked about the max in any public forum are.........so thanks god your around to take it on and I think its fair to say you do an excellent job.

[@MentourPilot]

Thank you. I hope they made sense

[@DanielE15]

Thank you for providing clarity. Always irritates me when the media puts a spin on things and they don't even know what they're talking about.

[@aaronwhite1786]

Great video as always! One thing I was curious about, I've seen to recent reports (Obviously, nothing is set in stone or officially confirmed) saying that the pilots on the Ethiopian Air flight were doing the Boeing recommended recovery protocols for the MCAS issue, but still crashed. Have you heard anything similar to that, and do you think it's possible that the reporting is just based on bad information?

[@StringerNews1]

In the past there have been cost-optional items on airliners that affected safety. For example the 1979 AA Flight 191 DC-10 crash in Chicago could have been averted if N110AA had been ordered with stick shakers for both pilot seats. As ordered, it had only a stick shaker on the captain's yoke, and when the #1 engine departed the wing, power was lost to it. When per company policy they reduced speed, the left wing stalled. Had there been a F/O stick shaker, the stall might have been reversed. Recent reports indicate that a missing AOA vane is on the same side as the stick shaker that activated on takeoff of the doomed Ethiopian jet.

[@henrydelana9317]

Sadly you are very wrong. As the engine departed the AA DC-10 it rolled up and over the wing before the two front mounts failed. It severed the hydraulic lines feeding the leading edge slats. They deployed. The aircraft went into a flap asymmetry , one of the most difficult control challenges pilots have to deal with. One wing goes down while the other tries to stay level. There is little one can do to compensate for this. Add to this the wing is lighter with the engine gone. No aircraft manufacturer factors in an engine separation from the aircraft as a parameter for safety. Where did you get this BS?

[@StringerNews1]

@@henrydelana9317 You should be ashamed of yourself, exploiting the deaths of people to put other people down and make yourself feel important. You are wrong in _every_ way.

[@henrydelana9317]

@@StringerNews1 BS is BS. The fact that I called you out has nothing to do with what you imply. Prove your story is correct and that my explanation is false. That is all you have to do. Go ahead. I'm waiting. You have a lot at risk. I have nothing at risk.