German Military Doctrine was Flawed

Get your Operation Bagration poster here! teespring.com/get-operation-b...
Promotion Code: SPICYBLITZ
German military doctrine was flawed. But some may ask why and in this video I express my concerns with the lack of operational insight in concepts like Bewegungskrieg and stellungskrieg although I don't mention the latter. Many people seem to know German doctrine through a purely tactical perspective; even on places like quora you see people calling 'deep battle' a modified version of Bewegungskrieg and this is seriously wrong. Bewegungskrieg has in essence a very 19th century perspective of warfare whilst Deep battle has a totally 20th century perspective, taking into account both world wars.
Here, I explore the differences between the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of warfare in case you are not familiar with them. Next, an analysis of bewegungskrieg and deep battle is conducted which shows why the chance based German doctrine relied too much on extraordinary circumstances. People may argue that this is because the Soviets had more manpower and could afford to do breakouts in dense sectors, however the problem with that is that both doctrines were developed way before the Second World War. I find it truly paradoxical that the Germans/Prussians practically invented mass mobilization yet still treated armies as they did in the Franco-Prussian war.
Furthermore, I argue what set deep battle apart from Bewegungskrieg in its sophistication. Heck, I don't even mention Maskirovka (Deception)! I also give the case example of Operation Bagration to demonstrate that whilst the Soviets were suffering manpower shortages in 1944, they still employed their doctrine successfully because it is much more complex than whether or not they had an abundance of soldiers and material. I hope you all enjoy this vlog style video. I tried to make it more interactive with animation and footage snippets, here and there.
[Timestamps]
0:00 Introduction
5:00 The Soviet and German perspectives at the Operational level
6:40 The German mass-mobilization/maneuver paradox
8:30 Bewegungskrieg versus Deep Battle
11:30 Why was German doctrine so flawed and what made Soviet doctrine so good?
13:55 Operation Bagration as a short case study
15:45 Conclusions and extra information
[Sources]
Operation Bagration by the Soviet General Staff (edited and translated by Richard Harrison)
• Why the Soviets won WW...
Tank warfare on the Eastern front by Robert Forcyzk
Analysis of Deep Attack: Operation Bagration by William Connor
When Titans Clashed by David Glantz
www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/o...
ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/p...
www.cc.gatech.edu/~tpilsch/IN...
apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltex...
apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltex...
kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/file...
[Images]
commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Fi...
[Patreon]
/ blitzofthereich
[Paypal]
www.paypal.me/blitzofthereich
[Amazon]
www.amazon.com/shop/blitzofth...
[Discord]
/ discord

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

Support Blitz of the Reich. Check out our online store! Get $3 off at teespring by typing in promo code: spicyblitz teespring.com/stores/blitzs-obshchina [Timestamps] 0:00 Introduction 5:00 The Soviet and German perspectives at the Operational level 6:40 The German mass-mobilization/maneuver paradox 8:30 Bewegungskrieg versus Deep Battle 11:30 Why was German doctrine so flawed and what made Soviet doctrine so good? 13:55 Operation Bagration as a short case study 15:45 Conclusions and extra information Typo at 7:18 'Maneuver' and 7:15 since I forgot the preposition 'of'. Thank you all for watching this video. If you want to support the future of this channel then be sure to check my patreon page at www.patreon.com/blitzofthereich and paypal at www.paypal.me/blitzofthereich

[@ctrlaltdebug]

The Germans try the back door to see if it is unlocked, while the Soviets kick down the front door.

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

great analogy!

[@Garhunt05]

This is largely due to resources Germany couldn't do what the Soviets did because they were always lacking even early in the war.

[@interstella5555]

blitzkrieg and deep battle explained in one line

[@yeetyeet5079]

@@Garhunt05 they just needed to concentrate their forces

[@kurt5490]

@@Garhunt05 Absolutely! They didn't have enough tanks, trucks for either motorized infantry or supplies or enough oil for the whole of their operations or economy as a whole. And especially MANPOWER! Even if they did capture the oil fields of the Caucasus and/or middle east they wouldn't have been able to operate them with german speaking people. It was all a gamble. After all the planning and especially the Paulus supply study and war game they knew they'd run out of supplies at about 500-600 kilometers and that the attrition from superior #s of soviet infantry would attrit the wehrmacht of its reserves before they got to Moscow.

[@SpookeyGael]

The Germans waited until opportunities were presented. The Soviets created opportunities themselves.

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

B-I-N-G-O

[@Kriegter]

In Russia, These things are normal. Watch those meanwhile in Russia videos and you would know what Germans lacked

[@mohammadsab4478]

No they got opportunities by manpower

[@dusk6159]

@@mohammadsab4478 Nice myth

[@ironstarofmordian7098]

@@mohammadsab4478 that's only partially true for some portions of the war.

[@frederickthegreatpodcast382]

I think it’s interesting, the Soviet doctrine was completely focused on the strategic aspect of war and was tactically bankrupt in the early years of the war and the Germans were the exact opposite, tactically focused and strategically bankrupt.

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

exactly. You nailed it. It's as if the Germans were great athletes but sort of lost in what they wanted to do. The Soviets were poor athletes but knew their objectives.

[@Arnaere]

I would argue the Soviets had no strategic vision whatsoever other than throwing men wherever Germans appeared.

[@frederickthegreatpodcast382]

Kortos Autumn that’s tactics. Strategic is from a higher level. Tactically, you are completely correct

[@Arnaere]

@@frederickthegreatpodcast382 I mean at all levels the Soviets had no other plans than that. They only knew they had to meet Germans but had no greater strategic scheme than pushing lines on a map.

[@frederickthegreatpodcast382]

Kortos Autumn the Soviets had the strategic view that Germany must be made a buffer state so that the Soviet Union could not be invaded from the west again.

[@jbweld6193]

I truly believe the German army had the best trained, best equipment available at the time and a will to fight like no other. That's pretty much where the advantages ended. They were horrible when it came to logistics, entire panzer divisions abandoned due to fuel shortages.. an asinine defense of stalingrad, an even more asinine attack on the soviets to begin with. It's as if the entire German war machine was composed entirely of US marine mentality individuals and lacked all other components of the war machine.

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

this is honestly a very valid. I have friends who are marines who don't have mentality but I sorta know what you mean by the jarhead kind of thinking: 'Imma fight with my bare hands'.

[@Arnaere]

"They were horrible when it came to logistics" Not at all. I've said it above, but the Soviets were far worse. Hoth notes in his memoirs that the Soviets in the central front were sending supplies to the Germans on accident for up to two days because they could not keep up with the advance. For the opening of the invasion, throughout Operation Barbarossa, the Germans were being supplied quite literally and directly by the Soviets. The problem is strategic and it is the whole purpose for the Axis going to war- the enemies it faces control the entire world. Japan was on war rations two years before it entered WW2. Italy had little strategic value compared to France or Britain. Germany was powerful and potent but lacked land and resources as well outside of things like coal. Essentially WW2 was the only chance those countries had at being powers and they had to fight world spanning empires with massive populations like the British empire, the French empire, the USSR, the US, etc. The material disadvantage you're seeing does not stem from operational planning but purely economic outputs outside the domain of military organization. "entire panzer divisions abandoned due to fuel shortages" All sides had fuel shortages. The USSR, despite having far more fuel reserves when the war broke out, had deficiencies. It is why they were criticized for using their tanks as artillery because they were so low on fuel. So low in fact that Soviet aviation fuel had to come from the Lend Lease program (some 57% of Soviet aviation fuel came directly from America). "an asinine defense of stalingrad" It's not clear to me what was wrong with it, other than putting Paulus in charge which was a fluke anyways. "an even more asinine attack on the soviets to begin with" The Germans knocked out 3,000,000 Soviets in six months. 4,500,000 in the first year. There has never been a more successful in history- or a dramatic failure as the Soviet case considering they had all of the advantages of logistics, defense, aerial and armor superiority, etc.

[@Centurion101B3C]

Well, certainly in the 1939 - 1942 timeframe, it did help that the Germans had their PantserSchokolade, which was nothing more (or less) than Methamphitamine. Essentially the Germans were hopped up on Meth.....until it ran out. And here we touch on another German vulnerability; being the logistics, the failure/breakdown of which meant that the flow of Meth (Pervitine) dried up.

[@Centurion101B3C]

@@Arnaere Hm, I find that story of Soviets supplying Hoth's 4th a bit specuous. Besides that, Hoth would have been a fool to use Soviet delivered fuel, since it was of distinctly different formulation than the (absolutely needed) German formulation. Besides that, there was also the flagrant difference between the logistical operation and execution thereof, which pretty much was horse-drawn with the Germans and fully motorized/mechanized with the Soviets.

[@Arnaere]

@@Centurion101B3C "Hm, I find that story of Soviets supplying Hoth's 4th a bit specuous" Why would this be? You started of talking about meth and switched to disregarding claims because you don't like them, so it seems kind of biased not to believe it, especially since it would explain both performances in 1941. "Hoth would have been a fool to use Soviet delivered fuel, since it was of distinctly different formulation than the (absolutely needed) German formulation." This is incorrect for the simple reason that the Germans used seized Soviet vehicles, repainting them and putting them into service. The fuel was designed for them so it fits perfectly with accepting it. This is very basic Eastern Theater information so it's surprising you wouldn't know about this. "Besides that, there was also the flagrant difference between the logistical operation and execution thereof, which pretty much was horse-drawn with the Germans and fully motorized/mechanized with the Soviets." This is actually also false. The majority of Soviet vehicles came from the US(Katyushas were commonly mounted on Studebaker trucks). The Soviets still had a severe lack of supply movers. Here is a quote summing up the Soviet position in 1945 by general Patton: "We promised the Europeans freedom. It would be worse than dishonorable not to see that they have it. This might mean war with the Russians, but what of it? They have no air force, and their gasoline and ammunition supplies are low. I've seen their miserable supply trains; mostly wagons drawn by beaten up old horses or oxen. I'll say this; the Third Army alone and with damned few casualties, could lick what is left of the Russians in six weeks."

[@firstnamelastname-tz1dp]

Thank you for making this video, not many seem to be talking about the inefficiencies in Blitzkrieg, it's always the classical idea of blitzkrieg being perfect. Many don't seem to realise that the USSR won strategically and tactically as well, not only because of numbers as most people suggest.

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

Yes, but the problem is most people view the Eastern Front based on what happened in 1941.

[@hardymaier7696]

Also it has to be remembered that the Western Allies had to explain their failures by building up the image of German military prowess. How else would a numerically inferior force keep beating the Western Allies unless they had a new magical formula? Could it be the Westerners were just inept??

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

@@hardymaier7696 well I th ink it has more to do with the fact that a lot of the German military ended up writing memoirs that sustained Allied preconceptions of the highly inefficient Soviet. Ya know- the Cold War and stuff.

[@hardymaier7696]

You are right on that, all the German generals wrote highly selective memoirs, which were popular with Western audiences.

[@xornxenophon3652]

# AstroAlex : Well, after WWII the German generals were able to publish their memoirs in the west, claiming that the russians were not good soldiers but only won because of unsportly behaviour (...they had more soldiers...), while, at the same time, nobody in the west really wanted to hear that those russian generals not only had many men, tanks and planes than anybody else but also knew how to use them!

[@kategrant2728]

Why tf do you only have 9k subscribers?

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

I don't know but it makes me sad. :( I need more to make this a sustainable living. :D

[@aquilatempestate9527]

He takes too long to outline basic points. Compare him and Tik...

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

@@aquilatempestate9527 most of my videos are documentaries which are scripted. also Tik does way longer videos than me. Anyway I do appreciate your honesty.

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

@@weaknessisnoobGSM I already edited a lot out and this wasn't scripted so I couldn't edit out the ums without sounding robotic. Sorry though.

[@richardbenitez7803]

Blitz Of The Reich - I can see you are putting a lot of heart in this medium and into what you have to say. KZbin has many dedicated guys. I’m amazed. I never take for granted efforts like yours. I intend to pay up on my end.

[@Samlind]

I've heard the German's logistic lift was about 350 miles for a single army, then it was spent. Logistics, which underpin anything you want to do operationally, were their weak point for the whole war. Compare that to the western Allies, closing to the Rhine with a majority of their logistic train still coming across the Normandy beaches supplying 9 armies.

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

still their fault for choosing the wrong strategies.

[@ironstarofmordian7098]

@@BlitzOfTheReich To be fair, it wouldn't matter what kind of strategy they took. They still needed to fight 3 extremely powerful foes (two by 1940s standards not that it wasn't entirely unfounded) and they lacked the man power and resources to do that.

[@casualduelist854]

Another good example would be invasion of manchuria

[@BellePepprs]

The main ideas I got from this: 1. German doctrine focuses on creating one salient in the frontline, which is a development of their archaic style of oblique battle. Soviet doctrine which emphasizes double envelopments makes it harder to counter than the singular salient the Germans used. 2. German breakthroughs are excessively reliant on battlefield conditions, and therefore not very reliable because you rely on the enemy frontline having a weakpoint. Soviet doctrine had them crowbar open a breakthrough wherever necessary; thus, German breakthroughs are convenient, while Soviet breakthroughs are expedient.

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

yes yes yes! :D I'm glad I was understood.

[@jbweld6193]

It's as if the German army fought like early Rome.. the Soviets fought like Late Rome.

[@Grondorn]

1. Germans used double envelopments throughout Barbarossa very successfully. 2. On such a large front such as the Eastern Front, weak points are inevitable and not very time consuming to identify.

[@Arnaere]

@@Grondorn I would agree completely Grondorn. There is no reason nor excuse why the Soviet military intelligence apparatus should have failed so badly, but then again they were under the same ideology that developed blocking detachments.

[@firasajoury7813]

@@Arnaere I think your just sort of a emotional fanboy basing your arguments on emotions 😂

[@Alex-fr2td]

you sound so different to the way you look

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

haha I get that a lot. Just wait until you see me with a man bun!

[@jbweld6193]

@@Gyrffos

[@kungsjanis5139]

He looks strange do to being latino.

[@jordank1489]

He looks like Peter Dinklage

[@blaine8197]

I believe part of why Germany didn’t have great strategical oversight with Operation Barborossa was that they believed it would be a quick war. “Kick in the door and the while rotten structure falls” sort of thinking. They thought that good tactics would carry them in short conflicts that would lead to tremendous victory. We see this occur in France and the Soviet Union up until 1942 with which as you said, the Soviet’s learned the hard way during the Russian civil war which allowed them to adopt different thinking to defeat an enemy with inferior strategy. It makes sense when you go into why these countries adopted these strategies. The Germans had limited resources which would favor strategies such as Scwherpunct while the Soviet’s held much more resources which allowed them to blunt through a point where they needed. In other words, the Germans broke through where they thought they could and the Soviet’s broke through where they needed to. Great video. I certainly enjoyed it

[@biscuit4705]

don't you think it's a bit unfair to compare Germany with USSR? i think one of the reason why German doctrine focuses on a single point instead of two is becasue they have no choice due to their resources problem and that's also why they want to seek a giant battle.

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

I covered this in the video but the problem is these doctrines were developed before WW2 and at certain points Germany still employed this with other countries.

[@biscuit4705]

@@BlitzOfTheReich yes i know but i'm saying in a german prespective because lets just say they employ their motorised, mechanised and panzer division in a similar manners as the red army then they will be pretty poorly conncerated as they don't have a lot of them

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

@@biscuit4705 maybe so, but if they employed deep battle they could concentrate their forces instead of choosing by chance in order to create local superior troop densities.

[@biscuit4705]

@@BlitzOfTheReich thats very ture but if they choose this approach that meant they could go for probally only one target at a time which dosen't make a lot of sense when you have the largest front humans have ever seen

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

@@biscuit4705 well I don't necessarily think so. the reason Barbarossa was so successful is because there was an element of surprise involved. Deep Battle imo does not include this element of surprise. You have deception of course but I mean the surprise of military invasion.

[@joeminella5315]

Can you tell me where to find the map at 8:55, the 4 maps of Wehrmacht reaction to Normandy? Thanks.

[@Centurion101B3C]

The prime example of where the Soviets leveraged the Art of War or Deep Battle by the book, so to speak, was operation URANUS where is is easy to define and pinpoint the relevant aspects of strategy (destroy viability of the enemy), operation (double envelopment) and tactics (combined arms doctrine at all levels.). They (at least in that case) left very little to chance or fate, thus changed the operational mode from making a (calculated) gamble into a man-makeable effort. It is clear that the lessons-learned were further worked out and refined in the fighting around Kursk and then deftly applied in the respective operations of the Bagration Offensive.

[@Sheo2049]

Good video, it is frustrating to see "war game veterans" continue to push the idea of Blitzkrieg tactical superiority and ignore the more pressing aspects of war time

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

exactly. I haven't seen you in ages!

[@Sheo2049]

@@BlitzOfTheReich Yeah I got behind in all of my subscriptions for a while

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

still. I am quite happy. Your comments are usually a barometer for my channels health. :)

[@Arnaere]

The German method was superior in every dimension and in each level.

[@seanmac1793]

@@Arnaere and Yamato was the best carrier ever designed

[@trilobite6569]

One of the most controversial titles I've seen

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

I like controversy.

[@mandalortemaan7510]

In short: Fritz: "Together, we crush them with our Panzers!" Hans: "What about logistics?" Fritz: "What's logistics?" Hans: "Um... strategy???" Fritz: "Strategy!? You mean tactics?"

[@ZS-rw4qq]

I think a lot of it comes down to communication technology. A medieval army can only spread as much as the messenger can ride. Telephone and radio changed everything

[@charleschase1300]

Historian John Suprin said: "Amateurs talk strategy. Professionals talk logistics."

[@user-kl4yc2bn8i]

This is the storyline of the Wehrmacht's obsession on the tactical level, and the lack of understanding a war on a general point of view. After the battle of Jena, General Von Scharnhorst sought to create a corp of staff officers, to properly advice the incompetent aristocrat officers, and because of the nature of combat during the Napoleonic Wars the Kriegsakademie, which it was established, focused mainly on the tactical view of a battle. And this emphasis didn't change much till WW1. However, new advacements on warfare, such as mass mobilization of whole countries, make the Reichswehr leadership, to create staff officers capable of directing a battle on the field, not via a central HQ on Berlin. But they didn't take into account the role of new weapons, like tanks, planes, motorised units etc. Instead, the stayed adhered to the infantry, cavalry and artillery. As Oberst (i.G) Fritz Behrendsen noted: "All officers on the rank of Captain were called to participate on the academy's exams. The exams were very difficult though. Of the 1000 candidates in 1936, only 150 passed. Studying on the academy was even more difficult. The lessons emphased mainly on advanced tactics, and ancient military history. The academy didn't take into account the development of tanks and planes, nor the political and economical factors contributing on a war." That's why Wehrmacht's officers didn't had a good understanding of how the war was going on. By the way, studing on Kriegsakademie, was indeed very difficult. Out of the 1000 candidates, only 60-70 managed to be officers of the General Staff. Advanced tactics was also a very difficult subject. The grades of this subject lied between 1 to 9. Only one officer, in whole academy's history, managed to achieve 9!

[@kevinpascual]

I just discovered the this channel and holy moly thank you for the content.

[@imahugeretardwithabadopini5416]

Why would you say something so controversial yet so brave?

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

I am not afraid to die. (metaphorically)

[@impaugjuldivmax]

More maps + more graphs = more subs.

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

is this positive or negative, because most of my videos have maps.

[@randall172]

germans ask can we afford it? soviets ask how much will it cost?

[@AbhinavTella]

A major factor of the 1944 disasters in Belarus and especially in the 2nd Jassy-Kishinev Offensive which led to the 2nd destruction of the 6th Army, that is ignored, putting aside myths of the Wehrmacht’s late war qualitative superiority is that by 1944 the USSR’s forces were far more mobile and much of the German army aside from the few properly equipped Panzer and Motoized Divisions was relatively still like it was in WW1, highly dependent on horse transport. This discrepancy in mobility between the two sides only worsened from 1941-1945 not to mention the chronic fuel shortages limiting the axis mobile units, which made escaping encirclements and covering breakthroughs much harder late in the war. The German army from a supply and production standpoint was not prepared for anything but a very short war in Russia. Peak tank production for example was only reached in November 1944. Even in 1941 by August their supply lines were at a breaking point and the differences in rail gauges between Germany and Russian had to be corrected to get supplies in faster which wasn’t complete even in 1944. You have to take into account a nice chunk of their tactical decisions were also based on these other limitations. It’s not so simple to comment on Soviet or German tactical decisions without taking into account these other factors. On the Russian side, Stalin’s ignorance of relativity accurate intelligence pointing to a German invasion, insistence on holding untenable positions leading to envelopments and early war use of armored units like at Dubno (Largest Tank battle in history) without proper infantry support (Zhukov’s fault for ignoring the commander of those units who rightfully asked to wait for infantry support) and the consequences of the purges of the 1930s had a devastating impact on the Red Army, which literally had to rebuild its upper level officer corps. Also Stalin’s insistence of attacking everywhere at once and pushing beyond flank support in counter attacks like near Kharkov in May 1942 wasted countless lives in encirclements even mid war. Some credit Stalin’s will for keeping the USSR in the war without collapse but his actions before and during the war are infact greatly responsible for the conflict lasting that long and being devastating for the USSR in the first half. American Lend Lease pretty much saved the USSR after the early disasters especially in replacement of trucks, armored vehicles and provision of supplies/food at a critical time when the USSR was moving its production equipment to the east/Urals. This allowed the USSR to maintain its mobility and keeps its forces fed.

[@kiowhatta1]

What is interesting about the reverence for German military tactics, is that one must widen their view historically in the context of Prussian military operational tenets. These evolved out of necessity and arose from an authentic and realistic appreciation of Prussia's access to resources, it's geographical position, and harnessing its adapted military ethos. If one reads Citino's 'Death of the Wehrmacht' which is compulsory reading for anyone who wishes to appreciate how and why Germany fell from its high watermark in late 1942, they will discover that 'Blitzkrieg' or combined arms warfare was a modern manifestation of traditional Prussian military principles. These being: Bewegungskrieg (war of movement), Schwerpunkt ( heavy concentration point) Kurz und Vives ( short and lively ), Auftragstaktik ( mission tactics ). There are wider Prussian societal virtues associated with Protestantism, social order and so on, however, one quickly sees that the Prussian and then German armies were built for offense, and the quick, overwhelming power of concentration of force. Despite the current popular revisionism that seeks to spread the blame for the Wehrmacht's failures in WWII more evenly rather than the popular narratives of a drug-crazed, control freak that was the monstrous Hitler, it still remains true that Hitler discarded whatever remained of the guiding principles set down centuries before him during Fall Blau, so that after the massive defeats of late 1942-early '43, attempts by some of the more talented and deep thinking German generals such as Manstein, Model, Balck, Guderian, Rommel, to adopt a new style of defensive warfare were never adopted wholesale, partly because it was not familiar, viewed as defeatist, and did not fit in with those who wielded the required power to reform the army's operational style.

[@zift18]

The German's doctrine wasn't perfect looking back in hindsight but considering they put it all together in less than a decade, completely destroyed a major military power, came very close to destroying two others and took the combined might of almost the entire world to finally defeat them.....I'd doubt you could find a stronger example of a military machine at it's point in time. The Soviets would have gone down early if the US and England wasn't supplying it with massive material and Japan hadn't backed out of the war against Russia in East Asia, freeing hordes for Stalin to waste. True, Russia built it's tactics as it gained experience in getting it's ass handed to it but if it had been Germany against Russia, alone from the start.....all Germany, by 1943.

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

The problem with this comment is that US lend lease kicked in late 1943 when it reached peak deliverables. By this point the Soviets had already defeated the Germans in quite a few battles (Moscow, Stalingrad, Operation Little Saturn, Kursk).

[@zift18]

@@BlitzOfTheReich You make it sound like the USSR only received Allied assistance when it was no longer needed but according to more recent research, such is just not the case. The first convoys with American goods were already being sent to the USSR by August 1941. Of far more importance in 1941 was English lend lease, which while far from supplying the bulk of Soviet war material, filled vital gaps that may have averted collapse. Researchers estimate that British-supplied tanks made up 30 to 40 percent of the entire heavy and medium tank strength of Soviet forces before Moscow at the beginning of December 1941. A total of 699 Lend-Lease aircraft had been delivered to Archangel by the time the Arctic convoys switched to Murmansk in December 1941. Of these, 99 Hurricanes and 39 Tomahawks were in service with the Soviet air defense forces on January 1, 1942, out of a total of 1,470 fighters. At the time, about 15 percent of the aircraft of the 6th Fighter Air Corps defending Moscow were Tomahawks or Hurricanes.By spring and summer of 1942 the Hurricane had clearly become the principal fighter aircraft of the Northern Fleet’s air regiments; in all, 83 out of its 109 fighters were of foreign origin. The English planes being arguably superior to any of the Russian aircraft and on par with the Germans. Specialized Industrial equipment and material also helped when Soviet capacity could not at the time supply them. 312 metal-cutting machine tools were delivered by convoy PQ-12 alone, arriving in March 1942, along with a range of other items for Soviet factories such as machine presses and compressors. Of course, not much later as you state, the floodgates of war material of all kinds and vast quantity was shipped to Russia. While it is a fact that predicting German victory based solely on the lack of Allied assistance during critical points of Russian incapacity is unsupportable, one can seriously ponder what would have happened without it. Especially if we factor in an avoidance of Germany's own avoidable and admitted tactical and strategic weaknesses at the time. Such historical pondering have occupied countless books since WW2 and will continue to do so.

[@viethoangtruong54]

US only helps when they are sure that the USSR has a chance to defeat the Nazi. That is why when I mention the date of lend lease to prove that it has nothing to do with USSR’s victory over the Nazi, most of US patriots begin screaming in denial. You are exhibiting the same reaction, no wonder why woke is destroying your country from inside out. Also England is fucked regardless. I dare to say that without the US and USSR to diverse Germany’s resources. England is likely capitulated in a near future.

[@BabyGreen162]

From what I could gather about relatively high Red Army losses throughout the war, they came about through multiple causes: - A chronic shortage of mid level officers: iirc Soviet chain of command had no corps level, forcing army generals to micromanage divisions under their command, reducing operational efficiency; - The Great purge wasn't so much the cause of this shortage as was the massive expansion of the Red Army: the purge must have lowered overall morale and officer initiative though; - Practical inexperience with combined arms warfare against a seasoned enemy; - The Wehrmacht having more efficient artillery and air force; Soviet lack of APCs likely contributed to infantry losses due to artillery barrages/Luftwaffe indertiction; - Insufficient medical infrastructure: a lot of Soviet losses, even in late war, were soldiers dying of their wounds or disease; - STAVKA or Stalins meddling with operational planning, forcing commanders to attack without proper preparation.

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

These are very nice suggestions however the Soviet army was at the corps level of the German army. Corps in the Soviet system were more like divisions and many like the mechanized corps had to be abolished because of lack of equipment. It was more efficient. Also the Great Purge did play quite a role.

[@Arnaere]

Good breakdown of tactics, operations, and strategy. This needs to be standard entry information for people coming into military history and doctrine. However... 1) The doctrine of Tukachevsky (Deep Operations) did call for operational planning focuses, but in effect this did not take place until 1943. Before 1943 there was almost no major operational coordination on the Soviet side. In Hermann Hoth's "Panzer Operations" he explains that the Soviets were even supplying the Germans in the central front for up to two days because they could not keep track of which towns were lost, so they kept sending trucks to them whereby the Germans simply took those supplies. Even worse were the critical battles around Leningrad and Moscow, where the Germans only halted because their strategy was to allow more Soviets to funnel into the cities in order to cut them off later(obviously this did not happen, largely due to Lend Lease according to the collected diaries of Rommel). The German strategy gave the appearance of a distributed operational strategy, but if you look at the encirclement usage they performed before it actually demonstrates that the entire German strategy revolved around operational encirclements altogether. This is more apparent when reading the memoirs of Guderian (such as in "Panzer Leader") where the Germans based massed armor into divisions rather than brigades purely for operational integrity and to exploit regional terrain usage (which is why German tanks outperformed French tanks despite the French having better armor and weaponry). The Germans were attempting to recreate the success they faced: In the first six months 3,000,000 Soviets were destroyed or captured. In the first year this number rose to 4,500,000 million destroyed or captured. The original Soviet army was the largest at some 3.9 million- the largest in the world with the largest tank force in the world when the war started. 2) The Germans knew operational routines since before their country formed together. They based their tactics and operations in the Franco-Prussian war based on what they had heard about the American civil war, and Moltke drew up the operational plans that would be used for training and even put into effect for decades after his death. Prussians probably had the most advanced idea of operations and were the first to note that this dimension of warfare was missing from the treatise of Von Clausewitz ("Vom Kriege"). Tukachevsky based his doctrine on what the Prussians themselves reported. 3) Ironically at the 9 minute mark you point out where the Soviets would attack through but attribute it to the Germans. The Soviets were known for attacking through woods in order to camouflage themselves. The Germans would generally use the most mobile terrain to come up to a target as quickly as possible. 4) The Soviet approach was ignorant of enemy weak points. This is why they were suffering higher k/d rates throughout the entire war-even during the period where the allied economies created a massive material advantage. It is true they were not fighting smarter, choosing to fight harder instead. I'm not sure how you could come to the conclusion that the Soviets were more advanced for this. 5) Rokossovsky is a hilarious example of a military leader. In his memoirs, he explains that he was sending out men piecemeal to the Germans and claims that this single handedly slowed down the Germans. In Hoth's memoirs you find him wondering why the Soviets keep sending men out in hopeless situations to get killed with no chance of success especially since the Germans had already halted their advance in the center so the southern front could catch up. Rokossovsky was feeding men into a grinder and failed to realize that the entire German north and center had already frozen in place, getting tens of thousands of men killed for nothing.

[@LinhHLe]

wrong, throwing men just a divert tactic

[@robertgill1296]

Military doctrine is born out of a country's given strategic reality, and certainly the Russian deep battle doctrine paid great homage to the manpower resource advantages that were available to the Soviet Army, if such realities didnt exist, then these strategies would not have been considered. The German Army simply did not have the capacity to fight on the same scale as the Russians, and the doctrines they did create were a result of trying to exploit the difference in quality between troops. The soviets on the other hand could not hope to win a battle on fair numbers, and had to develop tactics that made weight of numbers shade to their advantage. We can fault isolated decisions, doctrine or any mistakes the Wehrmacht made, but in the end they were a significantly outnumbered army who over the whole conflict dished out heavily disproportionate losses to their enemy. This doesnt sound like the result of an army with inferior direction; it would be like faulting the tactics of someone losing a chess game after he started with half the pieces, and still came close to victory.

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

You realize Soviet deep battle was born out of the Russian civil war, when Soviet manpower was nowhere near that of World War 2. Furthermore for much of World War 2 1/3 of the Soviet population lived in occupied territory. The Wehrmacht outperformed in 1941 and some of 1942, but from then onward there was a degree of equity in casualties.

[@pobgill]

@@BlitzOfTheReich Not sure random statistics about lost manpower reserves in occupied areas really covers the reality that, through every stage of the war, the Soviet army was multiples the size of the German one, and that the Wehrmacht were always heavily outnumbered in manpower resources. It's an undisputed fact, at various stages the Red Army had 2/3/4 times the available troops. With such telling domination of manpower, would one expect parity in casualties rates if the heavily outnumbered force was also being guided by inferior leadership? No, you'd expect the dominance of both fields to lead to a series of no contests and a pretty short war. From a strategic perspective I would like to know how you would foresee an army outnumbered so heavily being able to concentrate an attacking force to produce multiple front wide breakthroughs, while being able to commit huge numbers of strategic reserves into widespread and deep exploitation. The main thrust might be successful, but you'd have to commit such a high portion of your reserve into the move, counter attacks across the whole front would be like taking candy from a baby. You'd achieve isolated success with the enemy's counterattacks wrecked you over the whole front; you defensive reserves would be committed elsewhere to gain local superiority for your main thrust. The Soviets could not have operated deep battle doctrine without numerical superiority. Furthermore, it's worth noting that at the end of 1942, Germany had a shortage of machine, while lend lease was pouring in American tanks and machine. Deep battle doctrine requires the second wave of attack to be based around mechanised/motorised/armoured forces..... Would this have been possible to build without American Steel? Or without 500,000 donated vehicles from the USA or the 10000s of tanks, armoured vehicles and planes that the USA gave Russians. Zhukov certainly didn't think so. German infantry was down to 12 percent mechanised capacity by end of 1942, how do you expect men on foot with guns being pulled by horses to punch deep holes into an enemy line before they can respond? Ok, in the realm of fantasy deep battle was an excellent idea for Germany, but the truth is it never had the strategic capacity or reality to implement anything else. Considering it was heavily outnumbered, out gunned, out resources and was fighting on more than one front, to have given even a hint of a fight to the Russians is a testament to the leadership of its army.

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

pobgill sorry but you are wrong. The only time the Soviets even outnumbered the Germans 2:1 or more was from around mid 1944 onward. This is a complete myth propagated by fear of reviewing the orders of battle. The Soviets were just better at deception. For example the cherkassy pocket shows how they could secretly redeploy to create local superiority.

[@JRpolice_fan]

👍Thank you for explaining the difference between Bewegungskrieg and the Soviet deep penetration. Never knew the difference. Thanks from Amsterdam area.

[@MrNewAbortion1]

Okay, so there are some major flaws in this video. First off you can't speak of doctrine when discussing the German way of war. They never used the word doctrine since doctrine implies a SOP for every problem. Germans didn't believe in this concept since every military problem doesn't have just one correct answer but the answer depends on different factors for which a doctrine doesn't always provide a solution to. So we can say that there was no German doctrine that specified that you have to conduct the breakthrough with Panzer divisions or other schnelle Truppen. For example army group south decided to conduct the breakthrough with infantry divisions on June 22nd 1941 and keeping the mobile troops back so they could exploit the gaps. The problem with this was that it could lead to problems so the Panzer divisions would have to cram their way through their own infantry divisions which would slow down their advance enough to let the enemy react to the breakthrough. That is why the Germans opted to conduct the breakthrough usually with Panzer divisions. Second we have to make sure we understand the difference between tactics and operational art. Tactics means the use of troops up to the divisional level whilst operations means the use of troops from division upwards so army corps, army etc. The Germans not only had the most skillful operational commanders of the entire war, they were the inventors of the entire concept of operations. First outlined by Clausewitz and later in Das FuG and Truppenführung. Also your description of Bewegungskrieg as an archaic "doctrine" is not true. The idea of the Bewegungskrieg in the second world war was to first conduct the breakthrough which von Schlieffen had envisioned and then advance into the enemy's entire depth where no front lines existed and conduct the actual Bewegungskrieg. There are also numerous examples from world war 2 where there was no continuous front line due to the far too large sectors assigned to divisions and the open terrain. In these situations the the two opponents would try to outflank the other and conduct a war of maneuver in its purest form. One example that springs into mind are the battles fought at the Great bend of the Don in summer 1942. So no the concept of the Bewegungskrieg was not obsolete or even obsolescent for world war 2. I could go on and on for example your claim that the Germans chose one Schwerpunkt whereas the Soviets opted for double envelopment. Suffice to say that just look at Staryi and Novyi Oskol 1942 or even just the frontier battles of army goup center in 1941.

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

'Okay, so there are some major flaws in this video. First off you can't speak of doctrine when discussing the German way of war. They never used the word doctrine since doctrine implies a SOP for every problem. Germans didn't believe in this concept since every military problem doesn't have just one correct answer but the answer depends on different factors for which a doctrine doesn't always provide a solution to. So we can say that there was no German doctrine that specified that you have to conduct the breakthrough with Panzer divisions or other schnelle Truppen.' That is still considered a doctrine, an ideal of how to conduct warfare. Maneuver warfare is a kind of doctrine. 'The problem with this was that it could lead to problems so the Panzer divisions would have to cram their way through their own infantry divisions which would slow down their advance enough to let the enemy react to the breakthrough. That is why the Germans opted to conduct the breakthrough usually with Panzer divisions.' And this is still a bad way to conduct warfare because as a result the tanks were creating encirclement's that could not be liquidated all whilst losing their offensive edge. 'Second we have to make sure we understand the difference between tactics and operational art. Tactics means the use of troops up to the divisional level whilst operations means the use of troops from division upwards so army corps, army etc. The Germans not only had the most skillful operational commanders of the entire war, they were the inventors of the entire concept of operations. First outlined by Clausewitz and later in Das FuG and Truppenführung.' Apologies but I explained the difference and no, the German operational conduct during the war was lackluster at best. It was based more on improvisation than planning. 'Also your description of Bewegungskrieg as an archaic "doctrine" is not true. The idea of the Bewegungskrieg in the second world war was to first conduct the breakthrough which von Schlieffen had envisioned and then advance into the enemy's entire depth where no front lines existed and conduct the actual Bewegungskrieg. There are also numerous examples from world war 2 where there was no continuous front line due to the far too large sectors assigned to divisions and the open terrain. In these situations the the two opponents would try to outflank the other and conduct a war of maneuver in its purest form. ' Bewegungskrieg is pretty much a pre-WW1 concept. How is it not archaic? Also if you are referring to the Norwegian campaign in 1945 it is truly an exception because of the poor road infrastructure and mountainous terrain. 'One example that springs into mind are the battles fought at the Great bend of the Don in summer 1942.' Yet barely any Soviets were captured in this time compared to the start of Operation Barbarossa. ' could go on and on for example your claim that the Germans chose one Schwerpunkt whereas the Soviets opted for double envelopment. ' Both sides would exploit gaps where they saw them however this was more based on chance and usually the Germans opted to focus in one area.

[@MrNewAbortion1]

@@BlitzOfTheReich You do realise that the deep battle doctrine is also maneuver warfare? The German concept of maneuver warfare is only meant to provide a baseline from which to operate. It doesn't specify one single method of maneuver warfare contrary to the deep battle since as I explained the concept of a doctrine didn't exist in the German military. That is one of the reasons why the Wehrmacht was so succesful since its leaders could take into account the terrain, enemy, weather, available assets and so on and the and then come up with a working plan which to execute instead of relying on the same old playbook. Also if you think that the reason why the Germans couldn't liquidate pockets was that they used the Panzer divisions for the breakthroughs I'll just say that it had nothing to do with that. The reason was the use of the Panzer divisions after the breakthrough was made. The notable example of this was sending the 7th Panzer divisions east of Smolensk in July 1941 instead of sending it directly to link up with Panzergruppe 2 in the south. If you look at the encirclement of Kiev the Wehrmacht liquidated the entire pocket after its Panzer divisions linked up at Lokhvitsa and you guessed it, the Panzer divisions were used for the breakthrough that allowed the link up. And yes you touched on the difference between tactics and operations but never clearly defined it. Then you speak of a tactical encirclement at Vitebsk but that pocket was absolutely on the operational and not on the tactical level. It's also funny that you are actually the first person to I've heard claim that German operational skill was lackluster and improvised. Nothing could be further from the truth. They spent months planning future operations beginning with Case White. Each German division, corps and so on had their own staff with their own operations officers that supported the commander. I don't even have to mention the success of the 1939-1942 operations but even late in the war in the 1944 Ardennes offensive the Germans achieved complete operational surprise and it was anything but an half assed operation. They made extensive preparations by gathering intelligence, assessing weather, keeping operational secrecy by not using radios and phone lines among other things. Your argument that Bewegungskrieg is archaic because it is a pre ww1 concept doesn't really make sense. Does that also mean that the use of combined arms and creating a point of main effort are also archaic because they originate from thousands of years ago? Many principles are still very valid even today though they might be hundreds or thousands of years old. Also I was literally referring to the Don bend battles when I mentioned the lack of a continous front and despite not capturing many Soviets in those battles they were still wins for the Wehrmacht and if you want examples of the Germans capturing large numbers of Red army soldiers whilst fighting in the enemy's depth just look at Millorevo, Raseiniai, Minsk encirclement or other kesselchlacht during Operation Barbarossa. The Germans knew where the weak spots were in the Soviet lines when they were choosing the Schwerpunkt due to actual reconnaissance. It wasn't based on chance at all and I already mentioned the examples for double envelopments. If the Germans focused on one area it was to create a local superiority since they were far fewer in numbers than the Soviets and if they were to to split their forces in two they would have a very small chance of success indeed.

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

@@MrNewAbortion1 Apologies but I use maneuver warfare in a very 19th century context. I do think deep battle was something entirely new.

[@Grondorn]

@@BlitzOfTheReich ''Yet barely any Soviets were captured in this time compared to the start of Operation Barbarossa.'' Fall Blau was initially as successful as any offensive that was a part of the Barbarossa timetable, for example, 6 Soviet armies were erased around Voronezh sector at the offset. The reasons for the failure of procuring a high number of captured enemy soldiers were mainly for the chaotic flight of the Red Army, whereas in 1941 they would usually stand and fight and thus easily allowed themselves to be encircled. Still, according to Glantz, Soviets still suffered up to 1,500,000 casualties up to 24th November, while the Germans had around 200 000, which is an impressive ratio.

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

6 Soviet armies were erased, but a lot more Soviet soldiers escaped these encirclement's than in Barbarossa. The Soviets in 1941 also did try running away. Look at Kiev where Kirponos tried escaping and Khrushchev did escape.

[@RG-gw2sp]

Yeah the Germans were outmatched big time by the Soviets on the operational (and strategical) level, yet couple things I want to say: lightning war = blitzkrieg ;) The Soviet use of shock armies was also done by the Germans but in the form of air support (mainly Stuka) which they used to attack fixed positions to create weak spots that then could be exploited by the panzers Also the Germans had poor intelligence definetly in the East therefore it was more difficult for them where to locate Soviet troop concentrations I'm not trying to make excuses for the Whermacht, the German way of warfare was flawed yet it had it advantages in certain situations

[@thomasjamison2050]

I am reminded of a great comment by Robert E Lee in response to the criticism he received from the Richmond newspapers. To wit: 'The problem with the conduct of the war is that all the best generals are journalists, and all best journalists are generals." It was a statement meant to be highly ironic.

[@davidglogowski4955]

Really good video, but one question. You mentioned the Soviets also gained operational experience in WW1. Didn't the Germans as well? Weren't many leaders of the generals from WW1 and could apply the experiences of operational warfare?

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

Yes, but the issue is that the Germans were still engaged in positional warfare mainly in the Western front. The Soviets really gained their experience during the Russian Civil War. The scope of its area was vastly larger than that of World War 1.

[@klen7642]

Great Video dude. The first video i saw from you was the reform of the Russian Imperial Army after the disastrous Crimean war on which those reforms, nearly a hundred years later saved the USSR. I really thought it's just a pro Russia/Soviet thing, but dang. You dig deep bro. Thanks and keep up the good work!

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

If we keep digging this far we'll end up China.

[@lorimeyers3839]

Great vid, bud!

[@coldwarsarge7592]

As a shut-in, disabled vet I want to say how much I appreciate your fine programs. I love studying history and it's channels like yours that help bring the classroom to my bedside. Thank you!

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

First, thank you for your service. Second, it is comments like this one that keep me wanting to make videos. You just made my day.

[@coldwarsarge7592]

@@BlitzOfTheReich My best regards...keep up the great work!

[@axelandersson6314]

I'd just like to mention that the reason that frontlines emerged, likely was due to the inventions of High Explosive Artillery, Accurate Rifles and the Machine gun. The 3 developments made an attack across open terrain much more costly, greatly giving advantages to the defenders. And as artillery became the main method of causing casualties, one would attempt to increase the fire output of the artillery with mass barrages, and this also made maintenance of supply lines much more important and significant. Though, mass mobilisation and the inability to feed an army of the local lands probably played a large hand in the supply question as well. But maybe that's just what you meant with "industrialisation".

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

that's true but even with those inventions armies still engaged in more tactical engagements. Look at Konnigratz and the Franco-Prussian war. Mass mobilization and industrialization played much greater roles because armies could become larger and cover more ground. If that hadn't been the case armies could still outflank other armies because there would be too many gaps. Rifles + mgs + art can only shoot so far.

[@axelandersson6314]

Blitz Of The Reich I'm not sure about the effectiveness of the rifles used in those wars compared to later rifles, but as for HE artillery shells, it seems from a wikipedia search that they were invented and first used a while later. The Maschine Gun was used at around the same time in the Americas, but I'm not aware of their use during the (Franco and Austro)-Prussian Wars. Anyways, I think you're correct that a high density of soldiers compared to the frontline was required for the frontline to work. But I don't think that it's enough to just have the numbers. Without a sufficient bias towards defence, you can't cover an entire frontline without expecting to be defeated in detail. So I think that at least the artillery developments were needed.

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

of course. I am not denying their use but for example you had the Prussian needle gun in the Austro-Prussian war and the war ended rapidly.

[@axelandersson6314]

Blitz Of The Reich Maybe comparing the early Ottoman-Safavid wars with the Iran-Iraq war could show my point. Both conflicts involved similar border lengths, the total army sizes involved only initially varied by a factor of 2 between the two conflicts, yet one involved individual armies marching around while the other involved a single large frontline. Maybe there is an issue with my comparison between those wars, I'm not sure. What I'd like to know is if you think that mass mobilisation is enough to make frontlines useful.

[@kategrant2728]

Another useful comparison would be the American Civil war which used comparatively simple weapons and was pitched battles in the west, and frontlines in the east by the end of the war

[@symmachus898]

Regarding Operation Barbarossa. Could it not be argued that both Germany's tactical doctrine and operational objectives were sound based on their (woeful) intelligence? If the rump of the Soviet Union's forces were at worst no further East than Smolensk then I find it difficult to critique the time frame or logistics of the operational planning regardless of direction pulling from within the OKH and OKW.

[@shaneboardwell1060]

I've read the Soviets created specialized shock formations to break open the Axis lines for exploitation forces to capitalize on. I imagine the casualties for these "shock" divisions must've been insanely heavy?

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

Yes, that they were, but they had rolling artillery barrages to help.

[@LinhHLe]

just like the US marines divisions, a shock army

[@StratingBR]

For what i get you should exploit opportunities created by the enemies and not the versa. Thats an war principle no? ''You can guarantee your defense but your victory is give by your enemies'' - Sun Tzu

[@harvey8957]

You deserve far more subscribers dude

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

thank you my dude.

[@dcred123]

Like the classic "just give your soldiers winter clothes, Hitler!" Line, the problem is you have to truck(a lot of the time horses were used on the Ostfront) those clothes to every soldier, in a truck that could be transporting ammunition, guns, fuel, or food. You either keep your gun full, your belly full, or you can keep warm.

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

sure but the Generals and Hitler knew this and they did it anyway. It doesn't take a genius to know that the Eurasia has lower infrastructure and is huge.

[@dcred123]

@@BlitzOfTheReich The real problem was that Hitler fervently believed in the "Triumph of Will" and that through sheer willpower, he thought he could stop the red horde as was done during the Marne and the Battle of the Frontiers.

[@maxhouse2409]

@@BlitzOfTheReich What's amazing to me is that the German military schools studied the campaigns of Alexander, Julius Caesar, Napoleon and Frederick the Great but the OKW pooh poohed the importance of supply. Alexander laid siege to Tyre for several months before advancing away from the Mediterranean due to its supply importance. Caesar also dealt with supply considerations during the Gallic Wars. Napoleon didn't know how to deal with a "madman who burns his own cities". They studied Frederick the Great. His analysis covered strategy, tactics, mobility and logistics.

[@urplereen]

Elastic defense?

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

yes. check this article out. www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/wray.pdf

[@victormihaylov3905]

(sorry for the lack of good English, croissant here) one real good frenche magazine of militarie historie "science&vie, guerres&histoire" that seek to change mythe. Talke in one (don't have it here) about the mythe of the superiorite of the Prussian/German army. the one thing that the Prussian/German army(and you talke about it) believe in, in a philosophique concepte, was that of the decisive battle. that one battel will choose the winner and loser, and all one as to do is positions your self in the best condition for that one battle. and when you have the lecture of the war in that frame, you have to win all battle for it positions you in a better place for that battle. AND send all you got in that belive battle. great video by the by.

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

thank you. I speak some French and have always striven to find new sources.

[@victormihaylov3905]

@@BlitzOfTheReich well if you can read French, its a good place to starte. the team don't take side, they do focus a bit on the soviet, but becaus in the west we don't talke in of, but are real critical. for exemple the rezh offensive of Zhukov in '42.

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

@@victormihaylov3905 ok merci :)

[@williameftekhari3950]

I agree with your points except that operational thinking started well before World War I/Russian Revolution. It started with the Civil War and how U. S. Grant fought. Lee, like the Germans, focused too much on pitched battles. He won multiple pitched battles in spectacular fashion but it gained him really nothing. He even beat Grant most of the time n 1864/1865. However, over the course of the war, he took 22% casualties while inflicting only 15% on his opponents with nothing to show for it. Grant however, though he never put forth an exact doctrine, focused on the operational level. He maneuvered his forces in a continuous battle against Lee until he pinned Lee in a static defense of Petersburg, neutralizing Lee's greatest strength, his mobility on his home ground. Over the course of the war, Grant took 18% casualties while inflicting 20% casualties and won the war. It's the reverse of Vietnam and Afghanistan. The U.S. won nearly every tactical engagement, but ended up abandoning both places.

[@santinomartinez953]

soo basically... One can say the Soviet doctrine was more practical in the sense they didn't need to wait for opportunities whereas the Germans relied too much on them? Seems legit xD. If you are able to create opportunities by yourself instead of waiting for them, then fair enough. Btw: it's sad to see you have a not very big audience, you put effort in your videos... Suscribed and like.

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

Thank you very much for the comment. This is precisely that. It is a criticism of a lack of a coherent doctrine. I remember a German speaker got mad at me because I misused the word doctrine in his opinion but doctrine is precisely a certain perspective on how to do things. Ad hoc behavior is still a doctrine.

[@santinomartinez953]

@@BlitzOfTheReich yw mate :). Cheers from Argentina, wish you good luck in your future projects ^^

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

thanks! apologies for the delay.

[@christophmahler]

I appreciate that someone at least tries 'to put on the Russian shoe' when thinking about event history on the Eastern Front. I made more specific comments - e.g. on striking flaws in German doctrine and command and control - elsewhere... However, if one looks at Soviet doctrinal thought it must be noticed that the notions of 'shock armies, breaking through defensive lines' in industrial warfare sounds 'academic' or outright ideological ( *voluntaristic* 'cult of the offensive') - as *entrenchments can negate artillery preparations* and *automatic weapons favour a static defender* . The Germans (Manstein) did came up with the unique innovation of _armoured 'assault artillery'_ for that very reason: supressing fortifications with _direct_ explosive shell fire - covering the manoeuvre of small troops ('stormtroopers') to _infiltrate_ trenches before clearing them with bundled grenades or incendiary devices. I'd argue that one would have to look at examples like the *'Brusilov Offensive' 1916* in order to gain a more detailed, realistic insight into the notions of 'breakthroughs', arguably simply supposed by the Soviet, _former Tsarist_ theoreticians. In WW I, Germany had lacked the 'armour' to swiftly outflank adjacent Entente units after any _temporary_ breakthrough of the static front lines - with *_time working against them due to the remote British naval blockade_* , depriving their superior heavy industry the resources to support the further replacement of artillery pieces and munitions... It is this *_strategic_** circumstance* that explains the idealization of dashing tactical exploits in German doctrine. In WW II, Russia however arguably _did_ enjoy the space and time to rebuild it's compromised industry beyond the Urals and it arguably still had the resources at hand to fight _a fully mobilized war of attrition_ , requiring little technical or tactical skill or any advance technology to fight defensive operations (today, arguably a necessity in near-peer conflicts). *If one considers Tukhachevsky's failure to take Warsow in 1920, it begs the question for a **_strategic_** need in 'breakthroughs' **_at all_* - as long as Germany did neither control the oil fields of Baku, nor the mineral mines in the Donbas... From the little reading, done I can't argue with authority, here - but I suspect that the late *Soviet breakthrough operations ('Bagration' 1944) up to the very Battle of Grozny in 1994, possibly even Poposnaya in 2022, depended **_fully_** on prior **_exhaustion_** of the opposing force* , fatefully driven by 'a schedule to conquer all of Asia in a few weeks' due to dwindling fuel supplies (e.g. the US sanctions against Japan). If _that_ kind of 'artillery preparation' - the *counter-attacks with rested, supplied and well concealed mobile reserves* (Zhokov's *Battles of Khalkhin Gol in 1939* ) - was missing, Russian attacks would rather 'fail' in their 'breakthroughs' - in the sense that objectives may have been achieved, alright - but numbers of losses were too high to be swiftly replaced ('Pyrrhic Victory'). So, the Soviets may have put more reflection upon the aftermath of tactical gains - especially in regard to insisting on *diversions along the entire line of contact* until favourable circumstances would present themselves as well as the emphasis on supplied reserves and *the crucial role of 'defense in depth' and steady counter-attacks* - but one has to question whether the notion of 'breakthrough' is as systematic as it should be in *a war of attrition* ... (the preference for mortars of all calibers and strategic stand-off weapons may point to efforts in fulfilling that postulate)

[@daveanderson3805]

Thank you for this video very interesting

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

thank you!

[@stef1896]

The Axis lost the war on the grand strategy level. The Axis didn't had the grand strategy at all, like allies had. The allies had the "Hitler first" strategy, meaning the bulk of the effort would be put on defeating Hitler first, and than Japan. The Axis didn't had a grand strategy like the "British first" or the "Soviet first" grand strategy. The main enemy of Hitler was the USSR while the main enemy of Japan were US, even though they should knock out the British empire from the war first. Instead of knocking out the British empire first, they created new fronts against new empires instead, and dispersed the effort on multiple major theaters. In 1944. The Wehrmacht would fight the Soviet, American and British armies in major theaters at once, while the British and Soviets would fight only Germans. In the beginning of 1942. the Japanese would fight all major and minor forces in the region -- Chinese, Americans, British, Australians, Dutch... -- except the Soviets, the fight which probably would be the most useful for the common cause at that point. Instead they brought another empire in the war against them.

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

This is very very true. Apart from that, however, I would also say they didn't have a proper understanding the level of Operations.

[@ironstarofmordian7098]

@@BlitzOfTheReich I would say that the Japanese had a good grasp of Strategy but they had issues on the grand strategic level which just couldn't be fixed.

[@Flow86767]

I’m pretty happy this video was made.

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

although it was basic in regards to the editing.

[@LinhHLe]

Deep Battle- Shock Army- Operational level of the Soviet the best

[@nicollinastang8208]

Question: but didnt the soviets develop this type of warfare because they knew they had a huge manpower advantage, thus enabling them to send a shock force into an area of the front line to then later send in the more experienced tanka and motorized troops? meanwhile, the Germans, with their smaller numbers, decided to mount a breakthrough along the weakest point of the front lines with their experienced troops, therefore being able to save more men from dying if they were to attack another sector of the front.

[@WhenDoesTheVideoActuallyStart]

Germany had a superior number of soldiers all the way to 1943.

[@JL-tm3rc]

now we see this being repeated in ukraine the difference is that the russians have defensive lines to prevent encirclement

[@shoelaceshoelaces2799]

I Agree with you and how you see this the same way I do!!

[@pierren___]

10:22 concentre la force là où tu veux percer, pour faire ta manoeuvre stratégique.

[@diedertspijkerboer]

I agree with the view of Germany not having a good strategy. But on the other hand, they almost always had fewer losses in manpower than the Soviets. So what I mean to say is that the German army might still have been better, but too small and with too few resources. And surely, attacking a weak point is typically better than just using a battering ram at any point. Note how often Soviet attacks didn't achieve a breakthrough.

[@aintnoslice3422]

lookin real tyrion lannistery in this video

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

I fully take that as a compliment.

[@reginaldmcnab3265]

If German military doctrine was flawed then why did the victors adopted it during the war and after the war! German doctrine has continues to influence military doctrines. One failure on the German part is not having strategic bombers but 5hat was because Germany had no intention to fly planes long distance and Bomb cities but to assist front line troops. Also after World War II Germany lost about 14 percent of its territory and so under national socialism it tried to get it back but the British empire would never accept a strong Germany or any European country and the British empire constantly tried to draw Germany into a wider war, to invade Norway for an example. One British empire official said, “if reports are true that Germany is moving to invade Norway, this would be too good to be true because this is precisely what we want them to do”

[@hatejethro1164]

So it all boils down to one thing.... Logistics.

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

Ehhhhhh no... If that was the case then explain the Battle of France.

[@7john7able]

I am Surprised you didn't mention that Hitler used to worry that the same thing was going to happen to the Germany army in Russia as happened to Napoleons. Which was that the Russians kept having battles but when they started to loose them just retreating away further and further into Russia and sucking Napoleon further and further into Russia. This is why Hitler wanted to encircle and then destroy the encircled troops, so as not to make the same mistake. But unfortunately for him he just went and made different mistakes instead. As for having no strategic vision ! Well that is because after the Germans defeated the French and British they expected the war to end. So much so that Hitler even cancelled the Tiger tank program thinking the war was over. When he realised that Britain wasn't going to give in He then went and invaded Russia partly because he thought that the only reason Britain wasn't given in was the hope that Russia might join the war. So he thought that if he defeated Russia which he was told would be easy ! then Britain would also give in and the war would be over. Strangely enough that is the exact same reason why Napoleon invaded Russia! so history does repeat itself some times. I don't make KZbin videos myself about World War Two because I don't think I know enough about the subject to add any more to the conversation. I think you shouldn't make any more because you don't sound like you know any more than me about it in fact I think you might know less and even drawn the wrong or strange conclusions about what you do know. Hitler had a fantastic strategical mind but was rubbish at the tactical level. He knew that the Germans needed to take the Caucasus as they where running out of oil while his Generals wanted to take Moscow. He declared war on the USA because he said we are already fighting them because of lend lease to Britain but we can't sink there ships because we are not at war with them. by declaring war on the USA he was able to slow the flow of equipment to the UK and came very very close with the u-boats to winning the war there and then. I could go on and woops I think I just have.

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

I mention Hitler's paranoia with Russia in my Moscow documentary.

[@Stephanos480]

“The Soviet population was much larger and also younger. So Germany was 90 Million (with Austria, Sudetenland, occupied Poland and Memel) and the Soviet Union was 200 Million. In addition, 45% of its inhabitants were under 20 years of age in 1941. That number was 33% in Germany, so Germany was a young country also but the Soviet Union was a much younger country and had a gigantic pool of people who’s lives could be wasted in winning a war like World War 2 and that’s more or less what happened. Of those in Germany who were physically fit between the ages of twenty and thirty 85% were already in the military, which meant that Germany didn’t have a lot of room. If it took losses - whether dead, wounded, frostbite, desertion - it could replenish them only with small numbers of people aged twenty to thirty or people much older, which is what happened. The Wehrmacht that entered Russia in 1941 was essentially destroyed and was replaced by a different Wehrmacht. The Red Army was also destroyed but it was replaced by a similar Red Army … … You can argue that the Red Army won the war, but the documentation that is available shows you how poorly it fought in many cases and how wastefully. It fought courageously, it fought heroically, it fought in no other ways an army fought in difficult circumstances, and it also fought poorly. You’re probably aware that at the Battle of Kursk - the famous tank battle where the Soviets defeated the Germans. You’re probably also aware that some people see this as the turning point of the war, but the Soviets lost four times the number of tanks than the Germans did at the Battle of Kursk, even though they won the tank battle and that gives you an indication that Glantz (historian) is on to something that the Red Army could fight, but also that he’s a little too indulgent, given the scale of the losses and destruction the Soviets endured because of the way they fought. As well, the commanders - even the ones that got better - made tremendous operational mistakes. The Soviets lost so much which they were able to replace which the Germans were not able to do.” - Princeton Professor Stephan Kotkin at the Institute for Advanced Study on April 9th 2019 kzbin.info/www/bejne/Z3-5XpunZ8aeebM

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

you realize the Germans had allies right? Why do people think they went at it alone? Germany + Hungary + Rumania + Italy + Finland.

[@Stephanos480]

@@BlitzOfTheReich ---- And you do realize yourself that apart from the Finns, the Hungarians, Romanians and especially the Italians were of suboptimal military effectivness. Just think of the breakthrough of the Romanian lines by the Red Army to the North West and of the Italian lines to the South East of Stalingrad, creating the "Kessel" in which the German 6th Army perished.

[@Grondorn]

The population of the Soviet Union was more like 160 million. After Barbarossa and at the peak of the Fall Blau in 1942, Germans controlled a territory where at least 60 million people lived. Combined with the already suffered losses and the fact that other Axis powers fought on the Eastern Front, Soviets had a significant population disadvantage till late 1943.

[@VT-mw2zb]

Well, all the flaws of the German military doctrine is being replicated in by the US Armed Forces and the US political system. The US Army came out of the Vietnam war think exactly in the same way that the German Army thought of itself after WWI: "we never lost a battle but the home front lost hearts". Entire sections of the US society thought of it the same way, and led the country down the exact same path of bumbling from one frustrating war to another. The US Armed Forces have traditionally emphasised that their ultimate responsibility of controlling the Army lies with the civilian government. However, they in turn focus heavily on the tactical, operational kinetic wars while they were being called upon to conduct non-kinetic wars (counter-insurgencies). Then they stopped firing generals. The US Army expanded from a below third-class army (smaller than Bulgaria) to a 9 millions army at the end of WWII by firing a lot of bad generals who are simply too old, too old-fashioned, too pessimistic, and no longer suited for the new war. Since WWII, American generals were no longer fired. Westmoreland badly handled the war in Vietnam, and he ended up being promoted to Chief of Staff of the US Army. Barely any general was fired; exceptions included people like Stanley McChrystal, who might have been an excellent counter-insurgency theoretician but a terrible civilian-military relation person. Or that commander of Abu Ghraib. Even then, the general was a lady, terrible at tactical matters, and even worse at human intelligence operations. And she was allowed to run the camp for years. Every amateur historians and mid-rank military personnel complained about how the civilian meddling screw up military operations. I'll argue that in many case, non-intervention still case terrible results and actual interventions put better people in the right place.

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

honestly I sometimes think that because I am American but that is a very interesting criticism. The US still does like the concept of deep battle though.

[@VT-mw2zb]

@@BlitzOfTheReich there are a number of talks and lectures on YT that sort of deals with this issue: - "Westmoreland, the general who lost the Vietnam": on how a general who should have been fired by badly handled the war in Vietnam. - "why our WWII general was more successful": on how firings were necessary. A good introduction to Deep Battle, as an American researcher view on Soviet Doctrine, then David Glantz book's "The pursuit of Deep Battle". In there, the first couple of chapters were introductions to the defitions and terms that were foreign to American military. This showed the Soviet approached war at a deeper, more philosophical angle. There are shortcomings of the Soviet approach. The USSR spent 25% of its GDP on its Army. This is because of the deep fear and the "preparedness " required at the strategic level by its doctrine. This approach was because of the influenc of the army that many Soviet leaders tried to curb, to limited success. The American approach of more civilian control and responsibility put less stress on its military, reducing the actual internal political power of the military. But, it does reduce the kind of strategic success that people George C. Marshal enjoyed. Marshal correctly interpreted that any war Americans get themselves into will be both reactionary and unprepared. Thus the need to start firing of bad generals. The military being "unmeddled" but does not punish failures. Ultimately, only the civilian government fire generals. And they fire 4-stars ones.

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

Thank you so much for the sources. Are you Vietnamese by chance?

[@VT-mw2zb]

@@BlitzOfTheReich yes, I am. I grew up for the first 18 years of my life there but my university education was outside of the country where I got the chance to look into this war from the other sides' perspective. I'm in also a unique position since despite being a Vietnamese, my family was on the "losing side" and my upbrining did include a lot of the bitterness of the defeated side. In the end, my feeling is no side is as bad as the other side claim it to be, not as good as it claims itself to be. My parents for eg, said quite a bit about how much they suffered under defeat. Today, they are quite rich; I can't honestly say that the world has treated them poorly.

[@Kriegter]

@@BlitzOfTheReich wait lol I thought you're czech

[@bmbpdk]

This is a very interesting channel and video, the best of luck in the future. Operations: A collection of strategys Strategy: What you want to do Tactics: How you are going to do that

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

Thank you so much for this!

[@ironstarofmordian7098]

*Grand Strategy: what you want to do *strategy: what you want to do on this front.

[@Nonyobiz]

During much of WWII, the Germans were masters of tactical & operational Warfare but they were terrible in the strategic. Strategic is the most important when engaging in large-scale state-on-state armed conflict.

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

Tactical yes. Operational not really.

[@Nonyobiz]

@@BlitzOfTheReich through much of the Great Patriotic War, the Germans were indeed masterful in tactics & operations.

[@Nonyobiz]

@@BlitzOfTheReich also, to refer to the Kyiv kessel as a "debacle" is interesting...

[@gus2747]

Strategy is about achieving political goals. Could it be that a desire to be apolitical, led the German army to downplay strategy?

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

I am not sure strategy is exclusively in the realm of politics.

[@gus2747]

@Joseph Lisitza I didn't say they were apolitical. Of course they were not. But apolitical was part of their self image.

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

while studying for my future Operation Bagration documentary I saw that a lot of the German generals were acquitted from any responsibility however even Manstein was an opportunist to an extent.

[@gus2747]

@Joseph Lisitza I agree... You might want to re-read what I wrote.

[@gus2747]

@Joseph Lisitza The German army was an instrument of the nazis. Had German soldiers been completely rational, they would have seen themselves this way. But in fact they were human and saw themselves as largely above politics. Yes they knew the Army wasn't perfectly apolitical. Or perfectly anything. You say there was no delusional nonsense about the German army. I'm afraid I don't agree.

[@GD30.06]

They say it was because also they ran out of petrol.

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

over simplification

[@rafopderand8524]

The Germans could hardly afford a doctrine which is all about attrition though. Anyway, good video.

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

tell that to the Prussians in the Franco-Prussian war.

[@rafopderand8524]

I suppose just fighting against France instead of France and the entire world makes all the difference.

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

yes but in the Franco-Prussian war the Germans were the ones who did the outnumbering.

[@abduljabarabboodi7690]

تحية٠٠٠للثناءي ٠٠( الفيلد مارشال فون رونشتد٠٠ورئيس أركانه والقائد العظيم لاحقا٠٠الفيلد مارشال فون مانشتاين)٠انهم٠عباقرة ( فن الحرب و المناوره ) واساتذتها٠٠٠!!!

[@johnrogan9420]

Initiative...USMC...with basic intent of the Commander understood.

[@syppy7416]

immensely

[@diedertspijkerboer]

I would say tyat Kursk wad an exception to German doctrine, not a typical example of it.

[@Kriegter]

Blitzkrieg (Bewegungskrieg) is closed and normally focuses on destroying armies but meanwhile the Soviets have what seems to be unlimited reinforcements so that doesn't work at all

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

this is actually not true. by 1944 the Soviets were actually running out of units and had many divisions that were under strength. In addition, the Germans actually outnumbered the Soviets in the beginning of Operation Barbarossa.

[@Kriegter]

@@BlitzOfTheReich cool me lern smth new

[@Kriegter]

@@BlitzOfTheReich well i guess winter bush

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

I mean the Soviets started outnumbering the Germans around December 1941.

[@julius7643]

The germans outnumbered the soviets by start of Barbarossa because it was a surprise and thr soviets needed time to mobilise

[@Kriegter]

Wehrmacht units are actually still using horses in many places and they lack the resources to mass produce modernized material I think?

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

yes that is correct but I mean Soviet units weren´t so mechanized either but they did love cavalry brigades.

[@Stephanos480]

Thirteen mlllion Red Army casualities in WW II do make the point that numbers were expendable by the regime and played an important, if not even decisive part in defeating the Wehrmacht.

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

The problem is a lot of this perception comes from 1941 when the Soviets absolutely failed. However, toward the end of the war their armies got much more skillful.

[@Stephanos480]

@@BlitzOfTheReich At the Kursk offensive in 1943 the Germans lost around 100.000 dead while the Soviets lost around 300.000 dead The last Soviet offensive from the Oder to Berlin against a hugely outnumbered Wehrmacht in men and material again cost the Red Army around. 70.000 dead. These are of course without the much larger numbers of wounded on both sides where the ratio is similar. Thirteen milliion Soviet military losses for the whole war are, of course, an immense number. I've spoken to many former German soldiers and often heard the story of how the Soviets attacked, were stopped in their tracks and gunned down and how one wave after another kept coming almost without end. You are right that the Red Army learned from its mistakes - and from the Germans themselves - and strongly improved their tactics and operational strategy - but the fact remains that the lives of their soldiers didn't count for much in the Red Army , even during the last phases of the War.

[@davidshahebrahimi9149]

use of shock armies to wear down germans produced millions of casualities for soviets but german methods were far less costly but germans suffer from lack of oil

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

which is why the Soviets captured 200k Germans in Bagration.

[@Kriegter]

Yes I read wikipedia deep battle

[@coimbralaw]

Sounds like you’re making excuses for German military inferiority

[@slither42]

first of all you know nothing jon snow lol. anyways, german doctrine was developed to be used in france not in Russia. also, the red army had far more military resources to draw upon. they could afford to attack two points instead of one. they could afford to use infantry and artillery in the first wave instead of tanks. you are comparing apples with oranges not two different types of apples here...

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

Yes but that being said, why did Germany use this ad hoc strategy with countries it was at parity with, or even outnumbering?

[@slither42]

@@BlitzOfTheReich If the soviet union was allowed to launch a blitzkrieg on Europe there would have been no chance of defending from it.

[@Kriegter]

@@slither42 They were just waiting for the right time, but that opportunity never came

[@khaibui7957]

Noice, considering blitzkrieg wasn't fully developed after the french campaign and the german army or hitler, start the french campaign on thought of using ww1 scenerio, sought of hitler think and ordered a long battle between 2 countries

[@coimbralaw]

You’re not citing so much as one single source.

[@Grondorn]

This video doesn't make any sense, German military doctrine might have been flawed, but calling the Soviet one good is almost hilarious. Their deep battle doctrine was an utter failure throughout most of the was in the East, either failing completely with massive casualties or succeeding narrowly with massive casualties, Ironically, only when specific chances presented themselves. Bagration was indeed very successful, but that was like the twelfth offensive on Belorrusia while previous ones utterly failed, and its success was predominantly based on a successful deception campaign which made the Germans move their mobile reserves to other parts of the front, a method used by Germans since the beginning of Barbarossa. Had the Germans used the Soviet method, I doubt they would have reached even Minsk, but you go as far as to claim it would have been a better option in Kursk instead of attacking the flanks. Incredible.

[@Waterflux]

I think the German military weaknesses in higher level military planning (lower high) cannot be understood unless one is familiar with the Kingdom of Prussia and how it paved the way for the German unification in the late 19th century. The kind of wars the Germans preferred were wars of conquests involving forcing favorable political settlement after only one campaign season. Bear in mind that Prussia was only a minor kingdom when it became an independent polity. It could not hope to take on France or Russia ounright. Instead, it had to gain new territories, thereby increasing its economic base. It seems that the German General Staff was overspecialized: Planning for single campaign seasons were their ideal. However, their ideal was due to their historical past, which avoided wars of attrition. However, once they became involved in both world wars, they could no longer rely on their quick & decisive ideal. The scale of these 20th century conflicts were just too damn huge! In addition, they were rather deficient in other strategic-level considerations like the economy and intelligence. Check out this link: kzbin.info/www/bejne/mH2toJ9on8iCf6c Dr. Megargee covers weaknesses in the German General Staff. Notice that additional German weakness was how they had established the high command which turned out to be much more confusing than the Allies and the Soviets.

[@Kriegter]

They were really well trained and is true that they have the very best soldiers in the world. But in a larger scale planning, they're really bad at it

[@locklanh]

Confluence was correct.

[@hanz2904]

*Posts comment*

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

thank you comrade

[@conorm.5331]

Would you make a video of your opinion on different kinds of leftist ideologies and your opinions on them?

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

I would but I would have to finish my research to give a fully informed opinion. I have more than enough data and knowledge to argue the practical applications, but I am not a leftist theoretician.

[@aquilatempestate9527]

There's one here. kzbin.info/www/bejne/gGqVl2WJaKpjiZo

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

@@aquilatempestate9527 cheers

[@BeelzebulKlendathu]

So I read most of the comments for this video and the channel owner does some pretty good job on reducing enemies' bridgeheads outside their mouths, a.e. the tongue shortening thing. 🙂

[@KernanMzelikahle]

With respect, I respond as follows. Your analysis is incomplete. The Red Army used attritional methods, hence the Red Army suffered multiple times more losses in both personnel and equipment than the German Army. The important point to note there is that the Red Army could afford such losses while the German Army could not. Speaking in terms of Operational Efficacy of the techniques, it appears that it was more suicidal to be in the front for the Red Army than the German Army. A number of historians argue that the German Army was defeated due to the two-front war it fought, not due to the Red Army operational superiority. It is a fact that the Red Army raised more men and resources to last the war, however, it incurred the worst losses in WWII. In fact, even the Winter War in Finland exposed that the Red Army was not an operationally superior army but an attritional army. Notwithstanding my comments, I loved your video. Good work, keep it up.

[@ironstarofmordian7098]

The Red Army of the Winter war was not the Red Army that fought in Operation Bagration. The Red Army learned it's lessons and got far better at Tucachevsky's doctrinal ideas by that point. Also, when it came to man power, the USSR was having issues with getting men by '43. It's a bit more complicated than the Red Army being the imperial guard.

[@pressf4896]

Jorge Warcrimes It is all relative. We are comparing the Red Army with the German Army. The German Army had already called up it’s 17 & 18 years olds in 1941 to begin Barbarossa. This is not even considering the million German casualties of 1941. Red Army had 8million+ manpower, the Germans less than 3million. If we’re talking about materiel, the Red Army had literally 10:1 more equipment in some cases. That is not really the point of this video (discussing doctrine), but in the overall war, when the enemy has superiority in men and equipment to this degree, it’s an attritional war, and the Germans can not win. Bagration was good and all, but the Soviets were fighting a ghost by that point, the Wehrmacht was a shell of what it was by then. Hitler himself said in 1942 that they had knocked out 34,000 soviet tanks by then, and that if he knew a country could have 34,000 tanks he would have thought twice about the invasion. German military intelligence was notoriously poor, especially about the USSR. A quick victory was their only chance at success, so the strategy they employed seems reasonable to me, they simply didn’t get it done fast enough and attrition did its job.

[@ID0NTFUCKRATS]

Even though your communist I do respect your itellect. You actually helped me make my own doctrine.

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

I’m not communist at all

[@ID0NTFUCKRATS]

@@BlitzOfTheReich Sorry, your other videos seemingly supporting the soviet union made me assume.

[@ID0NTFUCKRATS]

@@BlitzOfTheReich also forgot to sub

[@spectralcoffee5177]

Aint no way in hell i even listen to this guys opinion, lmao!

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

oooooo maa gaawwwd

[@Xneutrone]

fanny jike and now try to win with Germany, fighting like Russia

[@Kriegter]

I mean you can't really say it's flawed, at least they know the basics like combined arms warfare, mission type tactics and command decentralization. You also have to admit they were masters of defense late war.

[@Stefano-dd2sf]

You are under aprecciated my man, your content is gold. Keep it up!

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

sounds like a Spandau Ballet song I know. ;)

[@KR0TE7]

German oil supply more or less lost germany the war by not having gasoline/oil to operate tanks and there supply controlling what they could and couldnt do

[@ironstarofmordian7098]

We only idolize German anything from the war because of how poorly the war is taught and represented in schools and media. It's quite unfortunate. The USSR deserves more credit for there strategy and doctrine than they get. Way more.

[@maxhouse2409]

Keep in mind that prior to the dissolution of the USSR, the only viewpoints most people got were pro-Western from the NATO countries by the German or Anglo/American commanders. Glantz has done much to present the Soviet perspective after their archives were opened up to westerners.

[@perniciousseizurehellio3438]

Good video

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

thank you for watching.

[@schmolywar]

The germans did better than they should.

[@mikenelson9366]

After studying the Eastern front for the last 41 years I have to come the the conclusion that doctrine was not the German's problem. The problem was the bohemian corporal from 'cloud cuckoo land' and the invasion of the home of Bolshevism itself.

[@nimp1827]

14

[@Kriegter]

So I think theres a reaso why some don't agree with this the way different countries define "doctrine" is very different Germans see "doctrine as the tactical level of war, but the soviets see it differently. The germans exceeded in what they see as "doctrine". Therefore your title is incorrect. A better title would be "german operational warfare is flawed" Everything else is good and I still don't understand why some wehraboos won't agree

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

of course, but I am speaking English and I don't view doctrine like the Germans.

[@richardbenitez7803]

I’m not familiar with military history. What I do know is the Russians were not adverse at taking heavy losses, often dragging own troops through humiliation and with limited provisions. The Russians had little respect for the individual soldier and felt they could whip units around with vicious loss of life. I read where the Most famous Russian (?) general was explaining that if the Germans loaded a field with landminds, the fields were routinely cleared by running their troops over the area. No problem. Germans were much adverse to what they thought the Russians scientific experiment had to say for the each individual soldier. you are saying there were two different minds playing out. ( I had to edit my comments. I can see you have very knowledgeable followers. I was trying to say what Alec Audakov says so well. I will keep my mouth shut in future).

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

To an extent you are right however the fact that the Soviets were so inhuman to their soldiers stems from their scientific viewpoint.

[@Infernal460]

"German Military Doctrine was Flawed" *Heresy*

[@maximilianodelrio]

shut up

[@coimbralaw]

If you’re a neo nazi cult disciple I’m sure it is heresy yes

[@christopherlupoi]

This is a very interesting theory, except the way u explain it is just terrible. You spend too much time on describing second generational warfare to third (the differences of frontlines from 1800s to 1900s) Not hate just criticism. Other than that I enjoyed this way of looking at things

[@BlitzOfTheReich]

Thank you for the suggestion. I was more succinct about it in my Operation Bagration part 1 video.

[@coimbralaw]

Or you’re a neo nazi deranged lunatic

[@christopherlupoi]

@@coimbralaw Thank you NPC #43941, very cool