Homework Assignment for Beidleman's Choice

[@maccoat]

Alot of decrepecies of this event can be explained with people not being honest to themselves and trying to rationalize their devisions that they made in a panic. Makes sense in order for someone to live with the survivor guilt of the event to rewrite events so in the future they can genuinly beleive there was nothing they could do. Issue is Krakaur didn't just lie to make himself look good to himself but maliciously attempt to rewrite history to his own financial benifit.

[@SS-xr7jf]

I’m inclined to believe that Beidleman is telling what he, at that time many years later, believes is the truth. ‘We got blown off course and visibility was terrible so we were lost’ isn’t really all that different from ‘I wanted to go a slightly different route to avoid x and the wind and visibility ended up with us lost’ which is the spirit of what I interpret him to be saying, even if it’s not entirely the same as what he says in the transcripts. I’m also more inclined to believe what he said closer to the event, than so many years later, with memory being fallible. Especially since I think it’s totally believable that people haven’t really scrutinized what he’s said much, as the narrative that became popular thanks to Into Thin Air doesn’t particularly encourage people to do so. This is also supported by all of the knowledge about Pittman from the interviewer suggesting it’s not what they’re paying attention to either. But he has, in all likelihood, been asked to retell the general story before. Probably many times. In which case, it makes sense that a whittled down, simplified, broad strokes version would develop over the years. I also don’t see any self serving reason for anyone to lie about it. The problem seems to be the weather in all of the tellings. As for the bottles, Krakauer has proven to be unreliable on issues of that sort you can probably just throw his version out. Boukreev doesn’t seem to contradict Beidekman’s. His book doesn’t seem to pay much attention to tracking oxygen in general outside of giving/bringing people oxygen, if I recall correctly. I’m not convinced anyone can give an accurate account of boukreev going out the first time. His telling of that was, in my opinion, confusing to the point where I’m not sure how anyone could come to firm conclusions on how far he ventured out, where, and how many times. I’m inclined to believe he did try. I might just be too dumb to follow the story, though lol

[@twobyfour]

Joe Simpson intimated at the same thing, not so much the fallibility of memory, but more the repetition of the story, told so many times the experience and the details become unreal, disconnected from the self. Krakauer seemingly had an agenda and Boukreev had his back against the wall regards those " He cut and run" allegations. Beidleman though, I can be a little more forgiving toward his account.

[@SS-xr7jf]

@@natefitzgerald5022 I’d argue that it’s not particularly conspiratorial, as the point of the video appears to just be to encourage people to analyze some different tellings of an event that don’t entirely match in order to deduce what was the most likely to have happened. If you can figure out why a story has changed in the telling, then it’s also gives you more means to figure out in what direction the truth was bent to get there, and thus where the truth might actually lie. Its an exercise. And not one that I think necessitates finding malice on the tellers’ part. For example, if he’s purposefully omitting stuff and simplifying it, it could be that he feels uncomfortable dwelling on it. Maybe he feels guilty, whether justly or not, or it was traumatic. Neither would be assuming malice. For the record, I don’t think we entirely agree. I don’t actually think he’s purposefully omitting unnecessary details. I’m suggesting he just straight up doesn’t remember it exactly as he did before. From what I understand, you don’t remember things like a video recording. You remember remembering. It’s how details get lost as time passes, if they didn’t feel important enough initially. And it’s also how false elements get added to the mix that the teller will swear up and down is true, and they will be being honest when they say as much, because, at that point, it is true for them. It also makes sense to me that Beidelman would consider it a solid account. Because, overall, it probably is. I’m pretty sure Michael himself has said that Into Thin Air and The Climb agree on most of the key details. Since most of the bigger fibs are about Krakauer himself, if you aren’t one of the ones who are being singled out for unnecessary, bad faith criticism, it’s probably pretty easy to just appreciate it for the stuff it gets right.

[@michaeltracy2356]

"Generally, Beidleman is fairly positive about Krakauer's book in the interview shown, which Michael doesn't really mention. Beidleman goes out of his way to mention that he thought it was a solid account of the incident several times. " Please post the portion of the transcript where he says it is a "solid account." He mentions the book and the media circus, which is just a factual statement -- definitely not a positive one. Says story "took on a life of its own." Certainly not stating the book Into Thin Air was based on as solid account. He later mentions the book and then talks about "inspiring" stories for children. He says the book is a "very compassionate telling of you know the people that he got to know." I don't see that as saying it is "solid." The book favors people Krakauer liked and is biased against those he did not like. Beidleman did not say was "solid." So, post the exact transcript of where he said so "several times."

[@michaeltracy2356]

@@natefitzgerald5022 Everyone is full of wisdom until you have to provide you sources.

[@abhilashkulkarni6601]

@@michaeltracy2356 He did mention about the ropes. The sherpa refusing to put ropes. He basically backed Krakauers version.

[@flowermaze___]

It’s also possible that everyone who spent that long on the mountain, in a severe crisis mind set, can’t recall things properly. That’s why there are so many varying stories. Also with the amount of deaths, there’s a lot of trauma and potential blame people are carrying - the brain is very good at convincing us of certain things to prevent trauma and protect. It’s a complex thing indeed. Can we ever know what actually happened… probably not?

[@michaeltracy2356]

You think Yasuko Namba survived?

[@flowermaze___]

@@michaeltracy2356 Perhaps in a parallel universe of events...

[@PhilAndersonOutside]

While there is truth to the memory issue, the problem is when people then manufacture a story to match a narrative. If you don't remember clearly, say so. I'm not saying Biedleman had a narrative specifically, but he most certainly could just start and end any conversation by saying it was an extremely stressful situation, they were all exhausted, at altitude in a bad storm, and his memory is thus quite likely faulty regarding details... Telling a story one way, then telling it another, doesn't help anyone or anything.

[@karlostvall2665]

From Lene Gammelgaards book, I interpret it as being two sherpas leading the group, or rather trying to find their way to the camp with the rest of the climbers (including Beidleman) following. That suggests it wasn’t really Beidlmans choice but just the blind leading the blind (lost sherpas - lost westerners)

[@rabarbarum]

Ooh, a puzzle. Idk about oxygen, but the timing of Krakauer meeting Adams, Krakauer’s return to camp, Boukreev’s first rescue trip up the mountain, and Beidleman’s group’s circling around the col - all supposedly happening at or near 6:30 and 7:30pm - does not make much sense as presented in both books. Either it was a very near miss, or someone is mistaken or misremembering. I’d say B. realized the problem but left the camp later than he suggests in The Climb, and Beidleman is telling a somewhat sanitized version because he’s sick and tired of this story. And Krakauer? Gee, God only knows. But I’m no expert, just trying this as a textual/intellectual exercise.

[@michaeltracy2356]

This is pretty close. Might look at Stu Hutchison as well -- he had an encounter with Boukreev that night that helps fill in some of the details.

[@mikegibby]

Michael Tracy: This comment does not directly relate to the Beidleman assignment - but as you have looked at so many accounts of the 1996 affair, I'm wondering if you will review 'A Day To Die For' by Graham Ratcliffe, which deals with which expedition groups had advance notice of the big storm?

[@Nobody-b6z]

I have just read this book. Reviews of it were very mixed, but it is yet another perspective of what happened that day.

[@mikegibby]

@@Nobody-b6z I agree the reviews are mixed - arguably it is two different books, one about the author’s own climbs and one about the mystery over the weather forecasts

[@teripittman]

He did when he answered my question on it

[@paulmclean7962]

It is not necessarily contradictory to consciously deviate from a standard route due to a storm and simultaneously be blown sideways on the new route.

[@michaeltracy2356]

Sure, but he is telling his story. That he left out his key decision in the telling of that story is the issue -- not whether the stories could simultaneously be true. People have offered numerous explanations as to why he did this -- he was simplifying, didn't want to get into it, etc. But it illustrates the point that you can't simply watch one interview and think it contains what that happened to that. person. More curious is your response. Rather than addressing what did happen -- which you ignore. You simply state a platitude that doesn't really address any of the issues raised. These questions tell more about the person answering them than they doo about Neal Beidleman. You have a definite desire to want to believe stories and ignore different versions of the same story that leave out critical pieces of information. A very religious type of thinking.

[@jamesm3471]

Michael’s channel is like the Makalu of Mt. Everest channels, razor sharp and criminally underrated.

[@kamakaziozzie3038]

Totally agree. I really like the fact he is providing various sources regarding this climb- and encouraging his audience to come up with their own educated opinions 👍

[@golden1789]

Agreed

[@MsMollieh]

This is my first try of a comment on this channel, so here goes: People who tell stories that involve themselves generally tend to modify stories to make themselves look better, a fact that is pretty well known from forensic witness statements, for example. Most people won't invent new stuff, but just tweak the story a bit here and there. So, Beidelmann leaving out his decision to change his route can be seen in this regard. In hindsight it wasn't the best idea, so he leaves it out in later retelling of the story. While I absolutely admire Boukreev I don't think he's completely free of this, especially in view of the attacks aimed at him regarding not guiding conscientiously enough. I think he went on his first search for missing climbers later than he claimed, and maybe not as far as he claimed (because of the storm?), and he had to somehow account for why he didn't find anyone, which may be a reason why the timelines don't match and why the whole account is such a mess. I think the missing oxygen bottles are the biggest puzzle. If I remember this correctly (if not, please fell free to yell at me), the Adventure Consultants group had one less oxygen bottle each than the Mountain Madness team. Could it be that Mountain Madness members had taken oxygen bottles that didn't belong to them, because there wasn't enough for them and they were desperate? If so, Krakauer would definitely leave that out since he was paid to make Rob Halls group look good (not only himself) and he went to astonishing lengths to do so.

[@jamesnasium4035]

Seems like a mistake to deviate from the standard descent route when it is dark and a storm is raging, so better to say that you were blown off course if you are trying to avoid accountability. But my main takeaway is that it was inexcusable to delay the descent from the summit to the point where it is dark on the descent; that was the critical mistake. Once you've made the summit, a major goal has been achieved, and then all efforts should be on the other main goal which is to get off the mountain alive. To me, that is the main lesson, not Sandy Pittman or Into Thin Air or anything else: be sure to summit early enough, then get the hell back down ASAP.

[@leighfoulkes7297]

I don't know that it was a bad decision or not (not a climber) but it does seem like a logical choice to go around like that if you are with severely impaired climbers. One could say it wasn't good in that one person didn't make, another was severely hurt but then again, it probably made it easier for Boukreev to save the three.

[@OIICE]

Going rogue here. I think Michael is leading us in the direction that Krakauer took some of the stashed oxygen bottles for his own use at Camp 4 😂

[@MogCity2]

Bingo

[@NoPitBullLeftBehind]

He already said that Krakauer barely made it to the camp. He made it into his tent then slept for hours. There were multiple people at Camp 4. Anyone worrying about the storm and not having oxygen would see the bottles and think they could take them. I don't see where he was implying anything at all. Krakauer already had a bottle someone else gave him, and he had a bottle set up my Adventure Consultants at Camp 4. I highly doubt Krakauer would steal oxygen bottles from another team, or even know where they were, let alone find the bottles in a blizzard.

[@fantastischfish]

@@NoPitBullLeftBehind You don't have to believe that Krakauer took the extra oxygen all the way to camp 4, but it's certainly believable that he took it from the South Summit, which is why he descended faster than Namba who only had a partial bottle.

[@Kriegschwein76]

@@fantastischfishI think all the bottles by then at the south summit were partials.

[@cappy2282]

Beidleman and Anatoli are cool 😎

[@TheLeontheking]

Overanalysis at 0:40 - notice how he stucks before mentioning yasuko's name - could be because of japanese origin, or because he feels the guilt of having abandoned her.

[@baze3SC]

One contributing factor is that Beidleman used to be a motivational speaker. People attend such events to hear empowering stories about determination, teamwork and overcoming adversity. Hard facts are not the main concern. I find it plausible that Beidleman, having retold the account so many times, gradually "optimized" it for such audience. Maybe he even started to believe it because just like in Krakauer's case it's easier to tell a version of the story in which the protagonists don't have to make questionable or morally ambiguous decisions. It's hard to blame him though, he did what he thought was best at the time. Charlotte Fox published an article in 1997 called A Time To Live, A Time To Die where she says: "I took one last look at the tents-so close-and then kept moving with the others. We spent an interminable time descending carefully in the darkness and increasing wind, spreading out individually in our search for camp. The ground flattened out; we were walking among oxygen bottles, but still no tents. Neal had the presence of mind to gather the dispersing people before anyone was lost."

[@michaeltracy2356]

More curious about what Beidleman says about Fox's account that she asked to descend earlier and Beidleman told her to stay on the summit. For all the times he has been "interviewed" and talked about this, there are two major questions that no one has seen fit to ask: (1) Did Charlotte Fox ask to descend earlier? and (2) How did you know which bottles to leave for Scott Fischer at South Summit?

[@pizzafrenzyman]

Maybe there were Os there when Jon passed through first, but not when Neal passed through later. I have no doubt that the memories of everyone up there that night is tainted due to shock and extreme fatigue. Medically speaking, blood wasn't reaching all the brain in order to keep the body alive.

[@michaeltracy2356]

Then what did Beidleman think he was leaving for Scott Fischer? Seems like you are blaming Beidleman for Fishers death. Beidleman too confused and out of it and leaves the wrong bottles for Fischer? Or we just can't know? Not much better a "Maybe Beidleman was confused and took Fischer's oxygen" isn't much better. Beidleman never said he was confused about the oxygen and his version has been fairly consistent over the years. He never said exactly what he left for Scott Fischer, but it appears he correctly left Scott his oxygen. So, perhaps people's memories and actions are not as messed up as you want to believe. And more importantly, you shouldn't just say "Oh, so-an-so was out of it and couldn't think straight" when that person had the ability to cause other people's deaths.

[@johnnomcjohnno1957]

I've just re-read parts of "The Climb". It reads to me that while Beidleman originally directed the group to the left at the end of the fixed ropes, he was not leading the group after that. He states "I could not travel to the front of the group carrying the Japanese woman, and I didn't have a headlamp on". I don't know who was leading or making the decisions on which way to go at that point, but I don't think it was Beidleman. It does appear that he was instrumental in getting the group to stop where they did to avoid potentially walking off the Kangshung face. On the other hand Adams, Krakauer and very much later Lobsang were all able to get back to camp during the storm via the regular route, so it probably wasn't a great choice for Biedleman (on his first Himalayan guiding assignment) to go the way he did, albeit his thinking process to a layman like me appears reasonable. I see that Boukreev says he was first out of his tent at 6:30 pm and the weather at the South Col was OK at that point, but 10 to 15 minutes later had deteriorated. I can think of no reason why Boukreev would lie about the times. But surely the Beidleman group are still somewhere above Boukreev around this time, not below? Martin Adams didn't get in until 8:30 or 9:00 pm, and he and Krakauer were some way ahead of the Biedleman group. Boukreev was back in his tent when Martin Adams came in so It seems more likely all the clients were still on the fixed rope sections when Boukreev finished his first foray. I've no idea why Krakauer would say it was 7:30pm when Boukreev left the tent. Doesn't make sense. I don't have a copy of "Into Thin Air" to see what else Krakauer may say about what was happening at that time. I've been trying to count oxygen bottles in "The Climb" but I can't tell what has happened, other than there wasn't enough. I'm surprised that Boukreev had to remove some from the sherpas to make his rescue attempts. I'm curious too as to what happened to the two sherpas who were reportedly with the Beidleman group initially - presumably they made it back to camp OK, but were unable or saw no need to raise the alarm about the missing clients.

[@michaeltracy2356]

Krakauer and Adams were returning over that section at around 6:30 and visibility was enough to see the camp. So, why diid Boukreev not see them? A later time would explain it, and in this initial "debriefing".. ANATOLI: Nobody. Not information. What I told: Between six and ten o’clock [6:00 P.M. and 10:00 P.M, May 10, 1996] I tried go up. (Boukreev, Anatoli; DeWalt, G. Weston. The Climb (p. 348). St. Martin's Publishing Group.) The main issue is what happened to Martin Adams. He was in front of Krakauer below the blue ice. So when exactly did he get to camp? If so late, why did it take him so long? This issue has never really been clarified. Stu Hutchison was out walking looking around the camp, so why didn't he see Martin if he was struggling back later?

[@johnnomcjohnno1957]

@@michaeltracy2356 Thanks. My version of "The Climb"is the August 1998 version, and doesn't have the debriefing transcript. It does state in a footnote (p204) that Adams recalled he arrived at camp 4 about 9:00pm, but it also states (p188) that Adams wasn't wearing a watch that day. The footnote also notes that Dr Hunt (at basecamp) received a transmission saying Adams arrived at 8:30pm. I assumed the times were correct, but It does make more sense if Adams got in earlier. Is it feasible that he got down, crawled into a tent, but no-one noticed him until later?

[@wildmanmountainjack3725]

Here is my take: Krakauer has very little credibility, as your videos prove. Of course the oxygen was a mess - people worried about their life will rationize their behavior. Beidleman gave off the air of someone who wanted to put 1996 behind him, he didn't want to explain his decision again. As he mentioned he doesn't give interviews about it, it could have been a requirement of granting the interview that the interviewer didn't push back. Lastly I believe Boukrev's account. Beidleman was an experienced mountaineer and seems intelligent. It is extremely likely that he would make a plan based on the terrain as the storm rolled in. It doesn't make sense that Anatoly would make up such a detailed story. My guess is Anatoly tried to go up to the fixed ropes, got thwarted by the storm, and then met the Beidleman group. Armed with new information about the groups location, he then went back out.

[@teripittman]

I read Graham Ratcliffe's book and now I am curious why the weather reports were ignored. And then there was the South African team... It's no wonder there's still a discussion about this climb. Thank you for logically walking us through this

[@michaeltracy2356]

They were no ignored. Ratcliffe's book is worse than Krakauer's. During the so called "storm of the century," the Japanese summited from the other side of the mountain. They climbed to the summit while Rob Hall lay dying a short distance below on South Summit. So, while there was a storm, it was not a big deal as Ratcliffe made it out. In any case, people on the other side of the mountain climbed, reached the summit, and returned successfully. So, most likely they "ignored" the weather reports because they wanted to reach the summit -- and they did.

[@teripittman]

@ is Lou Kasischke' version reliable? It's difficult sometimes to judge when something is self serving versus to the best of their memory. And thank you for answering that. Ratcliffe seemed as obsessed about whether there were weather reports as he was about climbing

[@michaeltracy2356]

Kasischke makes many obvious mistakes in his analysis. However, his personal accounts of what he personally witnesses seem reliable and match with other accounts other than Krakauer. All of the books have some angle they are trying to push -- that is the nature of book publishing. Ratcliffe's has the "top secret" weather reports that everyone "ignored." Kasischke has the "failure in leadership" of Rob Hall that everyone else ignored. Krakauer has the "inexperienced climbers" causing all the problems. The analysis is rarely so simple, and the photos of the climb tell a very different story of what happened.

[@Chicagocubbiegirl]

In the 1st clip, i think Beidleman is not changing his story, he's focusing on what happened once they were on the col, after they had already descended the icy slope.

[@michaeltracy2356]

They didn't descend the icy slope, so that would not be what he is referring to.

[@cameronclark3725]

He said they traveled the right distance but in the wrong direction so how does that compute with your statement and his original statement.

[@Kriegschwein76]

The U isn’t really silent. It’s a very short “uh” sound between the other two syllables. If it were silent, then it would be spelled YASKO in the romaji alphabet. That was really the only way to put the sound in there. In the west, we read it as Ya-sue-ko, because we have difference pronunciations of the letter U. In Japan they clip the end of the U off so it is very abbreviated, but there nonetheless. Lived in Japan for 5 years and have known a few girls with that name. The U is kinda spoken from the back of the throat as a halfcadenced pause between the other two syllables due to the end of the U being cut off.

[@GarbagePolice]

Perhaps, Namba, alone (possibly abandoned by Jon), deviated from the path. She was not moving fast at this point, so maybe she was just searching for the path - footsteps or a rope. Then, she was overtaken by other climbers, when visibility was lower, but not zero. At that point, the direction of the path was diverted to follow Namba, as she was effectively leading. Beidleman’s initial story could have simply been a justification based on an either/or, made with at least a bit of hindsight. Either he took the right path, or he made a decision to change the path.

[@Abhi-x9o1d]

The comments are gold 😂 Has anyone been in a whiteout? You can barely see anything beyond your arms. So, to suggest why the group didn’t stick to the regular route is ludicrous. As if there were neon signs indicating the regular route. Let’s just acknowledge that we all have our biases. For me, without NB, and possibly MG, preventing the group from walking off the mountain, there is no one to rescue for AB.

[@bobgeorge8382]

I'm a big fan of you Mr Tracy and your forensic taking apart of all the sociopathic narcissists out there (not mentioning any names, Thom Dharma Pollard) but might have to rethink if you keep setting me homework assignments. I'm 53 for cripes sake. Spoon feed me the facts Mr Tracy, sir. Please don’t give me detention eiither. Joking aside, please keep up the good work.

[@smolski666]

I'm sorry, my dog always eats my homework 😂

[@eric-wb7gj]

TY 🙏🙏

[@JoshuaNorton-ki6uf]

TL;DR N B went off-slope for the right reasons at the time but it's simpler afterwards to say the wind did it. J K has it right this time. In the wiki article on "The Climb" N B complains he was not consulted about many salient points, and it mentions M G also was not consulted - N B describes The Climb as "a dishonest account", so that leads us back to J K and N B's accounts, of which NB has to be the primary source, so J K's account in the book is the most likely one to be accurate. (I'm mixing up homeworks here as L G's book Climbing High has just arrived) - LG states that she and K S came down the slope and headed left towards some lights which turned out to be NB and the others. When they met up with them MG, B W and Y N are also there, so the larger group came down as one, and included two Sherpas. IF (big if) the group did indeed get diverted by the wind, then I think the fault lies with whoever was in front of that group, as the others would likely be stumbling along after them, (and J K's book has the Sherpas leading the way and then abruptly doubling back). Since both the guides were hampered by assisting incapacitated clients I can't find it in my heart to blame them for the decision. Indeed, could N B and M G have managed to get their two invalids down the icy slope at all? And afterwards? Is N B going to say "If only I had abandoned the other team's client I could have made the right decision" ? M G faced a similar situation in a TV interview on Australian TV where he stated he had no regrets about his actions but almost at once has to admit he wished he could have done things differently for B W. I'm going to say I think N B consciously took them around the slippery face because he and M G would not have been able to slide the clients down safely, but subsequently is caught up in survivor guilt because of it, and switched to the wind story because it isn't pointing the finger at anybody. BTW - I have an interesting insight into why the ropes weren't fixed which comes from L G's book, I'll wait for a suitable video on which to comment it

[@michaeltracy2356]

It was "simpler" to say, "I decided to go off route" rather than "I got blown off route." Beidleman's transcript is. in the book The Climb. It has Boukreev there in the tent. Beidleman is talking for significant portions. That's the problem when you believe Wiki rather than your own eyes. You do spot the problem with Gamelgaard's issue --- that is why she was so upset with Beidleman. She didn't get "blow off" the route. She saw a bunch of lights off to the left and thought they were the camp and that she got disoriented. When she got over to them, she found it was Beidleman and then they were all lost. Had she not seen Beidleman's lights, likely she and Klev would have just walked back to camp. The ropes were fixed and Gamelgaard doesn't say they weren't. Here is what she says about the longest delay she had p`166 "Come to a standstill for what feels like hours, almost nodding off having from the jump, until someone up there gets his or her ass in gear..." So, no, she is not waiting on any fixed rope. She even just stated they were using old ropes for some sections. At south summit, perhaps she waited a couple of minutes for the rope fixers to head out, but it is not clear because she does not report a precise time. At 11, she could not have headed out because of no oxygen. She reports oxygen there when she got there, so likely 12. Then at 1pm, there is a photo of her just below Hillary Step, so where is the wait? No significant wait for her. They were waiting on oxygen -- not fixed ropes. The problem is you blew. all your credibility with the "wiki" reference. Also ignores basic facts. Groom had a rope for Beck, so why couldn't get slide him down the ice with that?

[@michaeltracy2356]

You also fell for the classic misdirection of something being "dishonest" without saying what particular facts were incorrect and what the correct facts were. Beidleman saying the book was "dishonest" does not help to determine what actually happened. When someone can't take the time to explain why they disagree with some legitimate criticism, perhaps it is because the criticism is legitimate. Certainly, he could have done so in this interview -- and he did not. For instance, he could have said, "Charlotte Fox said she asked me to descend early from the summit and I said no., but that never happened." Instead, he just ignores it. Was Charlotte Fox's account also "dishonest?"

[@JoshuaNorton-ki6uf]

@@michaeltracy2356 I think the most striking thing about the podcast is not what N B says but what he doesn't or won't say. at 1:14 he is describing the last bit of the descent to the top of the col after the balcony, but then 30 seconds later they're all on the flatter section without any explanation of how they got to there. To be fair, he wasn't asked how they got there, but it is striking that he didn't feel up to volunteering it. But far more interesting is this triplet: at 50:04 in explaining why no ropes were fixed by Lobsang he alludes to him having dragged "somebody" up the slope but won't say who, instead "you can read the book" and at 1:11 describing a woman in difficulty on the descent needing an oxygen bottle swap and assistance, again, won't say who. But finally at 1:19:57, in listing the group he had been with in the huddle, after a long pause struggling to remember the final member of his own team, he mentions Sandy by name. Inconsistent. Fear of litigation, perhaps?

[@JoshuaNorton-ki6uf]

@@twistedneck Yes, all the Everest tragedies do have a compelling fascination that seem to glue us to them, we can't let them go and just move on. I keep coming back to 1996, M & I, Maurice Wilson, Boardman and Tasker. But the same fascination exists in other levels of the globe, from airliners embedded in mountain glacier to iceberg-stricken liners and lonely yachts abandoned on the ocean. The same mysteries and need to try and make sense of what happened glues us to them. I'm a student of aftermaths and the slightly disturbing trend of holding survivors to account to satisfy the need to find a villain or two. Since very few disasters are recorded minute by minute as they unfold, it is the survivor's memories that get picked over and used to condemn them, because of a long-standing reluctance to blame the dead. The the Titanic: the captain and some passengers got the hero status, the surviving chairman, 2nd officer and captain of a (debatably) nearby ship got the punishment. People couldn't accept Donald Crowhurst was unbalanced enough to have committed suicide all by himself so they seized on the boat builders and sponsor who it was argued put him in his impossible position. There are of course exceptions, Mallory and Irvine, Maurice Wilson, (who I cannot see getting up to the North Col). There is a common thread to these disasters (Crowhurst excepted) in that no minute by minute records existed, the accounts we have today were recreated by survivors after the events. The actions of trying to organise memories has an unfortunate effect of uncovering or creating inconsistencies. In computing terms, we're trying to do black-box testing where we really should be looking through a debug logfile. 1996 is interesting in that there were two journalists involved, one subsequently didn't write, one did, but both get blamed for being the root cause of the disaster. I don't see it hat way. Generally, the human race is lucky, but every once in a while, things combine to negate that luck. When that happens we need a scapegoat because we can't accept that sometimes luck just runs out.

[@michaeltracy2356]

Not sure why he kept avoiding mentioning her. Wouldn't make any difference from a legal point of view -- you do not escape liability from simply not stating a person's name. But there is no realistic legal issues even if he did say her name. I will note that for 1996, we do have a fairly detailed and accurate account of what happened. As soon as you ignore Krakauer's book, you have numerous photos and those match up with the accounts of Groom, Gammelgaard, and Fox. The photos allow a rather detailed understanding of what happened. That understanding is completely different from Krakauer's version, so people have a tendency to want to think something is not being understood correctly. Major piece of the climb are just misunderstood, and that comes from the "innuendo" technique employed by Krakauer. The whole "rope fixing" is nonsensical. Hardly any ropes were fixed that day, and we have a Scott Fischer photo of exactly when the first rope was being fixed. We have photos go shortly before the rope was fixed. And we have photos after the rope was fixed. Explanations of what happened are rather simple, but very different from Krakauer's. As I will get into in the video about the deal with Outside Magazine, the fundamental problem was financial or business orientated. Beidleman actually talks a little about it in his interview, Lou Kasischke is very upset about some of the things in his book. The problem was Krakauer successfully fooled so many people into believe he was an "investigative journalist" and that his account was the authoritative version. As such, even when people do read the other accounts, they get discounted as those people just making excuses for themselves. There is also the problem of access. Only two Adventure Consultant's individuals reached the summit and lived to tell the tale. Groom's book is next to impossible to get and tells a completely different story than Krakauer's. Krakauer's is easily available and widely read and he again uses innuendo to imply that Groom's account supports his version. It does not. In addition to the problem I identify in the Sheer Will video, Groom does not have Krakauer even present when the discussion about helping Yasuko took place. And the conversation is completely different -- not just a couple words different, the entire decision and reasoning for it are completely different. Ultimately, as soon as you break the climb down into a chronological version based on the photographs, it does not remotely match up with the narrative Krakauer is pushing. He chose a non-linear method for his story telling, and while it makes a compelling fictional story, it does not remotely stand up the scrutiny. It is also disingenuous of Beidleman credit himself with not write a book. Although he didn't physically write a book, his photos are featured in Krakauer's numerous versions. Thus, he is essentially a co-author, and likely paid as such, for Krakauer's work. It would be interesting to see what financial arrangements he and Krakauer had for the use of his photos. I would not be surprised if it was not a "standard" agreement.

[@brown958]

Based on what I’ve read, Boukreev doesn’t strike me as the type to expand much or go into much detail. He seemed pretty matter of fact.

[@michaeltracy2356]

It wasn't really Boukreev. A couple days after the event, the Mountain Madness team was in basecamp and they made a recording of a "debriefing" about the events. The Climb has a transcript of that "debriefing" and it gives a good record of what people said immediately after the incident.

[@toniwertman4818]

The whole thing was a disastrous boisterous effort by two competing camps. Leading to unnecessary risk morbidity and death Greed and fame powered this effort

[@bobbuilder5902]

Why all the hoopla over two different accounts?

[@michaeltracy2356]

Not sure why you would click on a video titled "Homework Assignment for Beidlemans's Choice" and then wonder why the video is about different accounts of Beidleman's choice. Very sad the way people act online.

[@cts1979]

@@michaeltracy2356Congrats on the least self-aware comment on this entire thread.

[@keithinaz9769]

People died, people lied.

[@OverTheLineSmokey]

If Beidleman knew the direction to camp and knew his view would be obstructed, he could have taken a compass bearing and followed it. ..survival 101. That is, if he had a compass...and he should have had one. Again, survival 101. Instead, he knowingly took the group to a place where a rescue party would not look for them if they got lost... again, not using basic survival strategy. It is no wonder he has been reluctant to be interviewed and is changing his story to "force majeure."

[@TheSaxon.]

If only you were up there that day.

[@dagmarbelesova4284]

It's very difficult to follow a compass bearing with no landmarks. This is why it's common to deliberately go off course to hit one and then follow it rather then risk narrowly missing your target.

[@kevinwoolley7960]

Have you ever traversed an ivy slope in a whiteout using a compass bearing to navigate? It is almost impossible to do this.

[@pegahghavami8062]

I think the whole expedition was not organized and poor decision making. No check and balance on o2.

[@stormtrooper9404]

About the Biedelman choice to go around... In retrospect, I think it was a mistake. (and by that I mean Neil consciously veered of course) They should have reached the steep and the ropes. Send a two fit man in the base camp to alert and send help(rescue party). In that scenario.. the stranded climbers would have waited much less.. and they will got oxygen in under an hour. Probably all would have lived... Thats basic boy scout manual. 🤷🏼

[@Kathleen-d4m]

I think the whole ordeal was a result of zero leadership, zero planning and failure to follow the rules. If the turn around time was 1pm, then the giudes should have enforced the rules. I realize that it is a huge expense for the clients, especially if they fail, but because the bottom line was more important than their safety, disaster ensued. I'm sure the lack of oxygen and fatigue skewed everyone's judgment. I'm surprised some jerk of a lawyer hasn't sued the mountaineering businesses, like they sue everyone else.