How to Doubt Absolutely Everything (Complete Skepticism)

[@Convexhull210]

This kind of skepticism is self refuting and collapses onto itself.

[@somedude6134]

It seams like with a lot of these it doesn't give us any reason to doubt that some such thing is true, its just showing that some person in such skeptical scenarios wouldn't have knowledge.

[@PaulTheSkeptic]

So you know me. I show up every year or so to binge your videos. I've been thinking about this channel again. A dangerous thing I know. I think I might be a philosophical skeptic. Here to learn more.

[@KonradTamas]

Where can I find SAP ?

[@esauponce9759]

So I don't know if Carneades is going to read this or interact with it, but I'll leave it here as food for thought to further the discussion (I don't think the following considerations are by any means original to me): There actually might be one interesting and (maybe) easy way, after all, to know something indubitably. Consider the following proposition: "This is an experience." By 'experience' I mean a what-it-feels-like-to situation or state of affairs. The word 'feels' there is used as broadly as we can to include anything that is part of the introspective awareness in one way or another. By 'this' I mean literally ANY what-it-feels-like-state of affairs I can be aware of. So the 'this' in the propositon will presumably be different for every person, given their own, unique subjective experience. But as long as it is a what-it-feels-like-to state of affairs that the person can reflect on, it will be part of what she means by "this". For me, the 'this' might be the (what it seems to me to be) letters in the thing I call a "cellphone's screen" while I write this, but it could also be (even simultaneously) the different shades, colors and contours that are present to me in the background and surroundings, whether "outside" or "inside" my mind (if they happen to manifest while I reflect on 'this'). There's no way, as far as I can see, to be wrong about that proposition. It definitely can't be false and it also can't be unjustified or justified in the wrong way. You can come up with any simple or radical skeptical scenario and all of them will not be able to render the proposition dubitable. I think this is because of the nature of experience, of subjective, first-person awareness and introspection. So that's something at least. I wonder what else could we get from that.

[@nickolashessler314]

1. If there is no "I", then what is it that is doubting the existence of "I"? 2. Is there any plausible way to doubt the statement "it can be doubted that this statement can be proven true"? 3. How is it psychologically possible for one to become a skeptic without taking a propositional stance on the existence of beliefs they have previously taken for granted?

[@nickolashessler314]

@D-O He offers arguments against 1, not 2 or 3. The arguments he does present against "cogito" and "sum" rely on an externalist view of justification and a Humean view of the mind respectively. The former fails if internalism or solipsism is posited. The latter fails if it is posited that the mind is simply the perceiver of ideas and impressions and cannot be reduced to the sum of its properties or the ideas and impressions it perceives. Finally, all these arguments assume the existence of a belief once taken for granted. Presumably, that is what the skeptic aims to cast doubt upon. If a propositional stance isn't taken towards the existence of beliefs once taken for granted, then skepticism becomes meaningless, or even psychologically impossible.

[@polemizator723]

2:04 I don't think is it justifield or not.

[@Elgeneralsimo69]

2:00 The leprechaun is only unjustified because of your unjustified belief that they do not exist. Using your level of skepticism, there is no rational reason why leprechauns don't exist but you and I do... either we all do exists, we all don't exist, or there is doubt about all our existence... I believe this is the correct Indirect Skeptic attitude but as I'm not an Indirect Skeptic myself, I do not know this)* If we replace leprechaun with data for example, which we have justification to believe that it exists since we defined what data meant and collected it** , then we arrive a seeming contradiction: Just because the data tells you something, you can't actually _know_ what that data is saying.... Just because "word" has an "o" in it's spelling doesn't actually mean I _know_ that that word has an "o" in it's spelling. Circular rationale it seems. As for the rest of your objections claims, I believe that if I had objections to your objections (and I know I did)*, they would be listed under the appropriated video and won't repeat them here. But in those claims I argue against the rationality of your position because of, among other things, an inconsistent use of temporal and existential logic, arguing exclusively for "all" when "some" is an equally rational and valid position for example or not being specific as to when and where you statements apply. (* How did I do that? How can I know or believe what I did or did not do? Do I not know that I know that I did post objections to you in other videos or do I only believe that I did? And if I only believe that I did, how could I ever know since even seeing the videos wouldn't allow me to believe in it, only doubt? The Indirect Skeptic, IMO, makes it a practice to paint themselves in a corner and is seemingly happy to stay there.) (**Remember, data is an entirely man made concept and thus exists entirely in a conceptual man made space. Anything that I can imagine to exists does exist in this conceptual space.)

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

As for the leprechaun, I'm (as an indirect skeptic) taking on the assumptions of someone that does not believe in leprechauns. If I am up against the rare person that does, I can simply pick something that they do not believe in to cause them problems. Just because statement x is true does not mean I know that x. This is not circular reasoning at all, merely the definition of knowledge, that it consists in more than merely a true proposition. kzbin.info/www/bejne/fnbZdYSZZayWn7M As stated above, I'll attempt to respond to all of the objections, but they are quite numerous.

[@Elgeneralsimo69]

" in to cause them problems." Hmmm... see, I'm not in it to cause them problems. I'm in it to understand their perspective and in turn, my own, better. As such, if they did believe in leprechauns, I'd want to understand why and how that affects their beliefs rather than trying to find another way to "score a point" against them. " As for the leprechaun, I'm (as an indirect skeptic) taking on the assumptions of someone that does not believe in leprechauns." Which means that if they did believe in leprechauns, then anything the leprechaun says would be justified in your point of view. This means that that if you live in a community of pure leprechaun believers, you would be forced to take on the assumption, for the rest of your days, that leprechauns do exist and that what they say is rational... .... the fallacy of bandwagon at it's most dire!. As such, it's not true that you have no beliefs but rather that you don't wish to commit to any beliefs and thus adapt any position necessary to not have to commit to a firm "yes or no" position. "Just because statement x is true does not mean I know that x." For you to have access to x being true you must know of x in the first place. Just because "the moon is made of rock" is true doesn't mean that I know that the moon is made of rock for I have no access to the moon to test this proposition. I have access to museums, and books, and even direct testimony but at the end of the day, "I" can't go there and do "my" tests so "I" can't truly ever fully know. On the other hand, because "my chimney is made of rocks" is true means I know it's true because I have access to what rocks mean, what chimneys mean, and I can apply those meanings to the object next to me which, lo and behold, fulfills the criteria for both rock and chimney... again, because I have access and can test these criteria.

[@Elgeneralsimo69]

"As stated above, I'll attempt to respond to all of the objections, but they are quite numerous." Again, please don't feel obligated to do so but if you want to, please take your time.

[@Betterdangaming]

@@CarneadesOfCyrene "I can simply pick something they do not believe in to cause them problems" That sounds like the whole basis of your skepticism

[@andystitt3887]

Can what does not exist feel?

[@GainingUnderstanding]

Reliability > Justification

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

GainingUnderstanding This series is mostly focused on internalist critiques. Hopefully, in the future I will give some responses to all you externalists out there.

[@GainingUnderstanding]

Carneades.org I've noticed that it's mainly focused on internalist critiques and I like it :) I'm looking forward to your critiques on externalism!

[@Elgeneralsimo69]

Would you agree that the most complete philosophy would have an internalist and externalist POV? After all, as I understand those terms, that which is internal to some border is by definition not that which is external to that border and to understand the "all" of the issue, the "entire" issue one is necessitated, as I see it, to adopt both viewpoints.

[@GainingUnderstanding]

Ricardo Rademacher I wouldn't say I agree, but I don't rule out the possibility of a blend. One of the great exponents of externalism, William Alston, had a unique blend of the two he entitled in a paper: _An Internalist Externalism_ The way you have defined the terms "external" and "internal" does not seem to be the way it is used in epistemology. I suggest you read this introductory article from the Stanford Encyclopdia of Philosophy entitled: _Internalist vs. Externalist Conceptions of Epistemic Justification_ Here's a link: plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-intext/

[@Elgeneralsimo69]

"The way you have defined the terms "external" and "internal" does not seem to be the way it is used in epistemology. " From what I read in the SEP, it doesn't have the notion of a border separating an internal space from an external space, so it's not using those terms in a way _anyone_ else is using it! LOL Could I not read an internalist as someone for whom internal knowledge is all there is and thus, as internal knowledge (internal self) is inherently subjective, ti should be doubted... ... in contrast to externalist as someone for whom external knowledge (outside the self) is all that should be trusted. I tried to read the SEP entry and couldn't quite tease out a clear internal/external dichotomy so if that's not it, what IS the dichotomy between internal(ist) and external(ist)?

[@MikeAnthony-tv5py]

There can be nothing less than nothingness. Could that be doubted? Or that cause and effect have no cause? They seem like they can't be doubted because if you were to postulate that there was something less than nothingness it would be a thing (not nothing) which would be contradictory. The same with saying cause and effect have no cause. If you doubt this then you are saying something could cause cause and effect which itself would have no cause (it would lead to an infinite regress of cause and effect which would have no cause) So maybe for something to be undoubtable the doubt must itself serve as proof of the thing its doubting.

[@Alkis05]

Half of these arguments were about agnosticism, that is, saying that you don't know. That is different from not believing, that is, skepticism. You can say you don't have a justification to believe "I think, therefore I am" but that doesn't mean that you don't believe it. Even if you believe that you don't believe it. Also, you might not know that you believe something (an unconscious belief) or you might believe that you don't believe anything when in fact you do (as you pointed out many times, people believe contradictory things.) I think the most a skeptical can hope for is that he aspire to not believe anything, even if it is the case that it is an unatanable position. But one might just call that wishful thinking. EDIT: Hum, yaeah, you covered that in the last slide

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

There does seem to be a difference between not believing, not having justification for, and not having knowledge. Why do you think I have a belief when I state that I do not? There are plenty of things without beliefs, rocks, trees, infants. Why should I be any different? That said, I am not certain that I do lack all beliefs. I could be mistaken, but I am no more convinced that I do have beliefs. I am not at all convinced by the claim that lacking all beliefs is an untenable position. Do you think that an infant who has no language to even form propositions must have beliefs? What is your argument that beliefs are required for life? Even if you can't abandon your beliefs, it does not mean no one can.

[@Alkis05]

@@CarneadesOfCyrene Sorry for the late response. I got caught up in the election week. The reason I think we all have believes is that we are wired that way. By we I mean mentally healthy humans (not rocks, trees or some severe cognitively disabled person). Yes, even babies are capable of that, and some animals. And, if you are capable of understanding what skeptic means and capable of calling yourself a skeptic, than it is definitely the case. We form believes involuntarily, and we can't help but be convinced of stuff. My argument is not that it is required for life (even though I think it is, to us humans at least). But that it is a characteristic of our species, like being capable of reasoning. We spontaneously form believes and we are not capable of choosing to believe or not. We are capable to withhold to act on our believes, or act as if we don't belief. It's not that I don't think you are not capable because I'm not. I think you are not capable the same way I think we are not capable of avoiding jerking our knee when a doctor hits us in the right nerve.

[@encouraginglyauthentic43]

​@@Alkis05So you assume that we are wired to have beliefs.

[@andystitt3887]

The idea a belief has to be justified is something How then is it possable to doubt the existence of anything?

[@DevinBigSeven]

So what is your take on performative contradiction, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Performative_contradiction? Such as arguing against the existence of argument or, more generally, purposeful action in general (argument being a specific kind of purposeful action, a non-reflexive action). It is not as strong a claim, only claiming un-deniability in practice. Even if your arguments are fallacious, you are still engaged for the performance of arguing even if done badly. You could be mistaken in your means and so not accomplish your end, but the more general clam of purposeful action would still hold. Granted you might be mistaken about what your ends really are, but it would be hard to deny ends in general. The denial itself would be a performance with some end, unless you are a robot or something else unthinking (no strong A.I.), in which case purposeful action would not apply and the performance would be impossible because all your actions would be reflexive; there would be no self to introspectively consider it. I suppose a hard determinist might think that even of themselves, that all their actions are reflexive. The use of performative contradiction is purely introspective and only inductively extrospective. Obviously "I am thinking" and cogito ergo sum can be considered as a performance to the self as well; and even if mistaken, there is still the claim of purposeful action to fallback on.

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

+DevinBigSeven I am predictably skeptical of performative contradictions, or at least with our possible knowledge of them. It seems that we could be mistaken about the ends. I think I am arguing about the existence of arguments when in fact I am being tickled or in bed sick hallucinating. I might think I am making arguments in a dream but actually have not come up with a single premise. It seems that if we need to create premises and conclusions to be arguing then we will easily not be able to doubt that we are succeeding at doing that. If we think that the only thing required to argue is to want to argue, then it seems we will count many things that are not arguing as arguing. And it does not mean either way that arguments exist, at least in some ontological sense.

[@andystitt3887]

Forming a belief is thinking.

[@TheKivifreak]

What about implications. Could the following statement be seen as absolute knowledge? "If I define logic to be xxxx, then A v ~A is a tautology."

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

That falls under things like 2+2=4. An evil deceiver could step in and mess up your logic such that you thought Av~A was a tautology, when in fact based on how you defined logic it was not.

[@davidsampaiopereira484]

How does someone doubt? By thinking. to think, and therefore doubt, someone must do it. For someone to think and therefore doubt, someone must exist. For someone to exist, to think it and doubt it, Something has to exist. And for knowing it, someone might need a justification for the truth of the belief of it all. What can be anough as justification, when not the impossibilty of not beeing able to give a justification? Implying the necessacity of existing, to think, for doubting as the search for justification. One cannot claim, that we would Not be able to know of something Impossible, for that it would mean that anything is possible, as knowing the Statements above. But If someone would want to try to doubt the possibility of possibility and impossibilty, it would be inextricably futile. The said Things and maybe more cannot be doubted, for it would either be Impossible, and therefore not possible to doubt, or incomprehensible flattering and therefore no doubt too. Concluding, that doubt cannot settle here. And to the claim, that it would be possible to belief nothing and doubt everything, it seems utterly incomprehensible to me. The reason beeing, that to doubt, one would rather like to not be fooled in doing so, therefore one has to belief, that one is doubting now and anytime. And if we would try to doubt, that we believe that we doubt, we would have to doubt, that we believe that we doubt, that we believe that we doubt, that we believe that we doubt... Etc. ad infinatum. Indeed we can say, that Stones and Stars dont believe anything, and therefore believe nothing, for that they are incapable of doubting to belief, as they cannot belief anything do to their complete lack of Reason and Conciousness. And if one trys to escape by saying, that beliefs are only related to Propositions and Statements, it would not help a bit, as one has to assure not believing anything by saying it, and therefore suggesting it, not only to some other but also to oneself. Otherwise one has to assume, that a said skeptic would be quite similar to a Stone and Star, and No human anymore, or at least no rational beeing, i.e no sceptic, as stones do not doubt. Either one chooses to be no more, and become a Stone, or to understand, that a sceptic cannot doubt himself, if it should mean anything, and reconsider his duty as philosopher to be a searcher, and not a selfdestroying doubter. This means to search for the truth, wich can be found Here, on this Level and these things, undeniably, with or without a evil Scientist or Demon. The truth does not depend on its location, But its foundation. And the only possible foundation for truth can be itself, as it is the foundation at all. A Circle is nondeless the most perfect form (as the word goes), for wich either this is true or nothing, wich is Impossible, also right through Introspection, of wich the sceptic doesnt lack luckely. What truth is, and why, questioning beyond it, that is the profound mystery that must fascinate anyone who seeks to know themself. γνώθι σεαυτον Thank you.

[@arexru]

It seems difficult to deny that something exists, irrespective of whether anyone has a justified, true belief or not that it does.

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

+Alexander Hogarth I don't deny it. I doubt it. In the same way that there is a difference between saying "I believe that the number of people alive right now is not even" and saying "I do not believe that the number of people alive right now is even" presumably, most people would assent to the second statement, but be hesitant to assent to the first, because they mean something different. I lack the belief that something exists, but I do not deny that something exists.

[@arexru]

I' m still trying to wrap my head around it xD In what scenario could, for example, mental phenomena be both experienced and simultaneously not exist (nor for that matter anything else)? So not memories, nor causal factors but simply the experiences themselves in the present moment that appear to be being experienced. In a similar vein, how could the concept of existence itself not exist without there existing a deceiver to make people think otherwise?

[@Elgeneralsimo69]

"I don't deny it. I doubt it." Doubt allows denial. The same way that if I showed/proved/justified to you that the number of people alive right now were even, then your doubt in either statement would be denied. "I lack the belief that something exists, but I do not deny that something exists." If you do _not_ deny that something can exist, then what is your criteria, as a skeptic, for _not not_ denying existence, for confirming existence?

[@encouraginglyauthentic43]

​@@Elgeneralsimo69You're a pseudo intellectual. It doesn't matter if it allows denial, they are claiming that they personally don't deny it.

[@Elgeneralsimo69]

@@encouraginglyauthentic43 I'll get back to you in another 7 years. 🤣🤣🤣

[@PotterSuppositionalist]

Excellent presentation Carneades.org My only criticism would be the objection to "Something Exists" you submitted. If by _believe_ you means accepting some _P_ as the case, as in an attitude about _P_, then one may believe the _P_ that Something Exists without further criteria. Granting the assumption that the account of knowledge is problematic, belief is still possible. I doubt knowledge which is supported by assumptions. But if there is doubt, my attitude is that there is something happening.

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

Potter Suppositionalist You're going to run into the problem of the foundationalist again. You make the claim: Q: "If by believe you means accepting some P as the case, as in an attitude about P, then one may believe the P that Something Exists without further criteria" Your claim is self defeating as the rule that lets us believe that p without any criteria, is itself a criterion for what you can believe and therefore requires justification. You have set up an implication. Even if we did assert the antecedent about the definition of belief, you still need to offer justification for Q and for the Modus Ponens that is required to go from Q and the definition to P.

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

Potter Suppositionalist Or in other words you need to prove the conditional "But if there is doubt, my attitude is that there is something happening. " and that Modus Ponens works. To conclude from that statement and the claim that there is doubt to the claim that there is something happening. Not to mention that I don't even assert that my explanation of belief is correct, I simply use it as the dogmatists do. Therefore you won't even get the claim I doubt in there. It's the original reason that Descartes did not state the Cogito as it is so often stated. He said "I think. I exist." Not I think therefore I am, as that requires logic.

[@PotterSuppositionalist]

Carneades.org Excellent reply and an interesting line of reasoning to consider. However, here you are unconvincing: *"Your claim is self defeating as the rule that lets us believe that p without any criteria, is itself a criterion for what you can believe and therefore requires justification"* Not so because I'm talking about belief, rather than knowledge. There is no 'rule' in question. I'm saying if we define belief as assenting to some x, then all we need to do to believe an experience is happening is assent to it. Something is happening regardless. *"Or in other words you need to prove the conditional [...] and that Modus Ponens works."* The definition of belief I provided has no such requirement, which is my point. I'm granting the assumption that 'knowledge' is problematic and, even if that is the case, the same problem doesn't apply to belief. Modus Ponens isn't required in order to believe you are experiencing your own thoughts. My point is that I can't seem to summon doubt about the first-person experience that is happening with or without my consent. Not even the Solipsist can doubt experience. Furthemore, you reject the rules you claim get you into this mess. What is your definition of doubt? *"You have set up an implication."* It's not easy to talk about this without using the language of philosophers. But I'm saying if we perceive our own experience then there is no skeptical scenario we can imagine in which there is nothing, because to have the experience requires _something_.

[@andystitt3887]

Objectios are things therefore things exist.

[@justus4684]

How do you know that?

[@andystitt3887]

Is there a universal mind?

[@JappaKneads]

Be skeptical of Skepticism itself...

[@andystitt3887]

Interesting.

[@JappaKneads]

@AT87 Because i've never met the person who doesn't have an opinion. Maybe what you call a belief MIGHT only be a belief in YOUR opinion. Show me the man without opinion and i'll think differently.

[@JappaKneads]

@AT87 Hmmm.. 1.) "Category error"...and now... 2.) "Generalization fallacy" !!! _"The fondness of labeling is strong in this one"_ - Yoda. Until you know of it, until you see it, Until you realize it... *_it doesn't exist._* Maybe there's yet another heavy sounding label for that too. You really Think your finger is the moon? m.kzbin.info/www/bejne/eaiziHeDq7llZ6c

[@JappaKneads]

@AT87 Don't you point with your finger? Maybe you really point at nowhere. Understand?

[@JappaKneads]

@AT87 _"I'm not sure i understand your reply"_ I'm positive you don't. Here's The Moon: _" Until you know of it, until you see it, Until you realize it... __*_it doesn't exist."_* Stop looking at your finger.

[@andystitt3887]

Can doubt be doubted?

[@andystitt3887]

If you justify that something exists isn’t the justification also a thing?

[@andystitt3887]

Doubt Is something therefore something exists?

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

Many non-skeptics are convinced that spooky things like mental states don't exist. We might be in a fully materialistic world where abstract things like doubt simply don't exist.

[@andystitt3887]

@@CarneadesOfCyrene Are there other ways to object to that?

[@andystitt3887]

Can the exsistance of thought be doubted?

[@paulkothgasser6623]

Yes, it actually is. We have no proof that thoughts as such exist,we only really know that correlate to certain reactions in our brain. So far it's the best bet that those are thoughts though, since we have no counterproof and it does accurately describe everything we know so far (about matter)

[@andystitt3887]

What about the idea there needs to be an entity experincing the thoughts.

[@andystitt3887]

Could the brain be an illusion?

[@VasselofGod2]

do you believe that you know that you know nothing?

[@GainingUnderstanding]

***** From what I've gathered from Carneades, Carneades is skeptical about whether or not he really is a skeptic. The skeptical sage lacks belief entirely and does not even believe that he lacks belief.

[@VasselofGod2]

GainingUnderstanding now, this just may be my dogmatist bias, but I that this is the very epitome of that one quote "modern man in questioning everything has lost his right to question anything"

[@GainingUnderstanding]

***** Kind of but not entirely. Indirect skepticism relies heavily on the Socratic method and can use the assumptions of others to offer questions.

[@MuhammadHamza-ou6zq]

Can you doubt that there is... existence?

[@sultanmuhammadwali2444]

What kind of justification do you have for believing that knowledge must be justified by proof?

[@andystitt3887]

How do we know belief has to be justified to be knowledge?

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

I don't, but as an indirect skeptic, it is my job to take on the presuppositions of my interlocutors and show they lead to contradictions. If you have a different definition of knowledge, feel free to offer it, though you open yourself up to criticisms from philosophers going back to Plato. kzbin.info/www/bejne/mam6qXqPi7t5gJI

[@andystitt3887]

@@CarneadesOfCyreneThen it leads to the contradiction of not being justified while requiring other things to be?

[@nimi8538]

Oh?... I got it in mother tongue like connection to dot on the spot of eXistenz... Had to spelL like that...

[@andystitt3887]

You imply that assumptions exist.

[@GainingUnderstanding]

Carneades.org The section "I do not believe anything other than this" is basically what I was getting at in our discussion about implicit beliefs. Maybe the skeptical sage really does have beliefs the skeptical sage is just not aware of such beliefs.

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

GainingUnderstanding And I'm still worried about what you mean by implicit beliefs. I forget if you said this in the last conversation, but what are the necessary and sufficient conditions for some belief being an implicit belief?

[@GainingUnderstanding]

Carneades.org Implicit beliefs are beliefs that we do not necessarily recognize ourselves as having. The section "I do not believe anything other than this" is basically what I was getting at in our discussion about implicit beliefs. Perhaps there are beliefs we hold but we're just not aware of us holding such beliefs.

[@Paradoxarn.]

Why anyone would think knowledge to be justified true belief after the Gettier problems, I don't know. I don't at least so I don't think your arguments apply to me. Despite that there are still problems with your arguments about justification. If poking of my brain causes me to believe "I exist" then while it wouldn't be a justified belief for an internalist, it would be for an externalist since the reason you believe "I exist" would still be, at least indirectly, caused by it being true. That is, it wouldn't be possible to believe it without it being true. The same goes for "I think". Logical possibilities, such as an evil deceiver, which entail the impossibility of justification can hardly be said to be justification for the impossibility of justification. Not only because it's self-contradictory (I'm sure it doesn't have to be) but also because that mere possibility doesn't give any reason to think that it is actually the case. Furthermore, how can one know whether these "logical possibilities" are actually logically possible? It may be the case that they in fact are logically impossible but we haven't noticed it for some reason. If there is not way to tell whether I'm Rob or Hugh then what's the difference other than you calling them different things? If this is some argument for that we cannot know if we are in an idealist or realist universe then that still doesn't entail skepticism. And once again the problem with arguments based on logical possibilities is that we can't know whether something actually is metaphysically possible or just epistemologically possible. I'm glad that you agree with me that you can have beliefs you're unaware of. It also pleases me that you agree that you cannot confidently assert that you don't have any beliefs. It seems to me that beliefs then can be seen as hypothetical assent to propositions. It also seem to me that a skeptic would assent to the proposition that they don't assent to any propositions. They would deny that of course but saying it is one thing, thinking it is another. But even if it weren't so, the skeptic does say that they don't assent to any propositions so at most they can say that they changed their minds but then that would be a belief.

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

Paradoxarn You are correct that my targets in this series are internalists, not externalists. If you don't accept closure and you claim that justification is not required for knowledge, these arguments don't apply to you. In the future I hope to do a series on some of the problems with the various kinds of externalism. . ."Logical possibilities, such as an evil deceiver, which entail the impossibility of justification can hardly be said to be justification for the impossibility of justification" Note, that I'm not asserting that an evil deceiver is logically possible, the dogmatist is. I'm also not asserting that justification is impossible. I'm saying I don't know if it is or not. It seems that if you assume that such is a possible world, that it implies that justification is impossible and therefore, you can't be justified claiming either that that is a possible world, or that you are justified in believing that any other claim. If being justified implies that you are unjustified, then you just are unjustified. I deal with a similar claim about the laws of logic in this video: kzbin.info/www/bejne/nXupZ2x4hbmMqJI . ."If there is not way to tell whether I'm Rob or Hugh then what's the difference other than you calling them different things?" There is a difference between epistemology and metaphysics. Just because you can't know if something is or is not the case, does not mean that there is not a fact f the matter about it. You can't know if there were an odd or even number of dinosaurs alive at this exact moment 100 million years ago. But that does not mean that there is not a fact of the matter. As with possibilities, once again, it is the dogmatist that assumes such things are possible, not me. I just whip some elenchus out on that claim and let their beliefs do the rest. . "I'm glad that you agree with me that you can have beliefs you're unaware of. It also pleases me that you agree that you cannot confidently assert that you don't have any beliefs." Note, I don't assert that you can have beliefs that you are unaware of. I don't know if you can or you cannot. . "It seems to me that beliefs then can be seen as hypothetical assent to propositions. It also seem to me that a skeptic would assent to the proposition that they don't assent to any propositions." I'm confused by your concept of "hypothetical assent". The skeptic does not assent to any propositions. Therefore they neither assent to the claim, "I believe nothing" nor the claim "If I could know something then I would believe that I believe nothing." What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for someone hypothetically assenting to a proposition?

[@Paradoxarn.]

Carneades.org I look forward to those videos about externalism. It can't be easy to make all of these videos so don't overwork yourself. I'm not quite sure about you making such a blanket statement about whether "the dogmatist" believes the evil deceiver to be a logical possibility. They may not, in fact it is plausible that they do not until you convince them that it is a logical possibility. While I personally do not think of myself as a "dogmatist" (I revise my beliefs/worldview all the time), I'm not convinced that the evil deceiver is a logical possibility. Even if it is a logical possibility though, the conclusion that justification is impossible doesn't seem to follow since that would require the evil deceiver to actually exist. At most one can conclude that it is logically possible that justification is impossible. About the difference between Rob and Hugh, I might have misunderstood but you're basically saying that the difference between them is like the difference between there being a odd or even number of dinosaurs 100 million years ago. The question that comes to mind is (to quote Hillary Clinton) "What difference does it make?" If I'm Rob, so what? Firstly, is it even logically possible as you claim that the "dogmatist" believes? Does the "dogmatist" actually believe it to be logically possible? If it is, what does it prove? Once again I don't see it proving more than it being logically possible that justification is impossible. Secondly, it seem quite irrational for me to believe that I am not Hugh even if I can't tell the difference since if I'm Hugh then I should (If true beliefs are good) believe that I'm Hugh. If I'm Rob then it doesn't matter what I believe since I just believe what Hugh believes anyway. To be rational then, I should wager that I'm Hugh since if I am I gain a finite amount of good but If I'm not then I lose nothing. "What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for someone hypothetically assenting to a proposition?" - I could ask you similarly, what are the conditions for someone assenting to a proposition? Is it to think "true" after hearing a proposition? To answer you question, I think that hypothetical assent to the truth of a proposition is the relationship one has to a proposition if one would assent to it if one thought about it, understood the nature of beliefs and truth and understood the proposition. Edit: Never mind, that's a bad definition. I'll think about it. "The skeptic does not assent to any propositions." - It seems to me if you didn't mean that ironically (which I presume you didn't), that you just did.

[@andystitt3887]

The deceiver must be part of the deception.

[@nobadragoon6499]

I am high as fk and I like this video

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

+NobaDragoon I'm glad you enjoyed. Thanks for watching!

[@user-pt3jr5cv1e]

How wouldn't, if the Hugh and Rob theory was the case, the fact that Rob simulates Hugh, as it is a true, justified belief count as knowledge?

[@DeconvertedMan]

Carnedes is a lobster!!!111

[@andystitt3887]

Your argument that logic might not work is contradicted by your next video where you talk about the fallacy of appeal to ignorance.

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

There's a difference between academic and Pyrrhonian skepticism. The appeal to ignorance is a fallacy committed by the academic, not the Pyrrhonian. I doubt that logic is true, I don't affirm that it is false. The appeal to ignorance applies for those who claim logic is false without evidence, but supports the claim that you should doubt logic until it is either proven or disproven. Lacking a belief about the truth of logic is different from believing that logic is false.

[@Overonator]

I guess you are not a fan of the so called properly basic beliefs that people assume but cannot justify.

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

Overonator At some point I want to do a series on the idea of faith, i.e. those beliefs that people hold, and don't claim to justify. In the end those seem to fall into the trap of the foundationalist expressed here: kzbin.info/www/bejne/j3-pqoR6bd-roa8

[@Overonator]

What do you think of the ideas of those that claim are a combination of foundationalism and coherentism like Susan Haack's "foundherentists"? There is a video idea!

[@DeconvertedMan]

I don't believe anything in this video. Or even that its a video. Or that you exist. Hahahahaa!!!11111

[@xenoblad]

@@DaronKabe I guess if you don't believe in modus tolens, then you could believe you have no beliefs, and that you don't believe you have no beliefs at the same time.

[@nimi8538]

Hmm... The habit used to as would one described use of head commonly known as the upcoming processes associated W such activities experience of have no problem W the idea therefore have though understanding of such adjusting settings evermore thinking as presented to senses make what them as thought considered assured being not so believablee come need convince the thought to emerge... Come on... What is thought? Mind formats of departments oof various tinkable functions...

[@danielhackman9810]

Utterly ridiculous,it works if your Sitsofirnic, or if you have a psychosis

[@CarneadesOfCyrene]

It is hard to doubt things you can't justify, most people have irrational beliefs that are hard to give up. But that does not mean that people who lack irrational faith are crazy, just rational.

[@joebob9094]

For the "I do not believe anything" couldn't one say: "I may believe this, but I believe me believing in this has no merit, thus I do not believe this to be anything true or anything exists" would this work even in the case if he/she does not have access to all their beliefs?