When Beliefs Don’t Seem True - Dr Laura Gow

Usually our beliefs seem true to us - we believe there is juice in the fridge, and it seems true to us that there’s juice in the fridge. However, sometimes our beliefs don’t seem true - I believe this desk is mostly empty space, but this belief doesn’t seem true to me. I argue that beliefs need to seem true to play their important role in decision-making. Many cases of irrationality, where we don’t make the logical or rational decision, can be explained by the fact that while we have the relevant belief, this belief doesn’t seem true.
Laura Gow is Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Liverpool. She has also lectured at the University of Warwick, and held postdoctoral positions at the University of Antwerp and the University of Cambridge, where she worked on Tim Crane’s "New Directions in the Study of the Mind" project. Her research interests are mainly in the philosophy of mind, with a particular focus on perception and perceptual experience. Her published work criticises contemporary attempts to provide physicalist accounts of perception, and her recent research explores the less appealing implications of endorsing a genuinely physicalist account of mind.
Dr Laura Gow, Ian Ramsay Centre, Beliefs, Humane Philosophy Society, IRC, Theology and Religion, Philosophy, Cognitive phenomenology, role of belief, belief systems, Blackfriars Hall, Oxford.