In Command of Overlord: Strategic and Operational Leadership in the Great Invasion

Join Rob Havers, PhD, President & CEO of the @PritzkerMilitary, and our very own Rob Citino, PhD, as they discuss the D-Day landing and Normandy campaign through the modern military lenses lenses of strategy-identifying long-term goals and providing the resources to meet them-and operations-plans to dominate the battlefield, foil the enemy, and win at the lowest cost.

[@timburr4453]

I can listen to Citino all day!

[@user-ih1mo8vv7o]

Citing is the best period. He puts the listener 'on the ground ' in the action .` no one in his league. His books.are out of this world

[@Alex-jn3hx]

Random guy from Missouri coming here to say that Citino is an absolute legend.

[@casparcoaster1936]

As a yank, also born in '58, in my last 20 yrs of reading I've come to think Monty just had a bad editor for his memoir, and a chief of staff who wasn't effective mgr of public perception. He was self diciplined, organized, and want to win, but winning with the lowest casualty rate, to always win, & to keep winning. Win with good logistics, good intel, and patience. Monty needs less biased historians to look at him again. He only blew it at Market Garden, and Eisenhower blew it there with him. They blew it together

[@dr.barrycohn5461]

A yank? You in UK?

[@dr.barrycohn5461]

They hit the nail on the head with that truth about Marshall.

[@MrFluidwill]

Excellent talk, thank you gentlemen.

[@Idahoguy10157]

Difficult to imagine to Patton and Monty getting along if Patton had Bradley’s job as Army Group commander. Eisenhower’s job would have been more difficult with two primadonnas

[@grumpyoldman8661]

Yes, I absolutely agree. (UK)

[@keithrosenberg5486]

Marshall spent part of his career in Chicago before WWII.

[@grumpyoldman8661]

At 3:59. The United States declared war on the Empire of Japan, and that was that, but then Hitler declared war on the U.S. NOT the other way around. At 4:50. What helped shape WSC and F.M. Alanbrooke's (Chief of the Imperial General Staff) interest in Italy - as the so-called 'soft underbelly' of Europe - was the massive loss of British troops on the western front in WW1. Indeed it determined the war making philosophy of Britain and her army thereafter, causing much misunderstanding with our great ally about ground tactics during the campaigns of WW2 [see John Buckley "Monty's Men" for an excellent revisionist study]. The American and British Chiefs of Staff disagreed over a cross channel attack, because the Brits argued it was too early with the foolhardy Dieppe raid - no fault of the brave Canadians troops who were the attacking force - bearing this out. I don't buy this thesis that it was Churchill's imperialistic impulses driving the peripheral strategy. To reiterate: it became quite clear that the Allied armies were (at that stage) unready to assault mainland Europe, but, (at the same time) Roosevelt was anxious that the (as yet untried) American army started to be involved in a combat role, hence, "Operation Torch" the landing in Algeria. In many ways "Operation Husky" the amphibious assault on Sicily was a vital point on the learning curve for the Normandy invasion [see James Holland "Sicily '43]. I'm stopping now; this video conversation between Rob Citino and Rob Havers is devoid of any critical analysis of the American role in the ETO, and (inevitably) little discussion of Britain's huge contribution, with Rob Havers 'feeding' his interlocutor the answers that he so obviously craves.. (UK)

[@casparcoaster1936]

well put, and i aint British

[@lbailey9607]

I agree with Grumpy. I don't like to be negative - I dislike trolls, I respect expertise and I welcome the opportunity to watch these video discussions. BUT this chat was quite superficial about the stated topic. Mr Havers even misquoted Churchill on the topic of allies. I think Churchill said that the only thing worse than fighting with allies was fighting without them (not vice versa, as Mr Havers misquoted). Also, fairly surprising that they did not know the number of troops landed on D-Day, were some way off on the number of casualties and regarded 'The Longest Day' movie as an historical source (I like that film a lot but come on). James Holland's series of books on North Africa, Sicily, Italy and Normandy is excellent on the breadth of Allied strategy and how they fought the war.

[@MrFluidwill]

On the who else but Eisenhower for Overlord I'd like to throw Auchinleck into the mix, he's a Brit so maybe not possible but supposedly the Americans liked him?

[@ericcook7622]

Wouldn’t be possible. The faction supplying the majority of the man power has to have their man in overall command. So just as Foch, a Frenchman, had to be the overall commander in WW1, Eisenhower or another American General had to be the supreme allied commander.

[@casparcoaster1936]

I'd bet if Patton had Bradley's rank would have (at least tried a lot harder to) close the Falaise Gap (so a lot more dead Poles)

[@dennisweidner288]

Why did Marshall push for crossing the Channel in 1942 and 43?

[@PaleoCon2008]

It is interesting that FDR was fundamentally opposed to British and French imperial interests but he was all too willing to support Soviet imperial interests. Of course, FDR had handed over much control of US foreign policy to advisors who were pro-Soviet if not Soviet agents by 1945.

[@casparcoaster1936]

Trying to make tanks into fishing boats, better bombing, and, better shelling from the destroyers, and less gear for the assault troops

[@terrysmith9362]

No mention about General Alan Brooke the CIGS. This is like mentioning WW2 without discussing about Hitler's role. This chat is simply about the US involvement and therefore does not reflect true history

[@PalleRasmussen]

In Balck's memoires he writes that all the bad/oldfashioned commanders that could not hack it in the East were sent to the west and the quality of leadership in the West was much lower than in the East. He himself was vastly disappointed when he took over Armegruppe G.

[@joechang8696]

who could hack it in the East? fighting a losing war, your forces whittled down to the point where you cannot a have strong continuous front, not to mention reserves. There are legitimate cases for retreat, (the US Marines called this attacking in a new direction), yet the only command from H was no retreat, even though that means getting surrounded, i.e., cut off from ammunition and food, squandering otherwise good men. Very few commanders had the ability to both endure this and not aggravate Hitler, as did Manstein. Shorner and Balck were best at this, though Balck was still a division commander at the time of Stalingrad. Had there been a flexible strategy, the Germans should have been able delay the inevitable. Manstein's Schildt and Schwert plan was good for the Donets phase. The main point should have been to buy time there to build a good defense on the Dnieper, but Hitler did not allow this because it would have conceded that withdrawal from the Donets was the plan. When Balck was sent West, he assumed command of unit that had been broken and reformed multiple times. what did he expect

[@mikejudge942]

Algorithm

[@RonaldReaganRocks1]

The English dude didn't like Patton. :)

[@terrysmith6791]

This is a staggering work of fiction designed to pander to American prejudices. How in the name of fact can the name of Alan Brooke not even register a comment