Jet Fighters: The Luftwaffe's Last Chance ? - The German Perspective

[@briandeaton3550]

The perspective of a military planner isn't often considered when an enthusiast has their wishlist for history.

[@tisFrancesfault]

tbf, I think perspective of a military planner isn't often considered by IRL Germany much either...

[@dallesamllhals9161]

@@tisFrancesfault ..or NATO post 2014😲

[@matsv201]

One thing that i kind of think is missing here is logistics and fuel production. Germany did have a lack of fuel, but mostly so light fuel. Heavy fuel they had quite decent reserve of, specially from 1943 forward when they was doing far less heavy ship raiding. Me109 and BF190 did not only need light fuel, they also need octane boasters, Something that Germany was also in very short supply of. It was actually so bad they had to detune the engines during the war to make them fly with less octane fuel. Of cause Germanys tank being petrol powered, also needed light fuel as so most of the Armour vehicle and a lot of transport and bombers. A Jet engine can run on basically any fuel. The only thing that is important is viscosity, and that can be manipulated quite easily. Suddenly Germany went from having a extreme fighter fuel shortage to have a quite decent supply.

[@dallesamllhals9161]

@@matsv201 A WELL BUILD Jet engine can run on basically any fuel. YUP!

[@KevinSmith-ys3mh]

​@@matsv201- that is certainly the case, and shows that the strategic bombardment campaign (while over-reaching and under-performing Norden's claims) wasn't the failure some others bemoaned, as determined opponents will adapt and dynamically adjust to your attacks: real war isn't a videogame against bots. To expand on your response, if you viewed the Wikipedia entry on BMWs 003 turbojet engine, is a link to the turbine engine development that was in progress for Panther tanks, intended as an option for the follow-on E series of panzers that never made it past prototypes. That could have freed up more fuel for piston engine fighters and lead to the first turboprop aircraft.

[@SkyhawkSteve]

A very interesting and unique look at what was going on! It' a bit surprising that the Jumo engine took so few manhours to produce. I imagine that this efficiency is offset somewhat by the very short lifetime of the engine. OTOH, the long service life of a 109's engine won't matter much if the aircraft is shot down after a few missions. Lots of stuff to ponder!

[@michaelogden5958]

I thought the same. I suppose the low bypass turbines were less complicated than later designs.

[@kirgan1000]

Take a look at a DB 605 or Merlin engine, loots of moving part that must be be manufactured with a very high precision, now look how simpel the Jumbo are. If a Me-262 pilot survive 5 misson and have worn out the engines, he is a ace, or close to be a ace, and can get a new par of engines. Its not like a "green" German pilot survive 5 misson, in the later war.

[@peterstickney7608]

The answer to the first part of the question is simple - Parts Count. The jets are mechanically simpler, and require less in the way of supporting accessories (Ignition Systems, Engine Cooling, Propeller Gearboxes and Governors, etc.). Germany was, like most of the rest of Europe, hampered by their poor understanding of how to efficiently do mass production - this was a drawback in everything from Small Arms to Warships. They weren't able to manufacture components to tight enough standards, so parts were hand-fitted - even (or especially) in the field. Quality of manufacture in a jet engine is very important, with their high temperatures, high rotational stresses, and the complicated and sensitive airflow within the engine. So, with reference to precision required, as opposed to a piston engine, it's a wash. The ease of manufacture of the jets was offset by the voracious appetite for engines to keep the planes operational. Basically, to keep an Me 262, or Ar 234 operational, you needed 4 engine sets - One set hung on the airplane. One set in transit to an overhaul facility. One set being overhauled (Hot Section Inspection and Replacement). One set in transit back from the overhaul facility to the airplane. When trucks are scarce, and attract attention from Allied Fighter-Bombers, and the alternative is a horse cart, what starts as a logistical problem becomes a logistical nightmare.

[@ianlewis6717]

@@michaelogden5958 They were all pure jets, not bypass engines.

[@givenfirstnamefamilyfirstn3935]

Zero bypass ratio turbofans. You are thinking of the Lufthansa 737-100, very early and very early JT8Ds. The 737-200 and JT8D really took off.

[@cannonfodder4376]

Only you and less than a handful of other Military History & Technology KZbinrs discuss such complex topics concisely. From the technical to the strategic and logistical level. The swap to jet engines and fighters is motivated by many factors and considerations, all summed up and explained nicely. Excellent video, Chris.

[@kieranh2005]

Look up TIK HISTORY. He's got some good videos on the political reasons behind the disastrous logistics and decisions.

[@cmdrflake]

Piston engine fighters required higher octane fuel. The synthetic fuel available in the Reich was of inconsistent quality. The jets had been able to use kerosene (paraffin to Brits) and on occasion ethanol. The supply of which was still fairly high when compared to the synthetic fuel for piston engines.

[@allangibson8494]

Gas turbines will run on anything with enough joules you can get into the combustor cans (coal included). WW2 reciprocating engines were far more picky (even the Junkers diesels).

[@stevenschnelz6944]

I agree. I didn't hear the fuel issue mentioned but I was distracted a bit and may have missed it. This is very important and seems under emphasized

[@geodkyt]

​@@allangibson8494I seem to recall Galland made a point of the fuel situation in stating he thought Germany should have built NO aircraft except Fw190 and Me262 as the end approached, because in his opinion, no other aircraft were worth the bother in 1944 and 1945, and the mass of Fw190 could be supported by existing fuel while bringing Me262 online and reducing the need for high quality gasoline. I think he was being exceptionally optimistic in hindsight (and attempting to burnish his credentials as a master Air Force general in the postwar period). The Me262 was *never* going to be available in large enough numbers soon enough. Never.

[@allangibson8494]

@@geodkyt 2000 Me262’s were built but only 400 got into the air due to lack of fuel and engines. The low reliability of the 004 engines counter balanced the low cost of manufacture - an engine that you get twenty hours of flight out of at a quarter the price is more expensive than one you get two hundred hours out of. (And twenty hours was optimistic).

[@IrishCarney]

Argh you said it. I swear I hadn't read your comment before I made mine

[@MarcPagan]

From a former airline pilot, and present WW2 history and aviation fan, ...thanks for an interesting, data driven, and fun video.

[@jacafren5842]

Huge respect for your diligent work! You are a first rate historian and a good communicator. Respect from Denmark 🇩🇰

[@henkormel5610]

A point not talked about is fuel quality. The Merlin went from 1030hp in 1939 to close to 2000hp in 1944 thanks to presurised carburetors (monopoint fuel injection) and increased octane numbers. Due to the increased octane numbers the manifold pressure could increase without engine damage due to knocking. A jet could run on any flammable thin liquidity fluid. Germany had big troubles to produce sufficient amounts of the high quality fuels necessary for the aero engines. The DB 600 series engines had about 37 liters of displacement while the Merlin only had 27 liters with comparable power output. The late Merlins used up to 150 octane (motor methode) fuel. This is about 140 octane (ron nr.). Gregs airplanes and automobiles is an engineering based channel that uses primary (mostly American) sources for it's content. A collaboration between the two of you would be great.

[@Ficon]

Check out The Secret Horsepower Race. It wasn’t so much about the fuel, it was about Germany not having metals to make exhaust valves that could withstand high levels of boost.

[@bartonstano9327]

Thanks Chris, great video. BUT, you forgot fuel. The jets could use low grade fuel that could be more easily made from coal [a kerosene like fuel]. Fuel was a constant headache for the Germans.

[@grizwoldphantasia5005]

That's a question I posted two minutes after your comment. I know oil refining can produce cheaper kerosene than piston engine fuel, but not if the same applies to synthetic production from coal. Do you have any suggestions for reading up on this?

[@MilitaryAviationHistory]

Aiming to make a video about the German fuel question in itself, so likely will pick this up then.

[@bartonstano9327]

@@MilitaryAviationHistory Thanks sir. The chemistry of low quality kerosene is easy to do when using coal to make it.

[@stevenschnelz6944]

@@bartonstano9327 You don't even have to. You can make a turbine run directly on powdered coal.

[@bartonstano9327]

@@stevenschnelz6944 Yep, but not easy to refuel the aircraft. But in 1945 Germany this idea would have had great merit!

[@kellyshistory306]

I think the move to the ME262 was justified by the performance of Luftwaffe Piston aircraft in 1944 and 45 against the daylight raids. Once the Allies got full range escorts, the Luftwaffe fighter losses were just far too unfavorable for the damage they were doing. The bomber intercept battles in the Autumn of 1944 especially were seeing 3 or 4 Luftwaffe fighters go down for every Allied fighter or bomber, just appalling given the Luftwaffe's numerical inferiority. The ME262 in the spring of 1945 manages to get somewhere around a 1:1 kill ratio, which is a significant improvement over the piston engine fighters using basically the same calibre of pilots (a mix of survivng experts and lots of under-trained pilots). A lot of people talk about the poor engine life of the ME262, but with the 262's roughly 7-10% loss rate per mission (from JG7) you're not looking at many air frames surviving long enough to need an engine change. And anyways what good was the piston engine aircraft's long engine life when those aircraft were being killed several times faster than the ME262s were? In isolation the ME262 was the right decision, however it took place in the circumstances of a losing war where it could never have a major impact.

[@wrathofatlantis2316]

For the first 5 of its seven months, the Me-262 had virtually no kills of any sort. 8th AF stats count 4 bombers in 5 months... Over 90% of its kills were with rockets in the last 2 months. Remember this: Guns HATE speed, especially on slow targets...

[@MrLBPug]

@@wrathofatlantis2316 And slow-firing guns with low projectile velocity on a fast aircraft hate slow targets even more. The MK 108's 30mm shell had great hitting power, but it was a difficult gun to use in combat.

[@kellyshistory306]

​@@wrathofatlantis2316 While I completely agree the 30mm cannon's were often unsuited for the speed of the ME262 vs the bomber it was attacking, I don't agree with 90% of losses being from rockets. I suspect you may have watched WWII US Bomber's video on the ME262 and gotten than number from there? I do like his channel, but he makes a big assumption that since R4M rocket use began in march (actually not until half way through march), that all or most of US bomber losses in March and April 1945 were from rockets. A fair number of the surviving ME262 pilots were interviewed in the decades after WWII for books on the ME262, and frankly my impression from those accounts is that R4M rocket use was not all that common, and that guns were often used to shoot down US bombers. Having read a lot of the US reports on the battles with ME262's, I've pretty much never seen a single reference to rocket attacks. That surprises me because the 9th Air Force which tangled with JV44's jets (Adolf Gallands unit) actually talk a lot about rockets being used to take down their B-26 Marauders during those battles (they lost maybe 10 aircraft to Gallands unit), so the lack accounts from the 8th on rocket use is interesting to say the least. Between the general lack of German pilot accounts of uising R4M rockets, and the almost non-existent accounts from US sources (other than the 9th Air Force), my impression is their usage was probably not very great. There is also an element of lying on the part of ME262 pilots, there are very clear cases of false claims being submitted by ME262 pilots and one German book talks about the pilots agreeing to lie so they could avoid attacking the US bombers and the swarms of escorts. It very much looks like some ME262 pilots were trying to survive the obviously-lost war while also avoiding a noose from their own side for cowardice. It helps the ME262 doesn't seem to have ever had gun camera's installed so pilots could lie and not get caught. Anyways, this is a long way of saying that I don't see much evidence that 90% of US bomber losses were from rockets. 90% of US losses to ME262s did occur in March and April 1945, but pretty much 90% of ME262 sorties flown were in March and April 1945. Though R4M rockets did show up on ME262's starting half way through Mach 1945, there isn't much proof they really helped the ME262 all that much in shooting down bombers. 90% of US bomber losses should have occurred in March and April 1945 simply because like 90% of the ME262 combat sorties occurred during that time.

[@wrathofatlantis2316]

@@kellyshistory306 Interesting counter to the 8th AF data in the WWII US bombers video. It could very well be that you are right concerning the Me-262... It is true I mostly heard about B-26s being hit by rockets... However other parts of my research do indicate guns did not perform as expected at high crossing or high takeover speeds, which is why hit and run high speed attacks on fighters were mostly successful against unaware targets going straight, and even then they required the target being kept unaware to the last moment by firing at point-blank range. This reduced versatility of hit and run (compared to 1930s assumptions) lead to the ever increasing use of low speed turn fighting at reduced throttle, because sustained 3G turns achieved 3 things: 1-They broke diving attacks, 2-they trapped targets in the circle (rolling out was fatal) 3-They provided long firing windows at a steady range, if downthrottled enough to have the smaller radius for a leading aim without stalling. Energy state absolutely did not matter, and 2-4 consecutive circles was the norm by 1944, going up to 90 in some cases. Amazingly enough, only the Japanese Navy was steadfastly refusing slow speed 3G turns throughout the War, to the point of criticism by US Navy pilots(!), a recent discovery from intelligence archives by historian Justin Pyke. The opinion that the Zero sustained prolonged low speed turns was entirely based on US opinion of captured Zeros, not what the Zero actually did, though brief hard high speed turns could keep the legend alive. It shows the extremely poor level of research that not even this is correct...

[@amerigo88]

Check out the in depth Me-262 video by Lord Hard Thrasher, grounded in at least four books he used for research. Came out in early 2024 and majes clear that this Jerry fighter would likely have been very good in 1947, but had so much new technology to work out, it was thrown into battle much too soon.

[@michaelbatson1879]

The pilot looking over the shot B-17 at 9:15 is Major Heinz Bar. This was one of his "kills". He would later fly the Me 262 and be credited with 16 "kills" in that aircraft. He survived the war, only to be killed in a light air crash in 1957.

[@MrLBPug]

Heinrich Bär (or 'Baer') - pronounced somewhat like 'bear' would be in English.

[@TrangleC]

Why did you put "kills" in quotation marks?

[@anm10wolvorinenotapanther32]

@@TrangleC Because "kills" refer to the aircraft being downed, not the airmen being killed themselves.

[@TrangleC]

@@anm10wolvorinenotapanther32 That still doesn't explain why he would put it into quotation marks, especially since he speaks of "one of his kills", making it clear that he is speaking of aircraft, not crew members.

[@julianbrelsford]

the TLDR of this video seems to be: German planners in 1943-'44: "If we do exactly what we have been doing, we are positively, 100% screwed. If we do something different the outcome may be different" You can't blame them for going down a path that led to places unknown.

[@jackd4393]

Again, such a wonderful video. You draw upom such rich primary sources to really paint a picture. So many others focus on stats and fitepower like a video game. I really think you nail the complexities of WW2 aviation. Thank you again.

[@tsegulin]

Thanks Chis for another excellent video! This nicely compliments Dan Sharp's book on the Me-262, which I'm reading at the moment. I'm finding the gestation of this remarkable aircraft really hard to follow. There was so much industrial politics, times when there were no engines for the airframe and the the BMW-003 engines initially failed so the moved to the Jumo-004 end then there were times when there were engines but no airframe and airframes but not engines. Over all of this was the over-extension of the Messerschmitt AG with Bf-109, Bf-110, Me-323 plus development programs for the Me-264 while Messerschmitt and Lippish seemed to maintain an ongoing brawl over the Me-163. Lurking above all of that was the extended disaster of the Me-210 which was so unstable that crews were refusing to fly it Goering was furious and Milch - who had had it in for Messerschmitt since his Lufthansa days made his life as unpleasant as possible. There simply were not enough engineering and jig making staff needed to fix the Me-210 plus stick-handle all the other projects at Messerschmitt so sometimes the Me-262 went on hiatus for months at a time and this was made worse by ongoing efforts to conscript such people into combat in Russia. Meanwhile there were all kinds of running Me-262 variations on bomber versions, high speed versions, increased wing and elevator sweep back, armament, pressurized cockpit or not, then waiting for the Jumo-004C, which was taking longer to arrive so they had to go into operation wit the Jumo-004B but there were plans for the Heinkel HeS-011. Meanwhile Hitler was demanding fighter bombers and Messerschmitt had more or less to built that capability into the aircraft early on, except the bomb racks were not fitted to the first 100 aircraft. All this stuff seemed to be coming down at once. Meanwhile Willi Messerschmitt was forced out of control of his own company by Goering due to failures and delays associated with the Me-210. The argument that a gas turbine is much cheaper to build than a V12 is certainly sound, but in purely procurement terms you don't see the benefit unless you are able to build fighters with single jet engines. Then apparently the entire unit becomes cheaper than a contemporary piston engine interceptor. That was a large part of the thinking behind the He-162 (along with some weird notions about flying it in combat with barely trained kids). There was also the fact that the gas turbines could burn a wide range of non-strategic fuels, and the kerosene style fuel they ended up using meant they were not competing for B4 or C2 fuels for the piston engine aircraft. It's amazing they ever managed to get the Me-262A into service at all, quite apart from being forced to build gas turbines with drastically reduced nickel content from the Jumo-004A to the Jumo-004B. When you consider that they were inventing all this stuff as they went along, it's hard to believe. Thanks again Chris. Really enjoyed this one.

[@peterstickney7608]

Excellent job again, Chris! It's interesting to note that, by the end of April 1945, the Germans had built (For certain values of completion), somewhere over 1,000 Me 262s, but the largest number of aircraft in the air on a single day was around 50 - for 1 or 2 days in mid-April 1945. Some of this is Tactical - Allied Counter-Air missions to cover and suppress jet airfields - and the vehicle coming and going around them. The Jet Airfields were very easy to identify, and couldn't be camouflaged. Allied Photo Recon was ubiquitous, and constantly updated, so the Allies knew where the jets were. Much of it is Logistical - getting the parts and fuel, not to mention rations and equipment from the places where they were made, to where they needed to go was becoming difficult in early 1944 (The prelude to the Normandy Invasion), and nearly impossible by early 1945. Last, but by no means least, was that the airplanes needed someone to fly them. Even before the War, Luftwaffe Pilot training was, compared to other nations, rushed. In the early part of the War, it turned out good Day Fighter Pilots, but training in Instrument Flying and Navigation were sketchy. As the War went on, even this was cut back. While machines were being replaced, the average experience and skill levels of the pilots was decreasing. In terms of Pilot Losses, the Luftwaffe forces in Western Europe and Defending Germany took 300% losses - admittedly not all of those were killed or unable to return to action, but it overwhelmed the training and replacement system - kinda hard to teach pilots to fly when their first flight may also be their first combat flight.

[@rolandgerhard9211]

Again a very good structured video. With different views like industrial level, operational level, and the view from Allied and German side. GREAT JOB 👏 and thank you

[@ClaraBells-u8z]

Hi roland

[@Ireton]

I always love these videos "The bomber offensive was not war winning" but then the video goes on to explain Germany stood everything on its head to attempt stop the bombers.

[@aleksazunjic9672]

They did not "stood everything on its head". Even at the end of the war Germans were producing more piston fighters than jet fighters. But the time of the piston warplanes was passing, that was clear to everyone everywhere.

[@chrisduhamel6858]

I think that the Allied bombing offensive clearly helped the war effort. One of the biggest results was the reallocation of the German flak guns from the front lines back into the Reich. The implications on just the Russian Front meant less T-34's would have been annihilated by the 88's. By the end of the war the Germans still had over 7000 88's mostly in Germany.

[@herschelmayo2727]

A pilot, who went throught the transition from flying piston airliners to jets, told me that an ignored factor the Germans dealt with was retraining the INSTINCTS of prop pilots. Yes, they learned how to fly the 262, but never had time to fly it to its full capability.

[@philippepanayotov9632]

Finally, the comparisons I always wanted to look into. You have done an outstanding job once again! 🎉 ❤

[@jeffjones4135]

Great video on the reasoning to go to jet vs. piston aircraft.

[@MilitaryAviationHistory]

Thanks Jeff!

[@chrisvankeeffe4006]

Excellent and informative insights into this aspect of the air war.Thank you very much.

[@RANDALLBRIGGS]

The "Production Costs" chart at 3:36 shows Bf 109E twice in what appears to be late 1940. Did the cost of the Bf 109E drop significantly right at the end of its production run? Also, it would be good to see the production cost of Bf 109Gs, since that was the major production model (series?) of the Bf 109.

[@ideadlift20kg83]

Thank you sooooo much for taking your time to do these. I love them so much! THANK YOU!

[@martindice5424]

I refer you all to the excellent (and hilarious) video by Lord Hardthrasher about this.. err.. ‘jet fighter’ . Always good to watch your very interesting shows Chris. Bloody good show sir! 👍👍

[@michaelguerin56]

Thank you Christoph, for another excellent historical video.

[@ClaraBells-u8z]

Hey michael

[@Dalesmanable]

The Me262 had a lot of problems, including the extra training requirement for twin-engine operation. IMO The He162 was a much better option as a fighter due to its lower production and training costs but time was against it. I look forward to watching your video comparing the 2 aircraft to see what you think.

[@robertmarsh3588]

Interesting and insightful perspective. Thank you! There's always more detail behind much of what we see. Some of these practicalities remind me of explanation of why the British seemingly mistakenly stuck with the outdated 2 pounder gun in the likes of the Matilda 2 tank (basically because the workforce would be reassigned if the production was stopped to switch to a 6 pounder design).

[@kranzonguam]

Outstanding video! Bringing in the wider considerations makes it great! Thank you for all your work digging up this information!

[@Idahoguy10157]

The Me 262 was a minor player against the Allied bomber campaign. There were only approximately 300 262’s in operation. They were impressively fast. They frightened the 8th AF. P-51’s had to kept orbiting Luftwaffe fighter bases to shoot them down. But for all that they put no dent in the Allied bomber streams.

[@twentyrothmans7308]

Amazing analysis, as always. Danke!

[@gregghelmberger]

This was a concise and interesting assessment of German motivations for producing the ME-262. I would be interested in a video comparing the actual results with the projections you discussed here, because obviously it didn't work out the way they intended. It's always interesting to compare what a military thought would happen vs. what actually went down.

[@paulelwick1437]

Hi Chris, thanks as ever for the videos. Great work! At 10:08 your bombers at the start of the week in the table is actually a 5% attrition rate, not 15%.

[@MilitaryAviationHistory]

It’s correct but a poorly phrased table. There is a 15% weekly loss with a weekly replacement of 10 bombers / 100 crew (see title of the table). I shouldn’t have called it an attrition of 15% and then keep the replacements apart from that attrition %.

[@janhaanstra2245]

​@@MilitaryAviationHistory I really enjoy your videos, your expertise and blunt analysis, but most of all I enjoy your humor and the (self effacing) way you handle feedback. It seems you are confident enough to admit slips and mistakes👍👍👍👍👍

[@minkymoo4794]

12:29 Wheels up Lancaster getting a hammering...

[@TheBrakpan]

Every time I see one of your videos, I'm intrigued by the bookshelves behind you and what you've got on them. How about a short tour of your aviation book collection with a few recommendations?

[@johng482]

I heard a quote once that amateurs talk of strategy, professionals talk logistics. I always appreciate history lessons like this that consider logistical issues in military history. One of the more interesting “alternate” history series I’ve read was Turtledove’s “World at War” series. In this, an alien race invades earth during WW2. Many people I’ve told about this series have scoffed saying there’s no way earth would have given the aliens any opposition. They forget what logistical arm could possibly exist back to a home land that takes 20 years to travel, what level of equipment and manpower would be needed to invade a medieval earth (the last intelligence probe was sent in the 11th century) and how much more difficult would an industrial world already geared for war be to defeat versus the medieval one expected. This even ignores other advantages earth had over the aliens I don’t want to share to avoid spoiling the book.

[@billbarton9046]

These videos are always informative and very watchable.👍

[@briancavanagh7048]

Over the period of time discussed in the video, how did the Luftwaffe pilot training change? I recall reading that only experienced pilots flew the 262, but were any pilots trained that went straight into the 262?

[@RobertWilliams-us4kw]

Intriguing analogy, thank you, Chris!

[@plumahoplita]

A nice Cressi Classic collection you have there on your right bookshelf!

[@captaincool3329]

Not a criticism, given that information on this could be hard to find, but at 3:43 it would have been interesting to see the production workhours for the Fw190 A, D and Ta152 as well to contrast these later piston engined fighters- especially the Ta152, given that it was (in some respects) a piston-engined competitor to the Me262, as both were newly developed late-war fighters intended to turn the tide of the war. Note: I'm about to build a Ta152 model kit, so there could be some residual bias on my part for wanting to see it compared to the Me262 and its predecessors.

[@KKRioApartments]

The "Wargaming Attrition Over 8 Weeks" @ 10:09 seems to be wrong and way off, unless I'm missing something. The figures depict an attrition rate of 5%, not 15%. The decline depicted by week 2 is down to 95%, or 95 bombers and 950 crew, which reflects a loss of only 5% (a loss of 15% would've brought it down to 85%, or 85 bombers and 850 crew). If you'd actually calculated with 15% attrition, the figures would've reflected a loss of waaaaaay more than a mere quarter of the force by week 8. Am I missing something, or is that just some bad math on the graphic?

[@MilitaryAviationHistory]

It’s correct but a poorly phrased table. There is a 15% weekly loss with a weekly replacement of 10 bombers / 100 crew (see title of the table). I shouldn’t have called it an attrition of 15% and then keep the replacements apart from that attrition %.

[@ColinHarvey78]

Great research, knowledge and analysis

[@grizwoldphantasia5005]

I have two suggestions / questions: 1. Jet engines use cheaper fuel which requires less refining than piston engines, especially the high octane stuff used by the Allies. But Germany got a lot of its fuel from synthetic conversion of crappy coal. Is there the same difference between piston and jet fuel when it's synthetic production? 2. Germany must have had significant inflation during the war. Is that factored into those price comparisons? The work-hours figures are immune to that problem.

[@jbepsilon]

For jet fuel it's more cost effective to use the Fischer-Tropsch process than the Bergius process the Germans used to produce high octane gasoline. However, jet engines are pretty flexible, and can use almost anything. So a switch to jets would have been a big benefit to Germany, no need to upgrade the basic Bergius process output to increase the octane rating.

[@peka2478]

work-hours are not comparable neither because you would have to distinguish between what slaves could do and what needed skilled (and motivated) labor, how much machine time stuff needed, what resources it took (distinguished as "freely* available" or "in short supply" or "not available at all in significant quantity"), basically, comparing costs during total war is a hot mess...

[@oldmangimp2468]

Since my grasp of German aircraft development and manufacturing timelines is... ... imprecise, I have a question. What impact (if any) did the Me 210/410 programs have on Me 262 development via resource and engineering personnel allocation? Also, did the Me 210/410 programs negatively effect the production of existing single seat fighters (Me 109 & Fw 190)?

[@slick4401]

Is that a Lancaster being strafed on a German field at 12:28???

[@Dalesmanable]

Yes, landed wheels-up.

[@ClaraBells-u8z]

Hi slick

[@ClaraBells-u8z]

@@Dalesmanablehello 👋

[@forgetmeshots]

What is the fuel consumption difference between the 109 and 262? Makes sense that Germany needed to preserve their pilots, as well as other good points made in the video. But if you have pilots and aircraft not being utilized because the 262 consumes more fuel during operation, where is the threshold of efficiency in that regard? Great video and channel. Well done, for sure. Appreciate it.

[@justinbrown691]

I'd like to add that a speed advantage is limited if you don't have a safe place to return to. I would love to hear more about the Luftwaffe's organizational problems that kept their numbers low. I've read a bit about issues with fiefdoms that sprouted up in the east, Africa and west but it was all brief and ages ago.

[@giacomopiccaro3852]

In my opinion, another important point that brought the German to switch to the jet engine was the fact that, in mid-late 1944, they basically hadn't more room left for their piston engines develompent while the allied did. The German lacked Behind in high octane fuels and raw materials for some of their engine components and they knew that, for these reasons, they were playing a game at which the allied were advantaged. Switching to jet engines, led them to a path they had been already studying for several years, in which they had esperience and that could have brought them to a position of matching effectively the allied quantity with quality derived from the tecnological gap of the jet over the piston powered aircraft.

[@jimbeam4736]

Really interesting video but ... how successful was die ME 262 in comparison to the older models and how did the Allies counter it? What went wrong in the end?

[@guidor.4161]

An excellent presentation on all aspects, except one. I miss a discussion regarding the fuel situation. I'm assuming jet fuel would be easier to make or even synthesize than high-octane fuel for high-power piston engines?

[@KevinSmith-ys3mh]

Yep, if you scroll thru the earier comments, you'll find a few posters that explain it in detail.

[@guidor.4161]

@@KevinSmith-ys3mh Thanks!

[@PassportToPimlico]

What the Germans failed to take into account was how the Allies would respond. The Americans soon realised the vulnerability of jets during landing. The RAF had moved Meteors over to mainland Europe specifically to take on the German jets. The Meteors were better set up as dogfighters as opposed to bomber interceptors and their pilots were spoiling for a fight. The end of the war prevented an early jet vs jet conflict.

[@richardvernon317]

Early Meteors were not that good in a turning fight, the controls had been deliberately designed to be heavy to stop the young bucks from throwing the aircraft around the sky and the G limits on the airframe were lower than that on the Me-262. The aircraft had always been envisaged as an interceptor. The Mk III wasn't that much different, though the introduction of Air Brakes were an improvement. The Mk 4 had a major redesign of the Wing to improve manoeuvrability. That, plus the Derwent IV engine with redesigned engine nacelles would have been almost a match for the Me-262 in speed. However the prototype Mk 4 didn't fly until July 1945 and production didn't start until 1947. Closest that a German Manned Jet and a British Jet got from each other was about 6000 feet. The date was 19th March 1945 and the Meteors were grounded due to bad weather at their forward operating base. Which got bombed by Ar 234's through a hole in the cloud. One of the Meteors suffered light shrapnel damage from one of the bombs dropped. The Meteors on the Continent were somewhat unlucky in not getting the chance to shoot any manned aircraft down. They ran into German aircraft in the air twice!! On the first occasion they were chasing some FW-190's, when they had to break off the attack after they were attacked by Spitfires who thought they were German Jets (they did manage to evade that attack without damage). The second time, a pair of Meteors on Patrol ran into a Fieseler Storch at low level. By the time that the Meteors had turned around and slowed down to engage the Storch, it's pilot had dumped the aircraft in a field, stopped and legged it into cover. The Meteor's then strafed the hell out of it.

[@givenfirstnamefamilyfirstn3935]

Meteors would have secure landing areas and air brakes would allow approaches with the engines running at higher revs, more responsive in a break off. 1945 RAF fighter operations had effective direction and cover from forward mobile radar cover located near the advancing front line and would have a tactical advantage. How did the opposing engines compare in acceleration? No Meteors and no Mk 21 Spitfires found any Luftwaffe fighters before the surrender.

[@heneagedundas]

​@richardvernon317 You are the only person other than myself I've ever seen mention that Storch incident, or the Arado bombing raid. Wondering if you've gone through the 616 ORB same as I did?

[@richardvernon317]

@@heneagedundas Been through some of it, The bit in 1940 when they were at Coltishall and the Meteor WWII era. Any relation to a member of the Squadron in 1940??

[@heneagedundas]

​@@richardvernon317 No, but I did a lot of research on them back around 2000, and published it on the Web on my rather crude and hand coded website (all well before Wiki came along). It caught the eye of the son of one of the groundcrew from 1940, they got in touch with me and I got to interview his dad, and then one of the 1940 pilots, Bob Morton. I went along to several of the squadron annual dinners in Doncaster, and got to meet a lot of air and ground crew, including a couple who flew Meteors during the war. Fascinating times, and a real privilege to have met them.

Thank you for the Video. Would somehow not have thought that the jet engine was faster to produce then a piston engine.

[@alkafluence]

@Chris Was there a reason the FW-190 wasn't included in the discussion?

[@MilitaryAviationHistory]

Big picture: What applies to the 109 applies to the 190 overall. The margins are different but that is for another video.

[@hullutsuhna]

I notice the lack of mention of FW-190, with 20k built 1941-45 vs. BF-109's 35k 1935-45 it looks like something that should be included in this comparison, how much did a 190 cost in terms of money and labor?

[@ilovetechnology8436]

As you've said it didn't work out for them in the long run, so in hindsight, were all those considerations wrong or did other factors come into play ? I've read a lot of ME-262's were downed while landing or was it just a matter of too little too late ?

[@Completeaerogeek]

Dan Sharp's groundbreaking book on the 262 (262 Development and politics) blows up many myths and injects a long needed dose of reality into the conversation and shows once and for all from the project head's own words, that those very mildly swept wings happened by accident, not design. 'An inelegant solution to a CofG problem' as he describes it. The 262 was both better and worse than many people think and not the 'potential gamechanger' that is often claimed.

[@michaelporzio7384]

Excellent video. I always wonder why the Luftwaffe never focused on intruder operations. A fast, heavily armed jet (especially with R4M rockets) immune to fighter intercept would have exacted a high toll on 1000 bomber formations forming up before and shortly after take-off.

[@Wien1938]

They didn't have the range.

[@MilitaryAviationHistory]

They did - the Zerstoerer concept was meant to cover this. There are examples where they tried this, with mixed and usually not sufficient results.

[@eric-wb7gj]

You have to have them fully designed & developed in time, which they weren't. The Luftwaffe gave up flying intruder sorties over Britain due to Luftwaffe doctrine (possibly from Goring). It was deemed that Allied bombers destroyed over the Reich would have far better morale value than those crashing on British soil, which German civilians would never see. As the other poster stated, always the issue of range. The other elements are, the Allies may have fighters up over the channel, Allied radar would still pick up the Luftwaffe over France (& it's AA guns could still put up a box barrage through clouds), & keeping your fighters over your own territory means if there is battle damage, mechanical failure or weather implications, you're far more likely to get your valuable pilots back (& the aircraft).

[@Wien1938]

@@MilitaryAviationHistory It was done for a time at night. Intruders would both follow the RAF bombers back and attack them while landing or bomb the airfields but the most damage was done through intercepting and shooting down training planes. It was successful and a big problem for the RAF but... it was never tried on a large scale (I think one specialist night formation carried out these attacks) and the losses were heavy enough over time for Hitler to forbid such operations (I think from mid/late 43).

[@michaelporzio7384]

@@MilitaryAviationHistory thanks for the response. I was thinking specifically with jets. ME-262s at 540 mph blazing through a group of fully fueled and bombed up B 17s struggling for altitude and trying to get into formation.

[@thomasryan6545]

Hey Chris! What book or author/publisher would you most recommend for learning about german aircraft, specifically the bf 109. Would you consider listing all of the books you have in your collection?

[@johnrogers1423]

Even though it only took 700 hours to produce a jet engine, two were needed for each plane (therefore 1,400 hours per plane) and they did not last as long as piston engines.

[@ClaraBells-u8z]

Hi John ❤

[@PaulSmith-pl7fo]

Hi Chris. An excellent analysis!

[@Cuccos19]

What if the Fw-190D "Dora" and the Ta-152 would entered into service about a year earlier? I know, it much depends on the developement not only the airframe but also the engine(s), Junkers Jumo 213 and Daimler Benz DB603 too. Could they turn the tide in sufficient numbers, with at least average, or rather more experienced pilots?

[@pRahvi0]

What now interests me the most is the operational cost of Me 262 vs. that of Bf 109 or Fw 190. And particularly, what would be the cost in terms of fuel, which seemed to be a limiting factor, per sortie or per downed enemy. Suppose a Me 262 could achieve a kill to death ratio of 10 times better than Bf 109, it might still be worth operating the latter if Me 262 consumed way more fuel per a kill. But I really don't know. I can just imagine based on my knowledge that two jet engines are quite thirsty, although a large V12 might not be that far off in that regard.

[@proteusnz99]

Good presentation. At least part of the problem facing the RLM as the failure of German industry to develop sufficient successors to those machines used at the start of the war. The Fw-190 was a superb fighter, albeit with altitude limitations, the Fw-190D/Ta-152 addressed that but too few, too late. Most of the other new projects failed (Thanks Udet), so Milch/Speer cranked up production of increasingly obsolescent models, at the same time the pool of skilled experienced pilots was being steadily eroded => casualty rates of inexperienced pilots soars, a vicious spiral of decline. The Jumo and BMW designs were good (the French Atar is a direct descendent) but by then German industry lacked some crucial elements needed for high temperature alloys, so the still somewhat experimental engines had short working lives. In the right hands (i.e. JV-44) the Me-262 was probably the best operational jet in that period (though Eric Brown thought the He-162 was a good gun platform, though again, not for inexperienced pilots), but limitations in fuel, jet engine development and skilled pilots meant even an effective fighter couldn’t overcome sheer numbers.

[@ukusagent]

Chris one thing I will say about the implementation of Jets into the German Luftwaffe, The Aspect for an oil starved Germany it was far easier for them to produce jet fuel than High grade Aviation fuel, so that made sense, What didn't make much sense was the thought at the time that Bomber pilots would be better 262 pilots because they were used to dealing with Twin engines 🤔, as I believe this was a thing

[@akk-nd3vj]

very intresting and informative. keep up the good work.

[@davidmunoz2943]

me encanto el video es bueno que se preocupen del publico hispano que ve esta clase de videos excelente

[@neurofiedyamato8763]

This is one of your best videos in my opinion. A very nice break down of the logic behind the decision at every level. German bashing has overtaken the wehraboos and its equally as bad because it completely ignore the very valid reasoning they had for the switch. It really does seem that there were only two issues with their idea. Fuel, and the fact the high caliber cannons weren't actually that good at killing bombers (per USAAF report).

[@aaronseet2738]

Also consider the amount of resources spent on the V rockets. What if they dedicated those to more fighters? Or moot if they couldn't muster enough pilots and fuel.

[@bf-696]

Very nice multidimensional analysis of where Germany was and why they took the path they did.

[@Wien1938]

It's a logical gamble given that the Germans are focusing in engine development since the mid-1930s. They understand that speed gives superiority as the faster fighter can always trade speed for space.

[@JefferyHagen]

One issue that’s been brought up with the ME262 was the fast closing speed of the plane to the target which diminished its accuracy, although the Luftwaffe was using rockets as a solution.

[@johnelliott7850]

Good, informative video - not just 'they were trying to build better stuff'.

[@YahBoiCyril]

You know, when you put it this way, they may have been on to something. The Vietnamese really put a hurt on us (The united states) by targeting our strike packages as a whole with the intention of neutering them instead of trying to win dogfights, and even had some success in this despite their inferior aircraft. It is fortunate the unique challenges of piloting a jet during ww2 derailed the german strategy.

[@ssnydess6787]

Great video, as always except for two little details: 1. You didn't take into account the much shorter lifespan of the jet engine and increased maintenance associated. 2. You have the advantages of direct fuel injection mixed up. The Germans could just put their nose down, take negative g's and dive away, while the Allied/carburated aircraft had to roll inverted to keep positive g's on the carburater float bowl.

[@MilitaryAviationHistory]

Good spot on 2, you noticed what I meant to say. Regarding 1) the lifespan wasn't a main concern from my observation of what I see in the files. Planes had a short lifespan anyway, and the production output (6000 Jumos by the end of the war) was able to cover it until a time by which standards were meant to improve.

[@MrLBPug]

2. This was only true for early Merlin engines and was partly solved with the implementation of 'Miss Shillings Orifice' on the float-type carburettors. Later models of the Merlin (and the Griffon) were fuel injected by means of a pressure carburettor, which didn't suffer from the fuel starvation issues, from 1943 onward.

[@MilitaryAviationHistory]

Yes, and the comment refers to the early period in the video, and mentioned the fixes later including the "Orifice" which was the RAE Restrictor. Everything is in the video I linked.

[@theonlymadmac4771]

Read up on the very short life span of German high performance aircraft engines in the late phase of the war. As they had the same rare metal supply shortages (for example big problems with valve seats, piston rings and such) combined with short supply of high octane fuel (no problem for jets) they had to be pushed performance-wise by water injection, high boost and so on with the result, that a late war high performance BF 109 engine didn’t last substantially longer when flown under combat power than a Jumo 004

[@theonemacduff]

About one third in, and still no mention of the FW-190. Wasn't that also a contender? As well, a short section telling us how these calculations worked out in practise, just a couple of minutes, would have been nice.

[@kennetth1389]

Having completed your video, I have a better understanding of why they pursued jet technology. Pretty much stuck between a rock and a hard place. Tried their best but in a losing situation.

[@TakahiroNamiki-lu8dc]

Thank always for your video. Some people point out the benefit of shifting to jet planes because they do not need high octane fuel that was scarce in Germany. One ex-Me 262 reported it ran on J-2 fuel but I cannot find any proof of this argument. When I look at photos of the triangular indication over fuel port on the left side of Me262 fuselage in museums, it often reads B4. Also, plastic model decals often read so. Is it possible Me 262 actually ran on B4? If this was the case, why Luftwaffe wasted precious aviation gasoline on jets?

[@peka2478]

I think it was Bernhard who said comparing Reichmark costs is rather useless, especiall over the years because of inflation, but also in general because money is usually not the bottleneck deciding which thing gets built and which does not - its (skilled) manpower or special resources or machine time or ....

[@amerigo88]

Let me instead recommend Lord Hard Thrasher's excellent, early 2024 video on the complete evolution and development of the Me-262. It is based on books by Mano Ziegler, Dan Sharp, and Martin Kitchen. In short, Me-262 development was highly chaotic and the version flying in 1944-45 was essentially a prototype /death trap with far more training and operations losses than combat losses. In addition to the kerosene vs synthetic aviation fuel omission, Chris fails to mention all the slave labor used to build the Me-262 and its subcomponents - certainly a key industrial consideration. He also left out the use of two seat models as nightfighters for battling the RAF bombers over the Fatherland. The Gloster Meteor actually fared far better as an early jet Fighter that wasn't an absolute flying death trap for its crews.

[@surlyboomergaming2517]

Maybe a word or two about actual attrition rates for 262? Otherwise really good, thanks!

[@davewolfy2906]

In a war time economy, does price matter?

[@MilitaryAviationHistory]

As an extension of domestic resources invested, yes. As a comparative metric across various non-trading countries, probably not.

[@gixxerman0016]

My understanding is that jet engines not only were able to use much lower octane fuels (around 65 verses 100+ for piston engines) but that the engines themselves took up a lot less in 'strategic (& therefore rare) materials' when compared to the late DB & Jumo piston engines. Going jet made a lot of sense, the puzzle is why they didn't really seem to see it earlier (production disruption aside).

[@KevinSmith-ys3mh]

Regarding fuel requirements- the main benefit is that turbojets can burn almost any liquid you can pump thru the spray nozzles, much like a steam plant boiler, and gasoline use can therefore be zero as octane is a non-issue (no high compression levels to resist detonation)! This means each turbine based machine reduces the load on the over streched gasoline production processes. The 2 available coal to liquid hydrocarbon processes made plenty of heavy fractions like Kerosene (favored by jet/rocket engines with JP- and RP- specs even today) and Diesel, their problem was producing light fraction products like gasoline at high quality/quantity. Perhaps they should have run the Army on Diesel and steam engines?

[@gordonwallin2368]

Cheers from the Pacific West Coast of Canada.

[@t.maximilianwaechter3208]

Loved the video, I do notice however either I missed it or you left out the fact that yes, you can produce a jet engine in 700 man hours whereas a piston engine will take anywhere from 1000-3000 man hours, but for the 262 at least you do need 2 of them, which puts the production man hour requirement for engines at 1400 per plane. Maybe not a huge point but certainly also something which to my mind would speak against it being more industrially efficient to build jets. (Obviously this argument goes out the window with the 162, but also from what I know the 162 was less effective than the 262 so bit of a moot point)

[@darthcalanil5333]

Have there been videos or somewhere one can direct me to that explains how the fighter strength, especially the German one got reached? because I'm not sure the math is mathing in my mind. Of just the Bf 109, something like 30000 were produced and another 20000 Fw 190. To put it into perspective, the most produced germany AFV was the StuG at around 12000. So either attrition must have been INSANE to the point where of 50000 total main line fighter production only 2000 AT BEST could be maintained in the field, or I'm missing something crucial.

[@callenclarke371]

Wow. It makes sense. Really great video.

[@sunanogaara6721]

Germany never walked the talk of "total war". There was always a effort to have consumer goods available and Germany never fully geared for mass production like US and SU did. This inconsequence made it impossible to turn around after the battles for Moscow and Stalingrad were lost. Richard Overys "Blood and ruins" is a good source for that topic, imho.

[@aleksazunjic9672]

Things to consider: Germans were still producing much more piston engined warplanes than jets, even at the very end. Air war was not just intercepting high altitude bombers, you still needed to give support to your own troops (CAS and counter-CAS) , fly night missions etc ... Me-262 was difficult to operate from grass strips. He-162 was better in that regard, but did not make into operational service (except few odd flights).

[@IrishCarney]

0:53 And right there he passes the "order three drinks in the bar" test to not be spotted by the secret policeman

[@daszieher]

13:20 basically what the US and the West took away. "Orcs" will be less well equipped but far more numerous, which is why Western forces must - at all times - maintain the technical advantage.

[@TheSgruby]

Please consider making video about Gloster Meteor and state of allied development of jet fighters in WW2. And did Nakajima Kikka was really copy of 262 :P? P.S. Thank for another great video.

[@jbepsilon]

Germany would really have needed second generation jets like the Me P.1101 or the Ta 183, needing only one engine per plane, and hopefully the engine being a bit less finicky than the Jumo 004. Yes, they had the He 162, but that was maybe a bit too far on the "cheap emergency plane" side of the fence.. But luckily the war ended before they got those into volume use.

[@richardvernon317]

What I would like to see is how a German military aircraft enters service into the Luftwaffe during WWII. What processes of testing and standard's the aircraft had to reach before the Luftwaffe considered it to be acceptable and what waivers could be thrown in to "Get it into service now". How was the testing done, Role of RLM test centres and the experimental Luftwaffe Testing Commands in getting the aircraft to be an operational Squadron Aircraft. Most people don't have a clue how the RAF did it and they think an aircraft enters service when the first operational unit gets the aircraft, which is not the case.

[@mylesdobinson1534]

I think that if the germans had cut their bomber production by say up to 2/3 and dedicated that production and flight crew to fighters , this would have made a huge difference.

[@thefly7331]

You know one thing Im courious of is how much does it affects the industry when you have multiple competing designs for aircraft. I feel like the Allies standardized on a few designed to fit multiple roles while Germany has multiple designs for specific roles. Like they have Bf-109, Fw-190, Me-262 and He-162. 4 fighters as opposed to the US having just the P-51 or the British having the Spitfire. Could someone with more knowledge shed some light on this?

[@MrSpirit99]

The Us had also 3 carrier fighters and the P38 and P47

[@grizwoldphantasia5005]

I think if you include all the various failed projects, the US had just as many as the Germans. The Brits had a lot of them too. As a single US example, the B-32 was a backup plan in case the B-29 didn't work out, and enough were actually produced to carry out a few attacks on Japan before the war ended. Or consider that from the P-38 to the P-63 was 26 fighter designs that got far enough to get official designations, and there were some experimental ones that went up to XP-75, I think. Or bombers -- from B-17 to B-32 is 16 bomber designs.

[@kirgan1000]

US did produse several diffrent fighter in huge quantity, like Bell P-39, Curtiss P-40, Republic P-47, its only that the sexy North American P-51 was heavly promoted in media, hence more "famous" Then we have a drool of prototypes and odd thing like the Twin Mustang.

[@jbepsilon]

One could argue with the enormous industrial capacity of the USA the Allies could afford to "waste" effort on a number of designs. The Germans arguably didn't have that luxury.

[@88porpoise]

In 1945 the USAAF had the P-40, P-47, P-51, and P-38 in active fighter squadrons along with the P-61 and P-70 as night fighters. On top of that they were still producing large numbers of P-63s to supply to the Soviet Union. The RAF had at least the Meteor, Tempest, P-47, P-51, Mosquito, Typhoon, and Spitfire active in fighter and night-fighter squadrons in 1945. There may also be some older designs active in Asia and I don't know if Beaufighters were still in active night-fighter units or if they were limited to other roles by then. And they also had the short lived Welkin designed as a high altitude fighter and deployed in 1944 before the British determined the Germans could never threaten them with anything that would require its capabilities (and upgraded Spitfires were better in areas that it could engage Germans) and were removed from service within a couple months of deployment. And that doesn't consider naval fighters. While the public focus in both the USAAF and RAF is on a few designs, they had a lot for different purposes and for redundancy.

[@MartinCHorowitz]

The Short life span of German Axial Flow Jet Engines was big disadvantage for the Jets. The Engines needed an overhaul after 10 hrs of light time. Although Axial flow would eventually be the long term answer for jets . The Materials weren't available for reliable engines in WW2. Also the inability to quickly adjust the throttle for early jets left them vulnerable during takeoff and landing, and predictable when banking in flight. Once the Allies adjusted the quicker speed, they started hitting the Jets with deflection shots if they banked and turned to close to allied aircraft.

[@richardmeyeroff7397]

Where does the FW 190 fit?

[@daveb4446]

The Soviets did some tests with strapping very simple turbines to propeller aircraft and they still reached 500mph. Even the first generation German turbines from 1938 had better performance, so they could have had hybrids for the entire war. And the Brits reached that level in 1940. So both sides could have done it. But for some reason their only hybrid tests were to see if the engines functioned in flight, and none to actually boost performance. Very odd decision

[@kentnilsson465]

Did the germans build a lot of concrete shelters for their aircraft, both for protection but also to stop from being seen?

[@Allan_aka_RocKITEman]

I had no idea there was such a disparity in the time required to manufacture turbojet engines and reciprocating engines.

[@LarsAgerbk]

Why didn't you mention those air-to-air rockets that was fitted un to the ME 262 late in the war. I saw a video that claimed the rockets increased the lethality of the ME 262 by more than 300%