This was amazing and I will be using this lol thank you!
@BEAST4LIF37 ай бұрын
Funny I used the same technique with remote magnet capture but had trouble parsing out lsass with volatility. SAM worked great.
@CyberAttackDefense7 ай бұрын
I have done similar remotely with PCIleach installed as a service.
@BEAST4LIF37 ай бұрын
@@CyberAttackDefense sounds similar to phymem2profit maybe? BTW what is the best way to reach you. I am a solo operator right now and always need people to bounce ideas off of😅.
@CyberAttackDefense7 ай бұрын
Twitter DM
@erwin1667 ай бұрын
Great!!, I like computer forensic, and I will keep this topic in mind.
@AharonMoshe-m2g5 ай бұрын
Thanks!!
@niksphd27425 ай бұрын
I'm glad I watched this. What privileges did you need to run that .exe and successfully dump lsass? Steps up to that would be flagged easily. Our soc would also see that being run and notify the client.
@CyberAttackDefense5 ай бұрын
You would need to escalate to local admin level or a level that can install software. Saying your SOC would see this unless your running application allow listing or have SIEM rules in place isn’t a given. You should test this scenario.
@crash97067 ай бұрын
Great content. i learn a lot from you as a red teamer. My question is, how did you learn or know about this.
@CyberAttackDefense7 ай бұрын
This one was brought on by a fleeting chat in a SANS chat room and experimentation. I am lucky to be around other smart people with great ideas that I can test and make into reality.
@theuni9037 ай бұрын
Hi Brian, thank you so much the content you are putting out. In terms of detection, would it not be more robust to look for the winpmem driver hash? As modifying it would invalidate the signature. Of course, assuming that we would have the detection capabilities and incentives
@CyberAttackDefense7 ай бұрын
Look for both :)
@cvport81557 ай бұрын
Wow bro make more ❤❤❤
@franciscog71107 ай бұрын
This is a great share. I am using it and dumped the RAM, and from it the SAM hashes using volatility3. However, it would be more useful to get the actual NTLM hashes of the AD users, and this is not in the LSA secrets method from volatility3. I thought, that maybe if I carved out somehow the process data from the Lsass.exe that is in the RAM dump it would be possible to analyze it with mimikatz minidump locally. But it just fails. Am I doing something that makes no sense?
@CyberAttackDefense7 ай бұрын
The hashes from volatility are the ntlm hashes. You can crack or pass them.
@franciscog71107 ай бұрын
thank you for the reply@@CyberAttackDefense. I get the local user hashes from the volatility3 plugin windows.hashdump and mimikatz returns also the NT hashes of the AD users in the same host. So I was wondering if it is possible to convert the output from Winpmem and use it on mimikatz offline. I know the DA NTLM hash is there, and then just need to pass it to end the test
@CyberAttackDefense7 ай бұрын
@@franciscog7110 You can dump the process with volatility and run mimikatz against it. Did you try using memdump? or if you have an older version of volatility there is a mimikatz plugin.
@eladfern7 ай бұрын
Great video !!! Unfortunately Microsoft requirements for Credential Guard are pretty "heavy". For example it will work only on windows Enterprise edition.
@CyberAttackDefense7 ай бұрын
Very true! This is the reason many orgs didn’t implement this control. Implement where possible.
@Goun-hn6uv7 ай бұрын
Then how to bypass credential guard?
@CyberAttackDefense7 ай бұрын
So you can’t really bypass credential guard. There are some other methods but the closest I have seen was what Oliver Lyak did here. research.ifcr.dk/pass-the-challenge-defeating-windows-defender-credential-guard-31a892eee22
@Goun-hn6uv7 ай бұрын
@@CyberAttackDefense thanks for sharing!
@gunnerysergeant88897 ай бұрын
Was that from a low-priv user??
@CyberAttackDefense7 ай бұрын
No this is assuming admin. Find an escalation path first.
@gunnerysergeant88897 ай бұрын
Okay, i see...the goal here is being quiet and stealthy!! Thank you