Militaries of Russia and Ukraine One Year Into the War

One year into Russia’s war against Ukraine, the militaries of Moscow and Kyiv have respectively failed to meet and exceeded expectations. The West is providing increasingly advanced and capable weapons systems. Ukrainian forces are attempting to arm and reconstitute their forces ahead of anticipated Russian offensives. For their part, Russian forces are both digging in and deploying forces mobilized at the end of 2022 to stave of Kyiv’s offensives, but also attempt to regain lost momentum. The delta between the West’s continued delivery of tanks and advanced weapons, and Russia’s mobilization and rearmament is likely where the next phase of the conflict will be decided.
How has the war affected the militaries of Russia and Ukraine? How has each adapted to the battlefield? What will the year ahead hold? Is Western support sustainable? What are the risks of escalation? What lessons, if any, does the war in Ukraine hold for the future of modern warfare, and for other theatres? Joining CSPC to discuss these questions and more are Lt. Gen. David Barno and Dr. Nora Bensahel-authors of “Adaptation Under Fire”-and Michael Kofman, the director of CNA’s Russia Studies Program. The Director of the Mike Rogers Center for Intelligence & Global Affairs, Joshua C. Huminski, will moderate this timely discussion.
This is a follow-on discussion to CSPC’s June conversation about the military adaptation of both Ukraine and Russia.
Lt Gen David Barno:
Lieutenant General David W. Barno, USA (Ret.) is a Visiting Professor of Strategic Studies and Senior Fellow at the Merrill Center of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He is also a Contributing Editor and Columnist for War on the Rocks, and an Adjunct Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses.
Dr. Nora Bensahel:
Dr. Nora Bensahel is a Visiting Professor of Strategic Studies and Senior Fellow of the Merrill Center at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), and a Contributing Editor and Columnist for War on the Rocks. She is also an Adjunct Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense Analyses. Her work focuses on the future of warfare, and military strategy and operations. She is the co-author of the recently-published book Adaptation Under Fire: How Militaries Change in Wartime, and currently serves on the Executive Board of the Leadership Council for Women in National Security (LCWINS).
Michael Kofman:
Michael Kofman serves as Research Program Director in the Russia Studies Program at CNA and as a Fellow at the Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center in Washington, DC. His research focuses on the Russia and the former Soviet Union, specializing in Russian armed forces, military thought, capabilities, and strategy. Mr. Kofman is also a Senior Editor at War on the Rocks, where he regularly authors articles on strategy, the Russian military, Russian decision-making, and related foreign policy issues. He runs a personal blog on the Russian armed forces at russianmilitaryanalysis.wordp...

[@carolinahiker7577]

The portrait on Michael Kofman's wall is fantastic.

[@LumenMichaelOne]

Actually, I completely missed that... good-call there. I got a little preoccupied with that, Modified Radiative Symbol, he's got in the back. What's that about?

[@mickmickymick6927]

Michael Kofman is great. One of only a handful of experts, in any field, who are worth listening to.

[@bnxjake]

Good

[@luskvideoproductions869]

And...he has a painting of Cpt. Picard ala 18th Century Royal Navy regalia lol

[@LordJuan4]

@@luskvideoproductions869 ahhh so thats who that is, good eye 😂

[@trevorthegreat]

All 3 guests were on point 🔥 .. Glad they’re on our team!

[@jusmeetsingh1907]

Michael Kofman is a cool collected analyst who is so well focused and comes out with the best most sensible learnings. While Nora Bensahel is so paranoid, so terrified of everything, that she just advocates extreme policies on all aspects..no texture, no granularity, no gumption in dismissing the less important. Just too scared and spreading exaggerated fear..unable to get the important learnings. "Just do everything in heaps and cover yourself well..because anything and everything will go terrifyingly wrong."

[@blackstone777]

In regards to structure: Russian military lacks a robust and coherent NCO corps. You have alot more officers in the Russian military doing the same jobs that mid to senior NCOs do in western militaries. This in turn leads to deficiencies down at the tactical level, and they're a myriad of issues: lack of discipline, esprit de corps, lack of initiative on the battlefield and so on.

[@jon9625]

Talking about the lessons learned from Russia's invasion.... I wish that one lesson would be that every conceivable avenue and programme must be proactively pursued to avoid a war with China.

[@Rokaize]

So the US should back down and give itself to chinas will?

[@looinrims]

I mean that sounds great until they invade Taiwan Just like how everyone wanted to avoid war with Russia until Russia invaded Ukraine (again), so, effects are obvious

[@liiv3354]

What's the status of himars sent to Ukraine?

[@chuckichas]

Putin is fighting a People. Not no simple army

[@gene4094]

America needs to incorporate the ‘military munitions corporations’ to a larger private/governmental industry. The financial costs and intellectual enhancements will give the military more cost effective control. This will also, help lower the costs on the defense budget worries.

[@SolaceEasy]

Enlightening. Missing analysis of the major changes to world naval forces subsequent to the current Ukrainian conflict regarding aquatic drones.

[@user-is7up6ln6m]

It takes 10 years to get USA navy ship

[@KbB-kz9qp]

By late July 2023, it is clear the Ukrainian counter offensive has been a failure. The dog that didn’t bark.

[@stephensipe5405]

These commentators are NOT applying all the lessons learned in the Russo-Ukrainian War 2022-2023. This is sad with a General Officer in attendance. For example: 1: Ukrainians built an off the shelf sea drone which has hobbled the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Why should the US rush to build any $1+ billion ship without 1ST developing a new Naval Strategy based on the most modern weapons systems? For example, will a stealth PT size boat, controlling 3-4 torpedo drones, be able to stand off 500 miles and attack Chinese surface ships? If not, will bases in an island array offer bomb proof direction centers where torpedo drones can be operated? Both of these options cost less than a vulnerable large ship. Ukrainian attrition is based on a transitional Soviet organized and equipped force to a NATO organized and equipped force. IF the US fought Russia or China, air dominance, then air superiority and ultimately air supremacy would determine the speed at which naval or ground forces were deployed. I would expect the ramp up mobilization of NATO forces would be masked by this air war. Would HIMARS make a difference? Well, HIMARS is out of the bag. It will be something else for which Russia or China were less prepared. The Europeans are way behind in NATO quality of force for mobilization ramp up. Most US National Guard troops in a standard 6 year part time enlistment will fire more MBT, Infantry, and Artillery rounds than almost every full time European soldier. The weaker areas are higher Command leadership and coordinated Unit fighting. But neither are most regular European Armies. The US biggest gap is the transitional battlefield from winning a war to building a lasting peace. The US needs a concept for a Pacification Corp of military and civilian nation builders. Not all people groups can be in the same national boundaries. For example, Iraq should have been partitioned. Not all groups of people are ready for Western Style democracy. For example, Afghanistan was not ready for 1 man 1 vote. However, a Council Of Area Leaders is more democracy than what we have today and allows for sub people group diversity. Later the US could send in a real Peace Corp of planners from school systems to utility supply, to military organization, to infrastructure.

[@oldlowsbecomenewheights]

Your analysis is refreshing in an overwhelming flood of disinformation and western funded carrots dangled from the stick that is the media matrix. I'm just amazed people can actually believe that the 'invasion' started in 2022.

[@user-is7up6ln6m]

USA way behind in drone warfare

[@danielhutchinson6604]

Overlooking the effects of Russians unplugging the 1500+ Electric Locomotives appears to have diverted Diesel fuel to the 30 Locomotives bought in 2018 from GE. The fuel that Tanks need appears to be diverted to logistics? The appearance of any Armored support in the limited offensives that Kyiv has attempted since November, seem to suffer from a lack of fuel. The Russians simply shoot the Ukraine's Trenches and Kyiv is forcing Draftees to enjoy the cold in the holes in the ground, as the Artiller falls around them. Bachmut is done, Avdivka has lost their rail connection to Dnipro, so the Artillery that has been shooting holes in Donetsk schools for 9 years appears to be slowing down. But Kyiv appears to be disadvantaged by a lack of Young Men, as the conflict continues. The Ukraine Air Force loses a Plane a day, Russia seems to fly around even behind Kyiv's lines. The US should have cut their losses before the $15 billion the IMF Funds are now sending them. Russia will have to rebuild the Ukraine, after evicting Nazis once again....

[@user-is7up6ln6m]

Is Ukraine army going run out of men

[@looinrims]

An army ‘running out of men’ basically doesn’t happen If Ukraine loses, it’ll have lost due to running out of ammo and/or equipment long before it runs out of manpower

[@sunhoorn7694]

Oh man. You guys are delusional if you sincerely believe what you're saying

[@barriofinito612]

😂😂😂😅😂 Just....delusional.. 😂😂🤣😂🤣😆😆😆 Stop, really! 😂😂🛑🛑🛑😂😂😂 Not only wrong but way to biased 😂😂😅🤣 tone it down a bit, its showing! 😂😂😆