Why Japan Lost The South Pacific Air War

[@justinpyke1756]

This was a fun one to record! The air war in the South Pacific is a fascinating campaign, and a very complex one. I hope this very brief summary is helpful! To clarify one thing I said in the video - when I mention "they lost the air war in a day" I don't literally mean combat ended, but instead that the IJAAS had attempted to build up enough serious strength to keep fighting offensively, but had the momentum so firmly reversed in a couple days of strikes against the Wewak area that while they kept fighting, they were forced up against the wall operationally. IJAAS losses on the ground were several times larger than those they suffered in the air. Both in the two major disasters mentioned in the video, but also in the numerous strikes that happened in between.

[@legoeasycompany]

Did the IJAAS make a scapegoat of anyone for the massive loses or was it jus the "fortunes of war"?

[@justinpyke1756]

@@legoeasycompany After the devastating strikes against Hollandia they apparently sacked the commander of 6th Air Division, chief of staff of Fourth Air Army, and others. In post-war reflections, the Japanese interviewed (both army and navy) tended to stress the logistical and engineering factors behind defeat in the South Pacific.

[@mensch1066]

This was a really great summary, Justin and helped to partially fill in the black hole that 1943 in the Pacific had been in my knowledge until recently. It's really shocking how poorly this particular year was covered in the popular English language sources I grew up on, especially since it seems that 1943 is when attrition really grinds down the effectiveness of the IJNAS and IJAAS. As far as you know, was 1943 a critical year in the quantitative and especially qualitative effectiveness of any other part of the Japanese war effort? I'm wondering about the merchant marine in particular (if not in terms of sinkings yet, then certainly in delays in anti-submarines efforts). The IJN surface and submarine fleets seem to have lasted as competent and potentially dangerous forces until Leyte in the former's case and later in the latter's, but I could be mistaken.

[@justinpyke1756]

@@mensch1066 Hey Mensch, I'm still trying to wrap my head around 1943. I think it was a critical year for the air services in particular. 1942 started to grind them down, but they bled white all the way through 1943 in hard-fought, grinding campaigns that are often skipped over or misunderstood. The fleet took a hammering in 1942 from which it never truly recovered, but the surface fleet in particular remained potent until Leyte. Linked to the air war, the carrier force's last action as an equal to the USN was Santa Cruz in 1942. However, plenty of good carrier air crews were used (or wasted) from land bases in Operations I-Go and Ro-Go in 1943. Often it will be assumed that Santa Cruz killed off the last of Japan's "First Team" carrier aviators but, as Tagaya Osamu noted, the quality of carrier aviators didn't really drop dramatically until 1944. I'm less well read on the submarine force, though it was primarily expended in supply runs and transport missions through 1943-44. The Japanese Merchant Marine was smashed in 1944, but was definitely taking a beating in 1943 as well. I still have to read _ The Japanese Merchant Marine in World War II_ by Parillo at some point. It is high on the list. The army's land forces were certainly taking it in 1943, but it was the least damaged branch of the Japanese military overall. It retained multiple first-rate formations all the way to the surrender.

[@BobSmith-dk8nw]

@@justinpyke1756 The impression that I've always had - was that there was very serious damage done to the Japanese Naval Air Arm at Rabaul because of their attempts to conduct an air campaign against Guadalcanal in 1943. The attacks through 1942 had at least had a purpose in that the Japanese were actively trying to take the island back but - once the Army pulled out of Guadalcanal - the further air operations taken against it accomplished nothing and began a serous degradation of their air power. One factor here - was that they took their air groups off their carriers and committed them (I believe) to Rabaul. That - to me - was the beginning of the end of Japanese Naval Aviation - and it was expended in an utterly futile effort. One of the factors I've read was that (as the Americans learned) light carrier aircraft used against ground targets were to vulnerable to AAA. These aircraft were just as vulnerable when committed against ships - but - trading aircraft for ships - was a very good trade. Losing an aircraft to put a hole in a runway ... was not ... When the Americans hit the Japanese with Carrier Raids - they did so with over whelming force - and went after the ships in the harbor more than against the air fields. It was the Army with their multi engine aircraft that were able to maintain sustained air campaigns against enemy air fields. .

[@MakeMeThinkAgain]

It's probably significant that the USA was able to use B-24 strategic bombers that would be based out of range for anything the Japanese had. The B-24 is an underrated WW2 warplane.

[@brianwong7285]

More of those were built than the B-17.

[@rogerwadham4627]

Love the plane, dont get me wrong here, unpleasant stall on that narrow highly loaded wing, so battle damage could turn bad fast, and they were notorious for not surviving water pancakes as those bomb doors would rip away, opening the belly to 100 mph water. All well known to the crews, who flew them anyway, courage personified.

[@ThumperLust]

The Japanese put out a book that, in American, was called Zero. It was mentioned within that the Japanese considered the B-17 and the B-24 were the reasons that they lost in the Pacific. The B-17 and the longer ranged, but more delicate, B-24 were able to fly over any Japanese force virtually unopposed. Subaru Sakai said he was impressed by how much damage they could take. It was, supposedly his attack from above that gave the Japanese fighters hope of combating these giants. I would take his book Samurai with a grain of salt, but it is good reading. According to his narrative the Japanese pilots never lost because the American pilots got better, only their planes got better.

[@brianwong7285]

@@ThumperLust Not just that, but almost all Japanese pilots flew on and on without any sort of respite until they got shot down. Problem is because of certain beliefs & philosophies (no pilot protection for the aircraft; plus the fact that Japanese pilots carried NO parachutes into combat), any shootdown of Japanese planes meant certain death for the pilots (this also lead to the loss of veterans whose skills were better suited for the higher quality planes the Japanese could only make available during the later stages of the war.)

[@danielmocsny5066]

@Swiss Army1386 - No, the B-24 was not the most produced aircraft of WWII. From Wikipedia: "At approximately 18,500 units - including 8,685 manufactured by Ford Motor Company - it holds records as the world's most produced bomber, heavy bomber, multi-engine aircraft, and American military aircraft in history." Some smaller aircraft were built in larger numbers, such as the Ilyushin Il-2, Messerschmitt Bf 109, Supermarine Spitfire/Seafire, and Focke-Wulf Fw 190. See the Wikipedia article: List of most-produced aircraft.

[@soulofastro]

15:50 "50% attrition a month" ...huh. My flight sim squadron spent 6+ months recreating the Pacific War (playing both sides) and this is pretty close to what we experienced. We definitely felt the turning point with Guadalacanal and Japan starting to get steamrolled afterwards.

[@legoeasycompany]

I really like the analogy of the kido butai hitting Rabaul as a "drive by". It was also interesting that that despite the fact that the IJA air forces didn't want to commit much and when they finally did it all got wiped so quickly.

[@LTPottenger]

That's basically why it happened, they did pretty much everything wrong at the top level so big surprise.

[@MilitaryAviationHistory]

First video of 2021! Hope you all have a fantastic year and *THANK YOU* for all your time and feedback in 2020! If you love the content and want to support, now might be the best time: *-15% discount OFF on an annual membership* > www.patreon.com/join/Bismarck

[@jameslalumandier9797]

Great start 👏 and looking forward to your new 2021 content!

[@divarachelenvy]

Now that you have done this special I would love for you to do a special about the RAAF .... cheers

[@ianwhitchurch864]

Speaking of the Pacific theater, do you know the story of the Australian Boomerang ersatz fighter, and how it got designed by a Heinkel engineer who had been doing work for Mitsubishi ?

[@troystocker6179]

The Japanese aircraft engines were underpowered and the 20 mm cannon was slow

[@rayschoch5882]

Nicely done! My Dad arrived just as all this was ending (July, 1944, with VF-19 aboard the 2nd Lexington [CV-16]). He missed the Turkey Shoot, but was actively involved in Leyte Gulf, flying an F6F.

[@tharos]

Since I was a kid I could always find Rabaul on a map because it just kept on popping up in everything I would read about WWII, from some documentaries on the RAAF, to Combat Flight Simulator 2 which took place in the Pacific and finally with Black Sheep Squadron where Rabaul featured heavily, as well as other stuff here and there. This was another great video which contextualized a lot of the different phases of the South Pacific air war, and I definitely want to see more Pacific and South East Asia videos whenever you get the chance!

[@MilitaryAviationHistory]

Thank you! Yes, Rabaul is one of those key locations that keeps coming back.

[@mpetersen6]

@@MilitaryAviationHistory I'm sure it's been pointed out but Truk Lagoon is no where near Rabual

[@reggiekoestoer1511]

CFS 2!! Good old days...

[@lamwen03]

@@mpetersen6 Truk was THE major staging port for IJN forces in the South Pacific. Rabaul might be considered not only a defensive bastion for Truk, but a forward staging base for operations against Australia.

[@apga1998]

@@MilitaryAviationHistory Rabaul has changed very little since its days as a Japanese stronghold. You can still see Japanese equipment hidden in the surrounding mountains. A trip to the Australian and empire cemetery is a must. It is a place of sadness, beauty and dignity. New Britain had been an Australian mandatory territory between the wars. The small garrison based in Rabaul was little more than a canary in a coal mine, without hope of resupply or rescue. My sympathies to the families of these men.

[@fazole]

In a nutshell, the Japanese never seriously considered the impossibility of logistically supplying all those island bases and how much US submarines could interdict supplies to those bases. Furthermore, the top brass really just seemed incompetent or stuck in the past. Aggressive when caution was necessary and timid when boldness was required. Attack plans that were overly complicated and which required excellent coordination, which the communications of the time wouldn't allow.

[@LTPottenger]

Yeah they are generals who never heard of logistics lol What they did there made perfect sense, but once they lost at midway it was game over. And midway itself made no sense at all, and pearl harbor made no sense unless they were going to follow through and occupy or at least totally wipe out pear harbor in which case there's nothing USA can even do for next couple years.

[@thethirdman225]

*_"In a nutshell, the Japanese never seriously considered the impossibility of logistically supplying all those island bases and how much US submarines could interdict supplies to those bases."_* I'm reluctant to completely agree because in reality, things are almost never that simple. But what you're saying is certainly correct and if anyone needs a refresher on what _was_ achieved by the US submarine service, Clay Blair's book _"Silent Victory"_ is a good starting point. That said, submarine warfare was only one aspect of a much larger overall strategy. For all of the arguments about the American contribution to victory in the war in Europe (and I'm not suggesting anything either way), the war in the Pacific was arguably America's most difficult and most successful theatre of operations. They learnt hard and they learnt fast and I think because they were the senior command in theatre - as opposed to Europe where success had so many fathers - the strategy was clearer. But from the simple point of view of size, the Pacific war was an 11/10 for difficulty.

[@thethirdman225]

@@LTPottenger That was the naval war. The Air war and the ground war - both of which were still very dependent on naval power - were less easy to understand and that's really what this video is about. The carrier fleet was Japan's striking arm, rather than her defensive arm. But even after four carriers were lost at Midway and the remaining carriers lost shortly after, Japan still retained a fairly formidable navy and land based air force, at least from the point of view of her ability to defend.

[@EllieMaes-Grandad]

@@LTPottenger The Pearl Harbor attack was not as perfect as some movies suggest. Having got within striking distance, no 'loiter time' was incorporated, although a Sunday morning attack was a well-timed idea. Battleships were yesterday's power, as the sinking of HMS Repulse and PofW proved. Had the oil tanks, repair facilities and submarines been hit, the effect would have been less spectacular but ultimately more effective. A few mines in the entrance would have been useful too. They should have bought delayed-action magnetic, acoustic and pressure mines from Germany. Loiter time would have allowed maybe a day or two for the carriers to re-appear, never mind enough time to type out the final part of the message, which a competent typist would have kept confidential anyway

[@LTPottenger]

@@EllieMaes-Grandad The battleships could have leveled the whole harbor and anything in it, that is what they are designed for. Nagumo also had plenty more fuel and bombs to attack. If the US carriers had come (enterprise would be there next day) what will they do against 6 carriers waiting for them? Nothing, that's what.

[@xxcelr8rs]

My Dad flew 30 missions tail gunning photographing in B25, I heard of all the places. Island hopping he called it. I wish he could have lived longer to listen to you men talk this history that he lived. I don't think he ever really got over it. A lot of near death experiences.

[@studdruppo]

God bless him 🙏

[@GregsAirplanesandAutomobiles]

I guess my time on the treadmill tomorrow with be 28 mins and 28 seconds.

[@parkercook288]

I always listen to these at the gym haha, and I just finished your recent Catalina video. Great stuff!

[@bryanjacobs5897]

Lol

[@camostorm]

So how did I go? Lol

[@GregsAirplanesandAutomobiles]

@@camostorm Well, I'm still fat, but the video was awesome.

[@SlavicCelery]

@@GregsAirplanesandAutomobiles Greg try to be more body positive, or you might be accused of fatshaming! Side note: I would never say that, LOVE your channel!

[@cannonfodder4376]

A fantastic and informative video. And Bis's "oof" when the IJN asked the Army for air support. 😂😂

[@harshanasamarakoon1086]

Wish my University lectures were as half as interesting as these!!! Wonderful video. Absolutely loved it!

[@laurencetilley9194]

Truk Lagoon is one of the best dive sites in the South Pacific. It is a Naval grave yard with many sunken wrecks.

[@verysilentmouse]

thank you as an Australian amateur historian I thought I could hum the tune of the south pacific war I was surprised by how close it all was to Australia and it was all interconnected at the strategic level. (this is what happens when you only look at tactical maps) This video among many other from this channel will continue to help me write my AU fantasy World War Witch Series though Im not even close to 42 let alone 44 :) thank you once again for your efforts

[@chrisdebeyer1108]

Very good indeed to get your perspectives on this important battlefield. (My father was in it) Some ironies about the Bismark Sea. Given the importance of Aircraft on both sides it would be good to mention Beauforts of No 100 Squadron RAAF and Beaufighters of No 30 Squadron RAAF made a significant contribution to the Allies success against the Japanese forces in the Bismark Sea.

[@richardcall7447]

Great video! There's just one thing wrong. It has recently been found that English speaking people have been mispronouncing the name Truk for years. It's not pronounced, "truck", it's actually pronounced, "trook", where the double "o" sounds the same as it sounds in "roof".

[@michaelmonfils2642]

Great video, guys! Many of the IJAAF's aircraft that were destroyed in the attacks were already suffering from very low serviceablity rates due to understaffed, undertrained and physically ill and underfed maintenance crews. The Aichi-built copies of the DB 601 engines in the Ki. 61 fighters exhibited numerous problems in that environment. Logistics and supply were especially sporadic and poor in those remote regions as well. The traditional Japanese ethos with its emphasis on offense and individual fighting prowess led to a lack of understanding or appreciation of the importance of non-combat supportive operational functions and roles in modern warfare. Their literature reveals that they were often just glad that they even got as many planes from the factories out to the combat zones so many thousands of miles away from the home islands as they did. Food, gas, spare parts, etc. were another thing entirely. The Americans after mid-1943 were in an entirely different league altogether.

[@parvuspeach]

this man has his own Sea, respect!

[@JoseJimenez-sh1yi]

@Edgar Miller Bismark sea

[@projectpacer]

Another good read on this topic is "Air Combat at 20 Feet: Selected Missions from A Strafer Pilot's Diary" by Garrett Middlebrook

[@joematthews2446]

This is unbelievably high quality content

[@francisbusa1074]

I must say, your knowledge of the history of this area of operations during the war impresses me. Thank you. I recall reading Saburo Sakai's book 'Samurai" when I was young, not all that long after the war, and a great deal of what you men are saying here tallys with what I remember from the book. As an old Navy vet, and a naval and Pacific War history junkie, I really appreciate your channel. I'll subscribe. Well done, men! Carry on.

[@Happy11807]

Sakai was knocked out of the war very early in the South Pacific August 42 I believe! Everything he referred to in his book was second hand information about that time !

[@ovk-ih1zp]

The Imperial Japanese failures were a fundamental & Systematic collapse of Tactical/Strategic Doctrine AND Logistics. BOTH the Japanese AND Allied(American) forces were at the tail end of a MONSTEROUSLY Long Logistical chain(Australia did provide a secure Logistical Hub for the Allies, but it still was a gigantic strain to move supplies from the US/Commonwealth TO Australia)which made EVERYTHING harder, but Japan failed to maintain a secure supply chain AND failed to understand how vulnerable the bases were & in doing so failed to provide sufficient structural defenses for the tip of their Offensive Spear. They essentially placed all of their "Eggs" in a single small doggie bag & allowed Allies forces stroll over & smash that "Bag" with a wrecking ball REPEATDLLY. As long as Japan was unable to strangle Logistics to Allied Air/Ground forces, the outcome was an inevitable conclusion. They Could NOT Win, under ANY circumstances.

[@princeofcupspoc9073]

I really hope people give up on that ridiculous trope "the outcome was inevitable." Just keep in mind that no one in the world expected Germany to roll over France. And they would not have except for the complete command breakdown. Wars are POLITICAL actions, and in politics, things could have gone in any extreme direction.

[@pleasedontdestroy4851]

@@princeofcupspoc9073 Well that is a bit different, France did have a better army, yet they still used a very similar command structure to WWI. The allies were in a bad logistical spot not because of their numbers but do the to refugees coming toward their armies from the Benelux, and the horrible command structure in France, the failure in French command to recognize the importance of reconnaissance and that is should be taken seriously. And you have to remember France capitulated in around 45 days, unlike the Japanese who were suffering from attrition, and lack of strength in their army, the French encirclement is different than island hoping in many ways, it was one large blow France took that destroyed two of France’s best armies and the BEF forces.

[@joem3999]

I have been reading on the air war on the eastern and western fronts for 20 years. Yet I never really studied the pacific air war. Very neat facts here. Similar in some ways to the German situation in Russia. At least logistics wise. It's always logistics that win or lose wars it seems.

[@ovk-ih1zp]

@@princeofcupspoc9073 The problem is that a "Political" Victory was Japans ONLY hope. Every other outcome ended in a Japanese Defeat, & once it appeared (& was pushed as) a "Sucker Punch" first attack instead of a Diplomatic SNAFU AND the evidence of mistreatment of both western combatants & noncombatants, the American public would not & the Politicians could not accept ANYTHING but a crushing of their opponent. If the Atomic bombs weren't developed & the US invaded the home islands that blood letting WOULD have had a significant impact on morale & opinions in the US, but this was still at a time that had a mindset of "Finish What You Start" & US policy would STILL have led to Massive Casualties on both sides before the end. The only real hope that Imperial Japan EVER had was if Roosevelt could be intimidated, or his successors could be intimidated & that was not going to happen. The Man in the High Castle scenario was an impossibility & would never had happened. To paraphrase Commander Adama in BSG 2003, "Rolling a Hard Eight" as your ONLY diplomatic hope does not a Foreign Policy make. US population numbers, natural resources & excess industrial capacity stacked EVERY other factor & variable AGAINST a successful Japanese final victory except a political one & that is just too long odds to place a bet that could burn your country down around you on.

[@immikeurnot]

Americans have always been... adaptable. Guys at the pointy end have always been willing to throw doctrine out the window and shrug off any consequences that might come. One of the things that comes to mind is that a lot of B-25 mods like the nose with 8 .50s or the version mounting the 75mm version came from field mods created in-theater by aircrews. Completely unauthorized (initially), "but what are they gonna do? Send me to North Africa??"

[@hughboyd2904]

Loved this interview/ discussion between you two. Very listenable and very informative, and yes, I’ve gone straight to the AWM website to read Shindo’s article. As an Australian I’m loving the recent focus on the South Pacific theatre of WW2, and yes, I watched your attack on Lae video too.

[@thethirdman225]

You should read Bergerud’s _’Fire in the Sky’_ and Anthony Cooper’s amazing book, _’Darwin Spitfires’._

[@blue387]

Eric Bergerud's book is excellent for covering the Australian perspectives on the south Pacific theater, something I have never read about here in America

[@murraystewartj]

Thanks, guys. Good discussion. What I love about you guys is how you recommend sources so those inclined can do further reading. As a former history teacher I approve. Good work, and cheers.

[@Engine33Truck]

Excellent video! Side note, I love these photos you found of TBD Devastators being useful. Such beautiful aircraft, and were the most advanced torpedo bombers in the world when introduced. But woefully obsolete by 1941, and only really famous these days for being slaughtered at Midway.

[@earlyriser8998]

That was a very nice summation of a complex topic.

[@MilitaryAviationHistory]

Thank you

[@themajesticmagnificent8561]

Great discussion with a good delivery of facts.Thank you👍

[@mihaiserafim]

That's what I like! Two swift strikes and another subject is on the ground... done. Thank you guys, great work!

[@ricmadeira]

This was awesome! You two rock! Thank you for the video.

[@icewaterslim7260]

My dad was in on some of this in one of the first three low level parafrag bomb groups as an A20 and A26 gunner. Compared to the carnage endured by 8th AF Bomb crews, particularly early on, he said they were relatively much safer missions with very good P38 escort service. He said they'd be in there and out before the IJA knew what hit 'em. Pictures will show, as your guest says, parachuted ordinance falling on very accessible scantily camouflaged targeted aircraft (often already in a state of disrepair) on hastilly prepared rudimentary airstrips and with the exception of West New Guinea not much in the way of antiaircraft defenses until getting much closer to the home Islands.

[@Digmen1]

Wow, Ive always loved reading about WW2, but I did not know much about this campaign. Your first ten minutes and the maps are very interesting and well done.

[@apstrike]

I don't think this video gets to the heart of the matter. I may be unduly influenced by Kenney's memoir, but the United States won by New Guinea by exploiting intelligence, seizing the initiative, and developing a number of innovative new tactics like skip bombing and parachute fragmentation bombs. For me the essential question is why Japan did none of these things first? Is it a failure of conception? Is it inter-service rivalry? Is it limited resources? Certainly the latter two were factors, as you note, but it's entirely unclear to me whether the Japanese understood the depth and breadth of the air campaign against them, and if they did exactly how they attempted to counter it.

[@immikeurnot]

Because Japanese culture is primarily one of seeing something good and making improvements to it after copying it. American culture is primarily one of "hold my beer." The top-down vs bottom-up work ethic in evidence.

[@aikishugyo]

@@immikeurnot Bad leadership number one factor. Starting with entering into war in the first place. Top-down control rather than leadership, no decentralized leadership or responsibility, and obviously no training or explanation of commander's intent to facilitate any of these things. Thus, the importance of things actually critical to mission success on the front lines was never grasped. And sort of overriding in all of this, no value seen in the actual human beings fighting the war.

[@motorheadrocker6504]

Thank you for another great video! I can give one more reading recommendation: John R.Bruning's - Jungle ace. This is a book about 5th Air Force 49th FG ace Gerald Johnson's adventures. Many events you talking about in this video is described in "Jungle ace", such as bombing of Wewak and many 5th AF raids on Rabaul. Really great book!

[@leonardoglesby1730]

My father flew with Johnson in the 9th Fighter Squadron, and recalls him as a great CO. That he flew as Johnson's wingman on many of his early missions, and that the two of them enjoyed flying formation aerobatics for fun. My father also has brief mention in Bruning's book. Another 9th FS ace, Grover Fanning is my Godfather.

[@stellarpod]

Excellent summation. I've ordered the South Pacific Airwar trilogy and look forward to diving into it. As always, thank you for sharing. Steve

[@lucasner463]

One factor that I recall clearly from Fire In the Sky were the details on how abysmal the Japanese aircraft maintenance and repair facilities and capabilities were throughout the campaign and the devastating affect they had on in-service rates. It explained all the photos of captured Japanese airfields littered with dozens unservicable aircraft.( many of which were later quickly repaired by allied troops) The allies easily repaired their own aircraft when seemingly simple, easily repaired damage and mechanical problems resulted in Japanese planes being pushed off to the edge of the fields and were never repaired.

[@BOBXFILES2374a]

That's because Toyota didn't build those planes.....

[@dimitrirebutsikas4353]

PLEASE CONSIDER THE FACT THAT THE JAPANESE CODE WAS KNOWN TO THE US MILITARIES SINCE MIDWAY ( JUNE 1942 ). SO MANY US OPERATIONS WERE SUCCESSFUL , INCLUDING MIDWAY AND THE HITTING OF ADMIRAL YAMAMOTO'S PLANE ON APRIL 18 , 1943 .... AND MUCH MORE. THE JAPANESE WERE VERY BRAVE BUT THEY HAD NO CHANCE WINNING AGAINST THE AMERICANS.

[@barryfleming8488]

Knowing the the code is irrelevant unless we were risking discovery targeting logistics first.

[@jacksavage4098]

Darn, another great offering. Really enjoyed this mix.

[@lyndondowling2733]

You failed to mention the Battle of the Coral Sea. and its significance. The plan was to invade Port Moresby and take the allies out of New Guinea. Making the major base at Rabul more secure. Also enabling Japan to threaten Australia more so. Loss of the Battle also has a knock on effect at the Battle of Midway. The Phiric victory of the Battle of Coral sea. and not taking Port Moresby started the rot that affected the prosecution of the Air war that sector.

[@seanmac1793]

i am not sure one could even call coral sea a victory.

[@lyndondowling2733]

@@seanmac1793 Tactical victory to Japan. But a Phyric one. Because it was it saved Port Moresby from Invasion and therefore long term a Strategic Victory for the Allies.

[@seanmac1793]

@@lyndondowling2733 at the risk of being pedantic Google defines Tactics as "an action or strategy carefully planned to achieve a specific end." if we use this definition then we can't say it's a tactical victory. Also another thing that factors into my analysis is that Japan had to concede the field

[@lyndondowling2733]

@@seanmac1793 History has proven you wrong. The Japanese inflicted significant losses on the American task force and many scholars see the battle of The Coral Sea as a tactical victory for Japan. However, as I stated the fact that the Invasion of New Guinea from the South was prevented it was a Phyric victory only for the Japanese.

[@seanmac1793]

@@lyndondowling2733 I know the historical concise and there is some disagreement on that along the lines my defentional argument earlier. I will continue to point to the fact that the Japanese accomplished none of their objectives and had to concede the field, in my mind this is a Japanese defeat.

[@4shink]

My uncle-in-law flew with the 499th squadron/ 345th bomb group (b-25 straffers). I have closely read the official history of the 345th and would note that ground and ship borne flak was significant in some target areas (Wewak, Rabaul, Truk, Hollandia) and accounted for the large majority of operational losses. Based on the official history and records, air-to-air combat losses were a relatively low proportion of the total that did include training and non-combat mechanical failures.

[@glynwelshkarelian3489]

I looked things up as you went along. I have now noticed that you have links to sources in the description. It is a conundrum that people who want to know more will pause and look it up. People who are going to disagree will disagree regardless.

[@Idahoguy10157]

The Japanese Army Air Service major war experience was in China. Where they barely needed to protect their airfields from Chinese air attack. They were behind the power curve dealing with the Australians and Americans

[@alexius23]

Worth noting 5th Air Force was the red haired stepchild for the US. It was on the bottom of the totem poll for supplies, air frames & pilots/air crews

[@WALTERBROADDUS]

the guys in Alaska and CBI would beg to differ.

[@mpetersen6]

In the pecking order it was probably CBI, Aluetians, SW Pacific with CBI at the bottom. CBI was really more of a British operational area. The Aluetians. Cold and wet. SW Pacific. Hot and wetter. Next up the food chain would be Italy.

[@gort8203]

Let me guess: Logistics, logistics, and logistics.

[@Mr00Ted]

With a side order of I N D U S T R I A L C A P A C I T Y

[@LTPottenger]

Stupidity, stupidity, stupidity. They made an unneeded attack on midway otherwise US would have let them have free reign for at least 2 years.

[@pawsnpistons]

The answer is simple. A relatively small country like japan or germany cant win against all the other countrys.

[@fulcrum2951]

These kinds of answers are the worst

[@LeavingGoose046]

@@LTPottenger The idea on Midway was they knew they had to cease the American will to fight and would not win in a prolong engagement and so they needed to bait the carriers into a decisive battle. The only issue is they had poor intelligence and so the Americans laid a trap and annihilated them.

[@sanguma]

New Britain, Kokopo and Rabaul, absolutley stunning place to visit. Incredibly beautiful and welcoming to visitors. Had a great time there in 2016 also seeing the memorials and museums about ww1 and ww2.

[@seanmac1793]

anything on the day to day that Japanese garrison did when they were cut off and under segie for 2 years

[@sanguma]

@@seanmac1793 its not a wealthy country but the memorials are well kept. the meuseums are more collections of artifacts, less reaserched story presentations. You can go into Yamamoto's command Bunker for example.

[@seanmac1793]

@@sanguma ah okay thanks for the info

[@jimwegerer5988]

I was hoping you’d do a collaboration with Justin sometime, I might have to put this video on a repeating loop for about a WEEK.

[@thatsme9875]

Hi, have you read 'The Miraculous Torpedo Squadron" by Mori Juzo, translated from the Japanese by Nicholas Voge, and available on Kindle? Juzo-san participated in the attack on Pearl Harbour and survived the war! I found this to be a great read, from an interesting perspective.

[@ronaldmiller6930]

Lots of details that are seldom explained. Good job.

[@hlynnkeith9334]

Two items: 1. IIRC the New Guinea campaign took place in the Southwest Pacific theater of operations. The South Pacific theater was different. But you know that. 2. I may be mistaken, but I do not recall that you two once mentioned General George Kenney. He commanded the USAAF in the Southwest Pacific. He made the most of his resources.

[@DrydockDreamsGames]

Wah, double Sensei-Combo! Me likes!

[@MilitaryAviationHistory]

Can't wait for that vertical slice ;)

[@anttitheinternetguy3213]

Veeewy honorabru 🏯

[@Thecrownswill]

Where's my damn task force admiral huh?

[@leonardoglesby1730]

Thanks for getting around to the SW Pacific. My father joined the USAAF 49th Fighter Group, 9th Fighter Squadron in 1943 at Dobodura, New Guinea, initially flying P-47D. In late 1943 the 9th FS switched back to P-38L's. He moved to various airfields through the advance up the NG coast. He was then part of the Leyte invasion with his squadron being the first tactical unit into Tacloban, Leyte in October 1944. He the took part in the Okinawa Campaign, and was one of the escort pilots for the Japanese "Surrender Betties" from Japan to Ishima. He is now 97.

[@brianwilliams9605]

There is a book on the complete history of the Japanese zero from the AM56 Claude through every version to the AM65 Zero including descriptions of individual combat. Martin Caidin. Zero Fighter. Introduction by Saburo Sakai. Purnell's history of the second word war. Weapons volume 9. It has the designer of the zero talking about every version and the problems encountered that led to versions not being built and the failures as a combat aircraft as the allies got better aircraft. It has allied and Japanese pilots telling their stories and dozens of photos.

[@jameslalumandier9797]

I think that a discussion about the Japanese anti aircraft capabilities or lack of would being an interesting subject. Some discussion has been had regarding the low success on the naval ships but their inability to defend their bases even when they knew attacks were coming and certain bases had been identified as "must have" the Japanese could not muster enough AA to scare anyone and very few allied aircraft seem to have been lost compared to other theaters. Just a thought

[@kullprit5610]

Awesome, Interesting, well presented. Please don't stop!

[@paxwallacejazz]

Rebaul was brilliantly just isolated and ignored into defeat or insignificance ultimately. Over 100,000 Japanese personal taken outa the fight without a fight. Douglas McCarther took credit maybe it was his plan but it's an action straight outa the Art of War.

[@haldorasgirson9463]

Was there anything MacArther didn't take credit for? He claimed the Army Airforce won Midway.

[@t5ruxlee210]

Tiny hint for everyone: "Ordnance (pronounced ord - nance) cannon or artillery. military weapons with their equipment, ammunition, etc. the branch of an army that procures, stores, and issues, weapons, munitions, and combat vehicles and maintains arsenals for their development and testing". or•di•nance ôr′dn-əns► n. An authoritative command or order. n. A custom or practice established by long usage. Constantly trips up native speakers of English, let alone those newly engaged in trying to cope with it.

[@zechariahtlee]

I can finally put a face to Justin's voice. Great information about the Pacific theater. I'm looking forward to being less ignorant.

[@janrobertbos]

Excellent video!!!! Thanks guys!!!

[@Articulate99]

Always interesting, thank you.

[@WTH1812]

The cost of Japan's failure to protect its airfields was best demonstrated on Guadalcanal. Holding the airfield may have changed the entire course of the Pacific War. But by not heavily fortifying their airfield (which was under construction) with ground forces and artillery they lost it to the US, which quickly completed it and used it to provide the only Allied air power when the US carriers were damaged and run off. ... Without the "Cactus Air Force" defending the island, Japan could easily bomb the US troop and supply ships from the air at their leisure. And Japanese surface ships would have almost unfettered access to the landings as the US battleships and cruisers in the area seemed to be able to do nothing but provide targets for multiple night actions they lost spectacularly. ... And this begs the question, "Why didn't the US build an airfield and staging base on Nendo Island about 350 miles to the east?" It would put Guadalcanal within easy range of US bombers and P-38s while staying completely out of range of Japanese aircraft and overextend Japanese surface ships and submarines.

[@Kim-the-Dane-1952]

Hi guys... that was a great video. I am a big fan of the way you did this. Very detailed and informative. It forms a nice companion piece to the video that Drach did a while ago on the naval campaign in the Solomon Islands and it is very interesting to compare the differences of experiences of navy vs air power.

[@guyh9992]

The majority of people commenting don't seem to have watched the video or else are preoccupied with making points that have nothing to do with it.

[@70sVRsignalman]

My late childhood neighbour was an RAAF air gunner in GAF Blenheims flying over New Guinea, and in his experience it was primarily Japanese groundfire that he encountered, and he only saw one Japanese airplane in the sky, so that was after the Wewak disaster. The other point that needs emphasising is that the SW Pacific Area, especially New Guinea, is extremely wet and humid, and not really conducive to maintaining aircraft easily, and that is without considering the inability of Japan to adequately maintain a supply system to its forces in the SW Pacific. The Allies at least had access to supply and repair facilities in Australia, Japan lacked a suitably endowed location close by. ( I am aware that "close" is a relative concept here. ) By necessity, the RAAF / USAAF ran airplane maintenance pools to keep as many aircraft as serviceable as possible, and in this regard the P40s were found to be a rugged and maintainable airplane in what are inhospitable conditions. In other videos, comment has been made about the combination of factors that impinge on the value of a particular airplane type, and I think this is particularly true of the SW Pacific where the geographic location just made airplane operations so much more difficult than elsewhere. I would venture that carrier based aircraft, especially after the Central Pacific Carrier Task Forces got into their stride were a lot easier to keep up to strength than was the case in the SW Pacific. Contrast my neighbours experience with a retired workmates experience of being an air gunner in RAAF / NEI B25 Mitchells, which regularly did missions over what was then the Dutch East Indies, now Indonesia, where Japanese air interception was a regular occurrence. Great video, and very informative.

[@hoodoo2001]

Japan lost the air war because they were a 3rd rate industrial power and picked a fight with the greatest industrial power in the world, which was already known in 1941. When did Japan lose the war with the US? December 7, 1941.

[@0Turbox]

Exactly, they had only 1/3 of the German military industrial output, let alone comparing it to the USA.

[@Cyberdactyl]

Mmmm, if the carriers had been at Pearl Harbor, the US might have been forced to sue for some kind of tragic and ugly treaty.

[@jamesricker3997]

They were expecting Germany to tired more allied resources than they did

[@fix0the0spade]

@@Cyberdactyl Very unlikely, the US built 21 Fleet Carriers and 70 Escort Carriers in three and a half years. If they lost all 3 Pacific Fleet carriers at Pearl Harbour the US Navy would have gone to war with 4 Fleet carriers initially instead of 7 and still flattened the IJN eventually through attrition.

[@filthyweaboo2694]

Japan wasn't the strongest power in terms of it's economy, but it's a outright lie to say that they're a 3rd rate power, and insult to the Allies who fought for nearly 5 years with the Japanese... Japan *is* a 1st rate power. 3rd rate powers would be Chinese warlord states, Siam or Belgium. A 2nd rate power is Netherlands or similar... A 3rd rate power wouldn't indirectly cause the British Empire's destruction. A 3rd rate power wouldn't fight for nearly 5 years with two most powerful countries on earth, just to surrender on their own accord rather than be occupied and forced to surrender. A 3rd rate power wouldn't build the two largest battleship on earth. A 3rd rate power doesn't fight a war for 8 years with it's much larger and populous neighbour and reduce him to a level of a rump state, while for 4 of these 8 years also fighting half the globe.

[@oneknight55]

Thank you for the comprehensive video about the Air War in the South Pacific. It makes me wonder if it wasn't arrogance on the Japanese part, due to all the success they achieved prior to these campaigns, that they didn't think anyone could hurt their air fields? It seems kind of basic in retrospect, but hind sight is always 20/20. Thanks again.

[@Aspir3xx]

Most of the War Material had been focused on the Navy leaving the Army and Air Force little to no material to produce a lot of essential things needed

[@jamesricker3997]

That was the symptom of the problem not the real problem Japan did not have the industrial capability to supply it's Army Air Force and Naval aviation The Japanese made the right choice, they were seriously outnumbered if the Allies got to within range of their land base aircraft it was all over for them

[@chuck.reichert83]

If the Japanese had taken a look at early British losses at their airfields, they may have changed the design of their own and potential losses would have been lessened.

[@gizmophoto3577]

I appreciated the quick mention of Eric Bergerud’s work. I’ve spotted his book Fire in the Sky on your bookshelf, and highly recommend it. And Lundstrom’s work is groundbreaking.

[@aseriesguy]

5th USAAF had some unique tactics for vertical envelopment. Pioneers were air dropped on a good spot for an airstrip high on a mountainous island behind the Japanese. Natives were hired to cut the tall grass. Engineers flew in with heavy equipment. 2 1/2 ton trucks were cut in half and flown in on two C-47s then welded back together. In a few days a rough fighter strip was ready and then expanded from there.

[@69Applekrate]

great topic and discussion. thank you

[@amadeusamwater]

Japanese air power dropped off not because of a lack of planes, but the lack of trained pilots. US subs sank so many tankers that Japan did not have enough fuel to give their pilots the training they needed.

[@mpetersen6]

Off course for the Americans and to a lesser extent the Australians* they had the problem of the South Pacific Area of Operations under Nimtz and the Southwest Pacific Area of Operations under everybody's favorite target of scorn old Dugout Doug himself. Nimitz saw the SW Pacific as little more than a side show. Mcarthur saw the SW Pscific almost as a sacred crusade as he had given his word the he would return. Nimitz wanted to defeat the primary means that Japan had to project power. The IJN. Midway started that process. Milne Bay started the process of defeating the primary tool of the Japanese Empire in subjugating the various nations and colonies of the region. In terms of logistics the South (and Central) Pacific certainly got more support in terms of material to start with. In some ways the SW Pacific was the Italian campaign of the Pacific region. And the boundry between the two meant was situated between the Solomon's/Bismarcks and New Guinea. This tended to complicate things between different commands. Army ground forces on New Guinea had a very difficult time getting any Naval support. I would assume that Nimitz had a hard time getting B-17s and later B-24s from the 5th Air Force to support him. A word on Mcarthur. I know he gets a bad rap from several vectors. His ego deserves it. But once the Buna area was secured by joint operations of Australian units and the 32nd Division USA in a campaign that was more costly than it should have been he perfected the leapfrogging operations that isolated various IJA units and strongholds along the north coast. The Buna campaign was made more difficult due to the near lack of artillery support. Partly this was due to General George Kenney desire to have his aircraft act in the role if artillery support. The USArmy and the Australians both learned valuable lessons at Buna-Gona. But at a cost. In terms of casualties the forces involved had a 1 in 11 chance of death versus 1 in 36 on Guadalcanal. *The Australians bore a large brunt of the fighting at Buna as they were engaged longer. The 32nd initially performed poorly. The major factor as they were ill trained. Of factor in this is from around January 1942 until the first elements landed at Port Moresby (by air) they had spent most of the intervening months preparing to move, in transit and setting up new training facilities. They had no training in jungle operations. In many ways it should be expected that the first units to be deployed to perform poorly in that state. My father was in the 32nd in early 42. At this time the division was converted from a square division with 4 infantry regiments to a triangular formation with three infantry regiments. The artillery unit my father was in was attached to the separated infantry regiment. That regiment went somewhere else and my father wound up in North Africa and Italy (173rd Field Artillery Group). The 32nd itself would go on to having more days in combat as defined by the US Army than any other US division. It was still involved in combat operations after the Japanese surrender in August 45.

[@BobSmith-dk8nw]

My understanding is that the reason they had poor artillery support at Buna was the difficulty of getting the guns there. As far as Naval Support - there was some reluctance to send ships into some areas because they weren't sure about the charts - but - the Navy was there when MacArthur wanted an amphibious operation - he just didn't need as many of them in New Guinea because it wasn't an Island as things were in the Solomon's. .

[@mpetersen6]

@@Salmon_Rush_Die The New Guinea Campaign is a text book case post Buna-Gona of how to defeat enemy by fighting them as little as possible. Going into Buna the US Army really had no idea what they were facing. I do hold MacArthur responsible for one thing though. His insistence that Pelileu be secured. That was most likely an un-nessecary fight in hindsight. The US Navy pulled out of supporting a beachhead more than once. As to Nimitz. Tarawa was as bad as it was for a couple of reasons. One in planning staff officers really did not take into account the tidal conditions properly. That cost the Marine landing force badly. Second is the effect of naval gunfire support pre landing was vastly over estimated. The whole reason Tarawa and a number of other operations in the Central Pacific was those islands sat astride the line of advance. In reality the airfields on Tarawa could probably been neutralized with out taking the islands. But they really didn't know that then. Kewajilan and Ewientok were seized because they provided anchorages. The Marianas provided the site for airfields needed for the bombing campaign against the Home islands. Also Guam was US territory. The Marianas also were astride the lines of communications to the Phillipines. Iwo Jima was providing bases for Japanese interceptors attacking B-29s on both the outward and return portions of missions. Their were probably more aircrew that survived than Marines that were killed on Iwo. Because of the reduced fighter bases, the availability of an emergency field and P-51 escorts. In terms of the size of the forces involved a lot of the operations in the Pacific were not that large compared to Europe and the Eastern Front. In total I think the USMC suffered around 16K killed in action for the whole war.

[@BobSmith-dk8nw]

@@Salmon_Rush_Die Yeah. I've heard that before. It's pretty much bull shit. The difference between the Army Landings in New Guinea and the Philippines and those in the Central Pacific was that the former islands were much larger and the - _Americans_ - had a lot more choice in where they were going to land. They could and did, in fact, build their own airfield on a nice flat spot they had noticed that the Japanese hadn't. They were able to do that - because you could fit almost ... in not in fact _all_ of the islands in the Central Pacific inside the bounds of New Guinea and still have room left over. (I'm not able to actually check that assertion - but - my point is - that this assertion could well be valid). The _Americans_ (Army and Marines) landing on smaller islands - didn't have that choice. There were not necessarily other places they could go. If there were - they went there - as was done on New Guinea - so they did on Guadalcanal, New Britain and Bougainville, where they just took enough land to have an airfield - defended it well - and let the Japanese try to attack them. But there often wasn't any place else they could go. So - not only did they have to land on these islands to take the airfields there - but - the Japanese knew it. So - these small islands were well fortified bastions and difficult to take. If they didn't need a particular island - they by passed it - patrolled it with aircraft to keep an eye on the Japanese there - and let them rot. But - on places like Iwo Jima - there was no where else to go. Japanese radar on that island detected the incoming B-29's bombing Japan and Japanese fighters on that island were intercepting them. They needed to take that island away from the Japanese and use it themselves - which they did. Then - the B-29's had a spot for emergency landings and P-51's could escort them to their targets from the air fields on Iwo Jima. Yes - the Marines paid a terrible price for taking that island - but they didn't have a choice. That island HAD to be taken. It just so happened - that MacArthur didn't have to make any choices like that. So - the difference here - is not MacArthur's care for his men - but geography. MacArthur's force in the Philippines in 1941 - where he had run the army for a number of years - was defeated by an amphibiously landed, numerically inferior force - and - his men ended up starving on their home ground. He had 8 hours of warning from Pearl Harbor - yet what happened? His air commander wanted to attack the Japanese on Taiwan before they could attack them - but MacArthur wouldn't let him. In Korea he landed at Inchon - and then headed for Seoul - just like Clark heading for Rome. There were better beaches to the south where he could have concentrated on cutting off the North Korean Army and destroying it - but no - he wanted the ... glory? ... of taking back the Capital. Once into North Korea - he didn't believe people who told him the Chinese had come in - and the result was a disaster. MacArthur was a good regimental commander in WWI - and - he did a good job of governing Japan after WWII - but - he has some monumental fuck ups to his credit too ... MacArthur trying to tell Nimitz how to run the war in the Pacific made about as much sense as would King trying to tell Eisenhower how to run the war in Europe. The man was an egotistical jack ass who surrounded himself (except for Kenney) with yes men. He should have been sacked like Short and Kimmel - but - the mood of the country had changed - and they wanted a hero - so they gave him a Medal of Honor instead ... .

[@guyh9992]

Buna became much easier when the Stuart light tanks were manhandled off the small coastal ships MacArthur had purchased to comprise the "Ragtag Fleet". Mission X was the official name for the fleet. Immortalised in the film The Wackiest Ship in the Army. The real issue was the lack of naval support and suitable shipping making it hard to bring in artillery and armour.

[@BobSmith-dk8nw]

@@guyh9992 Lack of naval support? I think the guys on the Lexington might dispute that ... I had a friend whose brother was on an LST sunk of Lae ... who might dispute that too. This is a statement typical of MacArthur supporters - where they blame the Navy for not providing things the Army was supposed to provide for themselves and failed to do. On Bataan - it was the Army's responsibility to feed their troops - and they didn't do it. The Navy found a way to feed their sailors - but the Army didn't. The Army had the whole of the Philippine Islands to draw on - and yet - they couldn't manage to stock pile supplies for the move into the Peninsula - which had been part of Plan Orange for years. MacArthur himself had been there for YEARS and yet - when his men fell back to Bataan - there were no stockpiles of supplies there. New Guinea fell within the area assigned to the Army. It was the Army's job to supply the units operating in New Guinea - and - they had the whole of _Australia_ to draw on for resources. The Navy was responsible for the South Pacific and was struggling as it was to feed the Marines on Guadalcanal with the shipping available and in the face of opposition by major units of the Japanese Navy. John Sheridan Fahnestock and Adam Bruce Fahnestock first came up with the idea of purchasing small boats to supply Bataan - but - nothing could be organized in time. This was the beginning of the Army's Small Ships Section of coastal vessels in the South West Pacific though and - _just as you would expect_ - these small ships were used to carry supplies to Army units in the shallow waters of the area. The small boats that served at Dunkirk - had already been organized by the RN - long before Dunkirk was an evacuation point. The RN had seen the possible need for such civilian auxiliaries and taken action to see that there was an organization in place to use them should the need arise. The _real issue_ here - is why the hell hadn't MacArthur seen a need for such things and organized them before hand in the Philippines? Organizing a Small Ships Section to supply New Guinea from Australia - was an obvious thing to do but it wasn't _MacArthur_ who thought of it and something that was not unusual for the Army to do. The Army had hundreds of boats and ships it used throughout the world - and yet - you don't hear the rest of the Army acting like this was some bit of brilliance that they had thought to do this. It was a normal part of Army Logistics. And so - once again - MacArthur takes credit for doing the obvious and denigrates the Navy for not doing HIS job. If you listen to MacArthur - the fact that he could tie his own shoes was a demonstration of his brilliance. .

[@supertorte1410]

After that video i would like to see a video about airfields. How are they constructed, run, defend etc. and is there a difference between us, uk, japan, german and russian airfields?

[@dylanmilne6683]

This sorta sounds like a good MHV video though. Maybe a bit of a colab?

[@johnreynolds7996]

Also the concept of "conservation of force", because once the allied forces struggled past the early days of what were, essentially, suicide missions (both in France in 1940 and in the Malaya/South West Pacific in early 1942) they took great care not to fritter away their air forces. Commit enough to hold the line, sure, but not at the expense of building up/concentrating your forces for Battles Yet To Come. Also, of course, the massive commitment to saving downed pilots. Submarines are themselves extremely valuable, but would be put at great risk to save a single downed pilot. Important stuff, but seldom discussed.

[@johnreynolds7996]

@@richardm3023 Well, truth be told of all your list the US airfields are the ones least likely to came under sustained air attack. Certainly not in the European theatre of war (except for Operation Bodenplatte), and apart from the Philippines and Guadalcanal seldom in the Pacific. It's much easier to construct airfields when you aren't stuck in a slit trench. I'm pretty certain that Henderson Field wasn't a pristine example of US airfield construction until after the Japanese conceded the campaign to retake the island.

[@kenneth9874]

The Americans could build an airfield in a matter of days which amazed the japanese

[@PewPr0]

Let me guess... Hellcat spam

[@MilitaryAviationHistory]

The answer might surprise you

[@TLTeo]

I was going to go with "because the BR system is broken"

[@martijn9568]

@@TLTeo Sounds better! Imagine having to attack a B-25 in your Ki-43.

[@PewPr0]

@@MilitaryAviationHistory It certainly did. Learned something new today, thanks!

[@MilitaryAviationHistory]

Thanks for watching :)

[@Enid2Sacramento]

I think I've read 75% of the books covering the Air War in Europe. Lately I've read "Race of Aces" and Don Hampton's "Operation Vengeance" covering parts of the Pacific campaign. I'm trying to get a copy of "Fabulous Fifteen" to keep the streak going. Really enjoyed your video.

[@thebigone6969]

You da greatest European military aviation historian in world history Chris!!!!! Thanks for this killer video!!!!!!

[@Snake-ms7sj]

Japan was never going to win a war against the US in the long run for a simple reason: resources. Japan is a chain of volcanic islands with little natural resources like steel and oil. They had quality military equipment but couldn't build or replace thier planes and ships at the rate the US could. Either could Germany. The amount of tanks, planes, and ships the US could produce in the later years of WW2 was insane.

[@NathanDudani]

*n

[@michaelhart7569]

​@@NathanDudani Correct. But I'm glad it was you, not me, that had to say it. Otherwise, yup. The Japanese, like Germany, lost from day one on grounds of population and economics. The US was at least half of calculated global GDP at the time and could not be invaded or significantly deprived of resources. Everything else is just detail.

[@wanyelewis9667]

@@michaelhart7569 plus, geography helps; a Boeing aircraft factory in Wichita or a North American Aviation factory in Dallas probably didn't have to worry about being carpet bombed 'round the clock.

[@simplyamazing880]

Why the Japanese lost. 1. They staked out an area that was so huge and provided almost nothing but more area to defend that it was indefensibl due . to the fact we could attack anywhere so they had to defend everywhere.. 2. They didn't have the secure natural resources to fight a war of attrition. 3. They didn't have the human resources to build a war fighting machine and manufacturing machine that would equal that of . the allies and what they had was vulnerable to attack. There was more but that's enough right there to lose them the war. My opinion.

[@martinmartinmartin2996]

Japan lost the war because: the entire GNP of Japan in 1941 was smaller than the GNP of New Jersey a single state of the USA !

[@lexchaotica190]

Japans booming economy paled but they were buoyed by 1905 war and the success against china/manchuria...The nasty surprise at The japanese received at khalkin gol/nomonhan prevented them from assisting their german allies at the outset of Barbarossa If they could not beat the crippled 3rd rate combined arms forces of the industrial peasantry of the USSR things were not looking good.The Pearl Harbour gambit-.They literally needed a fast knock out blow...against an advanced state with a resilient economy ...they should have never rolled the dice

[@TomD1999]

I thought the same when looking at the title of this youtube. Though the Japanese made a show of it out of sheer willpower in the early going, in the absence of the "sucker punch" that Yamato was hoping for, they were totally overmatched. The US easily, and I say that understanding the incredible sacrifice of the people involved, but on a national level defeated the Japanese using maybe 25% of it's resources.

[@troystocker6179]

The Zero used at Pearl Harbor only had a 1,000 hp engine , max later was 1,100 hp , 20 mm cannon was kind of slow

[@Valks-22]

@@lexchaotica190 we are skirting the what-if scenarios here but the Japanese invasion of USSR in assistance of the Wehrmacht is 99% unlikely. Japanese had doubts of Germans being successful by winter 1941 and due to most of their army being tied down in their primary focus - China - which just grew in complexity and resource requirements even as an alternative to PH USSR was never an option. More men, trucks, tanks, and logistics for the land push past Vladivostok they didn't have - but a longshot with a powerful navy was there.

[@rodbutler8069]

In other words, the Japanese lost their capacity to produce and update their war machines.

[@bensturges7412]

I have heard that US artillery support was key to overcoming Japanese attacks on Guadalcanal. I would love to see a deep dive on this subject.

[@roelkomduur8073]

You forget the batlle of Milne Bay, that was the first victory before Guadacanal. The RAAF of 76 sq made that possible!

[@ryandittmore348]

I came for the War Thunder thumbnail, stayed for the content.

[@stevehaug3603]

My father was in the 20th Army Air Corp in the South Pacific and at one time he was assigned to guard Japanese POWs who were being used as construction crews to build barracks and other buildings for the Army. He told me that they had to segregate the Japanese Army and Navy POWs from each other because they both blamed each other for their losing the war. They would have battles throwing hammers, two-by-fours and anything else they could hurl at each other between their construction sites. I would guess that their lack of mutual cooperation and coordination had a lot to do with their inevitable defeat.

[@pricelesshistory]

GREAT STUFF! In short the Japanese were caught with their tobi pants down at their airfields. I am also interested to hear about the Dutch efforts in this region. After all, that area was controlled by the Dutch (Dutch East Indies, DEI). Their contribution was not insignificant, but not know how much in total.

[@stevecastro1325]

I really appreciate the photos; many are pretty hard to find online.

[@chaseroberts3111]

you make a good point, by not sinking the carriers at Pearl harbor, you had coral sea(which stopped their southward expansion) and Midway(which guaranteed total defeat)

[@W1se0ldg33zer]

I watched an interview with a WW2 American carrier pilot and he said the big difference happened when they came out with the Hellcat. All Japanese pilots were trained to get American planes to chase them as the Japanese planes were climbing. They'd make the slower Wildcats stall, turn over on them and dive down at them for an easy kill. And they never changed their tactics which didn't work against the much more powerful Hellcats. Hellcats were able to follow them up as they climbed.

[@chrisb.1116]

The Japanese aircraft quickly became inferior. The lack of any armour negated any other advantages they had. That also had a hard time keeping aircraft in service and crewed. Another item is that they had no plan or intent to rescue downed pilots.

[@jameslalumandier9797]

I think their inability and in most cases not even trying to rescue downed pilots is one of the major failures of the war. Even after the leadership identified the loss of so many experienced pilots as a major concern, they didn't improve rescue capacity, armor in their planes, nor did they improve pilots training systems. I agree with you

[@Easy-Eight]

My view is the IJN Zero would have been perfect for the Germans in the Battle of Britain. However, for attrition warfare and long term operations the Zero is about the worst aircraft in WWII. Look at the P-39. It was not good in the Pacific. The last Soviet Kill over Germany was a P-39 greasing an ME-262.

[@chrisb.1116]

@@Easy-Eight Perhaps the most overrated plane in the pacific.

[@fix0the0spade]

@@Easy-Eight I don't think the Zero would have been up to much over Europe even during 1940. It out performs a Hurricane, but not so much a Spitfire and the RAF loved to make use of incendiary ammunition, making the Zero's total lack of armour and fire proofing a serious liability. It's long range would be good for time on station, but when that station will be directly over British AA guns with enemy fighters constantly directed to them that doesn't seem so handy anymore either.

[@miquelescribanoivars5049]

All IJAAF planes operated in New Guinea did have armor. The Ki-43-II airframe was still pretty damn frail, though.

[@Inquisitor6321]

Great content as usual!

[@buckstarchaser2376]

19:06 Solved that lack of fresh water problem for you.

[@georgehays4900]

Good stuff. Thank you

[@mcc_1024]

Absolutely loving the channel. It'd be interesting to see a vid of what the allies thought of the later gen Japanese fighters like the George and Frank.

[@JuanRodriguez-km9hl]

Great video

[@gordonvorenkamp6306]

I missed why no mention of the great sea battles, Midway, Coral sea, Pearl Harbor. Japanese wiped out our planes on the ground at Pearl Harbor and the Phillipines (more than 100 near 200 at Pearl). Also, in '42 our army fighters were low altitude and we needed marine Wildcats to intercept bombers.

[@CritterCamSoCal]

Nicely done

[@jonathan_60503]

Mention of the importance of airfield early warning reminded me of an example of the need for accuracy in that early warning. On December 7/8, 1941 after the USAAF in the Philippines received word of the attack on Pearl Harbor they thought a Japanese air raid was inbound so they scrambled their B-17s (so they wouldn't be caught on the ground). Unfortunately the warning was premature and the actual air raid occurred not long after all the bombers had to land to refuel -- so in the end they were caught, and many destroyed, on the ground despite (or possibly because) they'd been launched specifically to avoid that fate.

[@BobSmith-dk8nw]

There was cloud cover over their bases in Taiwan. They would have arrived as expected but for that. MacArthur's air commander wanted to use his B-17's to attack their bases but MacArthur (so I've heard) wouldn't let him. .

[@charlessmileyvideos]

The real underlying problem was that they had very poor, and almost non-existent, radar and sonar. Poor radios were also a problem in their aircraft.

[@josiahferguson6194]

interesting thing to consider concerning radio quality is that since the Earths magnetic field is weaker over the south pacific that most other places there is a bunch more radio interference which effected both sides and made the radios that worked well in other places basically useless lumps of metal that were then often removed by the pilots.

[@zootmojo]

19:43 - Truk is in the Caroline Islands, not the Carolina Islands.

[@thomaspalmar2481]

Thanks Chris & Justin excellent summary. Can recommend 'Flying Buccaneers' by Steve Birdsall, a history of the 5th Air Force operations in the area from the USAAF perspective.

[@sficlassic]

Sorry for making this post late, is the Ki-43 Hayabusa a Japanese version of the German Fw 190. Looks very similar.

[@NM-wd7kx]

I believe he's already done a video on it, but German engineers were sent to Japan to train their engineering teams, there's a couple of designs that bear the German design lineage, while being an entirely Japanese design.

[@bobdyer422]

The Japanese inability to adapt to the U.S. Hellcat, from the Wildcat for so many months, killed not only experienced pilots but also untrained. What was the reason for that " Hey look they're both Navy blue, so we must dogfight them in the same manner". The firepower and the speed of the P-47's seemed to surprise them also. The marauding "Apaches", the Japanese kept on stopping to breath, the U.S./Allied forces did not. The Navy blockades, surface and submarine, stopped precious metals, rubber, and oil shipments, so how can you improve and evolve. Talk about a strangle hold! Bring on a Python! Sure the "George" and "Jack" were improvements, but too little to late. Genda's Blade was deadly and did have some success, nothing though that could change the tide.

[@jamesricker3997]

The biggest problem the Japanese had with the hellcat when it first appeared was that it was very similar in appearance to the wildcat Mistaking a Hellcat for a Wildcat was a mistake very few pilots lived to tell about

[@tamer1773]

The entire Japanese war plan was an exercise in fantasy. The plan to force the US to the negotiation table was naïve at best. Their operations were usually complicated with unrealistic goals and little appreciation of the enemy they were facing. When the Pacific war is looked at in it's entirety the Japanese lost it on December 7, 1941. Their failure to get the US carriers and the oil reserves on Ford Island meant that while the US had suffered a heavy setback, it was far from destroyed. The Battle of the Coral Sea marked the furthest successful advance of Japanese forces and the Battle of Midway marked the steady pattern of defeat the Japanese would suffer in almost every major battle for the rest of the war.