Mindlessness

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@InventiveHarvest 2 ай бұрын

I've seen some dumb philosophical hypothesis over the years, but this one is extra crispy. Like I usually think of refutations using incoherence are just excluding by definition, but this one is 100% deserving of the label of being incoherent. It's like, if you are a mindlesss zombie, it's dark inside. But, it's not dark inside because you are having an experience of a cat on a mat. Therefore, you are a mindless zombie. Is Byrne trolling or something? Was there social clap-back to his bullshit, or did philosophers pat themselves on the back for refuting bile? Seriously asking in a kuhnian philosophy of science type lens.

@goidada 2 ай бұрын

Naive realists / eliminativists such as Byrne don't believe in phenomenal experiences or the whole metaphysical subjective-objective dichotomy, for that matter. For them, there can be experiences, but only in the sense of empirically observable interactions. There are no mystical, empirically unobservable things as far as this kind of empiricists are concerned.

@index3876 2 ай бұрын

Your interpretation does seem incoherent the way you put it, but I think Byrne would deny the second half of that - that you are having "an experience of a cat on a mat". You're not having an experience-there simply _is_ a cat on a mat, in front of you.

@InventiveHarvest 2 ай бұрын

@@index3876 I mean it certainly seems like I am having an experience, which the seeming is in itself an experience.

@index3876 2 ай бұрын

@@InventiveHarvestRight; Byrne would say that that "seeming" itself simply reduces to facts about the way the world is-not only without which there would be no "seeming," but which, more crucially, might in fact be seen as ontologically _identical_ to that "seeming" itself. That's the crux. There is perhaps always a way for the mind-denier to say: the mind is identical to the world (much in the same way external-world deniers will say: the world is in fact identical to the mind.) Personally, I think Byrne's argument is interesting not so much as a serious case for mindlessness as a kind of challenge to idealism and external-world skepticism... as being essentially meaningless. If it's so easy to completely reverse the argument by a simple shift in semantics, by simply and arbitrarily designating either the external or the internal world as primordially "real" in order to then doubt the existence of the other... then these debates aren't really _about_ anything and merely a matter of which language game we're using. Which side we choose to give ontological "priority," as it were, is completely arbitrary.

@InventiveHarvest 2 ай бұрын

@@index3876 thank you. Good stuff.

@lukebowman7513 2 ай бұрын

I remember Descartes making an argument in the third meditation that his thoughts about God must come from a source outside his mind (likely God). He argued that, in regards to thoughts about seeminly objective phenomenon, it is fairly easy to doubt that they have a source originating from outside his mind, and this is especially true for imaginative thoughts like those of unicorns. The critique of Byrne's mind transparency model seems similar; the most likely explanation for our "experience" of unicorns is that we form thoughts about them which originate from our imagination, which is seemingly a part of the mind, and taking it for granted that these apparent "thoughts" originate from outside the mind is a bit strange at best and arbitrarily limits what the meaning of "mind" is at worst. If you argue that mental images do originate from outside the mind and that there is no mind to interpret or think about them, that there are neurons firing in such a way so as to have retina fire in a certain way, but there is no "mind" to interpret the mental images that result from this process, then it seems like you are arbitrarily cutting off the properties that make the mind what it is (e.g. imagination, if one could call those physical processes such a thing). The argument dissolves into a sort of physicalism with the cherry on top that the mind cannot involve physical processes and so does not exist.

@lorenzreiher1407 2 ай бұрын

Paul and Patricia Churchland have logged on

@beherenowspace1863 2 ай бұрын

The evidence that I am having an experience of a cat is the fact that I am having an experience of a cat; it is not that there is a cat there.

@olgaustuzhanina6395 2 ай бұрын

I'm a philosophical zombie, AMA

@MrAdamo 2 ай бұрын

How does it feel?

@TheKingWhoWins 2 ай бұрын

We'll be here all day folks

@ExistenceUniversity 2 ай бұрын

Why would any ask a zombie anything? You answers are useless

@olindblo 2 ай бұрын

@@ExistenceUniversityLet’s start with the following question. Why do you think they are a p-zombie? You obviously have no evidence of this since you don’t have access into their mind to verify the existence of inner experience. You cannot point to the mind as say ‘behold, a mind!’ like you would with a goldfinch on the windowsill. Thus you have come to that conclusion either through testimony (them saying themselves they are a p-zombie) or through bias (you having decided arbitrarily they are a p-zombie). We would like to avoid the arbitrary option. However, you cannot gain knowledge through testimony from a p-zombie because the p-zombie cannot know anything, nor can they testify anything because they can’t have beliefs (this point may be argued and is the actually interesting assumption to interrogate). Therefore a p-zombie cannot, by definition, give testimony that they are a p-zombie. Therefore either you know (or doubt) they are a p-zombie for arbitrary reasons, or you have something like a behaviour that is in the world for us to point to. This would be the ‘criteria of mind’ which your behaviour needs to live up to in order to count as a mind. Hence there is no need for ontologically commitments to minds as natural objects, since it is all reducible to behaviour and the norms for what counts as a mind. Norms which can be changed and even eradicated, though I am not going to argue whether they should.

@adenjones1802 2 ай бұрын

Will i ever get married?

@secondbeamship 2 ай бұрын

This is a reaction image and a forum weapon.

@rsia08 2 ай бұрын

I'm more excited for uploads from this channel than any other. Thanks a bunch man! As soon as I get a job I'm giving you some cash haha.

@TheKingWhoWins 2 ай бұрын

Get two jobs for the both of us

@zeugens 2 ай бұрын

If you were really in doubt about whether there *is* a cat, you could use more than one kind of evidence to figure this out (call its name, pet it, listen to it, open up a bag of treats, ask others if they see it). You can’t prove the cat is there, but you can use multiple kinds of inquiry to improve confidence. There are ways to interrogate subjectivity, too, like creating/appreciating art, meditating, traveling and meeting new people, or whatever you want to do to discover yourself. Like the cat, there’s no way to absolutely prove anything about your mind, but you can use multiple avenues of inquiry and collect as much evidence as possible. That’s the best we can do.

@laika6202 2 ай бұрын

Been questioning similar ideas here all week, love it!

@beherenowspace1863 2 ай бұрын

The fact you can’t infer the mind from the external world isn’t an argument against the mind, it’s the hard problem, an argument against physicalism.

@crystalkalem9289 2 ай бұрын

You know, thinking about it. Clearly the writer of this whole thing must have had a an extreme case of Aphantasia. Where they had no internal world of any kind. No sound recollection, no recollection of smell or taste nor touch, pain or pleasure or any internal monologue to speak of. Truly they must have been empty inside to conceive of these hypothesis about others to claim and assert outright that others lack these all as well. What a horrible and sad existence that must be.

@nicholascarter9158 2 ай бұрын

The alternative is that this is meant as a kind of absurdist rebuttal: "The problem with this argument is identical to the problem with the other way round."

@zeugens 2 ай бұрын

I also thought about aphantasia. There are many reasons why a person might lack insight or awareness of their own mind. Even temporarily. People under stress rarely will experience depersonalization/derealization, and feel like they're not real.

@Uryvichk 2 ай бұрын

But before I actually look for the cat, there IS a clear difference between the answers to the questions "Is there a cat here?" and "Do you believe there's a cat here?" Before I locate the cat, I either don't believe there's a cat here or don't know whether there's a cat here. Ignorance seems like an obvious counter to the argument that I could lack mental content, because where in the external world is my ignorance coming from? And where am I getting the knowledge that I don't know whether there's a cat here? Should I be skeptical that I don't know whether there's a cat here; and if so, does that mean I *do* know there's a cat here and somehow... don't know that I know that there's a cat here?

@goidada 2 ай бұрын

Why do you think that ignorance is a mental state/content? Can we prove this belief by empirical means, or is it just a metaphysical position? Isn't the whole subjective-objective dichotomy metaphysical? If we are empiricists, then we should abandon such beliefs, no? (Actually, I don't see any difference between the Christian soul and modern phenomenal consciousness.)

@index3876 2 ай бұрын

I suspect Byrne would say your evidence of your own ignorance is, again, merely identical to the absence of a cat in your immediate physical environment. No light from the cat has so far reached your retinas-something like that?

@investidoramador9850 2 ай бұрын

as it turns out our inner experience is intrinsically related to the external world ,even if you are just having a dream of a cat sitting on the mat,still its external to you,and you react to that as if it were reality,because even when we are in a dream we see things as external to us,and we certainly see ourselves as separate from the rest,or outside world as you want to call it,there is no evidence its all happening in our minds,since theoretically we dont even have a body and mind in a dream,or likewise what we call reality could also be just a dream,what would mean your mind and body may no even exist,but surely this separation between us and the things exist to a certain extent,even if one may be dependent on the other for proper functioning

@Uryvichk 2 ай бұрын

@@index3876 I don't think his argument is symmetrical with respect to information I'm NOT getting. The non-presence of a cat does not impress itself upon my sensory perception, only positive evidence against a cat being present. But before I engage my senses, I know I can't answer the question yet. If I have no mind, I can't know that I'm lacking information.

@index3876 2 ай бұрын

@@Uryvichk I can't tell you for sure what Byrne would say, but I suspect he would at least deny your claim that you "know" you're lacking information (insofar as you can't "know" anything, since there are no minds, as Kane B explains). And I think he would object to your notion that there is a pre-sensory moment of cognition, i.e. "before you engage your senses," through which the internal fact of your ignorance could be isolated and grasped (on this view, the world simply continuously, uninterruptedly exists, and whatever you attribute to internal experience is really just the contact of your organism with that world; the skeptic would assert that there is nothing like what we normally describe as mental experience outside of some form of direct contact with the world.) So the feeling of ignorance/ambiguity you mention really just reduces to the state of the environment in relation to your organism. A situation of ignorance is the following: there is so far no evidence of a cat that's hitting your retinas, but perhaps there are other areas in the room that your eyes haven't inspected, so you describe this external situation as "not knowing." I can tell you that to me, rather than a sincere argument for mindlessness, Byrne's analysis is just a demonstration of how easily and arbitrarily external facts can be re-described in terms of internal facts and vice versa. This makes radical skepticism of either sort ultimately meaningless; they're just different language games.

@mikechristian-vn1le 2 ай бұрын

Long ago, my response to Descartes' I THINK, THEREFORE I AM, was HOW DO YOU 'KNOW" THAT YOUR THOUGHTS ARE YRULY YOUR OWN, KNOW THAT YOUR THOUGHTS ARE ANY MORE REAL THAN YOUR OTHER SENSATIONS?

@igstan 2 ай бұрын

I think philosophical arguments like this one are the best evidence we have that there are indeed philosophical zombies out there.

@vortexlegend101 2 ай бұрын

To paraphrase Daniel Denett, I think we may all be philosophical zombies

@TheKingWhoWins 2 ай бұрын

@vortexlegend101 hell of a scenario

@justinAclark2075 2 ай бұрын

I heard once that there were monks so enlightened, they no longer used full sentences, nor engaged in any form of personal decision making, outside of basic survival, and meditation. It's been rumored that many ancient texts of wisdom were not written by enlightened individuals, but written by the people surrounding them, fascinated by the contentment they observed. These average folk would study them, and listen and take note of every detail, eventually filling up pages and pages. Enlightenment, translated literally, means to be unburdened. Free, or even detached. Content with nothing more than the existence of each waking moment.

@al-kimiya6962 2 ай бұрын

Don't know whether one can be mindless or not but I've surely met heartless people.

@StatelessLiberty 2 ай бұрын

I agree with the argument of this video but it has led me to think there’s something impossible about philosophical zombies. Philosophical zombies, being physically identical to us, ponder the mysteries of consciousness, they write intense poetry, they attend conferences on “the hard problem” and when you ask a P-zombie how he knows he’s conscious he says “I know directly, nothing could be more certain.” That an entity could be so radically mistaken about its direct experience seems way too counterintuitive to me.

@Goigifuf52636 4 күн бұрын

Dr Kane B, did you forget to put this in the Philosophy of Mind playlist?

@propos05 2 ай бұрын

The only thing the discussion proves is that the lack of evidence for an argument is an existential threat to the modern mind.

@zaq9339 2 ай бұрын

Proves? 🤔😅

@TheGritherr 2 ай бұрын

When everything is undefined, how can morality weigh us down? Enlightening.

@modernmoralist 2 ай бұрын

Thanks for your work!

@italogiardina8183 2 ай бұрын

As a lister of You Tube which aligns to philosophy of mind but only partially to You Tube given it has a filmic dimension that correlates to vision as philosophical phenomenology then to this niche of philosophical voice centric methodological realism its important to arguably highlight that audio frequency ( sound wave into electrical signals) so it aligns to voice and ostensible a theory of mind. Therefore if human voice is the criterion to be captured along the full audio spectrum. To this I tend to sense the audio capture for this channel is on a dynamic microphone (clipping of phonetics) rather than a Condenser mic, also known as ‘capacitor microphones’ which capture a greater dynamic range of sound and so maybe more suited for a philosophy channel given philosophers medium is sound give Socrates did not write text did not leave a textual legacy, although through Plato is known to have been engaged in public oratory in the city state of Athens, and given Aristotle purportedly spoke in lecture halls then audio wave are significant correlation for the field of philosophy to which this channel ascribes.

@thelordz33 2 ай бұрын

Isn't this just a restatement of "I think, therefore I am"? I cannot prove that anyone else isn't a philosophical zombie, but I can be certain of my own mind because I experience it.

@burgerkiller4438 2 ай бұрын

He seems to reject weather you are or aren't a philosophical zombie. If I understood correctly, he just denies the existence of qualia, he thinks the color or taste or such are properties of your enviorment, not your mind. The chocolate is sweet and creamy, per Bern, doesn't say anything about your mind, just about the chocolate. I want to also say this seems increadibly insane and unconvincing, but it's what the paper is talking about

@hearts-on-sleeves Ай бұрын

@@burgerkiller4438 agreed. deny the existence of qualia (experience). note the logical impossibility of proving the existence of qualia (experience). claim that the absence of qualia is an equally valid hypothesis to the existence of qualia. except, not all statements that are true can be proved. and the mindless hypothesis's explanation for why we seem to experience metacognitive experiences gets more contrived the more meta we get. I seem to sense, I seem to perceive, I seem to doubt, I seem to that I sense, I seem to sense that I doubt, I sense I don't know. Etcetera etcetera. There's a way to explain it away, but it gets increasingly convoluted.

@DarthCalculus 2 ай бұрын

Seems like this position is inconsistent with properly basic beliefs

@xiutecuhtli15 2 ай бұрын

erm actually your position is inconsistent with properly basic beliefs

@uninspired3583 2 ай бұрын

@@DarthCalculus properly basic beliefs are properly ill informed.

@heathflick8937 2 ай бұрын

13:40 you might even say leaving it on the slide was a "mindless" mistake...

@reclawyxhush 2 ай бұрын

From now on when asking people for support of Your channel you should each time casually mention some argument for you definitely NOT being a philosophical zombie. Jokes aside, this hypothesis touches some yet more interesting aspect of practical significance. Since we now may not be able to tell whether we talk or listen to a bot or not, and the Turing test turns out to be literally powerless in the face of recent advancements, and the discussion about AI gaining some analogue of consciousness suddenly has got wind in the sails, a disturbing collateral problem emerges: how can we know that some living brains don't turn into philosophical zombies e.g. due to some kind of psychological stress or physical or mental illness? If we start talking seriously about the potentially sentient systems, shouldn't we also take very seriously the possibility that human brain may become subjectively dead before it dies physically, still mimicking its basic observable functions, communicative ones including? The complexity of the human brain and that of the neurological correlates of its knowledge should make us accept the plausibility of such horrific occurences.

@beherenowspace1863 2 ай бұрын

Scepticism of the external world isn’t scepticism that we have an experience as if there is an external world. Same with the mind.

@A3Kr0n 2 ай бұрын

I don't see what difference it makes if I'm in a vat, or not.

@ExistenceUniversity 2 ай бұрын

You are a type of brain in a vat, its your skull

@investidoramador9850 2 ай бұрын

none

@uninspired3583 2 ай бұрын

Classic distinction without a difference

@nicholascarter9158 2 ай бұрын

Well obviously if you were in a vat your fingers would get pruny

@Cole-Thinks-Things 2 ай бұрын

Unless you wanted to escape that state of being

@DusanPavlicek78 2 ай бұрын

As for the first example with hands, a brain in a vat is indeed perfectly POSSIBLE but is it also PROBABLE? I'd apply the Occam's razor principle: if our experience of the world is fully consistent with having bodies, why introduce a redundant layer of a brain in a vat? In that scenario, what's the point of even having a brain in a vat if all your sensory inputs are replaced with virtual reality. It would be easier to simulate our minds in the same virtual reality rather than having to deal with brains in vats. Overall, a brain in a vat seems like the LEAST probable of those options 😅

@MarcoServetto 2 ай бұрын

"I have no time fro private tutoring" == you are sorted? If so, congrats!

@beherenowspace1863 2 ай бұрын

The inference is that there is a cat on the mat from the experience of there being a cat in the mat.

@hearts-on-sleeves Ай бұрын

I can't say or act or do anything that is proof that I'm not a philosophical zombie to an external observer. But I can think, and I can feel, and I can believe this. All three things that philosophical zombies can't do. 9:30

@CollectiveDismal. 2 ай бұрын

I have become convinced of Eliminative Materialism

@beherenowspace1863 2 ай бұрын

Oh really? You’ve just had the subjective experience of being convinced there is no such thing as subjective experience?

@hegelsmonster5521 2 ай бұрын

I would not answer the question: "Do (you see) the cat on the mat" the same as to the question: "Is there a cat?", because as you rightly point out, the first is something about internal matter and the second is about something external, therefore I must point for to answer the first question to something internal, because the external things have nothing to do with it. I mean those things I see, doesn't have something to do with me as a subjective experienced entity. Also the kind of doubt would be different. In the first I would deliberate about the possibility that I (!) really don't see the cat, but I see with the lenses of another person. So strictly speaking the eyes belonging to the other person would see cat on the mat then. Then there would be the question on that part who does the thinking about this question, would be me really me. I think the second question would be answered by Decartes cogito ergo sum. However I don't not know how to answer the first question, because the sensual evidence would not proof that I don't see the world by the sense of another one.

@andrews4538 2 ай бұрын

A sexy new way to respond to those anthropic principle dorks.

@xiutecuhtli15 2 ай бұрын

I think "I'm seeing a red ball" might be a belief that enters your mind irresistibly and isnt an evidence-based conclusion. Seeing something forces your mind to believe that it is (at least seemingly to you) there. These are the brute facts that your not-abstract beliefs would be based on I think.

@BlueEyesDY 2 ай бұрын

It's unclear what 'mind' is supposed to refer to in this argument. Under what I believe to be the common notion of mind, things like visual experience, beliefs, taste, knowledge, etc are mental objects and would be defacto proof of mind.

@29derek 2 ай бұрын

Cyclical thought until principle is separated from phrasing; doublespeak in essence.

@beherenowspace1863 2 ай бұрын

I’ve always thought the existence of illusions is actual evidence against illusionism :)

@hearts-on-sleeves Ай бұрын

This seems like a weaker but more robust version of bundle theory. 5:46

@smjesniagent5552 2 ай бұрын

Just reject the first premise and the argument falls apart

@whycantiremainanonymous8091 2 ай бұрын

I mindlessly misplaced my earphones, and now can't listen to this video.

@blackbacon08 2 ай бұрын

Insane thumbnail btw 😅

@gk10101 2 ай бұрын

What are we getting at? Endless theories never resolve themselves as actual reality. Maybe all theories are wrong. Including what i just proposed.

@furkanekkiz7611 2 ай бұрын

I'm losing my mind.

@TheKingWhoWins 2 ай бұрын

Can't loose something you don't have

@enzomerdicane 2 ай бұрын

These videos always start with him introucing a way of think he's not intimately familiar with ,and certaintly doesn't agree with, untill he rebuttals with his own opinion ,while framing the whole process as if he's giveing both sides a fair examination .

@MarkAhlquist 2 ай бұрын

Philosophers never get to answers, they just go round and round. Otherwise, they lose their jobs.

@TheKingWhoWins 2 ай бұрын

Try answering some of these questions undeniably. Then tell me where you get

@MarkAhlquist 2 ай бұрын

@TheKingWhoWins What's ypur point? We agree?

@TheKingWhoWins 2 ай бұрын

That they aren't "intentionally" being opaque

@MarkAhlquist 2 ай бұрын

@@TheKingWhoWins I agree it's not intentional. And a lot of the craft is useful.

@adrianabronck7949 2 ай бұрын

I'm not different....but all my friends are ❤

@Millathunmain 2 ай бұрын

Can I be mindless well how can I know I am mindless if I am mindless hmmmmmmmm

@TheKingWhoWins 2 ай бұрын

Could a conscious person trick themselves into thinking they're not?

@Millathunmain 2 ай бұрын

@@TheKingWhoWins yes but would that mean they ARE mindless, I think it would only mean they have TRICKED themselves into believing they are not, not actually that they are not.

@M0ONCommander 2 ай бұрын

mindless self indulgence-core

@TheKingWhoWins 2 ай бұрын

That's most of philosophy??

@sjmurphysj39 2 ай бұрын

Excellent

@MinishMan 2 ай бұрын

I mean I guess good for him for getting to do philosophy and get paid for it. Stable jobs where you get to work on your passion ain't easy to get these days, but, like...who funded this trash? For me, my instinctual response came at the chocolate tasting example. There are people who put chocolate into their mouths and have a different experience to me. They have all the same organs, they look the same as I do in the a mirror, they speak in the same way, we can reproduce and make offspring that look like a combination of us both, I can question them on any different aspect of the situation, their life and their response to the chocolate and not once do I get a response that makes me question whether they're 'really doing' the same thing as me when eating the chocolate. They assuredly are, but their subjective experience is different. They don't like it, they prefer another kind of chocolate, it's too sweet, bad texture, they're not hungry right now, it goes on... I can only explain any of this by reference to some unique internal state that I call 'a mind'.

@fishizu413 2 ай бұрын

This is dumb, as a conscious being i know for a fact i am conscious at this moment. I can not 100% know this about other beings, so this is where the mindlessness argument becomes relevant, but i can know i am not a philosophical zombie. why was solipsism not even mentioned once?

@sean_nel 2 ай бұрын

This seems obviously false. A rat must have a mental model of the world if it is able to find its way through a maze. But at least that mental model must constitute a mental process for the rat. A mental process implies an "internal" experience separate from the external world. Ergo the rat is not mindless, and neither are we.

@uninspired3583 2 ай бұрын

@sean_nel a roomba has an internal representative of the room it cleans. Does it have a mind?

@sean_nel 2 ай бұрын

@@uninspired3583 Let's be careful to avoid an equivocation fallacy. The original claim was that we are mindless, in the sense of us having no internal mental processes, and that we therefore only react to the world in a physical sense, like water boiling on a stove. But water's reaction to a hot stove is a different kind of reaction to a rat or a roomba navigaging in an environment. We're really talking about their mode of reaction here. The water is "mindless" in this sense, whereas the rat or roomba is not "mindless" in the same way. That's not to say they have minds in the same way we do. Being without a mind is a different thing to being "mindless" in the sense we're talking about here, in the same way that being penniless is different to not literally owning a physical penny. I hope that clarifies my position.

@uninspired3583 2 ай бұрын

@sean_nel I'm not fully convinced it is equivocation. If determinism is true then all the actions of the brain are results of prior states, just like the water. I don't see why we can't have mental experiences and react deterministically to external sources.

@uninspired3583 2 ай бұрын

If philosophical zombies can't be real, then the argument falls apart. Since philosophical zombies are an unfalsifiable hypithesis, the no minds hypothesis doesn't get us anywhere.

@goidada 2 ай бұрын

You can cut out the mind hypothesis using Occam's razor, just like you would do in the case of the Christian soul. (Actually, I don't see the difference between these two.)

@uninspired3583 2 ай бұрын

@@goidada this is starting to sound like a game of definitions. I see the mind as a function of what the brain does. If you're using mind to equate with a soul concept, we're using the same word to talk about different things.

@goidada 2 ай бұрын

@uninspired3583 _"I see the mind as a function of what the brain does"_ Not the brain (that's just a mereological fallacy), but the whole body of the human being; and that's not the phenomenal mind, but simple observable behaviors, feelings, thoughts, etc. To call these things (except for behavior) mental or subjective things is to engage in useless metaphysics. There is no empirical way to establish whether those things are material or ideal. Don't be a closet dualist.

@index3876 2 ай бұрын

@@goidada This is a hysterical overreaction. This is like accusing a mathematician of being a closet dualist because she uses two variables (e.g., x and y) to represent a given function. The mind is simply a function of what the brain (and as you say the whole body) does; more properly, one might say that the mind is one, or several, of the various activities of the body. This does not require that I see the mind as a separate kind of substance. It is simply a category describing a certain class of phenomena. In the same way that I can treat my "body" itself as a category of object, as for example distinct from a "chair", without implying dualism, I can similarly make distinctions _among_ the functions _of_ my body-my "mind" as distinct from, say, my farts-with no implication of dualism.

@goidada 2 ай бұрын

@index3876 what's wrong with your account is your subjective-objective, or internal-external, or phenomenal-nominal dichotomy. That's just a metaphysical position that cannot be supported by empirical means. That's why you are a dualist. Suppose there's a red apple in front of you. How is it material but not mental, as opposed to pain in your leg, which, purportedly, is mental but not material? How do we establish that? What experiment can preclude back pain from being noumenal, to be a noumenon? None! Only your Christian metaphysical, dualistic position.