Morality and categorical reasons

[@KaneB]

"I believe, and so do you, that things could have been different in countless ways. But what does this mean? Ordinary language permits the paraphrase: there are many ways things could have been besides the way that they actually are. On the face of it, this sentence is an existential quantification. It says that there exist many entities of a certain description, to wit, 'ways things could have been'. I believe things could have been different in countless ways. I believe permissible paraphrases of what I believe; taking the paraphrase at its face value, I therefore believe in the existence of entities which might be called 'ways things could have been'. I prefer to call them 'possible worlds'." -- David Lewis

[@MooshBoosh]

I'm between two plausible presumptions: 1) Language relates to the world (let's just be Tractactus Wittgenstenians and say that The world is all that is the case, and that includes all the facts) in a non-trivial way and 2) There are many connotations and interpretations and analysises one could inject into any phrase. This commits me to thinking that meaningful phrases (so excluding "Beeazlf dorp bingbing!") are related to something like the world, facts, knowledge, human perception, something! However, also that in the realm of linguistic phrases and propositions, that there are a variety of readings. So someone saying "God loves you" is entirely dependent on what "God" means, "love" means, and "you" means. This will result in wildly different Metaphysical conceptions depending on whether the one saying it is Muslim, Jewish, Calvinist , Catholic, Hindu, New-Age...etc. Also, though, I just think David Lewis is doing something fishy by extracting Metaphysical realities from simple phrases. I think it's a misinterpretation of what people typically mean. I don't think this means that there aren't many worlds, but that the argument is unsound. I actually do really like the passage though, it's a fun one. Nice video Kane. I'm writing a seminar paper about Moral authority so it's useful food for thought.

[@dmitryalexandersamoilov]

modal realities are not EXACTLY the same as our reality. They are merely "possible to be true".... if you were in that world, you would think THAT world was the real one and THIS one is the hypothetical one. basically, it's like this... our real world, must necessarily exist... well... we can make some assumptions from that fact. 1) existence exists 2) mathematical truth exists 3) possible universes exist 4) possible timelines exist 5) our particular timeline exists 6) we exist (conscious entities) in that order

[@chronic_washere]

I have been binge watching all your vids.

[@KaneB]

Thanks! Nice to hear you enjoy them.

[@chronic_washere]

@@KaneB I go off to college soon and your channel inspired me to pursue a degree in philosophy. Thank you

[@KaneB]

@@chronic_washere That's fantastic dawg! I hope you have a good time.

[@visionaryhera]

@@chronic_washere NOOOOOOO DON'T DO ITTTTT

[@chronic_washere]

@@visionaryhera is it not worth it?

[@DrFassLaw]

There is a quite useful paper written by Mark Schroeder called "Having Reasons" which makes a helpful distinction on what 'having' a reason might mean, based partially on Williams' internal/external reasons distinction. He argues that there's an 'objective' sense of 'having a reason' that is a more pleonastic sense of 'having' (like saying 'I have a father'), which seems to be talking about there being a reason for something, whereas there is a 'subjective' sense of 'having a reason' which seems to be referring to having some kind of epistemic access or 'possessing' a reason (like knowing that there is going to be dancing at a party, and if I want to dance I 'have a reason' to go to the party). Maybe this distinction can help better understand how to answer the question 'does he have a reason not to do that?', in the sense that we might actually be asking different things: is there a reason (i.e. does it exist in some important sense) for him not to do that, regardless of whether he knows of this reason or not; or does he actually have a reason within his deliberation about what to do that counts in favour of not doing that? Both targets have different metaethical issues at play, I think, and we might have different problems with the former, the latter, both or neither. Hope that helps!

[@natanaellizama6559]

The first one seems to be a generic "there being a reason". The issues are: a) WHERE does this reason exist? It seems natural to posit a mental space for rationality is mental. b) So what? It is insufficient to say there exists a given object in a given realm, there needs to also be a grounded relation between the two. So it's insufficient to just say there is a reason, but we need to say what is the relation to that reason subject-reason.

[@bambiknow]

Admitting your difficulty in making sense of ideas accepted and championed by philosophical intelligentsia is both brave and refreshing. It's also productive in that it challenges them to make their ideas comprehensible to you. A frustration of my own: I think in everyday language modals-could of happened, would happen, or should happen- fundamentally are contrasted with what does actually happen, and are used with this contrast in mind. Without the contrast they lose their sense. Part of the concept of reality I am familiar with is that it is one thing, one consistent way, this is contrasted with the infinity of possibilities that weren't realized. I think recognizing hierarchically related organization of concepts is very important in tracing their use and sense in discourse. Without having explored the mental gymnastics of possible world theory formulation, my pre-judgment is that their appeal may be an aesthetic impulse to liberate the realm of the possible from the tyranny of the real, by exorcising the sense of -not real- which inhabits the possible in everyday usage, creating a kind of catharsis.

[@lanceindependent]

There's nothing they can do to make their ideas more comprehensible. By their own admission, these ideas are "primitive" and cannot readily be communicated or explained. It's not like complex math where if Kane B (or myself, since I'm in the same boat) study more, we'll eventually get it. There's no obvious set of steps we could take, even in principle, to understand what moral realists are talking about. Given that Kane B is no fool, that should give realists, and anyone on the fence, pause. Is it really plausible that moral realists have some kind of special access to concepts other people simply cannot comprehend?

[@whig3982]

beautiful description dawg

[@KaneB]

It's a modified quote from The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy.

[@ahmedbellankas2549]

1- if ( I would be blamed if I were to do x) then I have a reason not to do x. 1 doesn't seem true to me at all: P1- john wants preferedly to insult mary; P2- john doesn't care whether he's to be blamed or not; P3- john knows how to insult mary; P4- if an individual i insults another individual s then individual i will be blamed ( or must be blamed ); P5- if P2 then john doesn't care about being blamed (P4); P6- john is rational,( any individual m is rational iff that individual m acts according to his prefered want ); C1- john will insult mary. C2- if we were to tell john that he would be blamed if he were to insult mary,john would say " I don't care about that ( I don't want preferedly not being blamed) , that's no problem for me,that's no reason for me to change my behavior ". C3- so, if C2 then reasons-internalism; P7- C2; C4- reasons-internalism; P8- if reasons-internalism then categorical reasons don't exist; C- categorical reasons don't exist. So, 1 is false. You may appeal to searle's thesis to defend 1. O- searle's thesis is : if an individual i recognizes that he has an obligation to p or he believes that he has an obligation to p then that individual wants preferedly to p. T1- if the absurdman ( camus thesis ( mersault in the stranger )) is possible then searle's thesis is false; T2- the absurdman is possible ; Cn- searle's thesis is false. Furthermore, it seems that I can know that I must go to work today and I don't want preferedly to go.

[@slashingrobin665]

I vibe with interpeting my phenomenal experience of language/communication as a sort of impulse/desire in superposition seemingly collapsed in relation to the dimensionalities by which it is experienced/articulated

[@leocossham]

Have you read Sharon Street's "Constructivism about Reasons" (2008)? It provides a good theory about how to make sense of reasons.

[@lpgx9132]

Are you still recommending this work?

[@nicolasavila6047]

I think, following to Parfit on On What Matters, that the example of the rain is an incomplete view of reasons, because you mention reasons to WANT take an umbrella, not reasons to TAKE an umbrella, for example. (One thing is a reason for desire to perform an action, and another one is a reason for an action)

[@KaneB]

I don't see any significant difference between those, at least in the case I described. What do I mean when I say I ought to get a coat? Well, it's that I desire to stay dry, wearing the coat will keep me dry, and wearing the coat doesn't frustrate any of my other desires. I could just as well say that "I ought to want to wear a coat" -- that would just be a rather bizarre way of expressing oneself. For one thing, in saying, "I ought to get a coat", I already am expressing what I want. I don't accept that I "have a reason" for putting on a coat, where I might additionally "have a reason" for wanting to put on a coat. This feels to me like exactly like the kind of reification of reasons-language that I expressed suspicion of in the video. Perhaps there is something coherent being expressed by talking of reasons in the way you do here, but I'm not sure what it is. That's not how I use the terms... at least, as far as I'm aware.

[@nicolasavila6047]

@@KaneB i think that, in that sense, an statement like "i ought not kill" simply states that i don't have the desire to kill. Anyway, i think that this leads to a subjetive theory of reasons and, in the last example that i give, to a metaethical subjetivism. I think that there several critiques of that metaethical view

[@nicolasavila6047]

@@KaneB i didn't want mean that in the example of rain the expression of a desire does not play an important role. I want to say that this does not exhaust the content of the reasons

[@KaneB]

@@nicolasavila6047 Well, there are several critiques of every metaethical view! But there are plenty of metaethicists beyond subjectivists who reject categorical reasons, including some moral realists. Perhaps the specific kind of position that I hold is committed to metaethical subjectivism, but I'm not sure why that would be. Why not error theory, for instance? If we suppose that moral judgments are implicitly committed to categorical reasons, but that the concept of categorical reasons doesn't make sense, we have the materials for a case for error theory.

[@KaneB]

@@nicolasavila6047 What is the rest of the content in your view?

[@lanceindependent]

It's remarkable that we have an almost identical position on the matter. I was just saying last night that my view on reasons is something like a type of reductionist account where they're reducible to facts about means and ends. Likewise for where we're at regarding the notion of categorical reasons.

[@KaneB]

It might not be so remarkable, since my views have been influenced by our conversations. I think I've always been attracted to a desire-reductionist account of reasons, but then your defense of variability and indeterminacy has made me very suspicious of how philosophers go about constructing "theories of reasons" (and not just realists with their categorical reasons; antirealist theories of reasons seem problematic also... though they are, at least, understandable to me).

[@lanceindependent]

@@KaneB Sure, though I think if I've influenced you it it's at best probably largely clarifying or reframing things you had already considered or rendered salient certain considerations which hadn't been salient previously. I doubt I've *persuaded* you of anything. So there's still an interesting fact, I suspect, that we were both dispositionally inclined to think in similar ways about the topic prior to having interacted. Then again, it's not like I ran across your videos randomly. I listened to them precisely *because* of our dispositional similarities. Anyway, I'm not trying to point to any extraordinary events in the world. I suppose I'd rather just say it's nice to find people with similar views, however they arrived at them. When I was in phil grad school I felt very isolated, few people seemed to understand my position and framing of the issues and even fewer seemed sympathetic.

[@samsklair4701]

I think your explanation of reasons is more plausible than positing 'reasons' as non-natural entities but I'm not sure whether I find your reduction of normativity to desires and the means of satisfying them convincing. What would you think about an Open Question Argument applied to your position? It seems to me the question "ought I satisfy my desires?" is a meaningful question in a way that "would satisfying my desires satisfy my desires?" is not. You may find the former question weird, you may even think it psychologically impossible for someone to sincerely ask it, but it at least seems to make sense. I think Open Question-style Arguments convince me that normative concepts like (normative) reasons can't be reduced to descriptive ones (like what would most effectively satisfy desires).

[@KaneB]

Yeah, there's a difference between those questions. I don't know what "ought I satisfy my desires?" means -- I'd have to ask for clarification from the person asking it. The question doesn't make sense per how I usually use terms like "ought" and "reason". Whereas "would satisfying my desires satisfy my desires?" is tautologous. I said in the video that I don't have a theory of reasons. I don't think people really "have reasons", nor am I giving a theory of the meaning of all reasons-talk. It might be more useful to look at my view as (1) eliminating normativity entirely and then (2) giving a pragmatic account of at least some normative language (we can and sometimes do use it to express claims about desires and means/end relationships). Of course, it only captures some normative language. People use terms like "ought" and "reason" in all sorts of ways. So it's to be expected that "ought I satisfy my desires?" seems like a substantive question in a way that "would satisfying my desires satisfy my desires?" does not.

[@tartarus1478]

You speaking with Russ Schafer-landau (wow his name is long ti say but sounds weird to say just Russ of shafer-landau) sounds amazing and I can’t wait to see it. Two brilliant minds chatting… I admit I’ve dreamed of this day. (Edit) I really hope you and Russ schaf… I’m not sayin his whole name again, I hope you guys talked about the reduction account for desires you like., I’ve posted to you before I see issues with it. It seems odd to be able to recognize reasons only in terms of desires like that even though they’d seem to share the same sort of metaphysical profile as categorical norms. There’s not some further reason to satisfy a desire in the same way a non naturalist might hold that categorical norms are just going to remain only in normative terms and there won’t be a further fact to refer to or reduce to something else

[@KaneB]

It was a fun conversation, though as I said in this video, there wasn't time to get into much detail on the points where we really disagreed. We also talked about the evolutionary debunking argument, but that's not an argument that I'm inclined to endorse anyway.

[@KaneB]

>> It seems odd to be able to recognize reasons only in terms of desires like that even though they’d seem to share the same sort of metaphysical profile as categorical norms This might be the case for some reductionist accounts of reasons, but I don't see how I'm committed to anything like this. "I have reason to put on a coat" = (1) I desire to stay dry; (2) putting on a coat is a means of satisfying that desire; (3) putting on a coat does not frustrate any of my other desires. That's all I'm saying. How does this have the same "metaphysical profile" as categorical norms? (Perhaps part of the problem here is that I don't know what categorical norms are. So it's hard to make a comparison.) At least, that's how I would account for a lot of my own talk about reasons. As I mention in the video though, I don't have a theory of reasons. It might be that other people mean something different to this, and maybe sometimes I use "reason" in a way that's different to this. Maybe sometimes I do have a commitment to categorical normativity. In that case, perhaps I should say that my sentence contains a false presupposition.

[@Asura_vithu]

@@KaneB " We also talked about the evolutionary debunking argument, but that's not an argument that I'm inclined to endorse anyway." Why? Do you know not think it is one of the strongest argument against moral realism. My confidence in that argument was raised after watching your video on that argument. I'll rewatch it again to see if you made some qualifications or some objections.

[@KaneB]

​@@Asura_vithu First, bear in mind that the EDA, or at least the standard version of it, isn't really an argument against moral realism. It's an argument for the claim that even if there are moral facts, we don't have knowledge of them, or we can't form reliable beliefs about them. Anyway, briefly, here are a couple of issues I have with the EDA: (1) I don't think that the claims about the origin of our moral beliefs (or "basic evaluative tendencies" or whatever) are particularly well-supported empirically. If anything, I'm more inclined towards social constructivist accounts. Now, we might try to run a different kind of debunking argument, where we appeal to the cultural origins of moral attitudes rather than evolutionary origins, but prima facie this "cultural debunking argument" leaves a lot of room open for realists. The realist will just say that it's not a problem that our moral beliefs are explained by our culture, because by and large we have good institutions for producing moral beliefs. Similarly, a person's beliefs about the origin of the universe are explained by their culture -- it requires very specific cultural practices to develop and promulgate theories of the origin of the universe. This doesn't lead to skepticism of the Big Bang model, because we take it that our culture has reliable methods in this domain. Now obviously, an antirealist may deny that our methods for forming moral beliefs are reliable. But now the debate is just about what count as reliable methods. The genealogical story about the origin of our beliefs doesn't seem to be doing any work. (2) I've become more sympathetic to third-factor responses. Third-factor responses to the EDA argue that there is a third factor that is adaptative, and that correlates with the moral facts. Our moral attitudes evolved to track this third factor, and for that reason, they track the moral facts. Enoch, for instance, says that survival is pro tanto good; that natural selection favours that which promotes survival; so natural selection favours that which is correlated with what is pro tanto good. What's the problem with third-factor responses? The primary objection I always had is that they only work if they make substantive moral claims. It's not enough to say simply: there are moral facts, and maybe they're connected to some third factor that is adaptive. We first have to specify at least one of these moral facts -- say, "survival is pro tanto good". Then we can show how this relates to the third factor. But making moral commitments at this points seems question-begging, given that the point of the EDA is to undermine our justification for our moral commitments. These days, I'm not so sure. Recall that one challenge for an evolutionary debunking argument is that we need to make sure that the argument doesn't generalize to other domains. We can similarly tell an evolutionary story about our perceptual beliefs, for example. The usual line that debunkers take on this is to say that perceptual capacities are truth-tracking because tracking the truth is the means by which perception promotes survival and reproduction. Suppose there is a predator in my vicinity. A belief about which direction the predator is moving will be useful only if that belief is true. The facts about the domain apparently revealed by perception play a role in explaining why our perceptual capacities formed in the way that they did. But this isn't the case for the moral domain, or so the debunker argues. Now notice that, in giving an account of why we trust perception, we seem to be making substantive assumptions about what the world is like. It's not enough to say simply: there is an external world (or whatever), and here's how our perceptual capacities might have evolved to track it. We need to assume something about how that world works. If third-factor responses can't assume first-order moral claims, then we can't assume empirical claims about what the world is like. But then we can't explain why perception is trustworthy while moral judgments are not. In which case, the EDA becomes an argument for more general skepticism. (Maybe we're okay with that. But the metaethical EDA is supposed to target moral knowledge specifically.)

[@lanceindependent]

@@KaneB Agreed on (1). Have you read Machery and Mallon's chapter, "Evolution of morality"? It's relevant to the empirical discussion surrounding the topic of EDAs. (2) I'm not that sympathetic to third-factor responses. I'm more sympathetic to accounts which hold that we have some general capacity for reasoning and that among other things this allows us to acquire knowledge of moral facts; I think FitzPatrick argues for something like this. Regarding the problem of EDAs generalizing to other domains, my colleagues Tyler Millhouse and David Moss coauthored a paper with me on exactly this topic, which we call the "containment problem" (containing morality and not spilling over into other domains). That seems very relevant to what you're discussing here.

[@HudBug]

I think the reasonableness of our beliefs, or desire, simply is the fittingness of our beliefs, or of our desires. Something Is desirable means we have reason to desire it, that is, it is fitting to desire. Similarly, Something Is credible or believable means we have reason to believe it, that is, it is fitting to belief. But, what is this “it” when “it” is fitting to believe or desire? I claim “it” is the concepts and content, the object, of our beliefs or desire, and this are what are or aren’t fitting. If there is some group of persons, i may form a belief, with ‘what’ I believe being that there are three persons who have little hair and with thick clothes. The object of the belief is has many contents and concepts, like the concept of three and the contents of little hair and thick clothing. This belief may be fitting or unfitting, that is rational or irrational. If there actually are three persons who have little hair and with thick clothing, ‘there are’ reasons to believe this, and if i have perceptual evidence for this belief, ‘i have’ reasons to believe this. Moving away from reasons for beliefs, consider reasons to desire. Imagine you believe that, if you tightly wrap you entire hand around a red-hot iron bar, you will experience extreme agony. Then desire to not wrap, or touch, the red-hot iron bar. The object of this desire, ‘what’ you desire, is not experiencing extreme pain. This object has several concepts and contents, like the concept of undesirability, or the contents of things like experience, pain, and the dreadfulness. I strongly believe that pain is fitting to desire not, undesirable, although you’d disagree, claiming I’m just making a tautology. I think you have strong reasons to believe it is not tautological to claim that pain is undesirable.

[@KaneB]

If there are three persons in a room, I might say that's a reason to believe that there are three in the room, but that's because I care about having true beliefs and I want other people to hold true beliefs as well -- I want to live in a society that promotes truth. Similarly, I want people to form beliefs in accordance with particular procedures, e.g. using perceptual data. That's all I'm saying with my talk of "reasons" there. Are you saying something more than that?

[@HudBug]

@@KaneB I’m not saying anything more than, nor am I saying anything less than that. I’m not saying any of that, I’m claiming something completely different. Someone says, “you have decisive reasons to believe that two plus two equals four”, this doesn’t mean that i have any reason to care about believing 2+2=4. No one has any reason to desire, care, or act in any way that being that one or more have true or false beliefs, except in the instrumental sense. Reasons to believe, in and only of themselves, have no reasons to always be cared about. We have reasons to want everyone to believe that others suffering matters, but the normativity of these beliefs is instrumental, and not intrinsic to the reasons to believe in itself.

[@KaneB]

@@HudBug I guess I'm just not clear on what you think a reason for belief is. To go back to your original post, you say: >> If there actually are three persons who have little hair and with thick clothing, ‘there are’ reasons to believe this, and if i have perceptual evidence for this belief, ‘i have’ reasons to believe this. When you say that there is reason to believe that P, does that just mean that P is true? Similarly, when you say a person has a reason to believe that P, does that just mean that the person has some evidence for the truth of P? Or is it that the reason for believing P is something separate that obtains because of the truth of P/evidence for P? Obviously, I don't have any trouble with the notion of true propositions or evidence for propositions. So if that's all that's meant by the talk of reasons, I'm fine with that.

[@HudBug]

@@KaneB >>When you say that there is reason to believe that P, does that just mean that P is true? I a way i am saying that. My theory of truth is that only beliefs can be true, and there are no truths ‘out there’. A belief is rational, or justified, only when it it is fitting. Fittingness, only when it comes to beliefs, makes these beliefs true. If it comes to desires that are fitting, they are rational, in the way that they are fitting to desire. >>Similarly, when you say a person has a reason to believe that P, does that just mean that the person has some evidence for the truth of P? Yes. But, truth or evidence makes a belief fitting, that is, gives reasons for or make fitting a belief. Notice, “for a belief”. Certain things can make it fitting to desire. The truth of what it is like to feel pleasure, gives reasons to or makes it fitting to desire, desirable to have more of this way for what it is like to have pleasure. I think the best way to understand if some object is desirable, which is different from merely being desired, is whether it is inconceivable that someone wouldn’t desire to end it, if it were pain, or to have more of it, if it were pleasure. I have a hard time believing that someone who spilt boiling water on their genitals, would start to pour this boiling water all over their face, unless, UNLESS this pain isn’t as non-instrumental as it would be for me. You may simply claim that pain is defined as an undesirable experience. I disagree. I’ll explain explain why with these explanation i wrote in the notes app: An open tautology uses the same words twice, in some way that does not make any significant claim, but tells us only that something is what it is, or that if something has a certain property, this thing has this property. Two examples are the claims that (1) happiness is happiness, and that (2) acts that produce happiness produce happiness. Some open tautologies can be used to suggest significant claims. Two examples are ‘Business is business’ and ‘War is war’. When people make such claims, they intend to remind us that something is distinctively different from other things, and must be judged in its own terms. In business or war, these people may intend to suggest, ordinary moral standards do not apply. These suggested claims would be substantive. But most open tautologies are trivial. It is not worth claiming that happiness is happiness, desires are desires, beliefs are beliefs, and hope is hope. Rather than using the same words twice, a concealed tautology uses different words or phrases with the same meaning. One example is the claim that (3) felicity is happiness. Since ‘felicity’ means ‘happiness’, (3) means the same as (1). (3) is not a substantive claim, though we might use (3) to tell someone what the word ‘felicity’ means. Consider next the claim that (4) acts that produce happiness are felicific. Since ‘felicific’ means ‘produces happiness’, (4) is another concealed tautology, whose two open forms would be (2) acts that produce happiness produce happiness, and (5) acts that are felicific are felicific. As before, these are not substantive claims. Everyone who understands these claims would accept them, because they are so obviously true. And everyone could consistently accept these claims whatever else they believe. (4) differs in these ways from the claim that (6) acts that produce happiness are desirable. Since ‘desirable’ does not mean ‘happiness’, (6) is a significant, substantive claim, which sometimes conflicts with many people’s beliefs. Many people believe, for example, that cruel acts that give happiness to sadists are not in any way desirable. Desiring to have the experience of pleasure is not itself that experience of pleasure. Pleasures are not desires, rather, they are the objects of most desiring. The experience of pleasure is desired when we respond to our reasons to care about it. Is pain defined as an experience which we desire to lessen or end, that is, an undesirable experience? Well, suppose one may ask, “What is pain?”, and another might answer “An undesirable experience”. If one might further ask, “What an undesirable experience?”, the other may answer with, “Pain”. But, If pain is an undesirable experience, and an undesirable experience is pain, then all that is answered with is, “Pain is pain”. The concept of pain has been explained with the concept of pain, and therefore we have said nothing but the concept itself. The concept pain is not explained as an undesirable experience, if an undesirable experience is explained as pain. Could we then, in attempting to explain the experience of pain, explain it as anything other than pain? What is an undesirable experience, if not the experience of pain? firstly, if we are going to understand the concept ‘undesirable’, we must understand what a desire is. When we desire, we desire something, which is what we are desiring. What we want, those features of our desire, is what I shall here forth refer to as the object of a desire. If anything is desirable, that we desire its features, it is the object of our desire. In order to desire to act for some object of our desire, we need to believe there are or will be, or at least could be these features that are desired. In order to desire some object, regardless of whether or not I desire to act for the object, the object of our desire is something we believe is desirable. My believing the object of my belief is desirable is believing that the object of my belief is justificatory of its desirability. It is vice versa with undesirability. Some object ‘justifying’ some desire could be stated in terms of the object of a belief ‘giving a reason for’, ‘is a reason for’, ‘are reasons for’, ‘counts in favour of’, ‘justifies, ‘is favouring’, ‘gives a reason for’, etc. which all expressive of the exact same concept, and thus all mean the same thing. If something is justified means it is fitting, as i have mentioned. I bring up all these arguments against the claim “pleasure is itself an undesirable experience, by definition” because that a majorly wrong, and distorting view.

[@justus4684]

Smooth as vegan butter video

[@Ansatz66]

There's no reason to complicate this issue. A hypothetical reason do to X means that doing X will progress toward that goal. This is based on the assumption that our actions really have some predictable effect upon the world, which may or may not be true, but that shouldn't be a conceptual difficulty. If it turns out that we live in a fatalistic universe that conspires to produce the same results regardless of what we do, then we have no reasons to do anything, and so the concept of a reason would be a myth, but still it would be a myth that we can clearly imagine. A categorical reason to do X means that that doing X progresses toward the general good of the world. Rather than achieving some person's goals, doing X just makes things broadly better for everyone, or at least all the people who are within range of being affected. In addition to assuming that our actions affect the world, it also assumes that "better" and "worse" are meaningful measures, which can be controversial, but that is its own controversy which has no reason to spill over into whether we understand the meaning of a categorical reason. If we want to debate whether "better" and "worse" are meaningful concepts, then we should debate that directly and not turn it into a proxy debate through debating the meaning of "categorical reason." Often when we're trying to figure out the meanings of words and phrases, the best approach is to not overthink it. We've all lived our lives around people using these phrases, or the equivalent of these phrases in our native languages, and so we tend to have an intuitive grasp of what these phrases mean. If we just go with our intuition we'll tend to come up with a meaning for the phrase that corresponds with how most people tend to use it, which is the ideal outcome when writing a definition.

[@Voivode.of.Hirsir]

You see, if having a categorical reason to do x is defined simply as doing x progresses towards better states of the world, then the fact that I have a categorical reason to do something has no force on me. It's a mere description that requires of me no special action or behaviour.

[@Ansatz66]

@@Voivode.of.Hirsir : It's true, having reasons to do things has never had any force on people. We all have reasons to exercise and eat a healthy diet and brush our teeth three times a day, but there's no force of nature that compels us to actually do these things. Some people act upon those reasons more than others, depending on their personal choices. Having reasons for doing things and being actually motivated to do those things are separate issues.

[@KaneB]

You can define "categorical reason" that way if you want, but that's not how philosophers are using the term. So even if I were to accept your reforming definition, this wouldn't shed much light on what other philosophers mean. More generally, I do find it a little puzzling, given your inclinations to moral naturalism, that you insist on retaining this kind of reasons-talk. A lot of reductive naturalists just deny that there are categorical reasons -- Railton for example grants that somebody only "has a reason" to do what's moral (i.e. what promotes the general good) if they care about morality. That seems less misleading. >> We've all lived our lives around people using these phrases Perhaps this is the crux of the matter. I have not lived around people using these phrases. Generally speaking, in my experience people very rarely talk about what they and others "have a reason" to do. Certainly, they do not talk about categorical reasons. These seem more like technical notions introduced by philosophers. If it were the case that laypeople regularly talked about categorical reasons, maybe I would see the motivation for the kind of view you hold.

[@Voivode.of.Hirsir]

@@Ansatz66 That's not what I mean by force. I don't mean that I will be physically compelled to maximise the good. I mean there are no moral requirements on me to do so as the word moral requirement is commonly used.

[@Ansatz66]

@@KaneB : How do philosophers use the term? "Railton for example grants that somebody only 'has a reason' to do what's moral (i.e. what promotes the general good) if they care about morality." That is also a fair way to use the word "reasons". One can either think of reasons as goals that will be achieved by an action, or as motivating qualities to an action, and in most cases these two things would be identical, so they are both plausible interpretations of what people broadly mean when they talk about reasons. Words do often have multiple senses. "In my experience people very rarely talk about what they and others 'have a reason' to do." But it is not so rare as to make the phrase seem exotic or strange to most people. You said in the video that even you sometimes use it. It is not an every-day phrase, but most people know well enough what is meant by it, at least on an intuitive level sufficient for usage. "Certainly, they do not talk about categorical reasons." Only philosophers use the phrase "categorical reason" but they use that phrase to talk about the practice of regular people talking about having reasons for things without specifying any goal for the reason to achieve. "Categorical" and "hypothetical" reasons are terms to pick out particular ways in which we use the term "reason" in ordinary discussion.

[@bigpoppa192]

Hello, who are you? Do you have a degree? Are you a researcher? An author? Are you respected in your field? Loved the video!

[@KaneB]

I'm Kane Baker. I have a philosophy BA, philosophy MA, and I just submitted my PhD thesis. I'm pretty much unknown in my field, lol.

[@bigpoppa192]

@@KaneB Thanks for the answer 🤗

[@BatmanArkham8592]

@@bigpoppa192 he is famous in KZbin Formal philosophy

[@DeadEndFrog]

Im not sure i understand what people mean when they say 'cetegorical', is it supposed to relate to the same concept as Kants categorical imperative? To me it sounds like there are only two types of things. 1. Power (what is in my power), it might be a flimsy concept to some, but one can always elaborate to make it clear. My prefered way of imagining power is to imagine what i can't do. I can't possibly negate gravity for example. But i can clearly negate all imposed laws of god and men by not following them. The realists seem to think that some 'causal' relationship exists between me doing actions, and what is 'moral'. But i don't see it, and the position seems to have been given up with god as the ultimate arbiter of punishment and reward. But lets, for the sake of argument, even say that god exists and he will punish me for doing bad deeds, and the realists can attempt to make a connection to gravity, by saying, just as when i jump, i have to fall down eventually, the same is true with bad deeds, i will be punished eventually. There seems to be a diffrence between laws that effect me regardless of my positions (such as gravity always pulling me down), and gods and mens 'eventual' punishment. With gravity i always fall no matter what i do, and im not even able to fly, but with deeds, i can be as evil as i want, and i can kill, and all they can do is punish after the fact. So there is no 'force' in the argument because there is no 'force' preventing me to do evils. Sure one can always imagine there being platonic goods, but they have no causal force, they can only force the believers of these ideas into following them, so its ultimatly a game of memes limiting your actions, rather then genetics, or pragmatic reality. If one can dismiss them or not, that is the power one holds. But its fun to imagine moralities, and attempt to force other people to follow them :^) that too is power. They are only similar categories if we assume that i don't want certain things, such as falling to my death, or not wanting to go to jail, both being similar in that they are hypothetical considerations i might have, which brings me to point 2. 2. The second type of thing is my will, what i want to achive based on some hypothetical goal i have Morality seems to be a purely hypothetical imperative (to use kant). If i want to achive x, then there are good ways to achive x, and bad ways to achive x, and ways that won't achive x at all. If i want to be moral, i have to set up certain actions to achive the desired outcomes of my morality. in short, theres only what i want to do (will), and what i can do to achive that (power) The topic itself is immensly fascinating, its just that i can't help to notice that even if we find true morality™ it can easily be interprated to be yet another attempt at power, and its 'force' will only be as great as its resistance to be able to be rejected. For the rationalists, if they cant argue against it, their brains will be forced to comply as with an ' invisible force', yet they won't see the escape that is allowed by simply being irrational. For the egoists the pragmatic effects will limit their considerations, and they won't be able to dismiss it, because they will be afraid of the consiquences, but its of course equally true that i can just as simply ignore my own well being in the future for some fun in the present. and thats equally egoistic If ones emotionally effected, one will simply be unable to perform these actions if they conflict with ones emotional assessments. ect. ect. ect. Philosophy seems to attempt to find some 'objective' morality, but the word 'objective' seems to mean a compleatly diffrent thing in the domain of morality. I think that people who use the word objective seem to miss the point. But it sure as hell is effective. Btw. i hold true objective morality As for peoples virtue signaling their morality. Morality followed by the weak seems to be an attempt to ensure power in the domain of ideas, and for the strong, its insurance, just in case of a rainy day. Hope this makes sense

[@kevincurrie-knight3267]

I share your difficulty. I'll be honest, and I apologize if this seems uncharitable to those who believe categorical reasons exist. I think at the end of the day, moral philosophy is a quest for how we could possibly achieve moral consensus or certainty or assurance on grounds other than religious ones. So, we don't just want to think that at our time and place and in our culture, slavery is wrong. We want to think that if we try hard enough, we can find that one argument that really shows that it is really wrong categorically, and that would give us grounds to essentially ignore or banish dissenters with the charge of 'irrationality.' "The reasons are there and they ARE compelling. If you can't see that, it's your problem." I just don't think that is how our moral universe works. I think moral diversity is the norm, and I think it sort of inevitable that a reason which may compel some may fail to compel others (for a variety of reasons). But we WANT it to be otherwise, and philosophers have groped for ways to conceive, and possibly imagine, that it is otherwise. That's how I read a good bulk of western philosophy, at least.

[@nicolasavila6047]

Also, in the book of Parfit there a good theory of reasons and moral

[@KaneB]

I've read Parfit, but I don't find his views at all convincing and nothing he said helped elucidate -- to me at least -- what categorical reasons are.

[@lanceindependent]

I didn't find any good theory of reasons from Parfit. It's just the invocation of mysterious concepts he can't explain, like many other non-naturalist realists. It does not strike me as all that much different from religious people appealing to personal revelation.

[@nicolasavila6047]

@@lanceindependent why do You Say that? Can You bring an example?

[@lanceindependent]

@@nicolasavila6047 An example? Like a quote from On What Matters? Not sure what you're asking for.

[@nicolasavila6047]

@@lanceindependent an example of a mysterious concept, and why it is mysterious

[@1999_reborn]

The neck beard is returning

[@justus4684]

I also noticed 👀

[@KaneB]

It's not a neckbeard lol, it's just laziness. I haven't shaved for over a week.

[@justus4684]

@@KaneB It's all just disguise!! The almighty neck beard is returning, stronger than ever before, on a mission of conquering all humanity and forcing neck beard policies!

[@GoldenMan-Gaming]

I think a lot of philosophers find the idea of categorical reasons incoherent, but I'm not sure how you can't understand the idea. Sometimes, we discover that ideas we understand are actually incoherent, for reasons we didn't understand previously (see, for example: free will, omnipotence, etc.). As far as I can tell, most people who find categorical reasons incoherent in fact need to understand what those reasons are for the arguments they make. For instance, if Joyce can't show that morality is committed to categorical imperatives (and how could he, if he couldn't even understand categorical reasons?) then his argument against moral realism wouldn't work. Similarly with Mackie and his objective prescriptivity. So, if you genuinely don't understand categorical reasons (and this isn't just a misleading way of saying "I understand them perfectly well and think they are incoherent"), then I do think you are part of a very small minority here. Most critics of categorical reasons seem to understand them well enough, from my experience.

[@lanceindependent]

I study metaethics and I don't think the notion of a categorical reason is intelligible. I think those who think they "have" the concept of such a thing are conceptually confused, like someone thinking they "have the concept" of something being intrinsically north-facing. We (people who think of categorical reasons as unintelligible) may be in a minority now, but I am not sure why people keep pointing this out. Yes, we probably are in a minority. But I still think we are correct. That is, I think we are thinking clearly about matters, and the moral realists who think there are categorical reasons are not. These are phantom pseudoconcepts, they have no content, they have no significance, make no predictions, explain nothing whatsoever, and are an utterly superfluous and unparsimonious load of dreck. I remain baffled that philosophers are enchanted with a notion this ephemeral and strange.

[@KaneB]

This is the position I used to hold -- that I understand what categorical reasons are, and it's because I understand what they are that I can claim they don't exist. I'm not so sure anymore, though. But I'd be very happy with the incoherence claim -- as I note in the video, if I defend that, then I have an argument against these versions of moral realism. Simply saying that I don't understand something isn't an argument that any defender of categorical reasons is likely to find convincing (though perhaps, if they attempt to explain it to me, they might come to think that they don't understand it either). I think I understand what leads philosophers to postulate categorical reasons. I'm also capable of using this terminology in the way that these philosophers do. Perhaps that's enough for understanding. I don't feel like I know what I'm talking about when I say these things, though. Indeed, I'm not sure I understand what reasons are, as some philosophers apparently conceive of them, let alone categorical reasons. Part of this is because when I explain to other philosophers what I'm expressing when I use sentences containing the term "reason", they often say that this isn't what a reason is, or that I've expressed an aspect of the reason but I'm missing something important. But I have no clarity on what exactly I'm missing. So it's not exactly like somebody talking about e.g. a "round square". I can describe what round things are, and I can describe what squares are; and it's for this reason that I know that nothing can be a round square. That's a clear case where I understand the idea, but would claim that it's incoherent. In the case of reasons, by contrast, it's more like if somebody started talking about "gurzelworps", but whenever I ask what a gurzelworp is, no definition is provided that enables me to understand the concept. "Categorical reason" is not exactly analogous to this either because I do understand at least some of what's being claimed by people who talk about categorical reasons -- if categorical reasons are desire-independent, well, I know what desires are and what it is for something to be independent of desires. Maybe it's that the distinction between incoherence ("round square") and complete lack of meaning ("gurzelworp") is vague, and "categorical reason" falls somewhere in the middle. At least, I think that's how it is to me. I could be wrong about that.

[@lanceindependent]

@@KaneB Amazingly well put. I'm getting a lot of push back from people - not just realists - for moral realism's notions being in some fuzzy territory between incoherence and lack of meaning.

[@GoldenMan-Gaming]

@@KaneB Sorry for the name change, btw, I was asked to upload some things on KZbin and figured I shouldn't do so under my real name. However, I just take reasons to be a consideration in the most basic four-place normative relation between a person, an act or attitude, a consideration, and a situation. So, to say that X is a reason for Annie to eat waffles in the morning is to say that X gives Annie the most basic normative support to eat waffles in the morning. If you don't understand normativity, I'm going to have a hard time doing anything other than pointing at examples, which won't do much for you I fear. Then, to say that moral reasons are categorical reasons is to say that considerations which give the most basic moral support (assuming moral support is normative support) or moral dis-support (is that a word? probably not) are not constituted by, grounded in, presuppose, enabled by, or otherwise dependent on having a desire which would help be fulfilled by doing or not doing as the reason says.

[@itstandstoreason]

I think it’s a mistake to say that because someone is blameworthy for an act that they have a reason not to do it. I think it could be the case that there exists a reason for them not to do it. And that reason is the other desires of other people.

[@93alvbjo]

Here is a categorical reason for acting: ”one should always act, or reason, or think, in such a way so that one does not destroy one’s ability to reason or think about what one should do in the future.” This is not an instrumental ought, nor is it merely normative in order to achieve some practical goal. Another way of saying this: ”Don’t act in such a way that you remove your ability to know what you should do in the future.” Some desires destroy our reason. Don’t pick them up, because doing so necessarily mean you won’t be able to know which desire you should pick up. As a rational animal, I am not an automata. A desire causes me to be motivated to achieve some goal, but I decide whether I should act on that desire. That always depends on the practical problems I have in my life.

[@lanceindependent]

An agent could have the goal of its own destruction. For instance, suppose a heroic soldier is in the trenches and a grenade falls. It's going to kill everyone around them unless they jump on it. They don't want to die, but the only way to save everyone else is to sacrifice themselves for the sake of others. I don't think it's true that this person has any sort of categorical reason to not do this. Whether they do this or not will depend on their attitude, goals, values, etc., and they won't be doing something in violation of the categorical reasons they have to continue existing. So, I simply don't think it's the case that one should always act in the way you describe.

[@93alvbjo]

@@lanceindependent They are aiming to save others, not destroy themselves. They are treating their destruction as a means towards an end. But the end is an end in itself, because it protects the ability of setting rational ends, namely, people. Reason itself has no rule that, when it is instanciated in an indivdual, it needs to maintain that individual necessarily, in spite of reason.

[@93alvbjo]

@@lanceindependent yes and that is an immoral goal. but your example isn't evidence of that.

[@93alvbjo]

@@absolutelyoptimistictheologyyes I believe too I made that confused. I think the idea is if the self sacrifice is for the saké of reason as such, pure reason, then it is a duty. It is not ones own ability to reason necessarily that counts.

[@93alvbjo]

@@absolutelyoptimistictheologyconsider rather if the choice is between self-preservation by sacrificing someone else, and self-sacrfice. Then it becomes universalisable, as saving ones own skin using someone else is not unversalizable.

[@BatmanArkham8592]

Without GOD there is No Morality -Theists

[@lanceindependent]

Why would there be morality with God? And what would that even mean?

[@BatmanArkham8592]

@@lanceindependent kzbin.info/www/bejne/bYmpnKBveL90iJY kzbin.info/www/bejne/nIHOhnhja9ipjLc

[@lanceindependent]

@@BatmanArkham8592 Thanks. I've seen the first video already but not the second. I'm not asking for references though. I was hoping you could explain to me why you could not have morality without God yourself

[@BatmanArkham8592]

@@lanceindependent i not a theist i was just saying that Most theists think this They think God is The ONLY source of Morals and a Mindless Nature can not have any source for Morals and Some try to argue that if there is No God n Afterlife/Hell people can Do Whatever they like

[@lanceindependent]

@@BatmanArkham8592 Fair enough. I just want to know why they think that.

[@93alvbjo]

Of course there are reasons. Reasons are critical explanations for our actions. If they’re bad, we take that seriously. Categorical reasons are reasons for actions that hold for all rational beings. Slavery is wrong, because it treats an arbitrary set of rational agents agency as means towards a material end for some other set of rational beings. There is no categorical reason to do so, it simply comes down to might over right, which is not itself something that persuades a rational being.