Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety

[@LesbianVampireLover]

I just finished Schlosser's excellent book. It is a long read, but difficult to put down. As one who lived through the Cold War era, this book confirms that we were so much closer to the Apocalypse than we realized at the time.

[@droL_si_suseJ]

Good story and doc. I was an aircraft mx guy, 25 years, 73-98, mostly F-4 s and -135s. Not using the proper tools and not following tech data was, is and remains a big no, no for all aircraft and missile career fields. Too bad, SrA Livingston lost his life and others got hurt because a couple of knucklehead coworkers didn’t follow tech data. Just like the F-15 maintenance screw-up at Spangdahlem AB Germany in 1995, which cost the pilot his life. We are trained from day-one in aircraft maintenance to use tech data and follow procedures. I retired as a CMSgt, and during my career I read a lot of aircraft accident reports and almost everyone was pilot error or maintenance not doing something right. Few, very few accidents were material failure or acts of nature. Numerous times, as a young technician during bad weather, late nights, weekends, deployments, exercises, real-world situations I had someone above me telling me or suggesting to ‘sign it off’, ‘clear the red X’, or ‘just let it go’ and I’d hand the aircraft 781 forms to them with my pencil and say, “go ahead, you sign it of!” And you know what, they never did. To all current and future Air Force aircraft and missile mechanics do it right the first time-“it is pay me now or pay me later” in the aircraft/missile maintenance business!

[@AdurianJ]

A major problem in the Falklands was that many Aircraft weapons had so many safeties it was creating a large problem with getting the weapons to actually detonate when used. The British Cluster bomb was especially plagued by this and had something like 11 safeties. The problem was partially circumvented by weapons crews disabling a large number of safeties before arming the plane. With this in mind it's understandable the Strategic Air Command was worried about DUD bombs when you only get one trip.

[@gljazzhead]

An exceptional book, and an excellent discussion. Thank you for posting.

[@nicu_danciu]

What a fantastic book!!!!!!

[@daveeyes]

From Command and Control: "Two retired Air Force nuclear technicians, Michael H. Maggelet and James C. Oskins, have done a superlative job of obtaining information about weapon accidents from their former employer. And they’ve made documents on the subject available, largely unedited, in a couple of books that I found extremely useful: Broken Arrow: The Declassified History of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Accidents (Raleigh, NC: Lulu, 2007), and Broken Arrow, Volume II: A Disclosure of Significant U.S., Soviet, and British Nuclear Weapon Incidents and Accidents, 1945-2008 (Raleigh, NC: Lulu, 2010). Maggelet and Oskins don’t exaggerate the danger of the many bomber crashes and fires that involved nuclear weapons. In fact, they tend to understate the actual risk of an accidental detonation. But what they’ve uncovered is remarkable." -- Eric Schlosser I'm puzzled. Eric Schlosser speaks highly of your books ("superlative" is high praise). What's going on here? Puzzled, David Small

[@dsweedler]

My comment is specifically about the cause of the "Damascus AK" Incident. Missile techs claimed that dropped tools were a common event in the missile silos during maintainance ops. They also claimed that it would be a 1 in a million event for the dropped tool to strike the extremely thin missile sidewall. The film crew that made a PBS based reenactment movie in a decommisioned Titan Missile silo claimed that 50% of the dropped styrofoam mockup models of the 8 lb socket mamanged to strike the decommed Titan missile sitting in that silo. No one who works at height uses tools without lanyards and captive yokes to keep them from falling. No one. Not utility powerline workers. Not windfarm workers. Not highrise window washwashers. Not recreational rock climbers or cavers. EVERYTHING IS TETHERED whenever you work at height. Could be duct tape and nylon braided lines or something more sophisticated but you never work at height without those tethered lines connecting everything to your wrists or body. Only the USAF could be that stupid. Also why would you use an 8lb steel impact socket to remove what is likely an anodized aluminum or composite plastic fuel cap made from lightweight corrosion resistant materials. At the very least those impact sockets all have a heavy duty detent pin that must be pushed in to secure the socket to the drive head. In other words those sickets must be locked in place before you use them with a 1" square drive impact wrench to remove a truck tire lug nut or work on a huge diesel engine. Wrong tool for the job of removing a missile liquid fuel filler cap.

[@dclevelc9802]

Arkansas is AR. NOT AK

[@wtalso963]

The below reckless ad hominem attacks on Mr. Schlosser’s book compel me to provide a rebuttal for those readers who may not have the technical background nor security clearances to understand how outrageous they are. The claim that “Schlosser’s statements are full of disinformation and fabrications”, is astonishing. There are 122 pages of end notes and bibliography. What else is necessary for credibility? By the way, I have lived nuclear safety for 55 years in the military and as a DOE contractor. I find the book very credible and thought-provoking. I particularly like the author’s observations that security classification issues have caused nuclear weapons policy to be decided by a small group of people where often there ought to be public debate. If we want to pick nits, the statement that “Sandia Labs designed and tested fusing and firing systems” is inaccurate. Sandia designs and tests arming, fuzing, and firing (AFF) systems. (Those who understand weapons systems know the word is “fuzing”.) Mr. Maggelet says “as for military resistance, that is pure BS”. I assume he is talking about design safety. It is much more complicated than a simple inflammatory statement. It depends on your point of view and your definition of risk. Weapons design is a constant debate between the military who want to optimize operational capabilities and the labs who emphasize safety. This is healthy and insures all issues are addressed. Mr. Maggelet’s statement that “Schlosser’s claims of ‘close calls’ is false” is a matter of opinion. I submit any Broken Arrow is a close call. Further, Mr. Maggelet’s discussion of the Goldsboro accident is inaccurate. First, to set the stage, the government, in this case, the Air Force, is often its own worst enemy by suppressing information and forcing the media, and other self-appointed experts, to speculate. The Goldsboro accident happened in January 1961. As Mr. Schlosser points out in his book, it wasn’t until September 2013, 52 years later, that he obtained a copy of a declassified report under the FOIA. The report, entitled “Goldsboro Revisited” written by Parker Jones, the man responsible for mechanical safety systems at Sandia Labs, states that “one simple low voltage switch” was all that prevented a nuclear detonation. A fire signal had been initiated. Further, this accident and the schematic diagrams of a Mk39 bomb were the basis of a Sandia Labs safety course for years. I also disagree with Mr. Maggelet’s depiction of the Damascus Arkansas accident potential as “an outright falsehood”. The book says the warhead “could” have detonated. Meaning, if it remained intact, and if a fire signal was generated, it had the potential to incinerate the state of Arkansas. That is a clear depiction of potential risk. To a lesser degree, it could have produced some nuclear yield if the high explosive had detonated at multiple points. Mr. Maggelet’s statement that there was “no danger of a nuclear detonation whatsoever” is astonishing. This statement disregards the possibility of a partial yield and the spread of radioactive material. By the way, the Air Force EOD rendered the warhead safe after it was inspected by the Los Alamos designer and, at his direction; the high explosive was saturated in hydraulic fluid to minimize the potential of friction causing a spark. The reader can now make up his or mind.

[@SSCFPA]

Methinks someone does not like their book - good as it might be - being overshadowed by Eric's. Botom line - this guy does his research. He also cites extensive sources and interviews with those directly involved in what he reports. Without being once part of an institution such as the USAF.

[@emls5]

As my statics professor once said, statics don't lie but liars do statics. It all depends on what truth you want to tell. The whole truth or just give enough information to tell only your side of the story that you want people to believe. Still partially true but misleading for the whole truth.

[@firebombclipper]

Very good discussion.

[@kelman727]

Maggelet's motives are perhaps s little different than that he/she wants us to think...

[@SpicyPotato8675]

MH Maggelet: as a budding historian myself, I find your comments Eric Schlossers work to be highly unprofessional. If you are the "historian" that you claim to be then you should be reviewing his book in a fashion that is accepted in the academic community instead of insulting him on every online thread that his book appears in.

[@GCF-Media]

His book is very opinionated and agenda-based. People that were actually there that day have said many times the book is highly innacurate.

[@rakanmosuly6640]

.30

[@jhonreyabre6609]

Crap I love this 33 God's o holy.host Oh my

[@mhmaggelet2288]

Schlosser's claims of "close calls" with nuclear detonations are false. The Mk 39 bombs at Goldsboro contained two solenoid safety switches, which were in no danger of functioning. His statement that the W53 warhead in Arkansas could have detonated "incinerating" the state of Arkansas is an outright falsehood. The W53 was severely damaged with broken detonator cables, and was incapable of producing a nuclear yield. EOD rendered safe the weapon, no danger of a nuclear detonation whatsoever.

[@johnwatson3948]

I read it and thought it was even more BS than Mr. Maggelet did. It’s just a series of anecdotes instead of a step by step study of each accident. Maggelet is a known respected retired nuclear technician and author who writes about weapon accidents - who are you?

[@danielyoung6630]

WRENCH DROPPED IN A SILO CAUSING HUGE PROBLEMS! WHAT IS NEXT?

[@Dolnor]

And now our President-Elect has decided we need to increase our nuclear weapon production and deployment. I hope I am wearing clean underwear when this all goes south! -*( TQQdles™