Pearl Harbor: Japan's master plan?

[@skyden24195]

I would agree with the assessment by CentralCrossing. The attack did what it intended to do: i.e., give Imperial Japan time to take over as much of the South-Western Pacific as they could and secure the resources that Japan needed. Really, the greatest flaw to the plan was not missing the carriers or oil fields, etc., the greatest flaw was underestimating the resolve of the United States of America. It is somewhat ironic that, in the Japanese Samuri code it dictates an attack perpetrated by an enemy must be avenged for the honor of the Samuri, but foolishly, Japan did not attribute the U.S.A. as to having such honor, a mistake for which they (Japan) would ultimately pay dearly.

[@robertneal4244]

Like most "what ifs" in World War 2. More success in one particular battle would not change the end result, but would change the length of the war and probably total casualties. Damaging the drydocks and fuel farm in Pearl Harbor would have slowed down the operations and recovery, but it wouldn't stop them.

[@PurpleRhymesWithOrange]

Ultimately Japan was fated to lose the war because no matter how successful they were in any particular battle they could do nothing to slow down the US industrial capacity. The US was able to continuously replace lost ships which was something Japan could not keep doing.

[@LuqmanHM]

Japan ultimately lost when they decided to go to war against both the USA and Britain, regardless whatever the alternative options offered.

[@BHuang92]

Rarely does a plan go as intended.

[@clmk28]

Especially in War!!!

[@Makeyourselfbig]

As he pointed out, this one did.

[@jimwyatt9894]

Precisely. When does “Plan A” ever work?

[@tomlindsay4629]

Excellent video, so full of details that the often repeated statements about Pearl Harbor never mention. Thanks for posting!

[@glennac]

Succeeded or Failed? An important aspect of the attack was the expectation that the American government and, more importantly, the public would be highly disheartened by the attacks and thus not be in a position to press for revenge. There really was the Japanese expectation that America was not up for a protracted war. However, the actual American response took Japanese leadership by complete surprise. America’s industrial and military windup in the months and years following Pearl Harbor was the rousing awakening of a’sleeping giant’ that Japan was entirely unprepared for. So, yes, the attack itself succeeded. But it also was a direct cause of Japan losing the war. One wonders if Japan had foregone the attack and just pressed south as it had planned would have Japan ended up in a better position once hostilities had ceased. 🤔

[@WilliamMurphy-b6v]

In the South, they had to deal with the US Asiatic fleet. A not very effective force but might try to stop Japanese incursions into European holdings in Southeast Asia or off-shore. The Asiatic fleet was a trip-wire, just as Pearl Harbor turned out to be.

[@PurpleRhymesWithOrange]

If Japan had not attacked the US directly it is likely there would have been little public support for getting involved in the war. While Japan was fated to lose eventually due to the US industrial capacity if they had left American territories alone there likely would have been a negotiated peace under which Japan would have been allowed to keep at some recently acquired territories.

[@WilliamMurphy-b6v]

@PurpleRhymesWithOrange Might I point out that peace talks were going on in Washington DC, between the Japanese delegation and the USA. Those talks were going nowhere since they were nothing more than a distraction, giving Japan enough time to complete their attack on Pearl Harbor. Whether the USA was drawn into the war from an action in the Pacific or one in the Atlantic, early or late, even peace-loving Americans were getting fed up with what the Axis Powers were doing worldwide. It was simply a matter of time before some incident, real or created, would have crossed some line in the sand somewhere that triggered war for the USA.

[@anxiousbottle]

If Japan hadn’t attacked Pearl Harbor they might have drawn the us navy into the sort of kantai-kessen battle they always wanted and force the us to surrender before their industrial force could start pumping

[@PurpleRhymesWithOrange]

@@anxiousbottle That would not have gone well for Japan either. The US was far more capable of replacing lost ships than Japan was. In the two years following the Pearl Harbor raid the US launched 26 fleet and light carrier, significantly more than Japan launched during the entire war. If you include escort carriers Japan launched about two dozen total while the US launched nearly a hundred. Not to mention how many planes the US produced when Japan was never anywhere near replacing the number of planes they were losing. The only way Japan could have come out of the war with more territory than they had stated with was to keep the US uninterested in pacific island. Likewise, the US could never have ignored if Japan had tried landing troops in New Zealand and Australia.

[@manilajohn0182]

The objective of the attack on Pearl Harbor was to prevent the United States Pacific Fleet from interfering with Japanese operations in the "Southern Area" (i.e. the Philippines, Malaya, Dutch and British Borneo, and the Dutch East Indies). As this objective was met, the attack was a success.

[@PurpleRhymesWithOrange]

The initial raid was a success because Japan did not lose any ship and only a few aircraft. The value of that success was short lived as the US was able to replace all the ships and even refloat some sunk in Pearl Harbor. From the start of the war to the end Japan only produced two new battleships and zero heavy cruisers.

[@WilliamMurphy-b6v]

It was both a partial success and partial failure. They achieved surprise and sunk or damaged a lot of ships. They missed the aircraft carriers, maintenance facilities, and much of the stored oil. Hey, it was what it was. And, it did awaken a sleeing giant. Biggest mistake? It brought them a war that they could least afford and later they lost.

[@Dv087]

The oil was a big miss.

[@thatguyinelnorte]

@@Dv087 The oil and drydocks were not in their plan. The second mistake was attacking before the diplomatic move was made. The first was attacking the USA at all.

[@A.LeeMorrisJr]

Great tactical victory for Imperial Japan, terrible strategic blunder.

[@The_Modeling_Underdog]

A well balanced and fair analysis, Crosser. Well done.

[@edge7387]

Excellent

[@alancranford3398]

Thanks. You confirmed what I have been studying since 1976. I had dabbled in history before enlisting in the Marines in 1974 but was stationed on Oahu during September 1976 and I walked on many of the locations where the Pearl Harbor Raid took place. Later, I learned about the code breakers and why they didn't find out that Pearl Harbor was a target--but the code breakers did track the invasion fleet that hit the Philippines ten hours after the Pearl Harbor Raid began and warned MacArthur. The first day of the Philippine Island conquest would make an interesting video. MacArthur suffered more losses than Kimmel and Short--the latter were court martialed because American needed scapegoats and MacArthur was awarded a 1942 Medal of Honor when American needed heroes, I agree that Pearl Harbor was a success because the raid exceeded the goals established. I don't know all the specifics, but the Pearl Harbor raid was to cripple the Pacific Fleet and get away with the Japanese carrier strike force intact. A successful raid would prevent American offensive operations for at least six months and would limit interference from the American navy. It did just that--despite the Hail Mary play called the Doolittle Raid in April 1942. It was only that April when Yamamoto began regretting that the American aircraft carriers were not caught in port and bombed and torpedoed. Next: Coral Sea halted the southern part of the Japanese expansion. The Aleutians operation was a diversion from seizing Midway Island and attempting to bomb Oahu into submission. The miniature submarine infiltration into Pearl Harbor may have put a torpedo into one of the damaged ships--nobody knows. The mother ships, fleet subs, were supposed to sink any American ships in Hawaiian waters. The lost fleet submarine demonstrated that the American sub hunters (both airplane and destroyers) were active and effective. Japan had limited assets and couldn't keep its submarine fleet on station waiting for the "cowardly Yankee imperialists' to stick their noses out. There was a second Pearl Harbor Air Raid in March 1942 and it failed. I saw that oil tank farm and when I last saw Pearl Harbor in person (late 1990's) the tank farm was still in use. The tank farm was not an easy target. It would have taken a direct hit from a 500-pound bomb to destroy one tank--merely damaging it and setting it ablaze wouldn't do because the tank farm was designed to minimize damage and repairs probably would have restored a damaged tank to service in a few weeks, the fuel oil replaced. Smoke from damaged fuel tanks would have made hitting more than a few a hit-or-miss proposition. As it was, smoke from burning warships made accurate bombing difficult for days afterwards and even when caught by surprise the heavy anti-aircraft fire made bombing Pearl Harbor dangerous. A third raid would have lacked the element of surprise, the radar stations would have given 45 to 90 minutes warning for the third raid and would have tracked the raiders from where they came to where they returned. The Japanese commander probably made the right decision to leave with most of his aircraft and all of his ships intact. He exceeded the mission goals. If the Japanese had known the details of War Plan Orange and that it had been replaced by War Plan Rainbow 5 in November 1941 (under consideration since June 1941)--abandon the Philippines, hold in the Pacific, and beat Hitler--perhaps the Japanese wouldn't have bothered with Pearl Harbor. Sinking aircraft carries wasn't a done deal--the Yorktown was "sunk" at the Battle of the Coral Sea, sunk three more times at Midway, too. In 1944 several of the battleships sunk at Pearl Harbor duked it out with Japanese battleships in the massive Battle of Leyte Gulf. www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1978/august/strange-case-rainbow-5 Note on Rainbow 5: the standard operating procedure (SOP) for government bureaucracies is CYA (cover your ass), and it was a secret until after the war that FDR knew he wouldn't be able to hold onto the Philippines. The Japanese expected to clear the Philippines in December, mop up the remainder no later than the end of February. Roosevelt was hoping for a delay of 90 days. Corrigador fell in May. Letting America know that America was too weak to prevent conquest of the Philippines didn't come out until years after VJ Day.

[@donaldirons3174]

One detail you overlooked, was the fact that the Japanese striking forces tankers were heading for its rendezvous point to refuel the task force. Because of this, the Japanese could not search for the missing carriers let alone launch another attack wave.

[@Malbeefance]

Given the historical outcome, the answer to the question is pretty obvious.

[@WilliamMurphy-b6v]

@@Malbeefance Maybe to you but the rest of the world may not have your insights or knowledge..

[@manilajohn0182]

As the objective of the attack was not to win the war, the historical outcome was irrelevant.

[@WilliamMurphy-b6v]

@manilajohn0182 Very cerebral. Some might say downright crazy. The historical outcome was hardly irrelevant. WW2 changed the world significantly, for good and bad, thereafter.

[@PurpleRhymesWithOrange]

Very insightful commentary.

[@Kwolfx]

Good video. I would add one thing to top it off. The idea that Admiral Nagumo made the decision to pass up launching a third wave to attack Pearl Harbor and this decision was deeply regretted by his subordinates and even argued against by one the principle planners of the attack; Genda Minoru, is a myth or lie, made up by Fuchida Mitsuo, who was the flight leader of the attack. In 1963, Fuchida told Gordan Prange; the author of "At Dawn We Slept," that while returning from leading the second wave he was thinking of all the valuable targets; like the oil tank farm and port facilities, that could be attacked in a follow up wave. He said he was shocked another attack was called off by Nagumo and that Genda argued in favor of such an attack. This version of events is also repeated in the movie Tora Tora Tora, which Fuchida was a technical advisor on. Genda said this conversation never happened. Furthermore, Fuchida was interrogated in October 10, 1945; about five weeks after Japan's surrender was signed, and was specifically asked about the Pearl Harbor attack. Here is one key quote from that interrogation and I will provide a link to the entire transcript. Q. Why, if it was so successful, did you not repeat the attack. A. We did not realize we had destroyed planes to such an extent. We knew we had done in four battleships, but did not know the extent of damage to American planes, and of course the carriers were not there. We figured if we could sink four battleships, then it was a success. About three days afterwards when the intelligence was gathered, it was realized what had been done; but we thought that you would be re-supplied with planes from the other islands in the HAWAIIAN Group, so it wouldn't pay to return. No mention of a possible follow up attack the same day. No mention of missed opportunities. Here is a link to the entire transcript. Questions and answers cover the entire war. www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/USSBS/IJO/IJO-29.html

[@hazchemel]

Its a feasible argument, and it let Japanese naval operations roll out with little problem. Also, the culture among flag officers was probably somewhat different, regarding how much scope for improvisation was acceptable.

[@wplg]

Won the battle but lost the war. The phrase "awoken a sleeping giant" came from a movie, "Tora Tora Tora!" Which was released in 1970 to weak reviews in the U.S. But was a major hit in Japan. I was at the premier in Tokyo, to a sold-out audience. At the time I was serving in the U.S. military, on a special assignment touring Asia. The sneak attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese audience "cheered" with every bomb that hit its mark. For me it was educational, watching in horror the US military complacency. The only redeeming quote for me as an American, was the quote "Awoken a sleeping giant." But as far as I know, Admiral Yamamoto never said those words. To its credit even by today's standards, "Tora Tora Tora." I believe it to be a masterpiece. But after watching it in Japan, It left me very unsatisfied. But the total opposite for the Japanese audience.

[@takashitamagawa5881]

By launching the Pearl Harbor attack, carried out by aircraft, the Japanese made its main targets, the U.S. battleships, irrelevant to the war that they started. In the five months that Japan made its conquests in the South Pacific and Pacific Rim regions where its strategic interests were located their own battleships largely sat at anchor uselessly. The NAGATOs, the ISEs, and the FUSOs were of as little use to the Japanese during that period as the battleships sunk or damaged at Pearl Harbor were to the U.S. Only the HARUNA battlecruiser /battleships which had the speed to operate with the Japanese carriers were utilized by the fleet during this time. Apart from them the old battleships of both navies would not participate in any engagements during the war against their own kind.

[@AlanToon-fy4hg]

The Japanese could be, and were tactically and technically brilliant, but strategically only succeeded in arousing and uniting America. Hiroshima and Nagasaki were a direct result of Pearl Harbor.

[@indianasunsets5738]

A clear and straightforward analysis.

[@bkjeong4302]

I’d say that PH was a failure but not for the reason most people point out (the fuel tanks and other facilities weren’t actually viable targets, the carriers not being in PH was simple bad luck and not a mistake by the Japanese): the big issue is with the entire Southern Strategy being actively detrimental for the Kantai Kessen doctrine and instead feeding into the most up-to-date American war plan.

[@manilajohn0182]

The Japanese had no viable alternative to carrying out the southern strategy, as they were being starved for oil, tin, rubber, manganese, bauxite, and iron ore, to mention just a few raw materials. Granted that it was their own actions which got them into that position in the first place, but they were being starved nonetheless. Abandoning the southern strategy would have obligated the Japanese to withdraw not only from French Indo- China, but from all of China as well- and that included Manchuria. That was never going to happen. The decisive battle doctrine was not a major factor, as every Japanese naval exercise conducting the decisive battle had ended in a defeat for the Imperial Navy. Cheers...

[@bkjeong4302]

@@manilajohn0182 No, they could have avoided the Southern Strategy. What they really couldn’t avoid was war with the US in general (thanks to the oil embargo), but there was a way where they would have lost less badly by not following that strategy.

[@manilajohn0182]

@@bkjeong4302 Well, the Japanese needed the oil above all else, and the southern area was the only place that had it in the quantity that they required. That said, okay, lay it on me. What was the way in which they could they have avoided that strategy? Cheers...

[@bkjeong4302]

@@manilajohn0182 Try to fight the war the way their own doctrine called for (albeit abandoning the final battleship fight entirely for a carrier strike against the American battleline, but that was a mistake everyone else also made) - namely, leave PH alone, ignore the Philippines (which couldn’t support an American naval presence big enough to threaten the IJN in 1941 anyways) and don’t bother going after all the Pacific island outposts (that ended up as resource sinks that the Americans often just ignored), focus ENTIRELY on the British and Dutch holdings in SEA (basically a far more limited version of the southern strategy instead of what Yamamoto demanded). Then, once you have those European colonies, take advantage of political pressure within the US to defend the Philippines to try and bait the still-building up USN into a pointless naval offensive over the Philippines within the first few months of the war so they end up in the decisive battle scenario the Japanese wanted. Now the USN is fighting you when you’re the one closer to the supplies and before all the new ships under construction have entered service, giving you an advantage. Will this take the USN out of the fight entirely and let you win in the long run? No. But it’s still going to leave you in a much better position overall when that American onslaught comes eventually, with fewer losses on your side and heavier enemy losses.

[@charlesjohnson4933]

I always questioned why the Japanese Navy didn't shut down Pearl Harbor with submarines. It could have been worse than the U-boats. Deeper water all around Hawaii and even off the California US Navy bases.

[@The_Modeling_Underdog]

Most of the evidence points on the contrary. Japanese submarines were based on very different operational requirements to their German counterparts, these affected their overall performance and, while capable when properly used, they were certainly not a Typ VII or a Typ IX. Japanese subs could not dive extremely deep, were a bit slower and far noisier than average when submerged; and difficult to maneuver under water. Worst of all, the General Staff kept putting them on the losing side of things throughout the war. But, you have a valid question there. "The Japanese Submarine Force and WWII" by Boyd and Yoshida is an old book, but worth reading if you want to understand how the IJN mismanaged such an important asset. Cheers.

[@charlesjohnson4933]

Yes, I will read that. Thank u

[@The_Modeling_Underdog]

@@charlesjohnson4933 You're most welcome. Cheers.

[@astolatpere11]

They didn't think this through.

[@WilliamMurphy-b6v]

Where did you get your facts? There were many statements made, after the war, that were pure posturing by the Japanese; often made to make the Emperor appear far less culpable or to prevent embarrassment to the Army or Navy of the Empire. In otherwords, using hindsight to "save face".

[@kidmohair8151]

this was Imperial Japan's equivalent of Imperial Germany's Schlieffen plan. tactically it might succeed. strategically it didn't.

[@ssyn6626]

Ok heres the numbers ignoring the carriers even if Japan permanently sunk the 8 battleships there everyone seems to forget the US still has at least 9 more the Colorado the 3 Mississippi class ships the New York class (2ships) the Wyoming and the North Carolina class (2 ships) plus the 4 south Dakotas would be ready early the next year. So the big deal about this is pretty limited if the US wanted they probably should have sent the rest of the fleet (most of the cruiser and destroyer were also in the Atlantic) and would still match the Japanese forces in most aspects. Japan basically ironically worked more like the US today making very short sighted plans to cover for the previous short sighted plan. So for the limited buy some time it did what they wanted actually did better since they were expecting huge losses the Kongos were expecting to tow some of the carriers back for example. So it worked better than it was hoped. Long run going to war was the mistake regardless of where it started.

[@LuqmanHM]

Japan ultimately lost when they decided to go to war against both the USA and Britain, whatever the alternative options offered.

[@sheilah4525]

When you bother to learn to read and STUDY YAMAMOTO, it makes one breathless. IF you study military history, tactics and command, you easily see how WRONG THIS MAN WAS IN FORMING HIS UNMANAGEABLE BATTLE PLANS, forever splitting his forces and making things chaotic. He was not the genius too often presented; in fact his plans were AWFUL and his only “half victory” was a surprise attack against ancient battleships AT ANCHOR prior to a declaration of war. His choice of admiral led to Nagumo, always a hesitant man, but who, up to then, never had to make DECISIONS UNDER PRESSURE. Nagumo failed at Pearl Harbor and failed worse at Midway while Yamamoto hid 300 miles behind the Kido Butai in Yamato. Yamamoto was a totally overrated admiral and, in the end a dismal failure, right up to the moment and INCLUDING IT, when flying in a very BAD PLANE THAT TENDED TO BURST INTO FLAME, and getting himself shot down.

[@princessofthecape2078]

It was a strategic disaster, and it was arguably a tactical disaster, too - obliging the Americans to fully embrace carrier doctrine way earlier than they might have otherwise. Had Japan committed to fighting a grand, Jutland-style battle - like they had planned since the 1920s - it is entirely possible that they might have defeated the slower U.S. Pacific Fleet. And, if sunk at sea, there would obviously be no salvaging lost ships, and fatalities would have been much higher. By attacking the Pacific Fleet at anchor, failing to bag the carriers, and then not following that attack up with either an invasion of the Hawaiian Islands, or - at least - a sustained bombing campaign to destroy most infrastructure of military value, Japan just did the international equivalent of kicking a hornet's nest and leaving the most dangerous bugs still flying around. It didn't resolve anything, and it didn't shock the U.S. enough to knock America out of the war. It was in every regard a failure - essentially resulting in the complete opposite outcome that the IJN had hoped.

[@nickdanger3802]

May 1941 1/4 of the Pacific fleet transferred to Atlantic to escort British convoys.

[@oldcarnocar]

Uncle Sam came knocking, August 6th,9th 1945. so eff no!

[@manilajohn0182]

Not relevant.

[@oldcarnocar]

@@manilajohn0182 they had it coming

[@manilajohn0182]

@@oldcarnocar lol

[@greener2497]

@@oldcarnocar smartest boomer

[@SoloRenegade]

Pearl Harbor was a disaster. Japan needed to both declare war FIRST, then attack, but also needed to bring a battleship fleet with to blockade the Harbor afterwards and sink anything that tried to leave or exit, and use its remaining airpower to establish air superiority. Sink both the Enterprise and Lexington or force them to sail back to teh US mainland. And then they may have actually been able to negotiate as desired.

[@railwaymechanicalengineer4587]

THE BIG QUESTION IS !!! The BIG QUESTION of course is: Why didn't Roosevelt warn Pearl Harbor it was going to be attacked, as he was informed by Churchill 3 months before that attack. That Pearl Harbor was to be the primary target, of ALL the many locations attacked across the Pacific & South East Asia at EXACTLYY THE SAME TIME (07.30 Hawaii Pacific time). Other locations attacked at the same time, were Guam, Philippines (Northern Luzon), northern Malaysia, Thailand, and numerous other locations. Which all resulted in the Japanese Military commandeering 25% of the WHOLE Pacific Ocean, and chunks of South East Asia, in only around 6 weeks !!! It needs to be noted here that Churchill in response to his knowledge of the attack, dispatched THREE MONTHS before Pearl Harbor, a British Battleship, Battlecruiser, Aircraft Carrier, and at least another Flotilla of Destroyers to Singapore. Singapore the British knew would become the target for the Japanese Army landings in Malaysia executed at exactly the same time as the Pearl Harbor attack. All of which clearly reveals the British knew much of the detail of these huge and combined simultaneous attacks, three months before they occurred !!! A fundamental problem for Pearl Harbor was that no Admiral in any Navy would believe that their wonderful Battleships could possibly be sunk by irritating little Airplanes. A warning first given by the US Army Airforce Colonel "Billy Mitchell" by his demonstration on July 21 1921 by sinking the captured World War 1 German Battleship "Ostfreisland". A warning that cost Billy Mitchell a "Court Marshall" for his pains. This implies that "Roosevelts" advisers most likely said "We will shoot down any little Japanese planes, so we don't need to worry Pearl Harbor about any attack" !!! Indeed the Admirals really believed their Battleships were invincible, despite the fact the British Navy had attacked the Italian Navy in its main Port of Taranto (11/12th November 1940) a year BEFORE Pearl Harbor. And with just 24 outdated Torpedo biplanes sunk 50% of the Italian Battleship fleet (& other lesser vessels), and evened the odds for the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean at a single stroke. For the cost of just two of those Biplanes shot down by the Italians !!! The most interested "party" in that attack on Taranto were the Japanese (allies of Italy) who rushed in to assess the damage at Taranto. Which laid out the basis for their attack on Pearl Harbor a year later !!! Further evidence to support the knowledge that certainly the White House was fully aware of the coming attack, was the fact that the USA had NO Radar in 1941. So how come there was a strategically placed Radar station located on O'ahu, that just happened to be facing the North West. Which was of course perfectly placed to see the in coming Japanese Aircraft. That (mobile) Radar Station had been provided by the British and was in fact manned by British Military personnel, dressed in U.S Uniforms (to disguise them from prying eyes). Which again proves Churchill had not only warned Roosevelt but sent the necessary British Radar equipment to exactly the spot where it could detect incoming Japanese aircraft from the North West !!! To support the fact the U.S. had no Radar in December 1941, is the first Battle of Savo Island on 8/9 August 1942. Where a U.S Fleet had to be accompanied by a number of Royal Navy Cruisers FITTED WITH RADAR, to provide a Radar screen. The Two U.S. Admirals present, had little faith in "that Limey radar contraption". As a result they refused to believe the British ships warning of the approaching Japanese Fleet, and we (British & U.S. Navy) suffered a humiliating defeat. This battle note was 8 months after Pearl Harbor, and still virtually no U.S Naval vessels were Radar fitted. Virtually all British Naval vessels from Destroyers upwards had Radar by 1940. Indeed I discovered (in 1985) the evidence and its precise location in a mountain pass. How could I have known this ? My Father had worked in Bletchley Park (the British top secret decoding centre) during World War 2. And he guided me as to the probable location, as part of his research, for a book on "The truth about Pearl Harbor". Which still cannnot be published as it contains "too many" secrets still NOT in the Public Domain. (Under the British Official Secrets Act publication could land me and probably the publisher in jail).

[@markymark3572]

The failure to sink the absent aircraft carriers that would go on to destroy the Japanese carriers at Midway meant that it was a huge failure.

[@mbryson2899]

The US was very, very lucky at Midway.

[@WilliamMurphy-b6v]

​@@mbryson2899And they had read the operational messages in advance and still almost lost the battle.

[@kennethlarocque2605]

They also never attacked the fuel depots or the dry docks.

[@WilliamMurphy-b6v]

@@kennethlarocque2605 Supposedly, by some sources, the third wave, which never flew, was to handle such things.

[@Dilley_G45]

Yes but rhe IJN had no clue where they were. Just that they weren't in the Harbor.

[@janwitts2688]

All good plans have allowance for changes in events.. zero japanese operations were conducted correctly.. at midway, their fleet should have been together and their battleships could have run down the USN force easily..

[@outlet6989]

Had Japan not attacked Pearl Harbor but the Philippines instead, the U.S. would indeed have declared war on Japan and sent a great battle fleet toward the Philippines to exact revenge. When the two forces met a great sea battle would have occurred, what naval commanders had always wished and planned for. Most, if not all, of the ships based at Pearl Harbor would have been in a Grand Fleet heading off to destroy the enemie's, Grand Fleet, and vice versa. The U.S. had never seen the destructive power of aircraft carriers, and since the attack on Pearl Harbor didn't occur, it would only discover it when the two fleets met. I can only imagine how disastrous this battle would have been for the U.S. Unlike Pearl Harbor, the American warships that would be sunk could never be refloated and repaired like at Pearl Harbor and used again. Knowing that Japan's next move would most likely be a land invasion of Hawaii, I am sure the U.S. would sue for peace.

[@stephennewton2223]

Perhaps. But in the event the old battleships were all sent back to the coast because they used outrageous amounts of oil and we didn't have oilers enough to keep them going. The Philippines may have had sufficient oil to tide them over. I don't know. The US did not have firsthand experience with carrier use, but, they did know about Taranto and the Indian Ocean raid. The US was also seriously upgrading their aircraft. I also am not convinced that the US fleet could have been found by the Japanese before it got cover from land planes. No idea on how the US would have supported the land forces in the Philippines.

[@outlet6989]

@@stephennewton2223 Thank you for your informative reply. My comment presented a possible scenario of how Japan might have forced the U.S. to react to the invasion of the Philippines. I'm sure the Japanese would have won the naval engagement if it had occurred. With the loss of our carriers, Midway would have been a cakewalk for Japan. Thanks again for your reply.