Pearl Harbor Third Wave, World War Two Logistics & the Closing of Red Hill

[@eherrmann01]

Great talk Sal, thanks. But I gotta tell ya, every time you do one of these "state of naval logistics" type shows my blood pressure goes up a bit. We really need to start building ships in this country again. And closing Red Hill is a really bad idea. I get that it's an environmental hazard, but we need to figure out a way to replace it in a way that maintains capacity for our pacific fleet.

[@markmaki4460]

It's so hard to not think about that goofy movie '1941' whenever the IJN token attacks on the west coast are discussed.

[@fortusvictus8297]

One of the best movies no one seems to know about.

[@wgowshipping]

I just did a presentation on this and I had a clip from the trailer of 1941 in it.

[@major__kong]

Hollis Wood played by Slim Pickens, who played Major Kong, my KZbin handle, in Dr. Strangelove.

[@markmaki4460]

@@major__kong And Taggart in Blazing Saddles!

[@Syndr1]

It wasn't a documentary?

[@Nordy941]

The Japanese attempted to destroy the Americans in a fight. The Americans tried to destroy the Japanese ability to fight at all.

[@laurenglass4514]

I never understood why Red Hill was closed. It seemed a problem for many reasons to me. I lived down the road from Pearl Harbor in 67 and 68. I was on the base a lot. This was the viet nam west pac tours that lasted 9 months. I was a Navy wife. Pearl Harbor and all of the other bases were really busy during that time. I can’t imagine how they could have done without red hill. Also , we bought all of our gas for cars on base . Driving that island and military driving the highways to work it would have been too expensive. Hickham of course is right next door to Pearl Harbor

[@bob___]

This discussion highlights how much of a strategic advantage is provided by nuclear powered aircraft carriers and submarines, and it makes me wonder why the US doesn't have nuclear powered cruisers and destroyers. Regarding the Philippines, the US had agreed to withdraw from the Philippines in 1949, and the original Japanese plan was to wait until after that to take over the Philippines. But Germany talked Japan into acting sooner, because Germany was concerned about what the US could do in Europe with a distraction in the Pacific.

[@nnelg8139]

Possibly because nuclear power is not well suited for those roles. Nuclear reactors are very slow to increase power output (safely), and even slower to decrease power. This means they need to be operated at a constant power draw to be efficient. Fleet Carriers are the heart of the US Navy's battlegroups, so they are always needing plenty of power. They are also massive ships, better able to manage the high weight of a nuclear power plant than smaller ships. Submarines, on the other hand, normally operate in a slow and steady manner to reduce noise. They also have mission profiles that benefit significantly from not needing to surface to allow air-breathing diesel engines to recharge batteries, let alone return to port for refueling. Specifically, the MAD ballistic missile subs benefit most from this; littoral attack subs benefit less, and may be better with a deisel-engine-and-batteries arrangement.

[@bob___]

@@nnelg8139 Nuclear powered ships are not directly powered by nuclear reactors. The nuclear reactors generate heat, which is used to make steam, and it's the steam that supplies the power for the ships. The reactors operate at a pretty constant state.

[@nnelg8139]

@@bob___ Uh, yeah? That's exactly how land reactors work, too. What's your point?

[@bob___]

@@nnelg8139 That nuclear power may work for a cruiser or destroyer as well as for a submarine or aircraft carrier?

[@thomasmahoney6567]

We did have nuclear destroyers and cruisers until the end of the cold war.

[@major__kong]

We didn't really take a lot of Japanese tonnage until 1944 after we fixed the Mark 14 torpedo. In 42 and 43, the Japanese didn't need to protect supply lines too much, at least from submarines.

[@Fix_Bayonets]

If we get drawn into war in Venezuela, China, Iran and with Russia would the US just seize tankers? Questionable ships like the Avenca or the Chinese ghost fleet sitting out there with their transponders off could be captured. As opposed to sinking tankers might we just take them like we did Suez Rajan. Is Suez Rajan still off Galveston?

[@juelix]

Please also do a naval history eposide about the USS Liberty. People need to know what happened.

[@AllNighterHeider]

Ill push back on the statement that ship building requires gov subsidies. Gov representatives, agencies, departments, branches etc. produces absolutley nothing in and of themselves (except tyranny), gov only takes from the private sector and redistrubutes the way that best suits gov. With no profit and loss or accountability to worry about, gov gets to be as inefficient as counter party risk allows. The private sector on the other hand, does have P&L to worry about. So a project must be efficient with scarce resources as counter parties will come looking for the profits that were contracted. Private sector doesnt issue and control its own currency to "print" its obligations away and debase all existing currency in the process. Gov has that monopoly. Lastly, gov spending is nearly 25% of an already inflated GDP, this is not the mark of a healthy economy and leaves us vulnerable to a single point of failure. Thanks again Sal I sent this one to my Dad

[@wgowshipping]

I agree with you, but the difficulty in shipbuilding is having to compete against China. They provide: 1. Cheap Land 2. Cheap Capitol 3. Cheap Labor 4. Subsidized Steel and Machinery 5. Massive Subsidies With China able to undercut everyone, this forces Korea and Japan to do the same and this is why these three countries build 94% of the world ships and China alone, 44% and growing. The fear, is that China runs Japan shipbuilding out, and then it is just China and Korea. Unfortunately, shipbuilding is not a level playing field.

[@skutchBlobaum]

Most modern day private sector institutions have no accountability today since they now own the government. Bought if fair and square on the"free market". Vote harder next time, it won't make ANY difference in foreign or economic policy.

[@skutchBlobaum]

@@wgowshipping China is just reacting to our lack of serious foreign policy by the US. Bombing and sanctioning isn't diplomacy. When you bully everyone they will band together.

[@AllNighterHeider]

@0neOver0neThreeSeven I agree this is the greatest nation on earth, if that is what you believe as well. But, if you trust your gov representatives, well, ignorance is bliss, continue feeding your captors. If you think the language of legalese is for your benefit, well, you must not know how to read. Why is it that the State refers to humans as legally defined "persons"? Do we as humans have to obey anything but Common Law? I think you're in so far over your head that you can't see the very prison you're trapped in. You probably believe voting is a patriotic act 🤣 Real patriotism is self reliance and holding representatives accountable, not asking for a savior!!! Are you even aware of what a surety bond is?

[@AllNighterHeider]

@wgowshipping unfortunately this is the outcome of the Cantillon effect described in an essay by Richard Cantillon dating back to 1730. In short, a nation that dives into luxuries as a result of "money printing" drives out domestic production for cheaper foreign production. This leaves that wealthy nation underproductive and reliant on foreign labor. But, again, I say get the gov and it's harmful capital directing regulations out of the way so we can be competitive again. It's a cycle, and the sooner we recognize that, the sooner we can work to get to the next productive phase.

[@nbrown5907]

Why are you assuming the shipyards in China are the same as ours were? They build substandard housing over there I have seen the videos so I suspect everyone buying a Chinese built ship has to do a super inspection then pray the damn thing does not fall apart!

[@russbell6418]

Considering they’re building a large percentage of the commercial fleet I expect they’ve learned to build ships. Their onboard equipment may not be up to our standards, but the ships are probably well engineered and constructed. Remember our history with Japanese imports in 50s and 60s. It was initially junk, the vehicles were made with substandard sheet metal and castings, and poorly engineered. Once they came to understand our markets, they rapidly improved quality to surpass ours (at a labor rate that was still a fraction of ours).

[@nbrown5907]

@@russbell6418 Well until living standards are equal we will always deal with the labor issue. This practice of we are white collar and farming out all blue collar will destroy us in the end if we do not understand it. Cannot have all captains and no ensigns.

[@eliasthienpont6330]

🦁🦁🦁🦁🦁🦁LION c LIKE No. 127

[@allenschmitz9644]

😮who baited who?

[@RonaldRaygun-r2k]

The war is over dude. Get a grip

[@fortusvictus8297]

Those who don't know their past have no future.

[@AllNighterHeider]

Great talk of history Rest in peace to those we lost then. Great reporting as usual, thanks Sal

[@George-vf7ss]

I was wondering about the logistics involved in this. Thanks.

[@partyeffectsdotbiz]

What is going on with shipping could easily be a podcast as well.. just strip the audio and upload it. I would listen to it for sure!

[@lordinquis8r679]

Thanks, Dr Sal!

[@martineastburn3679]

The ship at 8"30 was from the Great White Fleet and my Cousan parked them there when he was in charge of the fleet. George Dewey (December 26, 1837 - January 16, 1917) was Admiral of the Navy, The only Admiral of the Navy. Had a Tug boat named for him. Of all things.

[@pauldelray5839]

Mahan's book has been required reading in the Chinese PLAN navy the last 25 years .Chinese navalists have been increasingly drawn to the work of a different sea power theorist, the British naval historian Sir Julian Corbett. Only control of choke points or control of specific areas can be accomplished by those in Command of the Sea. This was Corbett’s idea and it is still valid today. In war, Command of the Sea can mean control for only some limited period of time or of specific small areas. Only when one opponent or the other is militarily defeated can Command of the Sea be absolute. Absolute Command of the Sea did not exist and, without a military victory, Sea Power can achieve only limited goals.Command of the Sea, therefore means nothing but the control of maritime communications, whether for commercial or military purposes. The object of naval warfare is the control of communications and not as in land warfare the conquest of territory.

[@bc-guy852]

This host should consider consuming a LOT less caffeine before these sessions?? HOST pace is so rushed it spoils the exchange. It's not about how fast you CAN speak; less, is more.

[@carltontweedle5724]

I remember about the oilers I was in the RFA. We made that mistake before WW2, hate to say this but you had to teach us how to refuel at sea. We used to have bases around the world. You have made the same mistake we did. The total plonkers in power do not understand. Time to get on a big horse. Maybe wave a cutless around.

[@laurenglass4514]

Great conversation

[@zopEnglandzip]

"nobody in the world had practiced any sort of carrier night landing" absolute tosh, Pearl was inspired by Taranto.

[@darrelllancaster9554]

Educational and enjoyable. Thank You both.

[@Syndr1]

Hi Sal, miss your face. But I love the slides. Use that KZbin zoom feature. Old topic,new tricks.

[@wgowshipping]

Noted!

[@simon9070]

thanks

[@laurenglass4514]

Why we gave up the Philippine base explain, it was not the thing to do

[@mitchyoung93]

Because Marcos was thrown out and then their Congress voted the bases out. Mt Pinatubo meant we didn't fight that decision toouch.

[@gagamba9198]

Great point about America's ability to shift oil tankers to Pearl as a stop-gap measure if the tanker farms were damaged. Good conversation. TL;DR: The Japanese military spent billions of dollars, tens of millions of lives (both Japanese and non), and saw the destruction of its cities, industries, and merchant fleet to obtain resources on the cheap worth tens of millions. Penny wise and pound foolish. The question I have is the question that isn't asked. Why didn't Japan continue buying the resources it needed instead of invading China? Plenty of other countries lacked resources - even the US that lacked tin and rubber. The Japanese had rubber plantations in Malaya as well as iron ore mines. These endeavours expanded to manganese and bauxite ore (aluminium) - the Japanese were the first to discover the latter in Malaya. Japanese set up businesses in Mindanao, Philippines and in the Dutch East Indies. In the Philippines they dominated the abaca (Manila hemp) plantations. This commodity was vital in ocean shipping because it was the one material that didn't degrade due to exposure to salt water. (The US Navy realised its importance and began to stockpile it, though by war's start its supply was insufficient.) On Mindanao Japanese controlled 80% of the abaca, 50% of the copra, and all the timber harvested commercially. Japan's merchant fleet dominated Asian shipping - it was a major dollar earner, almost equivalent in value to raw silk exports in 1925, the height of Japan's trade in this commodity and its #1 export in value (the commercialisation of rayon created an alternative to silk that hit its exports in '26). Formosa had become such a large supplier of sugar (also used in the production of alcohol) that Japan no longer needed to import it from DEI. Coal, rice, and other agricultural goods were provided by Korea. Its modern fishing fleet faced little competition regionally - 50% of fish sold in Singapore was caught by Japanese vessels and about 100 ships were based in the city permanently. Japan's economy had recovered from the effects of the Great Depression in 1932 when its GDP exceeded 1929's that year. (The 1920s was Japan's dismal decade - end of WWI boom, Great Kanto earthquake in the industrial centre, banking crisis of '27 and '28. Yet despite these travails Japan had the highest rate of industrial growth in the world during the 1920s, with production increasing from $31.3 billion in 1923 to $49.6 billion in 1932 - a 58.5% increase.) One may claim Japan faced protectionism, but Japan started employing protectionist measures in 1907 against locomotives and rolling stock. Despite protectionism in oversea's markets, in the mid 1930s Japan became the world's number one exporter of cotton garments - its wholesale price of cotton textiles was almost half Britain's per yard - and it was the second largest exporter of rayon textiles. In response to Japan's invasion of China in '37 ethnic Chinese communities in SE Asia, groups who were important commercially in Malaya, DEI, Indochina, and the Philippines, launched boycotts of Japanese-made goods and Japanese-owned businesses operating locally. It was in places under Japan's thumb like Formosa and Manchuria where consumer choices was restricted that Chinese boycotts had little effect. And Japan's advance into Manchuria and China caused its trade partners to scrutinise more closely Japan's ambitions. Business interests were able to play up Japan's militarism to plea for legs up, yet authorities were often hesitant to impede trade because the principal consumers were the poor and working class. Japan's military put the country in a ridiculous and self-defeating predicament. Though nations were displeased about Japan's seizure of Manchuria, it was taken as fait accompli. The military had been there since the Russo-Japan War and no one other than the Chinese - and not all of them - was really pushing the issue. The Soviets sold their railway to Japan in '35 and departed Manchuria, and the Soviets allowed Japanese oil production on the northern half of Sakhalin Island. The invasion of northern China in '37 followed by the naval blockade of China's coast and seizure of Chinese port cities in '38 increased tensions (as well as the Panay incident and the IJA's siege of the British concession at Tientsin), yet met little more than words of protest until the invasion of Indochina. Yes, some war material was being transported via Indochina, but it wasn't an enormous amount (it was a single rail line) and the French colonial gov't had been pressed by Tokyo to restrict transit. The weapons and munitions reaching Chiang in the late '30s were of Soviet origin mostly. Furthermore, European-flagged merchant ships in Asia were manned in part by Chinese nationals and they began to quit in late 1930s due to the dangers and their fear of what the Japanese would do to them when captured. If we look at Japan's oil consumption in 1936 (let's call it peacetime) it was a drop in the bucket - less than 30 million barrels. And this included the IJA and IJN, the latter being a major consumer. In 1940 world oil consumption was a bit more than 2 billion barrels, and Japan consumed about 1.5% to 2% of it. The US was consuming about 68%. Prior to the invasion of China in '37 oil provided 7.3% of Japan's total energy needs - gov't, military, civilian, and business. Japan was powered by coal (72 - 75%) and hydroelectric (18%). Households were still using charcoal for cooking and heating - homes were designed to maximise comfort in the humid summer. Depending on the season, hydroelectric provided from 75% to 80% of electricity used. The remainder was provided by thermal - coal, which Japan had in abundance. But electricity use outside business and industry was low. Homes had a few light bulbs and an electric iron. Only 50% of households had a radio in 1940, and it was just in the latter years of the '30s that radio made significant inroads into homes. Coal was even used to produce coal gas used in industry, for example the firing of porcelain. Japan was well aware of its resource shortfalls and was determined to maximise the use of domestic resources. This understanding came during the Russo-Japan War when the price of coal skyrocketed. It began to build its hydroelectric capacity to offset this vulnerability. This ought to be no surprise. The great importance of coal was true for most every other industrialised country as well. Even the US. Coal was king (the major source of all energy consumed) in the US until the early 1950s. In 1940 the US consumed 5 quadrillion more BTUs in coal than petroleum. In 1945 it was 6 quadrillion more. The US was not the world's largest oil _exporter_ in the 1930s. It was the largest producer. And it was also the largest consumer. Venezuela was the largest exporter. By a lot. Ninety-three per cent of the country's oil was exported. In 1928, Venezuela surpassed the United States as the world’s largest oil exporter, and by 1936, it was exporting almost as much oil as the next seven exporters combined-the US, Peru, Iran, Romania, the Dutch East Indies, Iraq, and the Soviet Union (43.05 million tons versus 44.39 million tons). Venezuelan crude was cheap too; so cheap that the US imposed tariffs in '32 resulting in Venezuela shifting to new markets. Why didn't Japan try to shift suppliers in Venezuela? Or Peru? Or even Mexico? Peru's northwest coast oil fields produced 48k barrels per day (17.5 million barrels per annum, about two-thirds of Japan's peacetime requirements) in 1936. Mexico produced 48.5 million barrels in '37. After Mexico nationalised the oil industry in '38 and Britain retaliated with an embargo (transport, retail, and maritime insurance), Mexico was keen to find any nation willing to buy it. Transit via the Panama Canal whilst building a 1000km rail line from Tampico to Puerto Vallarta - the Japanese certainly had the expertise and technologies because they had done so in Japan, Korea, Manchuria, and Formosa. In 1936 Japan spent $88.3 million dollars to import US raw cotton (for cotton and rayon textiles, though wood pulp was more often used to produce the latter) and $28.3 million to import US crude and refined oil products - oil was a $1.12 a barrel then (a barrel is 42 gallons, and with refining's expansion it's transformed into about 44 gallons of product). Japan's peacetime economy was more dependent on cotton than oil. We don't see the IJN and the IJA declaring the existential struggle for raw cotton and wood pulp. Two years later Japan had shifted to wartime mobilisation. Cotton imports dropped to $52.8 million and oil products from the US increased to $49.8 million, though some of the amount bought was to build its stockpile - in 1934 Japan enacted a law requiring all oil importers to maintain a 6-month stockpile in country, necessitating their building oil storage farms to supplement the IJA and IJN's. Industry converted to produce for wartime needs and not exports of consumer goods such as raw silk as well as cotton and rayon textiles and garments. Where exports were expanding greatest was in the imperial yen-bloc zone, but this was not dollar trade.

[@gagamba9198]

Japan's railways were powered by coal (intercity) and electricity (intracity). In 1940 Japan had 0.5% of the vehicles America had, and wartime rationing of fuel began in '38, which certainly didn't do much for vehicle sales to the general public. Conversion of buses to coal and charcoal began in '38 and many bus lines reduced service, a trend that continued until the end of the war. 'Ride the train and walk/bicycle.' By 1941 only its 77,000 commercial trucks could buy fuel, and the amount allowed by rationing was one-third the amount prior to the invasion of China. Commercial aviation was a handful of aeroplanes. These were the main Japanese peacetime consumers of oil. The military, chiefly the IJN that was the world's third-largest navy. Merchant shipping, though mixed because many vessels still were powered by coal. And the fishing fleet. Yet all of these were able to operate just fine in 1936 and the first half of '37. It was Japan's brutal invasion of China, the outbreak of European war in '39 that threw merchant shipping into disarray, the invasion of Indochina in 1940, and the sinking of merchant ships including oil tankers by German U-boats in '40 and '41 that had the US, UK and Dutch East Indies decide that oil (and other resources) was needed elsewhere, i.e. the US and Britain. And this was true. Due to the shortage of oil tankers Japan was sending dry-bulk carriers to the US to pick up oil and petroleum products in 55-gallon drums. And the 1.8 million metric tons of US scrap metal exported to Japan in '39 was needed by US industry in '40 and thereafter. Scrap steel averaged $15.95 per metric ton in '39, so about $29 million. After outbreak of war in Europe there were talks between Britain and the Netherlands about shifting Asian-based oil tankers elsewhere to support the war effort, but London decided it was prudent to maintain DEI's deliveries to Japan in the hope Tokyo would remain neutral. Then in late 1940 Japan tried to strong arm the Dutch. On 12 Sep '40, a delegation led by Ichizo Kobayashi, Minister of Commerce and Industry, started negotiations in Batavia (later Jakarta) for the purchase of Dutch oil and the acquisition of oil fields and exploration rights in the East Indies. Tokyo wanted 50% of the islands' production, which would have required much more Dutch shipping at the expense of Britain's cause. At the time the East Indies supplied about 10% of Japan's crude. Ten days later Japanese troops entered neutral French Indochina - this surely rattled the Dutch. On 27 September, Tokyo joined the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy, and because the Netherlands was at war with and occupied by the Germans, the stance of the East Indies colonial government stiffened. Perhaps Tokyo wagered these moves would sufficiently strike fear in Governor-General Van Mook and he would cave. He didn't. By October 1940, negotiations had reached a deadlock. Japan demanded 3.5 million tons (25 - 28 million barrels depending on specific gravity) of crude and aviation fuel. The Dutch government replied it was not an oil merchant; Japan would have to negotiate with the oil companies, and most of their production was already contracted with others. *Japan also demanded to pay in yen* (bold my emphasis); after Japan left the gold standard few were accepting yen in international commerce. The Dutch replied only guilders and dollars were accepted. In the end, Japan got about one-third its demand and no aviation fuel. Japan was running out of dollars because of the military's take over of the gov't and its priority on autarky, expansion, and war-material production at the expense of dollar-earning exports. Japanese military leaders were bewitched by the industrial and military development of both the USSR and Germany. It was not the business interests demanding conquest but the military - the first-tier zaibatsu were reluctant to invest in Manchuria, so it was undertaken by second-tier corporations like Nissan after generous financial inducements. In the 1930s gov't spending increased 435%, and in the decade's latter years the military was receiving about 75% of public money. The failure to conquer China quickly in '37, which the military promised, and the walloping the IJA took at Khalkhin Gol in '39 should have warned Japan that its military ambitions were far beyond its capacities. Lastly, Japan was sitting atop 16 billion barrels of oil at Daqing, Manchuria and didn't realise it - the Chinese discovered it and began production in 1955. The military's pursuit of autarky and the antagonistic line Tokyo took with foreign oil companies starting in 1934 prevented it from seeking joint exploration and production with oil-industry experts.

[@sic5764]

@@gagamba9198 This explains the grand strategy of japan during that time quite well: kzbin.info/www/bejne/p3bCmoGLjc2lnNk You also have to keep in mind that the war in 1937 was started not by the japanese government or the high command of the IJA, but by some rogue japanese units in manchuria, which then escalated since the IJA high command did not want to back down and planned for a short war by first taking shanghai and then nanking (the capital of china at the time) where they could negotiate a peace deal, which never happened and thus they found themselves in an ever expanding and escalating war. Aside from that I would point to the ideology and political system of japan during that time, the short version is: a military dictatorship divided by the hatred between the navy and the army with an ideology that was centered around the believe of japanese racial supremacy and everything that naturally derives from such logic, i.e. everybody else is inferior, our spirit and willpower alone can trump bigger populations, industry, resources and capital etc. It's the same basic issue you had with Hitler and the USSR, "Once we kick in the door, everything will fall apart" kind of mentality. As for more rational reasons, well trade makes you naturally vulnerable and dependent on others and vice versa. Any geopolitical player wants to increase their power and decrease their dependencies on others as much as possible and that is especially true if we talk about ultra-nationalistic and expansionist powers such as imperial japan. The only thing that you pointed out that I can't really figure out is the role of venezuela and mexico, it seems we are both missing some context as to why they never traded in oil with japan, I can only think of the US ownership of the panama canal as the one practical reason as to why such trade, even if carried out, would have stopped in 1941 anyway. But why they didn't trade before the IJN made their southern expansion plans I couldn't say.

[@MerchantMarineGuy]

How many fast combat support ships do we have in the pacific, the largest ocean in the world?

[@wgowshipping]

There are only 2 AOEs and one is in the Atlantic and the other in the Middle East.

[@MerchantMarineGuy]

@@wgowshipping my point exactly.

[@michaelcarr3037]

Interesting history I kinda dont see the the rationale in building a bunch of ships that will be so vulnerable to long range missile strikes and drone attacks will see just so much has changed and knowing where all there assets are on the board thats what happened to the German u boat flotilla in ww2 they had the upper hand till the Tommy's figured out how to locate em and it was over pretty quickly

[@StevenPalmer-cs5ix]

FYI, during World War One Japan did deploy ships to the Mediterranean as part of the Allied force.

[@wgowshipping]

I almost mentioned them as I am writing a book on WWI, but it was brief and they seemed not to learn too much from the experience.

[@StevenPalmer-cs5ix]

@@wgowshipping I knew about Japan's Pacific operations in WW1, but only recently learned about the Mediterranean operations from R. A. Burt's book on Japanese battleships.

[@debispilker4392]

👍👍👍👍🚢🚢🚢🚢

[@keithmiller5264]

❤

[@skutchBlobaum]

Sounds an awful lot like how England lost the war of independence here in the states. Warfare has changed and most of these ships would end up sunk by missiles. I would rather see a push for diplomacy instead of bombing and sanctioning any country that refuses to bow to our oligarchs racketeering. Besides, "we will coup whoever we want" via the covert agency community of the 5 eyes alliance is the new tactic. At around $1trillion (that we know of) budget already in the MIC budget you're just throwing good money after bad. We can't recruit into the services anymore so what do you think will happen when the merchant marines are sent off to support another one of these BS wars for profit ?

[@lllPlatinumlll]

I find it so extraordinary that America with all it's available economic might and available brain power, that no one has designed a missile loader for your vertical launch systems. Must be a very short list of people who are allowed to use their brains over there. I'm not sure counting ships matters that much if first the missiles aren't counted.

[@nnelg8139]

It's not that VLS can't be reloaded, it's that they don't need to be. All the ship's missiles are available for firing at any moment. If there's spare displacement for more missiles, those missiles can be given VLS cells of their own. VLS cells are packed pretty densely, so the only reason I see to not use them is if you're for some reason more limited by deck space than by displacement. In that case, you should use a different type of launch system, as the USN did before switching to VLS.