Perception leads to Idealism - Prof Howard Robinson

[@BarryJohn2211]

A really valuable discussion, thankyou.

[@Omnis-Determinatio-Est-Negatio]

I have always liked this channel because it dares to touch nuanced thoughts. Furthermore I love that the new content is not attempting to simplify the content in order to reach an audience that does not understand the underlying philosophy. There aren't many channels that appeal to people with an education in analytic philosophy.

[@discordlexia2429]

I don't really love that because to me it sounds a lot like they're discussing language problems rather than actual metaphysics. They seem to get very caught on the definitions of words and conflate that with reality. But, whether reality is mental or something else, words are simply labels used to communicate observations.

[@djazz393]

Love these videos with contemporary idealists. Would be awesome to see you do a video on the relationship between Idealism and Neoplatonism, both of which I find to have a lot of similarities (especially the emphasis on the fundamentality of intelligibility which strikes me as inherently mental) but which also seem to be pitted against each other (in that idealism is often seen as the extreme extension of empiricism/nominalism while Neoplatonism assumes a form of realism). These two strands also have very complex relationships to theism (especially with regards to the Eastern Orthodox Church). Been having difficulty reconciling these 2 very intuitive yet different lines of thought and wondering if you had anything to say about their similarities/differences

[@djazz393]

You get into it with the discussion of universals later in the podcast, maybe that’s a way to find a throughline through both?

[@youtubebane7036]

Just remember no matter how hard reconciliation seems to to be or how unattainable for such things like chaos in order that despite everything they must be reconciled in the end because chaos in order to both exist and they have to for their opposite to exist as well and that is the key. Reality is a paradox and the only way Unity is broken is by differentiation and that means that the first differentiation is the self and the not self and that's when Duality comes into play and one is the subject of the other one is the objective and they are in balance and neither one of them is actual reality because that's your reality is the unity of nothingness that you start with which is completely impossible and that's why it all stems from a paradox. Nothing just has information associated with it so that means it's something 217 is established you must list all the things that it's not and then add a negative term to that and that way you double Infinity right off the bat and then you have to add the potential complexity of nothingness as compared to a completed infinity and that's like comparing the number one to the infinite that is another way nothingness is larger than infinity. Luckily there's two dualities though because you have absolute nothingness and completed Infinity on one hand and then you have absolute nothingness and something or potential Infiniti or the physical Universe on the other hand and this one can grow and that is where the balance is achieved. One is relative and one is absolute and this mirrors the relationship of Chaos in order or the quantum and the relative. Objectivity is just group subjectivity and it's subjective in its own frame of reference. The reality end up looking like a series of fractals or nested Russian dolls ever increasing in size on one hand condensing and Contracting in potency on the other

[@TheWorldTeacher]

Idealism: Metaphysical Idealism is the view that the objective, phenomenal world is the product of an IDEATION of the mind, whether that be the individual, discrete mind of a personal subject, or otherwise that of a Universal Conscious Mind (often case, a Supreme Deity), or perhaps more plausibly, in the latter form of Idealism, Impersonal Universal Consciousness Itself (“Nirguna Brahman”, in Sanskrit). The former variety of Idealism (that the external world is merely the product of an individual mind) seems to be a form of solipsism. The latter kind of Idealism is far more plausible, yet it reduces the objective world to nothing but a figment in the “Mind of God”. Thus, BOTH these forms of Idealism can be used to justify all kinds of immoral behaviour, on the premise that life is just a sort of dream in the mind of an individual human, or else in the consciousness of the Universal Mind, and therefore, any action that is deemed by society to be immoral takes place purely in the imagination (and of course, those who favour this philosophy rarely speak of how non-human animals fit into this metaphysical world-view, at least under the former kind of Idealism, subjective Idealism). Idealism (especially Monistic Idealism), is invariably the metaphysical position proffered by neo-advaita teachers outside of India (Bhārata), almost definitely due to the promulgation of the teachings in the West of Indian (so-called) “gurus” such as Mister Venkataraman Iyer (normally referred to by his assumed name, Ramana Maharshi). See the Glossary entry “neo-advaita”. This may explain why such (bogus) teachers use the terms “Consciousness” and/or “Awareness”, instead of the Vedantic Sanskrit word “Brahman”, since with “Brahman” there is ultimately no distinction between matter and spirit (i.e. the object-subject duality). At the risk of sounding facetious, anyone can dress themselves in a white robe and go before a camera or a live audience and repeat the words “Consciousness” and “Awareness” ad-infinitum and it would seem INDISTINGUISHABLE from the so called “satsangs” (a Sanskrit term that refers to a guru preaching to a gathering of spiritual seekers) of those fools who belong to the cult of neo-advaita. Although it may seem that in a couple of places in this treatise, that a form of Monistic Idealism is presented to the reader, the metaphysical view postulated here is, in fact, a form of neutral monism known as “decompositional dual-aspect monism” (“advaita”, in Sanskrit), and is a far more complete perspective than the immaterialism proposed by Idealism, and is the one realized and taught by the most enlightened sages throughout history, especially in the most “SPIRITUAL” piece of land on earth, Bhārata. Cf. “monism”. N.B. The Idealism referred to in the above definition (and in the body of this book) is metaphysical Idealism, not the ethical or political idealism often mentioned in public discourse (e.g. “I believe everyone in society ought to be given a basic income”). Therefore, to distinguish between sociological idealism and philosophical Idealism, the initial letter of the latter term is CAPITALIZED.

[@TheWorldTeacher]

monism: the view in metaphysics that reality (that is, Ultimate Reality) is a unified whole and that all existing things can be ascribed to or described by a single concept or system; the doctrine that mind and matter are formed from, or reducible to, the same ultimate substance or principle of being; any system of thought that seeks to deduce all the varied phenomena of both the physical and spiritual worlds from a single principle, specifically, the metaphysical doctrine that there is but one substance, either mind (idealism) or matter (materialism), or a substance that is neither mind nor matter, but is the substantial ground of both. Cf. “dualism”. To put it simply, whilst materialists/physicalists/naturalists believe that the ground of being is some kind of tangible form of matter (or a field of some sort), and idealists/theists/panpsychists consider some kind of mind(s) or consciousness(es) to be most fundamental, MONISTS understand that Ultimate Reality is simultaneously both the Subject and any possible object, and thus one, undivided whole (even though it may seem that objects are, in fact, divisible from a certain standpoint). The descriptive term favoured in the metaphysical framework proposed in this Holy Scripture is “Brahman”, a Sanskrit word meaning “expansion”, although similes such as “Sacchidānanda” (Eternal-Conscious-Peace), “The Tao” and “The Monad” are also satisfactory. Perhaps the oldest extant metaphysical system, Advaita Vedānta, originating in ancient Bhārata (India), which is the thesis promulgated in this treatise, “A Final Instruction Sheet for Humanity”, is a decompositional dual-aspect monist schema, in which the mental and the physical are two (epistemic) aspects of an underlying (ontic) reality that itself is neither mental nor physical, but rather, psychophysically neutral. On such a view, the decomposition creates mutually-exclusive mental (subjective) and physical (objective) domains, both of which are necessary for a comprehensive metaphysical worldview. The mere fact that it is possible for Awareness to be conscious of Itself, implies that, by nature, Ultimate Reality is con-substantially BOTH subjective and objective, since it would not be possible for a subject to perceive itself unless the subject was also a self-reflective object. The term “transjective” has been coined by contemporary scholars to account for precisely this reality. This subject-object duality, and the notion of the transjective, is foundational to a complete understanding of existence/beingness. Therefore, it seems that the necessary-contingent dichotomy often discussed by philosophers in regards to ontology, is superfluous to the concept of monism, because on this view, BOTH the subjective and the objective realities are essentially one, necessary ontological Being(ness). In other words, because you are, fundamentally, Brahman, you are a necessary being and not contingent on any external force. This concept has been termed "necessitarianism" by contemporary philosophers, in contradistinction to "contingentarianism" - the view that at least some thing could have been different otherwise - and is intimately tied to the notions of causality and determinism in Chapters 08 and 11. Advaita Vedānta (that is, dual-aspect Monism) is the only metaphysical scheme that has complete explanatory power. Hypothetically, and somewhat tangentially, one might question thus: “If it is accurate to state that both the Subject of all subjects and all possible objects are equally ‘Brahman’ (that is, Ultimate Truth), then surely that implies that a rock is equally valuable as a human being?”. That is correct purely on the Absolute platform. Here, in the transactional world of relativity, there is no such thing as equality, except within the conceptual sphere (such as in mathematics), as already demonstrated in more than a couple of places in this Holiest of Holy Books, “F.I.S.H”, especially in the chapter regarding the spiteful, pernicious ideology of feminism (Chapter 26). Cf. “advaita”, “dualism”, “Brahman/Parabrahman”, “Saguna Brahman”, “Nirguna Brahman”, “subject”, “object” and “transjective”.

[@youtubebane7036]

Mind and Consciousness are not the exact same thing. Mind is the field of information that describes all reality and Consciousness is the process that this information differentiates and become subjective and discreet. I'm working on a mathematical and physical model of this

[@OuroboricIdealism]

Though metaphysical solipsism inescapably is problematic, transcendental solipsism inescapably is apodeictic. It is common to argue for the reality of a plurality of minds on the basis of apparent intersubjective agreement, but this is an appeal to the stone à la Dr. Samuel Johnson. In the same way that Johnson kicked the stone to show, against Berkeley, that mind-independent matter exists (but failed, because Berkeley does not deny that the perception of stones or pain is real), appealing to apparent intersubjective agreement is an appeal to the stone against solipsism: the solipsist does not deny that there is immanent regulative intersubjective agreement, he only doubts (problematic solipsism) or denies (dogmatic solipsism) that other minds have constitutive transcendental reality. I distinguish between two types of solipsism, metaphysical and transcendental (or critical): metaphysical solipsism entails that only one mind (oneself) exhausts existence (metaphysical solipsism is problematic, never assertoric, never apodeictic); transcendental (or critical) solipsism entails that, even if a plurality of minds exists, no one possible mind could ever possibly interact with any other possible mind (transcendental solipsism is apodeictic). Incidentally, it is worthwhile to mention David Hume’s statement, as he writes in the Treatise of Human Nature, that “To begin with the senses, ’tis evident these faculties are incapable of giving rise to the notion of the continu’d existence of their objects, after they no longer appear to the senses. For that is a contradiction in terms, and supposes that the senses continue to operate, even after they have ceas’d all manner of operation”. And, as he writes in his first Enquiry, “It is a question of fact, whether the perceptions of the senses be produced by external objects, resembling them: How shall this question be determined? By experience surely; as all other questions of a like nature. But here experience is, and must be entirely silent. The mind has never any thing present to it but the perceptions, and cannot possibly reach any experience of their connexion with objects. The supposition of such a connexion is, therefore, without any foundation in reasoning”. Transcendental solipsism (that is, critical solipsism) is apodeictic because it entails a contradiction to say that the mind can extend beyond its own limits; viz., transcendental solipsism is not merely an empirical observation about the limitations of mind, but rather follows necessarily from what mind is. The very concept of mind transcending its own sphere of immanent representations (perceptions, ideas, judgments, etc.) is self-contradictory, such that transcendental solipsism inevitably is apodeictic, even if metaphysical solipsism is problematic (metaphysical solipsism is never assertoric, never apodeictic). The distinction between the apodeictic nature of transcendental solipsism and the problematic nature of metaphysical solipsism thus emerges from the same logical principle: the impossibility of mind transcending its own sphere. In the case of transcendental solipsism, this impossibility establishes its truth with logical necessity; in the case of metaphysical solipsism, this same impossibility ensures the question of the transcendental reality of other minds must remain perpetually undecidable. Transcendental solipsism must be apodeictic: the very concept of mind transcending its sphere of immanent representations is self-contradictory, and even any conception or judgment of such transcendence would itself be an immanent representation in mind; in fact, any perception, idea, judgment, belief, conviction, feeling, sensation, and literally everything that constitutes one’s mental life is an immanent representation, such that transcendental (or critical) solipsism is inescapably apodeictic. There is no mental content or activity whatsoever that escapes being an immanent representation. The very concept of mind transcending its sphere of immanent representations is therefore necessarily self-contradictory: any attempt to even conceive of such transcendence would itself be an immanent representation. This makes transcendental solipsism inescapably apodeictic: it is not just that one happens to be unable to transcend one’s representations, but rather that the very idea of doing so is self-contradictory, since any such idea would itself be an immanent representation. The impossibility follows from the very nature of mind and representation. And of course, this realization itself - including my current understanding of why transcendental solipsism is apodeictic - is itself an immanent representation: every thought, every judgment, every perception, every belief, every aspect of one’s metal life is immanent representation, such that transcendental solipsism must be apodeictic. Eo ipso, any metaphysical position which asserts the transcendental reality of things-in-themselves, of other-minds-in-themselves, object permanence (continued existence of objects after they no longer appear to the senses), etc., is what Kant called “transcendental illusion”. The transcendental illusion inheres in supposing we can somehow reach beyond our immanent representations to grasp or make claims about transcendental reality. But any such supposed “reaching beyond” would itself be an immanent representation. This is why Kant identified it as an illusion: it involves taking what are necessarily immanent representations and mistaking them for knowledge of transcendental reality. This ties back to why metaphysical solipsism must remain problematic while transcendental solipsism is necessarily the case. The transcendental illusion involves forgetting that all our mental contents (perceptions, ideas, judgments, private language arguments, transcendental deductions, degrees of confidence, etc.) are necessarily immanent representations and can never establish claims about transcendental reality. Of course, even if transcendental solipsism is apodeictic, it does not follow that one cannot uphold the regulative validity of the idea of other minds: even if one agrees that the constitutive transcendental reality of other minds is problematic, practical reason still allows the regulative validity of the idea of other minds (even if granting regulative validity amounts to an immanent representation too).

[@theautodidacticlayman]

So many new terms to look up! 😋 Like somebody spilled cookies everywhere.

[@kd6613]

🎯 Key points for quick navigation: 00:00:00 *🎙️ Introduction to Professor Robinson* - Introduction of Prof. Howard Robinson and his expertise in philosophy of perception, mind, and metaphysics. - Overview of his recent book "Perception and Idealism". - Outline of the episode's discussion topics. 00:02:00 *🧠 The Puzzle of Perception* - Exploration of the main puzzle in perception regarding subjective experience versus external stimuli. - Discussion on how consciousness appears to reach out to the world in perception. - Contrast between subjective experience and scientific explanations of perception. 00:04:00 *🔍 Naive Realism Explained* - Definition of naive realism as the direct awareness of the external world. - Explanation of how naive realism handles causal processes in perception. - Critique of naive realism's ability to account for subjective modifications in perception. 00:06:00 *📸 Representational Realism* - Introduction to representational realism and its view of perception as mental representations. - Differentiation between traditional and intentional representational realism. - Challenges faced by representational realism in accurately depicting the external world. 00:08:00 *🌌 Phenomenalism and Idealism* - Overview of phenomenalism, viewing the physical world as a structure of experiences. - Explanation of Barlean idealism and the role of God as the source of experiences. - Comparison between phenomenalism and other realist theories. 00:10:00 *📚 Current Trends in Academic Philosophy* - Discussion on the decline of sense-data theories post-World War II. - Shift towards representationalism and the resurgence of debates on perception. - Influence of philosophers like JL Austin and Mike Martin on contemporary views. 00:12:00 *🛡️ Challenges to Naive Realism* - Presentation of the argument from illusion against naive realism. - Examination of how subjective factors modify our perception of objects. - Impact of illusions and hallucinations on the validity of naive realism. 00:14:00 *🧩 Disjunctivism and Its Critique* - Introduction to disjunctivism as a response to perception challenges. - Criticism of disjunctivism's ability to differentiate between hallucinations and veridical perceptions. - Analysis of the sufficiency of brain state explanations in perception. 00:16:00 *🔄 Comparing Realism Theories* - Comparison of naive realism and representationalism in handling perception. - Discussion on the role of causal processes in different realist theories. - Evaluation of how each theory addresses the unity of perception experiences. 00:18:00 *🧩 Further Issues with Representationalism* - Exploration of the limitations of representationalism in explaining sensory experiences. - Debate on whether mental states alone can represent external objects accurately. - Critique of intentionalism and its reliance on phenomenal representations. 00:20:00 *🧠 Professor Robinson's Idealism* - Explanation of Prof. Robinson's idealist perspective on perception. - Distinction between his view and traditional sense-data or representational theories. - Integration of theistic elements into his idealist framework. 00:22:00 *🔑 Root Problems with Realism* - Summary of core issues with both naive realism and representationalism. - Introduction to idealism as a solution to the perception puzzle. - Final thoughts on the necessity of re-evaluating realist theories in light of these challenges. 24:38 *🔄 Phenomenalism vs Theistic Phenomenalism* - Exploration of phenomenalism and theistic phenomenalism as explanations for perceptual experiences. - Differentiates between natural common sense views and philosophical theories. - Discusses the role of God in providing structured experiences in theistic phenomenalism. 26:26 *🤔 Humean Skepticism on Causation* - Examination of Hume's skepticism regarding the necessity of explanations for perceptual events. - Contrasts Humean views with those advocating for comprehensive causal explanations. - Highlights Barry Lowe's defense of Humean causation without invoking laws of nature. 29:54 *🧩 Sense Datum Theory and Perception Puzzle* - Analysis of Sense Datum Theory in addressing the main puzzle of perception. - Distinguishes Sense Datum Theory from naive realism by removing direct outward causation. - Identifies remaining challenges in reconciling inward and outward directions of perception. 32:09 *🌀 Hallucinations vs Veridical Perceptions* - Differentiates between hallucinations and veridical perceptions within Sense Datum Theory. - Introduces the concepts of availability and publicity to distinguish perceptual experiences. - Discusses the relativity of veridical perception across different species. 35:14 *🐾 Species-Relative Perception Structures* - Investigates how different species perceive the world based on their unique structural experiences. - Addresses the potential for communication despite differing perceptual frameworks. - Explores the behavioral implications of structural perception in animals. 37:29 *🔄 Robinson's Flip on Phenomenal Experience* - Introduction to Prof. Robinson's reversal of traditional views on phenomenal experience. - Explains how thoughts structure sense data into properties and beliefs. - Contrasts with the conventional separation of phenomenal experience and cognitive processes. 40:16 *📚 Aristotelian Structure in Perception* - Comparison of Aristotelian and Kantian perspectives on perceptual structure. - Argues for the pre-organized structure of the world aligning with Aristotelian views. - Rejects the Kantian imposition of categories on perceptual experiences. 43:09 *🧬 Nature of Reality and Conceptual Structures* - Discussion on the origin of perceptual structures in reality versus the mind. - Examines whether different species share similar structural experiences. - Debates the role of conceptual apparatus in categorizing experiences across species. 44:18 *🧪 Informational Content in Perception* - Focus on the informational aspect of perceptual content and its structural basis. - Links behavioral responses in animals to their informational perceptual structures. - Connects structural perception to scientific explanations of animal behavior. 45:01 *🗣️ Communication Across Species* - Explores the possibility of interspecies communication despite differing perceptual structures. - Challenges Vicken Stein's claim regarding conceptual disconnect due to different categories. - Suggests structural overlap facilitates communication between species with varied perceptions. 47:03 *🏛️ Goodman’s Nominalism vs Perceptual Structure* - Compares Goodman’s nominalism with Robinson's theory of perceptual structure. - Critiques the idea of arranging objects without pre-given perceptual structures. - Discusses the tension between nominalist views and phenomenological theories. 49:34 *🧩 Goodman’s Nominalism and Object Formation* - Examination of Goodman’s nominalism and the concept of middle-sized objects. - Discusses the realism of arbitrary object combinations. - Contrasts mological universalism with mological nihilism. 51:34 *⚛️ Atomism and Phenomenal Exclusion* - Critique of atomist views excluding phenomenal aspects from the physical world. - Importance of middle-sized objects in scientific epistemology. - Discussion on substantial forms and their role in organizing matter. 53:34 *🧬 Hylomorphism and Quantum Theory* - Exploration of hylomorphism as a solution to quantum theory mysteries. - Debates on substantial forms in modern scientific contexts. - Critique of hylomorphism's compatibility with quantum mechanics. 55:34 *🐕 Perception and Informative Judgment* - Explanation of judgment as propositional content in perception. - Examples of dog behavior illustrating informative perception. - Difficulty in separating cognitive from sensory experiences. 57:34 *📖 Correspondence Theory of Truth* - Prof. Robinson's correspondence theory stance on truth. - Critique of coherence and formalist theories of truth. - Relation of correspondence theory to perception and universals. 59:34 *🏗️ Argument Against Physicalism* - Overview of physicalism and its definitions of matter. - Historical critiques of matter models, such as Jesuit Boskovich's magnetic field theory. - Introduction to the regress argument concerning powers and forces. [1:01:34](kzbin.info/www/bejne/jHjIYnSFlN-AhtU) 🔗 Regress Argument and Qualitative Experiences - Detailed explanation of the regress problem in physicalist theories. - Role of experiential qualities in terminating the regress. - Critique of alternatives like Lewis's quiddities and the necessity of experiential qualities. Made with HARPA AI

[@anteodedi8937]

I still continue to think that idealism, just like materialism, falls for the same type of mistake, but it just does it the other way around. They both desiccate reality by removing one of its fundamental aspects, i.e., the mental or the material. So this talk didn't really convince me for anything, but a nice one nonetheless. I thoroughly enjoyed the overviews of different positions, and it was a chill and open-minded discussion. Howard is a pleasant and academic interlocutor.

[@AbsolutePhilosophy]

Thanks for the comment. Are you a dualist then?

[@anteodedi8937]

@@AbsolutePhilosophy Sort of. I prefer a pluralism or dualism of properties. Not like I have any serious issue with a dualism of substances, but the former strikes me as more intuitive.

[@nutronhammernutronhammer]

What is reality? What is the need for one?

[@anteodedi8937]

@@fishfrogdolphin2799 Thanks for such a marvelous string of assertions! I will convert to Idealism right away! Not even sure why you mention materialism because I don't endorse it. That should already be obvious from my original comment. Affirming the material doesn't necessarily mean that's all you affirm. Anyway!

[@anteodedi8937]

@@fishfrogdolphin2799 Perhaps there are arguments that carry some weight. The purpose of the argument is to persuade anyway, as you are going to rely on premises or intuitions which you take for granted at some level. Theory is prior to arguments. Furthermore, someone who genuinely asks for evidence doesn't proceed immediately after that throwing several assertions. But if it makes you happy to assert idealism, go ahead.

[@troytice8354]

Are you aware of David Bentley Hart's "All Things Are Full of Gods"?

[@AbsolutePhilosophy]

Others have recommended the same book and it looks interesting. But I've not read it. You?

[@troytice8354]

@@AbsolutePhilosophy Thanks for the reply! I am making my way through it. I think it's a masterpiece. (But I'm not trained as a philosopher, so take that for what it's worth.) He argues for a theistic idealism and makes mincemeat out of physicalist arguments. Plus, he has a wry sense of humor and the interaction between the divine interlocuters often has me laughing out loud.

[@danielkianmckiernan4909]

With “idealism” used for different concepts - some fundamentally different from others - good policy is probably to skip any discussion that begins with that word used baldly.

[@celestialteapot309]

As a Marxist and atheistic Hindu I have no problem in being both a materialist and an idealist.

[@Barklord]

I'm the same, but an orphic neoplatonist and also very sympathetic to marxist analysis of phenomena. The problem seems to be associated with conflating phenomenology with materialism.

[@dadgrowscapsaicin4341]

What does Communism have to do with this??

[@johncracker5217]

You’re a fool lmao

[@johncracker5217]

You’ve just admitted to and proven philosophical illiteracy

[@johncracker5217]

@@dadgrowscapsaicin4341dialectic materialism. My God dude.. catch up

[@0Jes68]

I think exactly the opposite. I am an absolute materialist. Nothing allows me to think that there is anything other than matter and energy. For me, even qualia are material; as far as we know, they do not exist outside a brain, and they are the result of the action of (and on) a material system and do not exist if you disconnect the brain during anesthesia for example. You have qualia when you dream, not when you are anesthetized. I think there is nothing immaterial, I even think that this word doesn't mean anything.

[@aleksandravicus]

But you describe the material world using ideas, not matter. And think ideally, not materially. So you are still locked within the ideal world. Yet this doesn't prove the matter doesn't exists outside of our senses and thinking. Same should hold true for God's idea. We think that God exists and is the cause of everything, yet we cannot prove or disprove this. And the only real thing we can be certain about is our and other people's senses and ideas. Or simpler only ideas are real, hence if matter or God were to exist, be real, these must be ideas too.

[@0Jes68]

@@aleksandravicus No, because Idea "in the air" doesn't exist. For me, ideas are as material as a stone or an axe. An idea is a material process inside a brain, which depends on material inputs gathered by our senses and what our brain does with them materially. Then the idea is communicated to other humans with a brain, through language which is a material audio wave made by our vocal cords or through writing with a material electromagnetic wave which is captured by our eyes and materially decoded by the brain.

[@aleksandravicus]

@@0Jes68 OK, so how can a material stone and axe be at the same time outside and inside the brain? According to your material realism. If both are identically material?

[@0Jes68]

@@aleksandravicus I don't really understand what you mean. The stone and the axe are definitely not outside and inside the brain at the same time. The stone is in the world outside of the brain, it is made, well, of stone and whatever is in the brain when someone look at or think of a stone is not a stone and is not made of stone. It doesn't mean that it is immaterial. it 's a configuration of neurones firing or not inside the Brain.

[@kyran333]

If i switched off your five senses, where would you exist, and what would you be (aware) of?

[@NoThing-ec9km]

*Can u please make a video on ur view about probly the oldest form od idealism that is Advaita Vedanta(Reality according to Vedas)? Please if possible use right definitions and explainations.*

[@AbsolutePhilosophy]

I don't now about Hinduism, sorry.

[@ArlindoPhilosophicalArtist]

Metaphysical idealism is more compelling than materialism/physicalism. Undoubtedly.

[@ALavin-en1kr]

It definitely is more compelling. There is still ‘the hard problem of consciousness’ for philosophy. Material science likes to extrapolate the material or the elemental as being the nature of, and fundamental to reality. It is likely that consciousness is all that is and what we perceive is just perception not reality; the equivalent of a mirage or a mental projection.

[@James-ll3jb]

It's also more honest😊

[@aleksandravicus]

I think the problem with materialism/scientism is similar to Astrology and perhaps even most of religions and ideologies. It literally uses the same method as Astrology, trying to explain, understand reality by observing phenomena, trying to find regularities, repetitions, natural (godly) laws etc. And at some point this method did start working to some extent, causing the great scientific discoveries, allowing to manipulate phenomenal world. And this sort of miraculous manipulation, all the astrologies and religions were after, has unravelled in a widespread belief in science among mases of educated and uneducated. So it's now a fully fledged ideology as well as method and philosophical view, branch. Hence trying to offer or to work on alternative method of understanding the reality will always cause the clash against these dogmas of materialism, naive and indirect realism, scientism and so on. Looking into this problem deeper, idealism also is now being pushed outside the western socio-cultural discourse (paradigm), as it's more compelling towards conservative worldviews, being in direct competition with liberal ones.

[@kyran333]

It would be great if you could interview physicist tom cambell 🎉

[@secretweapon8367]

idealism and theism. both markedly unpopular in the philosophy community. how brave.

[@UnbabelScience]

This was a very interesting discussion. As someone who reached idealism through mathematical physics (as explained here kzbin.info/www/bejne/eKDFpYioaNN_gsk ), this conversation shows how complex the problem is, for any theory of mind, and that idealism gives hope to answer at least some of these questions in a more direct way (at least once you realize that whatever you'd do you'd have to have some starting assumptions).

[@Evan-rm3zm]

Deleuze would rather disagree

Idealism is always, always, always, based on Denialism. 💙

[@gabydareau]

You could say exactly the same thing about realism 😉

[@theautodidacticlayman]

The weird part is when materialists/physicalists try to solve the hard problem of consciousness by denying the reality of consciousness or of the self and stuff like that. Imagine thinking the very thing that allows for inquiry doesn’t exist.

[@aleksandravicus]

​@@theautodidacticlaymanmaterialst can prove self doesn't exist by describing it as fake complex idea similar to the idea if god. People believe in selfs, create this very complex and dogmatic idea of self through evolutionary social interdependence. In that acting as personal selfs is the basis of social co-existence. Same way god or gods were and still are in other cultures. But the idea of us as personal selfs should go away with time. Much more diffiucult to deny reality of mental states though. Dennett was good at it but I dont think it was too convincing...

[@anteodedi8937]

@@theautodidacticlayman Doesn't idealism suffer from the same analogous problem, i.e., the hard problem of matter? After all, the moment you argue against materialism by pointing to the hard problem you are relying on dualistic intuitions that is to say there is a gap between the material and the mental, i.e., they are distinct, and you cannot deduce one from the other. So by employing such strategy, the idealist shoots himself in the foot! Just like the materialist is forced to eliminate the mental from the picture the idealist is forced to eliminate the material. As such both views are radical and totally at odds with common sense.

[@theautodidacticlayman]

@@anteodedi8937 I’m not sure about that. Traditionally, materialists begin with the existence of matter as fundamental reality and define matter in a way that it doesn’t have subjective experience or self-awareness, and that’s what gives rise to the hard problem of consciousness. Idealists begin with consciousness as fundamental, which is capable of not only having experiences, but also of creating them, so there doesn’t seem to be a gap between mind and matter, especially if material things are in fact reducible to mental qualities and phenomena. I have to look into the problem of perception to learn more about that, though.

[@JamieStott-b7e]

I thought he passed away?

[@AbsolutePhilosophy]

Nope. I talked to him yesterday :).