Philosopher Gives 3 Arguments for an Immaterial Mind (Michael Huemer)

watch the full conversation here: • Philosophical Reasons ...

[@PenseesClips]

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[@TheProdigalMeowMeowMeowReturns]

See Peter Tse for a neural model of free will

[@chad969]

I wonder, would it be correct to say that a photograph of a tree be about the tree? If so that would seem to mean that one physical thing can be about another physical thing.

[@legron121]

It is not correct in ordinary speech to say that a photo of a tree is “about” a tree. We can say that it’s a photo “of” a tree.

[@chad969]

@@legron121 Sure, but is that because there's some metaphysical problem with photographs being about things? Or is it rather due to linguistic convention? In other contexts the words "of" and "about" are often used interchangeably. For example, I could say "I'm thinking of a tree" or "I'm thinking about a tree", and the words "of" and "about" would mean the same thing in those two statements.

[@legron121]

@@chad969 It’s because it’s meaningless to say that photos are about things - it has no use in our language. Meaning is a precondition for a string of words to express a true or false proposition. In some contexts, “of” and “about” are synonymous (e.g., in thinking). In other contexts, they are clearly not (e.g., photos, paintings, mental images, etc.). In other words, it depends on the sentiential context. On the other hand, it’s obvious that we can speak of some physical things as being “about” things. We can ask “What is this painting about?” or “What is this movie about?”. Indeed, we can talk “about” things, just as we think “about” things”, but talking is obviously not a nonphysical activity. The obsession with “aboutness” in philosophy of mind is misleading.

[@chad969]

@@legron121 well maybe you have a different conception of “aboutness” than I do, because it’s not clear to me that such a statement is meaningless. But let’s suppose it is meaningless. In that case, there must be some relevant difference between a photo of a tree, and my thought of that same tree, that explains why it’s meaningful to say that my thought is about the tree, but the photo is not about the tree. I’m curious what that relevant difference is. It can’t be the fact that the photo is physical and my thought is non-physical, because as you said, physical things like paintings can be about things.

[@legron121]

@@chad969 My point is that, if someone were to ask you in ordinary circumstances "What is that photo about?", you would have to ask them what they meant. However, if they asked you "What is that a photo of?", you would immediately know what they meant. So, I think there is clearly a distinction in meaning here. You are now asking what _makes_ a thought that the tree is large about a tree. I would say it's that the tree is the subject or "topic" of the thought, in the same way that a conversation is "about" a tree if the tree is the topic of the conversation. The same cannot be said of a photograph.

[@PenseesClips]

watch the full episode here: kzbin.info/www/bejne/ZmSzomOvoaiLrKs

[@plastic2666]

Thanks, but why would this points to substance dualism rather than property dualism? my guess is free will.

[@PenseesClips]

I think you're right

[@plastic2666]

@@PenseesClips actually I was looking at other interviews he gave and he says it's actually the problem of personal identity that pushes it over the line to substance dualism. For him it's an obvious fact that you (he) exists and since all other theories of personal identity fail , the only explanation for the fact of you existing is a soul. Therefore you have an immaterial soul, according to him...

[@PenseesClips]

@@plastic2666 oh yeah, I remember asking him about that idea since he thinks that we lose all memories at death of the body and I thought it was so odd that thw only thing that would matter for personal identity would be the same substantial soul but literally zero memories. Thanks!

[@muhammedshanushan3931]

@@plastic2666 Do property dualists affirm that mind can change/cause brain states ?

[@plastic2666]

@@muhammedshanushan3931 idk, the first problem any duelist has is the classic, how does nonphysical affect physical, and idk what the major academic proponents of property duliam have to say, but I'd bet it varies. It seems coherent to hold property dualism without mental affecting just resulting from physical, so I bed that camp exists, but idk they may be some way the nonphysical things, like semantic content, affect our actions it and we just have no clue how it works. Huemer does talk about how mental construction like schedules and days of the week explain human action much simpler than entropy fluctuations, but that's a based on comparing virtues of theories and idk how much Im satisfied by those sorts of arguments. Do you know?

[@emZee1994]

What was said at the end about, "if you believe this then why aren't you a Christian" is so cringe. Firstly, Christianity doesn't hold a monopoly on Truth. Just because they believe in something true, doesn't mean everything they believe in is true. Also, this argument (and philosophy in general) predates Christianity and is not original to them Otherwise, good clip and summarised these arguments very well actually

[@legron121]

Mary certainly learns something new: she learns what “blue” means. The question is whether this is a “physical fact”, and philosophers have never defined that phrase in a useful way. Does it mean a fact of physics? If so, then it is not a physical fact. It’s a fact about how the word “blue” is used (namely: to denote _this_ colour).

[@TotalitarianDemocrat]

But that's not the only thing she learns: she learns what it's like to experience a certain colour (whether that colour is called "blue" is another matter).

[@legron121]

@@TotalitarianDemocrat I think the phrase "what it's like to experience a certain colour" requires some unpacking. If someone asked me "What is it like to see the colour of your wall?", I would be very confused. Normally, we ask "what was it like?" when the experience in question has some _affective quality_ (in which case there answer will be something like "It was wonderful" or "It was awful"). But, for the vast majority of things we see, hear, etc., there is usually no particular affective quality at all. In the case of Mary, she might respond to this question "It was interesting", but that would be hardly be considered a fact that she learns. To be sure, again, Mary does learn what "blue" looks like (she learns that it looks like _this:_ 🟦).

[@TotalitarianDemocrat]

@@legron121 And she didn't know that it (or anything for that matter) looked like that beforehand?

[@legron121]

@@TotalitarianDemocrat Not by hypothesis. She's never seen colours before.

[@TotalitarianDemocrat]

@@legron121 Right yeah. What kind of new knowledge then does she gain? I would say phenomenal knowledge not just linguistic knowledge.

[@TheMahayanist]

Very disappointed. I don't even see these as arguments. Anyway.

[@RefinedQualia]

Why not?