Philosophical Reasons for the Soul and Reincarnation | w/Dr. Mike Huemer - ep. 154

[@ParkersPensees]

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[@GeorgiosMichalopoulos]

Absolutely fantastic! I rly liked Dr Huemer's reaction when you asked how he relates to Christian interest in his work: all the debates I know with atheists involved are of the either/or form. Thing is you may very well reject atheism, materialism etc without espousing any religion - this should be dead obvious to philosophers, but still it's desperately often assumed that the only reason to think in certain ways about metaphysical questions must be that you grew up as a Christian and you still harbour a religious belief of sorts.

[@EmersonGreen]

33:36 "one of them, as far as I know, is held by no one." This idea that you are an indivisible physical particle sounds very similar to a view defended by Nino Kadic. He defended a solution to the combination problem for panpsychism he calls "phenomenal routing", in which all the experiences of your body's particles are routed into one specific subject, which is really you. It's a part of a broader view he calls "dynamic panpsychism". I interviewed Kadic on my podcast about this. It's actually a really interesting view, especially if you're already attracted to panpsychism. Anyway, sorry to "well ackshually" Huemer, but I thought it might be of interest!

[@ParkersPensees]

Yeah this is good, I'll check it out thanks!

[@PanLamda]

There is also Bernardo Kastrup's Idealist theory (a panpsychist kind of idealism). the basis of this theory is that the underlying nature of cosmos is mental, that the cosmos is simply one mental subject. What we see/observe/measure is simply the extrinsic aspect (how it "looks") of the cosmos intrinsic aspect (its experiences). "Matter", 'energy" etc. are concepts attributed to the extrinsic appearance of the universal idenity's mental states (which are structured and law-like thats why we derive these inductions in our sciences). So this makes it an idealist version of Russelian Monism. The view that 'matter" is a seperate thing is a categorical error according to Kastrup, abstracting from experiences and then treating the abstractions as things. This leads to problems such as overdetermination, since now you have two things (or types of things), a subject and a bunch of 'matter" causing the subject. So in this view, the problem of overdetermnation is substantially reduced. It is not a seperate 'matter" causing a different type of category-"mind". My "mind" 'looks" like a "matter" (a working brain") to a different observer (it is the extrinsic aspect of my mental states). This theory than also has a natural and simple explanation of personal idenities which correspond to our bodies. Kastrup's uses the analogy of dissociative disorders. All living things are dissociations (alters) of this one universal identity (again from a third person perspective they look like bodies with their own metabolism). So in this view there is a kind of universal identity, there is only one identity (the cosmos) with every living thing being an instatiation of it. This solves how for example bats, animals etc. have their own seperate "littel souls". They don't , each individual is just a "dissociation" of this one universal idenity. Its a very "trippy" kind of thery, but ontologically is very very elegant, only one mental thing exists, no inflation of things that exist, dualisms, trialisms or what not.

[@PhilosophyVajda]

@42:00 fission cases - there's biomedical ethics and metaphysics that talks about splitting in early embryos. Suppose that life begins at conception, and you have an identical twin (monozygotic twinning). When did your twin come into existence? We'd probably say there was a twin when there was physical cleavage (separation) of the cells, perhaps sometime between days 4-8, before implantation into your mom's uterus. Okay, but then we can ask - who was alive at conception? Was it you, your twin, both, or neither? The answer needs to be non-arbitrary, and that's the same basic worry as splitting cases when you're an adult.

[@Pabloblob1]

When they were talking about memory and brain damage the presenter was presenting a good objection to the thesis of memory destruction with the Iron Man suit, it is basically a way to explain the theory of the brain as a transmitter filter, which allows temporary damage to memory but not permanent, ie damaging the filter blocks the filtered phenomenon but does not eliminate it. Unfortunately the presenter got confused and unbelievably ended up saying that this would be a point in favor of Huemer, when it was a counterexample. It is very strange anyway that a substance dualist defends that the brain can erase the memories of the soul....

Mike HUMOR... i really enjoy how he enjoys philosophy 😂

[@felixsanchez4805]

Michael huemer again. Not complaining 🤷‍♂️

[@JosephMarkMcClure]

FYI: Roderick Chisholm argued, in a paper in 1978, that persons are identical to a microscopic physical particle in their brain. The title of the paper is "Is There A Mind-body Problem?"

[@afdulmitdemklappstuhl9607]

This sounds wild

[@HugoNewman]

Re: the idea that someone should conduct mini-experiments to determine whether Near Death Experiences are legitimate or just hallucinations, there *are* some such experiments that have yielded compelling results. I highly recommend you and Dr. Huemer check out Leslie Kean's book "Surviving Death". She's a very careful and rigorous journalist. Fascinating stuff.

[@CMVMic]

No one survives brain death. Clinical death doesnt prove mental/unexplainable phenomenon is evidence of a distinct substance

[@richardcrenwelge]

How is this theory of reincarnation qualitatively different than annihilation, if memories are erased and the interim state between bodies is unconscious?

[@ParkersPensees]

Guess if you hold to a psychological continuity view of personality identity, it wouldn't be qualitatively different

[@milosmilojevic3506]

This is really interesting. When we think about infinities it's hard to avoid counterintuitive conclusions.

[@introvertedchristian5219]

I have so much to say, I'm just not going to say anything. This was really interesting, though.

[@polymloth]

Is the overall number of souls, if all exist at once and none _come into_ existence, then finite or countable infinite, and what would that imply?

[@pinecone421]

I love Huemer 😁

[@ParkersPensees]

Same!

[@lawrencestanley8989]

At 4:14, wow... Listening to that explanation, to have to live life over and over again in this sinful, fallen world? That sounds like hell to me.

[@CMVMic]

If it doesnt feel like your living in hell while you are alive, then you probably wont feel that way if u live this life over and over again with no memory of living it before.

[@Garghamellal]

Please put a link to the paper "Disembodied souls are people too", i cannot find it online

[@ParkersPensees]

It's in a forthcoming book, something like radical philosophy

[@ParkersPensees]

I think he named the book in this episode

[@runningdecadeix4780]

Discounting religion, is Michael Huemer a theist? I've enjoyed his work for many years. I ask because I just think it's hard to resist theism especially given his views on dualism now. Does he think that if the past is infinite, or if there is an infinite causal sequence, then there is no First Cause? Leibniz's classical argument sidesteps such considerations by asking for the explanation to the existence of any (or, if one prefers, the totality of, in plural logic) dependent/contingent beings. And given that Huemer accepts dualism, it seems that the personhood of a First Cause (as a cause of immaterial persons, too) is hard to resist. Theism could also be useful for some of his other commitments (ethical realism; i think he also accepts some form of abstracta realism, etc)

[@Oskar1000]

He isn't. I've noticed both naturalist and theist seems to think that if any thinker comes near their views they ought to be sucked into naturalism or theism. I don't see why this should be the case.

[@runningdecadeix4780]

@@Oskar1000 I don't think they ought to be "sucked into it", I just think it's hard to resist (since in my case I find theistic arguments compelling) and, as I said, it would be *useful* for his metaphysical commitments commitments (ethical realism, realism about abstracta, dualism, etc., these are all positions that have been traditionally accepted by theistic philosophers but found much more controversial by atheistic philosophers. One wonders that there must be a reason why - and indeed there is, in my estimation)

[@Oskar1000]

@@runningdecadeix4780 I understand you. I feel the same way about some theist thinkers that embrace some naturalist positions. I'm like "just go all the way already, cmon"

[@Zictomorph]

Huemer's soul is a weird thing. It's not the part with the logic or decision making, so should the soul be responsible at judgement day? Definitely not the Christian soul. I'd be interested in his take on the infinite set of beings just like me, each "me" with their own being. The set has a non-zero probability even if each being does not.

[@richardgamrat1944]

1:14:48 Wait, why is point a zero volume region of space?

[@PhilosophyVajda]

If a point has any other value of volume than zero, wouldn't it be extended? If it is not a region of space, wouldn't a point then be non spacial? Given what I've said, why do you think it isn't a zero volume region of space?

[@sebastiannickel4377]

oh why isn't this one in your podcast feed? I almost missed it. *asks to talk to the manager*

[@ParkersPensees]

Haha the podcast feed is a few episodes behind

[@springinfialta106]

Is it Pence-ease? Or Pah-nc-ays?

[@indef2def]

As a linguist, I'm a little surprised that Mike doesn't know "qualia" is just the plural of "quale". (Or perhaps he was just being polite.)

[@CeramicShot]

14:06 Basically "Associative imagination exists, therefore something called a 'soul' persists after the death of the brain." This is a totally asinine non-sequitur. Could you imagine a dragon if your brain was smashed to a pulp? No? Then it what sense is the ability to imagine something sovereign to physicality?

[@otakurocklee]

This is like saying that destroying a tv destroys the television program itself.

[@CeramicShot]

@@otakurocklee No, it really isn't. Our experience of consciousness is very obviously dependent of the condition of our physical brains. Fatigue, drugs, stress, sickness, age, blunt trauma and lots of other things affect it. In what sense do you think your consciousness would survive if your brain was destroyed? By what means would you see, hear, touch, think, remember, or experience pain and pleasure without a brain, sense organs, or a central nervous system? Do you have any proof whatsoever that such a thing exists?

[@openyourmind2269]

​​@@CeramicShotwell, it depends on what you call "proof". There is good evidence for continuity of consciousness after bodily death, at least since the last century. Furthermore, not all of our cognitive abilities depend on brain activity. There are cases of padoxical and terminal lucidity, for instance Moreover, phenomenal consciousness must have priority over physiological processes: any physiological change can only be experienced as a mental state if there is already ongoing consciousness. Thus, the physiological apparatus cannot be the *origin* of phenomenal consciousness, but only its *modulator* The only viable way to consider this issue is by uniting Aristotelian and Platonic proposals, namely: the soul is the form of the living body, but this form itself is immortal. The so-called “soul”, in the so-called “afterlife”, continues to have a type of body with its respective sense organs. This is how she perceives her respective world. To some extent, this is the view of some philosophical-spiritual traditions. This is why I am, in metaphysical terms, a mind-matter continuist

[@raf889]

Plato’s Phaedo gives arguments for reincarnation.

[@jellojiggle1]

LOL! Anyway this seems to be a trend among philosophers and physicists, maybe has been for awhile, idk. A rejection of a Creator replacing it with a "consciousness" that we are all a part of ,and we, in essence, are god. Making our own way, calling the shots. I could be wrong.

[@joshuabrecka6012]

Thanks! Huemer is a great philosopher and his blog is really helpful for thinking about philosophy grad school/ the job market. However, I find many of his views (e.g. political) absolutely nuts (not an objection just a reflection).

[@ParkersPensees]

I love his political stuff haha if I weren't a Christian I'd probably whole heartily follow his political philosophy

[@joshuabrecka6012]

@@ParkersPensees Political libertarianism just strikes me as Mad Max world politics lol. Some things just shouldnt be for sale...

[@joshuabrecka6012]

Just curious, do you see specific implications of your Christianity on your political views? Your comment suggests that Christianity is a reason not to be a libertarian, but there are many who see the two as very complimentary (somehow...).

[@ParkersPensees]

@@joshuabrecka6012 lots of different forms of Libertarianism, Christian commitments precludes various forms I'd say. I thini there are rightful authorities but their authority ought to be much more limited than what we find in extant governments today

[@chrismathew2295]

Huemer's work on the nature of the state and political obligation is one of the greatest works of analytic political philosophy. Hands-down.

[@Arczi0]

01:06:45 Isn't "1950 theory" worse (less parsimonious) than "13.8bln B.C theory" because former is exhausted by an excuse "point of huge energy and laws of physics just were there" while former has to add to that "and everything that appears to be complete coherent natural history from 13.8bln B.C to 1950 A.D according to said laws, also just was there"?

[@thejimmymeister]

It seems to me that both theories are equally parsimonious. Both account for the totality of the universe, and I don't see why one organization of that totality is more or less parsimonious than another. Any organization is of the same stuff (so there is no difference in the number of fundamental entities), and its existence is a brute fact (so there is no difference in the complexity of the causal chain leading up to it). The laws are the same in both cases, and the laws in 1950 theory will necessarily give the appearance of a past going back 13 billion years just as the laws in the Big Bang theory do because they are the very same laws.

[@Arczi0]

@@thejimmymeister I'll mostly reiterate what I've already said. 13.8bln B.C. case includes: The set of laws. Maximally simple beginning (singularity). Every state is explained by "look at state one, follow the laws" except for the beginning singularity, which complexity is close to none. 1950 C.E case includes: The set of laws. Very robust and complex beginning (1950). Every state is explained by "look at state one, follow the laws" except for the beginning 1950, which has enormous complexity. Difference between cases is [almost] entirety of complexity of 1950, which 13.8bln explains anyway. It seems to me that the only way to defend "that's the same level of parsimony" is to say "distribution/properties of the substrates which constitute the state of affairs in both situations is irrelevant when assessing level of parsimony (assuming all substrates are still there)". I start to doubt if "parsimony" still means anything in this account. If "more parsimonious" is supposed to be "using less number of assumptions", I'd say 1950 case clearly does use more (atomically understood) assumptions. Exhaustive description of the entire state of 1950 without any doubt requires more paper, to say the least

[@thejimmymeister]

@Arczi0 The "maximally simple" beginning of 13.8bln B.C. contains everything that the "very robust and complex" beginning 1950 A.D. case (I'll use A.D. and B.C. for consistency rather than mixing B.C. and C.E.; don't read anything religious into it) contains. There's a structural difference, but I don't see how that structural difference is less parsimonious. It's all the same stuff. Everything that's in the singularity is also in 1950. Additionally, 13.8bln B.C. theory posits that there were all of the states between 13.8bln B.C. and 1950 A.D. If you take an overview of not just the intial state but the total complexity posited, 13.8bln B.C. theory posits a lot more complexity-what 1950 theory posits plus a huge amount more. However, I don't think structural complexity is an issue of parsimony to begin with. Every state in both theories is explained in exactly the same way. If you look at 1951, you can explain 1950 by following the laws. I don't know why you think otherwise. Likewise, you can explain the singularity by following the laws; that is, in fact, how we came to the conclusion that it existed. Parsimony's meaning is still plenty clear: a theory which posits fewer entities (or, on Jonathan Schaffer's view, which I hold, fewer fundamental entities) is more parsimonious. I don't see any problem with that understanding of the term. That is consistent with how it is used by most people both currently and historically. According to this, the commonly accepted definition, the theories are equally parsimonious. I don't see what assumptions are needed in 1950 theory but not in 13.8bln B.C. theory. (Edit: Other than the assumption that the universe began in 1950, but I think this is canceled out by 13.8bln B.C. theory's necessary assumption that the universe began in 13.8bln B.C.) An exhaustive description of the 1950 state is exactly the same according to both theories because both theorize the exact same state in 1950. I don't know why you'd need more paper in 1950 theory to describe what is exactly the same in terms of structure and elements as in 13.8bln B.C. theory.

[@jjjccc728]

There seems to be a tinge of the argument from incredulity going on here. A certain explanation for something (example physicalism) doesn't make sense to me therefore it's not true. As an alternative I'm going to imagine a non-physical entity. I'm not going to worry about falsifiability. Imagination rules here.