RAF Bomber Command were the real Masters of the Air? A WWII Myths Show

RAF Bomber Command were the real Masters of the Air? A WWII Myths Show
With Dan Ellin
Part of our WWII Myths series of short shows
• WWII Myths - A series ...
This is a new type of show for the channel. Our guest historian will examine a popular claim made about the Second World War and either confirm or debunk it. There probably won't be time for questions from viewers but we hope the shorter length will be popular.
With Masters of the Air receiving worldwide acclaim, it has reignited the debate about the merits of daytime versus nighttime bombing and the differing doctrines of the RAF and 8th Air Force. Dan Ellin joins us to examine the two methods and offer his conclusions using a wartime song sung by RAF crews as his starting point?
Dan Ellin is a graduate of the University of Lincoln and has a PhD from the University of Warwick. He curated the exhibition at the International Bomber Command Centre and continues to work building an inclusive, open-access digital archive that includes over 1,100 newly created oral history interviews with veterans and survivors of the bombing war.
www.iwm.org.uk/partnerships/s...
staff.lincoln.ac.uk/d13d9f32-...
Please click subscribe for updates and the bell icon for notifications
You can become a Patron and support us here / ww2tv
You can become a KZbin Member and support us here / @ww2tv
Social Media links -
/ ww2tv
/ ww2tv
/ ww2tv
For First World War content follow our sister channel WW1TV
/ @ww1tvchannel
WW2TV Bookshop - where you can purchase copies of books featured in my KZbin shows. Any book listed here comes with the personal recommendation of Paul Woodadge, the host of WW2TV. For full disclosure, if you do buy a book through a link from this page WW2TV will earn a commission.
UK - uk.bookshop.org/shop/WW2TV
USA - bookshop.org/shop/WW2TV
Patreon Brigadiers: Susan Yu
Become a WW2TV Brigadier and become part of this Hall of Fame
/ ww2tv

[@Chiller11]

Fortunately I think the RAF and the USAAF nationalistic rivalry was far less than that expressed in most KZbin comments sections.

[@f1matt]

Masters of the Air achieveing exactly what it set out to do. Getting massive numbers of people to discuss and remember the staggering sacrifices that were made.

[@ppsh43]

My old man was in a B-24 outfit flying out of England. The only negative comment he had about the RAF was that their construction outfits took a lot longer to build infrastructure than US construction units. This may have been due to having less heavy equipment or fewer men. This was just his observation from a small piece of the war.

[@eric-wb7gj]

British units probably had less equipment (no one was as well equipped as US units, they were the only country that could have won the pacific island hopping campaign - Japanese strategic planning thought they were safe in their island fortresses). British equipment may have been used in bomb damaged areas, US could concentrate on military matters. Another thing was the US military did have more modern & flexible 'can do' attitude, whereas British units could have a more rigid military & regulation structure, which could be inflexible (read slow) at times.

[@stevej8005]

Great discussion - thank you Dan & Woody!! Both the RAF & USAAF were in the position of not having the technology and weapons systems that could deliver what they were trying to achieve (generally). They were both on a very steep (and costly) learning curve of what they actually could achieve with their bomber strategies.

[@rustykilt]

Daylight bombing had one important advantage, it drew heavily on German daylight fighters who would eventually have to face heavy fighter support in the shape of Mustangs and this was a huge drain on the Luftwaffe. Something that could not be achieved due to the elements of nighttime bombing.

[@ps1281]

good point

[@MsZeeZed]

The RAF & USAAF were a team that shared reconnaissance, intelligence and equipment as well as fighter cover as a team. They had different strategies, but they weren’t conflicting. It might have been more effective mid-war if they had the same strategy, but the round the clock attack on the same targets at war’s end exhausted the remaining Luftwaffe defence.

[@walterm140]

The RAF and USAAF were not a team, that is the problem. The RAF by "Day" and "Night" avoided.the Germans and a cowardly show it was. Britain was working its post war agenda , quite willing for the Americans and Russians to deal with the Germans.

[@stuartburbridge8091]

@@walterm140 the RAF lost 95 aircraft in one single night op against Nuremberg in March 1944, which will be the subject of Dan’s next presentation. As the grandson of a Bomber Command bomb aimer who was killed over Berlin in 1943 I take huge umbrage at your comments that the RAF was ‘cowardly’ and ‘hid’. You are starting to look like a troll.

[@walterm140]

@@stuartburbridge8091 Obviously Bomber Command was attacking by night and attempting to avoid contact with the Germans. They were hiding. Their operations did nothing to help clear the way for Invasion either. Bomber Command aircraft were unstaisfactory by definition or they would have attackekd by day.

[@primmakinsofis614]

@@walterm140How nice of you to entirely ignore the large and often quite effective German night-fighter force.

[@PaulScott_]

Great show and information! Somebody in the comments was asking about what affected bombing accuracy and I will touch on a few items. I was a Canadian Air Force Maintenance Officer(former bomb loader) and asked that very question to fighter pilots. They told me that even with precision guided weapons there are many meteorological influences such as Upper Level winds(strength & direction), Mid Level winds(strength & direction), Surface level winds(strength & direction), updrafts and down drafts due to pressure systems and geography including: is your target near a lake, spring time with some of the ground dark and thawed, some with snow, near rising or descending terrain etc. For high altitude drops, remember that the earth is moving underneath you which must be accounted for, just as snipers do for extra long range shots. The Transport pilots informed that you have to take all of this into account for paradrops including both personnel and cargo, hence one of the jobs of pathfinders. Hats off to the bombsight designers and engineers and the aircrew that had to use them!!!!!

[@eurovnik]

I hugely appreciate you producing this content and putting it on KZbin. A great service to history bringing lots of academic perspectives to a wide audience in an accessible way. Thank you. I especially enjoyed your episode with Adam Tooze. May I humbly suggest getting Prof Phillips O'Brien on? Adam Tooze mentioned O'Brien in his video. His take on the primacy of air and sea power in the allied victory in WW2 is fascinating, controversial and personally I find it compelling. Especially stats like Nazi Germany spending 50% defence budget on aircraft, mostly deployed in Germany and the West and under 10% on AFVs, mostly deployed on the Eastern front. Also great analysis of the relative effectiveness of German vs Japanese vs American submarine campaigns. Plus nuggets like the B29 programme costing more than the Manhattan project.

[@nickdanger3802]

B29 program cost 1.5 times the Manhattan Project. V2 Program cost about the same as Manhattan Project.

[@eurovnik]

@@nickdanger3802 thanks. Corrected to "B29 cost more than the Manhattan project" The point I'm getting at is that the victorious western powers and even the Axis powers that fought them devoted far more national resources to production of air and sea materiel than is generally assumed. The US and UK made an active choice to deploy man(and woman)power to industrial production of weapons that could in turn destroy the Axis' productive capacity. Rather than enlisting them into the army. They were only able to do this successfully because they were capitalist democracies. See the Me-210, V2 and lack of development of the Zero during the war to see how bad autocracies were at high tech programmes. The Eastern front was a less technologically sophisticated war between two brutal autocracies and largely an infantry/armour/artillery meat grinder because both sides had men but less economic output for materiel in general, let alone strategic weapons which could dent each other's production. Germany bombing factories beyond the Urals? USSR bombing German industry in Saxony and Silesia? The USSR was economically as small as Japan and more backward technologically, despite lend-lease. Germany devoted almost all its air power to combating the Western powers' air offensives, initially strategic, then also tactical. Plus it made a significant investment in the strategic Atlantic submarine campaign. Turning to the impact of history on contemporary geopolitics, the huge Soviet casualties on the Eastern front, tragic though they were in human terms, have been used to create a sort of "blood debt of gratitude" which the West is expected feel towards the brutal Soviet regime. The present day Russia manipulates that debt for all they are worth as a means of distracting from their past and present unpleasantness.

[@ToddSauve]

@@eurovnik Russia for centuries now has been a gangster state.

[@eric-wb7gj]

@@eurovnik Thank you for your post. We do have to remember that the German economy (& unit costs) was fixed by the state, so % cost values may not be accurate. Aircraft & ships are more expensive in general than land vehicles. The Germans looked at a strategic bomber, but lost interest when the commander in charge (Wever?) died in an air accident. Goering could still have had a strategic bomber fleet, but was told he could have 4 medium bombers, or 3 heavies, he went with the mediums as the numbers were larger, would give more flexibility, combined better with the adopted tactical doctrine of supporting the army, & pushed less of the technological envelope for the engines/weights/ranges of the time. They still did have a strategic heavy bomber (He177) programme, but it ran into many delays. German strategic offensive action initially would be provided by it's Navy (attacking Allied convoys with it's fast battleships/cruisers, possible CV & submarines). Hitler couldn't use women for war work as he'd put himself into a corner with his propaganda. What he had was slaves instead. Yes, the Nazi economy was a bureaucratic & political monster, but it could still produce advanced weaponry, & did, leading the Allies in various fields. It also had advantages over a capitalist economy (i.e anything could be forced through to Hitlers wishes immediately, & not go through political & tendering processes etc) It was a lack of access to raw materials (including scientists), pushing technological boundaries, suitable test pilots, & a fast changing, declining military & economic situation, that held them up, more than the political strategic will for projects to succeed. The German military was constricted by lack of raw materials (Hitler knew they were very unlikely to win a long war, & he had to get resources from Russia), so decided to tailor their military to suit. They would have to beat each predicted opponent ON LAND in a short campaign, so strategic bombers weren't really required. Germany's economy was in ruins in 1939 (Hitler had spent everything on the military & public works). The clock was always ticking once Germany was at war, & when the Soviets weren't defeated in 1942, each month drew the German military & economy further into a war for which it wasn't suited. The Soviets did have strategic bomber policy, but they encountered design problems up to WW2, so only a few were completed. A few strategic raids were carried out. The ones left slowly whittled away as they concentrated, as you say, on resources which would give them a better short term return (especially in numbers). Apart from low numbers of submarines, a few balloon fire bombs & the 2nd Pearl Harbour raid, the Japanese seem the most short sighted strategically. It's a good point you make ref resources used, as for decades, historians only really concentrated on the battles in the field, the economics & logistics got left behind. I agree about the "blood debt of gratitude''. Allied propaganda pre-war was very anti communist, but they had to change their tune when the Soviets became uneasy Allies, & they did too good a job, eg British Intelligence post WW2 being infiltrated due to Soviet sympathisers.

[@johnbower7452]

I knew a gentleman who flew in a B17 Electronic warfare aircraft for the RAF, he had the DFC, but would never tell how he earned it, and I wasn't about to push him. But one story he did tell me was how he (he spoke German) managed to vector German night fighters onto their own returning bombers one evening, away from an RAF bombing raid. I would love to have known how many they shot down before they realised.

[@Mike-br8zt]

Interestingly, my Polish grandfather was a radio operator on Wellingtons and Mitchells and he spoke fluent German.

[@Paratus7]

My Uncle flew in 100 Group RAF (223 Squadron flying Liberators from RAF Oulton) and got a CGM medal. Joined up in 1935 and did over a 1000 hours by the end. The RAF did more than their fair share. Thank you for this - balanced and informative.

[@nickdanger3802]

Pointblank Directive "Redrafted by the Air Ministry, the directive tasked the 8th US Army Air Force with attacking the aviation industry; RAF Bomber Command would work towards 'the general disorganisation of German industry', as before." BBC Berlin Air Offensive page

[@NickRatnieks]

Queen added in the missing aircraft with their line: Thunderbolt and lightning, very, very frightening.

[@davidlavigne207]

Thanks for bringing in such a well informed, objective and charming speaker to discuss a controversial topic. As Phil Bosworth says, I too am looking forward to his next presentation.

[@usg-647]

The song at the beginning made me want to hear Motorhead - Bomber! "The way we fly, five miles off the ground"

[@1089maul]

Woody/Dan. Interesting discussion! Look forward to be seeing Dan again. Bob

[@willierobertson862]

Another wizard presentation from Dan, totally got the trolley problem for BC.

[@jeffbraaton4096]

This was a great myth show Paul and Dan. Lots of stuff I didn't know, look forward to a longer presentation. Like you said, it's not that any myth was dismissed or confirmed but that there is a very serious conversation for how strategic bombing policy was carried out by the Allies. Thumbs up and let's do it again, from the comments it looks like there could more folks to be heard from on the topic.

[@johnlucas8479]

Excellent presentation, Allied mastering the Sky by 1944 in the end was joint effort.

[@LewisFranck]

Excellent presentation. The more I study about World War II the more I learn about, not only the putative rivalry of US Army Air Force and the RAF, but the inter service rivalry of the RAF and FAA/ the US AA and the USN and worse the intra-service rivalry of the the Generals vs. Generals and Admirals vs. Admirals. And then there's the US Navy Admiral Fletcher appreciated by Nimitz and rubbished by King. Over on the UK side how Churchill binned Dudley North (not Pound). All of this occurring in an existential conflict. Oh, I forgot to mention the murderous enmity between the INJ Navy and their Army. It's mind blowing.

[@johnshepherd9676]

I think the approach taken by each air force reflects on national characters. The Americans were going to make daylight bombing work and they did, just not the way they planned on. The US built a long range air superiority fighter to escort the bombers to and from the target. It had the benefit of destroying the luftwaffe in the air in process. That was probably the most important effect of the US daylight bombing campaign.

[@gordy3714]

I love these WW2 Myths, perfect length as well. ✅

[@WW2TV]

Thanks. Some people don't like the shorter format, but they always bring in new viewers which is why we do them

[@Ezekiel903]

If we imagine what these young pilots went through, it let use in awe! I fear that today's youth would not be willing to make such sacrifices! In a survey conducted by a Western think tank, only 30-40% of our youth would be willing to fight for their country, which is why some are considering reintroducing compulsory military service. Many people take their freedoms and prosperity for granted. they can't imagine that this can be over in a very short time.

[@brianperry]

Some of those myths are perpetrated by people like Spielberg and Hollywood, where WW2 was fought solely by US forces.

[@WW2TV]

Actually I think that's also a myth. There have been plenty of big budget movies in recent years not focussed on US units: Dunkirk, Defiance, Resistance, Son of Saul etc.

[@american_cosmic]

@@WW2TV I still prefer the longer ones, but sometimes it's nice to have a broader, wider-in-scope presentation that doesn't wade too far into the weeds (although I'd imagine most of us LOVE wading into the weeds and it's a big reason we love this channel) - but yeah, the shorter format can be a nice change-up every now and then, and I like how you frame the shows around common WW2 myths. And, certainly, if they help bring in more viewers, all the more reason to do it.

[@bananabrooks3836]

'Wizard' 😁 must remember to use that myself. Lancaster drawing, an excellent depiction, Bomber song. Mosquito v B17 bomb load!!? Loved the tone of this discussion.

[@primmakinsofis614]

The Mosquito with bulged bomb bay doors could carry a single 4,000 lb bomb to Berlin; standard Mosquito carried 2,000 lbs of bombs (4 x 500 lb). The Lancaster could carry 10,000 lbs of bombs to Berlin; the Halifax III, 8,000 lbs; the B-24, 6,000 lbs; the B-17, 5,000 lbs.

[@bananabrooks3836]

​@@primmakinsofis614Thankyou.

[@richardvernon317]

@@primmakinsofis614 The vast majority of the LNSF Mosquitos just carried 1000lb of 250lb Target indicators or 2000lb of 500lb bombs. Of 27000 sorites flown between January 1944 and the end of the War, the number of Cookies dropped by the force ranged between 950 and 1400 sorties dependant on sources.

[@amerigo88]

For a very in-depth examination of the Avro Lancaster capabilities, nobody beat's "Greg's Airplanes and Automobiles" channel on KZbin. Here is some TLDR on the B-17 vs. Lancaster debates: each design was adapted to its environment - the day bombers (B-17, B-24) traded off bombload for a larger crew, more and heavier self-defense armament, more powered turrets, more armor and crew survivability. The night bomber (Lancaster design) was tilted in the opposite end of those settings since encounters with nightfighters were less likely and at closer ranges (as in .303 caliber range), flak was less accurate in darkness, and air generals always want more bombs to deliver. The B-29 Superfortress was originally configured as a daylight strategic bomber for fighter contested operations over Japan. Once LeMay took over, he switched to night bombing and had the B-29's reconfigured for it - shedding loads of guns, ammo, and other weight in favor of more bombs and more fuel for operations at lower relative altitudes - all just like the Lancasters over Europe. This also reduced the strain on the immature Curtiss-Wright R-3350 radial engines of the B-29, thereby reducing non-combat losses. The B-17 and Avro Lancaster bombers were the best "horses for their courses", but neither was in all respects objectively superior to the other. kzbin.info/www/bejne/gJPcZK2iitR3npIsi=hzUmUwWM9sDxwneT

[@MrFluidwill]

Great stuff

[@lyndoncmp5751]

Very good show this. Glad this one was done. Been elsewhere so need to catch up on a lot. Had You Tube issues as well (posts disappearing, getting unsubscribed from channels) and was on the verge of giving up with You Tube. Cheers.

[@user-wk9wq8yq5u]

Another great show. One thing that stands out to me for all the higher up’s on all sides is the inability to let go of a bad idea. I’ve experienced this in manufacturing where the front office is never wrong no matter how much it costs those actually engaged in the plan. I saw a short from your show where a historian made a valid point about the air war over Europe. It was a blip in history that only happened once and will never happen again. As I watch more of these programs I’m curious about the bomb loads these planes could actually deliver for the cost.

[@billy54bob]

Great, balanced presentation. Thanks

[@philbosworth3789]

A good balanced presentation by Dan. Looking forward to his Long Presentation.

[@michaelwilley4085]

Well done!

[@dutovdevlich3781]

Good show.

[@andrewflindall9048]

I believe it was said about the Memphis Belle remake that the producers wanted to do Bomber Command but a night setting wouldn't be great cinema.

[@terryjohnson7389]

Not a problem for the classic movie "The Dambusters" also night bombing crews aa my late father in law was proceeded to also take part in day light operations during 1944 so this could have a been a subject for a proposed movie.Footnote my late father in law was shot down in a Lancaster during a day light over Caen.

[@andrewflindall9048]

@@terryjohnson7389 I think it's more likely to have been an excuse for going with 8AF's imagined precision bombing was an easier sell than BC's grim grasp of the realities.

[@stevegt2682]

No allies ever get along perfectly or see eye to eye on all issues but the British/American coalition in WW2 was about as close as you can get imo.

[@nickdanger3802]

"British-American co-operation in the war was unique in history. As Lord Halifax said in his farewll speech at Washington, never before had two countries fought a war with so great a unity of military, industrial, and political effort. Two nations with sharply differing temperaments and outlook performed, in partnership, a miracle." para. 2 BRITISH-AMERICAN WAR CO-OPERATION (HISTORY) HC Deb 24 March 1947 vol 435 cc1000-5

[@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-]

@@nickdanger3802 Indeed Nick, . Compare that to the relations between the Germans and Italians or the Japanese army and the Japanese navy!

[@MichaelCollins1922]

I loved Masters of The Air. It would be wonderful if a similar miniseries was released dedicated to the story of Bomber Command in WW2.

[@mabbrey]

w/d chaps great stuff

[@rossdawgsbrokenspirit9038]

Now THIS is more like it!

[@nicholasperry2380]

Another superb episode and I admire the way you both avoided glorification or what is, in the end, slaughter on a massive scale. I lived near to Cologne in the 1990s and every time I saw people looking at the still blackened cathedral, sadness was overwhelmingly the most obvious emotion whether from former enemies of allies.

[@walterm140]

Here is a segment of Crosby's book "A Wing and A Prayer" that I copied out. It is a fascinating look at the nuts and bolts of the operations - the raids over the continent. "I am a pilot, LeMay said, "but I am the only person in this room who is also a trained navigator and trained bombardier. When I was a group commander in the First Division, I flew a mission as lead pilot, a lead navigator and a lead bombardier...." One by one the colonels or lieutenant colonels who had flown right seat spoke. Yes, my group assembled on time Yes, we made the wing rendezvous as briefed, but the other groups weren't there. Yes, we flew good formation during the whole mission. Yes, we were at the fighter rendezvous but the fighters weren't. At the I.P., we tucked in tight, but the bombardier missed the target. After all the command pilots talked, LeMay said, "Do any of you lead navigators or lead bombardiers want to add anything?" Of course we didn't. We were all first and second lieutenants. Not one of the command pilots had described a mission anything like the way it was really flown. Even so, who wanted to contradict our own brass? Silence. Uncomfortable silence. "Lieutenant Shore, Group Navigator of the 390th. Who was the bombardier with you in the nose on the mission of July 18th [1943]?" Marshall Shore pointed to a bombardier. LeMay turned to the bombardier. "Do you have anything to add?" "No, sir." "Were your bubbles level during the bomb run?" When Colonel LeMay asked that question, I must have gasped. I knew exactly what he had in mind. Maybe because of the sound I made, Colonel LeMay looked directly at me. He slowly winked. Something was wrong with the side of his face, and it was a grotesque wink, but that is what it was. I felt my heart speed up. I could hardly breathe. I looked around at the other navigators and bombardiers. How many of them knew what LeMay's question meant? What he was really asking was who was flying the plane. If the bubbles in the bombsight were level, the Norden was flying. If the bubbles were off, a pilot had overpowered the controls -- and was probably doing evasive action. When I looked back at Colonel LeMay, he was still looking at me. I winked back at him, and nodded. That funny smile again. He looked back at the bombardier. "Did your equipment work all right?" "No malfunctions, sir." One by one LeMay addressed all the lead bombardiers and asked them several irrelevant questions.-- and the one about the bubbles. Then he turned to the navigators, me first. "Lieutenant, give me your story." "Sorry, sir, I wasn't leading any of those missions." "What group are you in?" "The 100th, sir." Colonel LeMay turned to colonel Harding. "Why is he here, Chick, if he isn't a lead bombardier?" "He was the lead on Trondheim and Warnemunde. Before he replaced the lead navigator, he was on a wing." Colonel LeMay looked back at me. "Trondheim, good show." "Thank you, sir." He turned back to Lieutenant Marshall Shore of the 390th. "Lieutenant, when you were on the run from the I.P. to the target, what was the maximum deflection on your compass heading?" "About twenty-five degrees, sir." By now every lead navigator in the room knew what was going on. If the Norden was in charge, the corrections wouldn't have been more than five or six degrees. Only a pilot could jerk a plane around like that. At the end of the debriefing Colonel LeMay knew what every bombardier and navigator in the room knew, and I doubt if any of the pilots knew he knew. I realized I was in the presence of a very bright man, and a very skilled leader." ---"A Wing and a Prayer" pp. 75-78 by Harry Crosby.

[@peterstickney7608]

I'd like to address the myth that the Mosquito carried the same load as a B-17. It most definitely could not. A "Standard" Mosquito bomber's bomb bay had 4 stations (Racks, in American parlance), and their loadouts were 4 250 lb or 4 500 lb bombs with shortened fins. Mosquitos with bulged bomb bays could carry a single 4,000 lb Light Case bomb (Cookie), essentially an oil drum backed full of explosives. So, you had the option of a load of 4 bombs totaling 1,000 or 2000 lb, or 1 4000 lb bomb. It's a great loadout for light "nuisince" (for values of nuisance = 2 tons, which is certainly something not to be ignored) But not so good for, say, interdicting a rail yard, or a Factory Complex. The B-17's bay (Somewhat shorter and much deeper) had 42 Racks/Stations - Loadouts ranged from 24 100 lb, (2400 lbs, total), 16 300 lb (4800 lb), 12 500 lb (6000) lbs, 6 1000 lb (6000 lb), 2 2000 lb (4000 lb, limited by the bay geometry, or, if teh need arose to punch through anything, 6 1600 lb Armor piercing bombs. (9600 lb) It must be noted that the Eighth Air Force records show that the average load delivered on missions to the Berlin area was a shade over 5,000 lbs. We can discuss the external racks (2, 4000 lbs capacity each) later - but they were rarely used. The Lancaster was a good hauler - normal loudouts were around 14,000 lbs, thanks to its very long bomb bay.

[@nickdanger3802]

Recommend Search Operational history of Lancaster 1B R5868

[@amerigo88]

For a very in-depth examination of the Avro Lancaster capabilities, nobody beat's "Greg's Airplanes and Automobiles" channel on KZbin. Some bits I have picked up on the B-17 vs. Lancaster debates: each design was adapted to its environment - the day bombers (B-17, B-24) traded off bombload for a larger crew, more and heavier self-defense armament, more powered turrets, more armor and crew survivability. The night bomber (Lancaster design) was tilted in the opposite end of those settings since encounters with nightfighters were less likely and at closer ranges (as in .303 caliber range), flak was less accurate in darkness, and air generals always want more bombs to deliver. The B-29 Superfortress was originally configured as a daylight strategic bomber for fighter contested operations over Japan. Once LeMay took over, he switched to night bombing and had the B-29's reconfigured for it - shedding loads of guns, ammo, and other weight in favor of more bombs and more fuel for operations at lower relative altitudes - all just like the Lancasters over Europe. This also reduced the strain on the immature Curtiss-Wright R-3350 radial engines of the B-29, thereby reducing non-combat losses. The B-17 and Avro Lancaster bombers were the best "horses for their courses", but neither was in all respects objectively superior to the other. A Mosquito traded off speed in lieu of guns and armor as a bomber.

[@nickdanger3802]

@@amerigo88 B-17 vs Lancaster Payloads and Armor (unlisted) Gregs Air and Auto kzbin.info/www/bejne/qnq0m2Wnm9WLick&lc=UgyqEM1O_qNRScyeM7t4AaABAg

[@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-]

People on this page here will always argue that one air force did all this, and that air force did that, but it was the fact that the German leadership expanded their war into a multi-front disaster that their resources and manpower could not sustain. While the Luftwaffe and thier allies put up a tremendous fight, the sheer weight of numbers of the RAF, USAAF and Soviets along with their allies combined, finished the Germans off. Yes, the USAAF's combined bomber/fighter offensive hurt Germany, but the early bleeding by the determined RAF dealt Germany a blow that was felt for the rest of the war. The meat grinder of the Eastern Front was a slow hemmorage to the Luftwaffe, committing vast resources of the German war machine. So in the end, it wasn't any single Allied airforce that won the war, it was a concerted effort, no matter how small the role, that took down the Luftwaffe.

[@lyndoncmp5751]

How dare you state the truth. You should be stating the Hollywood/US tv version of history. 😝

[@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-]

@@lyndoncmp5751 Thought i'd write a balanced comment as i'm really getting sick of the immature pissing contests.

[@lyndoncmp5751]

@@Bullet-Tooth-Tony- Yeah I read some of them. Been out of the loop lately. Still problems with You Tube, missing posts, don't always get notifications etc. I'll soldier on ha.

[@stephenm.fochuk7795]

Missed the live presentation. This was a good one. Maybe Dan could explain in the future Prof Zuckermann's explanation on how he gauged the usefulness of a bomb; something along the lines of four 500lb's per acre...hence, area bombing. And that 4000lb cookie. Was it not used for blowing the roofs off of buildings and windows?

[@nickdanger3802]

Correct, purpose of High Capacity /"cookie" bomb was to blow roofs off and windows out to facilitate incendiary bombs, some which weighed as little as four pounds.

[@primmakinsofis614]

@@nickdanger3802The primary British incendiary bomb was the 4-lb; secondarily was the 30-lb, but Operational Research founfd that the 4-lb was more efficient. There was also the 250-lb, used more early in the war, and later served as the basis for the target indicator bomb. Limited usage of the U.S. 500-lb incendiary bomb occurred late in the war.

[@Caratacus1]

What a weird title. I've not followed this apparent fallout from the TV series but I've never heard a Brit, or a Historian, say that the Brits were the 'Masters Of The Air'. Indeed it's the US who have made a TV show claiming that they were the 'Masters Of The Air'. It's a bloody silly phrase that I guess no contemporary ever used anyway. Only seen few clips from MotA and they looked pretty silly too. I can't work out why special effects seem to have gone backwards in the last 10 years. Anyways was an enjoyable vid to watch if a little scattergun and I'm still not sure what was being addressed by the end of it 😂

[@nickdanger3802]

So far they have been getting their asses handed to them. I suspect the title is intended to be sardonic.

[@ToddSauve]

Masters of the Air is actually an excellent series! If you watch episodes 3 and 5 you will see that the special effects are extremely good! Episode 3 is the first Schweinfurt raid and episode 5 is the Munster raid where the USAAF took a terrible beating in both. This is not some whitewash series to try and portray any sort of national superiority. It is grimly realistic and my heart goes out to the men who flew those bomber missions in both the RAF and USAAF! 👀🤯🤨

[@JS-fe8sx]

It’s named after the title of a book written by a navigator in the 100th bomb group.

[@richardvernon317]

@@nickdanger3802 Its the name of the book. Its actually very good.

[@chrisw8417]

@@JS-fe8sxthe book the series is based on is from Donald L. Miller. A professor of history. Yes there are “other” books with that title but this is the book the series is based.

[@morganhale3434]

The myth of either the Bomber Command or the 8th and 12th and then later 15th Air Forces as the Masters of the Air ignores who I think were the real Masters of the Air in the ETO which were the Allied Fighter and Fighter-bomber Groups which came to totally dominate the airspace in Western and Southern Europe during the war. When the Western Allies acquired air superiority was when the beginning of the end to the Third Reich occurred, in my humble opinion.

[@CLARKE176]

80% of German military deaths were on the Eastern front.

[@primmakinsofis614]

@@CLARKE176Which did not destroy or otherwise hinder German war production. The CBO did.

[@HGmusiclist]

Nice show, bring things a bit more in perspective. RAF whas a force to be reckon with in the skies and the Lancaster whas state of the art.

[@nnoddy8161]

Gents, fantastic analysis, so big thank you. Just an important one, the 'RAF Bomber Command' was made of more than just Brits, it also included Australians, New Zealanders, Canadians, South Africans and other from the Commonwealth. My great uncle flew Halifax's in RAF 100 Group (although he was RAAF). Can you please do something specific on the 'Norden bomb sight' myth which feeds in to the 'RAF area bombing' vs 'USAF strategic bombing' myth. There was nothing between the Norden and the RAF's bomb sights in terms of accuracy. The ultimate for the RAF were the daylight strategic bombing epitomised by 617's work on Tirpitz and Berchesgarten.

[@primmakinsofis614]

Lancaster: max. internal load, 14 x 1,000 lbs B-17: max. internal load, 6 x 1,000 lb GP bombs (8 x 1,000 lb SAP bombs) B-24: max. internal load, 8 x 1,000 lb bombs (or 4 x 2,000 lb bombs)

[@nickdanger3802]

8,864 Americans in the RCAF. Mark XIV/Sperry T-1 went into service in 1942, the same year RAF heavies started bombing only in darkness. RAF heavies resumed daylight raids mid 1944 after the USAAF cleared the sky. "strategic bombing epitomised by 617's work on Tirpitz and Berchesgarten" Not strategic bombing. SPAATZ: Which had the more effect in the defeat of Germany, the area bombing or the precision bombing ~ GOERING: The precision bombing, because it was decisive. Destroyed cities could be evacuated but destroyed industry was difficult to replace. SPAATZ: Did the Germans realize that the American Air Forces by intention did only precision bombing ? -5­ GOERING ~ Yes. I planned to do only precision bombing myself at the beginning. PDF Goering Interrogation - Jewish Virtual Library WWII B-17 Combat Bombing Accuracy - Not related to the Norden Bombsight kzbin.info/www/bejne/oISneISKjaiYf6c

[@kirktravis5780]

​@@primmakinsofis614I thought the b-17 could carry six 1600 bombs internal. And yes I know your just talking internal. I bet we both know it could carry an additional 8000 external.

[@morganhale3434]

For some weird reason, there were regular punch-ups between submarine and battleship crews on the west coast of the USA during the war.

[@ddraig1957]

Bomber Command inflicted devastating damage on Germany at great cost. It was the 8th AAF with it's Lightnings,Thunderbolts and most importantly it's Mustangs that achieved air superiority over NW Europe ,without which D-Day and the liberation of Western Europe could not have taken place. Technically domination of the skies and defeat of the Luftwaffe made the Americans masters of the air.Of course Fighter Command also played a major part in destroying German aircraft over the skies of France ,Belgium and Holland.

[@brunozeigerts6379]

Whatever the merits of the respective air strategies... German was being bombed day and night. You had to wonder if the civilians still thought their side was winning.

[@joannedickie7863]

My husband had two uncles flying in Lancasters: one in RAAF (Australian) 460 squadron & the other in 617 Dam Buster squadron dropping Tallboy & Grand Slam eathquake bombs after the Dam Raid. Many of the 617 operations towards the later part of the war were daytime raids. His uncle in 460 was lost on the disasterous Mailly le Camp raid prior to D-Day. His uncle in 617 survived the war. I read an article quoting a USAF senior officer who said it was very probable that many B17s were downed by friendly fire due to the use of .50 calibre ammo being fired by nervous trigger happy gunners in their tight box formations. The Americans made a lot about the Norden bombsight but both the British & Germans had assessed the Norden against their own bombsights & found it was no better in combat situations.

[@nickdanger3802]

"To destroy the German aircraft industry, for example, precision bombing was needed, and in this the Americans specialized. The United States Eighth Air Force had been trained to bomb by daylight using the most accurate bombsights which could be devised, and with these they might reasonably be expected to hit buildings, such as the Messerschmitt assembly plant at Augsburg or the Vereinigte Kugallagerfabrik at Schweinfurt. Bomber Command, since it could operate in strength only at night, was not in a position to follow these tactics. The navigating device 'GEE'; was in operation and increasing in efficiency almost nightly, but 'H2S', 'OBOE' and the other scientific devices by which a greatly increased degree of accuracy would, it was hoped, be achieved, had only just been introduced. The bombing on a heavier scale of industrial targets situated in cities was, therefore, Harris maintained, the only alternative if his Command was to make an adequate contribution to the common effort. This was recognized in the 'POINTBLANK'; Directive, in which it was stated that the primary objectives of Bomber Command were unchanged." page 4 Hyperwar Royal Air Force 1939-1945

[@nickdanger3802]

14/15 Sep 42 "W/Op wounded by fire from another 4-engined twin fin a/c" 26/27 Nov 43 "Had collision with another Lancaster just after bombing the target." Search: Operational history of Lancaster 1B R5868

[@nickdanger3802]

Minister of Production Speer: "On February 23, 1944, Milch visited me in my sickroom. He informed me that the American Eighth and Fifteenth (Italy, ND) Air Forces were concentrating their bombing on the German aircraft industry (Pointblank Directive, ND), with the result that our aircraft production would be reduced to a third of what it had been, at least for the month to come. Milch brought with him a proposal in writing: Inasmuch as the Ruhr Staff had successfully dealt with the bomb damage in the Ruhr area, we needed a 'Fighter Aircraft Staff' which would pool the talents of the two ministries (Air Ministry and Ministry of Armaments) in order to overcome the crisis in aircraft production." page 332 Inside The Third Reich, Speer

[@nickdanger3802]

As the Luftwaffe encountered more Allied heavy bomber raids, it became apparent that great increases in defensive fighter firepower were needed, especially against the even more heavily armed American bombers. This dynamic led to the development of ever more heavily armed sub-types of fighters, including some Focke-Wulf 190s with six 20 mm cannon, the most ever mounted in a German single-engine fighter (Dill 2015, 50-4). This sub-type entered service concurrently with the most powerful weapon used by German fighters during the war, the 210 mm rocket mortar, which was used in significant numbers from July 1943 onwards both on the Western Front and in the Mediterranean, but not in the East (Forsyth 2016b, 53-7). The ultimate result of these developments, focused on the needs of defence against strategic bombing, was that the aircraft types retained on the Eastern front were ever more poorly armed in comparison to those in the West. Just 15% of Luftwaffe aircraft guns were allocated to the East by January 1944 (Table 4), a much lower proportion that the 34% of combat aircraft allocated to this theatre (Table 2). While the desperate German attempts to develop technology to confront Allied pressure have been noted in the literature (van Creveld 2011, 116-7), as has the German tendency to use older aircraft in the East (O’Brien 2015: 65, 291). What has not been sufficiently emphasised is that these aircraft possessed considerably less firepower, on average, as demonstrated here. page 15 How were German air force resources distributed between different fronts in the years 1941 to 1943 pdf

[@nickdanger3802]

DH98 Mosquito B.IX 54 built 1,680 hp Merlin 72 engines - otherwise as B.IV. Could carry 2,000 lb internally, plus one 500 lb bomb or a drop tank under each wing. Some modified with bulged bomb bay doors (in 1944) for 4,000 lb bomb. BAE Mosquito page

[@navalartichoke]

I can not tell if this Book has been brought up The Bombing War by Richard Overy is an excellent resource and I highly recommend it

[@tonyvart7068]

Enjoyed that from Dan....loved the way he brought some balance to the us v them.

[@morganhale3434]

This was an excellent show, and I can't wait till Mr. Ellin comes back in the future.

[@TerryDowne]

Nice presentation from Dan. I would love to hear him talk about Nuremberg, if only because I love the late great Martin Middlebrook's book about the raid so much.

[@chrissouthgate4554]

Late War, one of the Bomber Command Groups switched to Daylights. It was the one with some aircraft with solid-coloured Tail fins. These were the bomb leaders, whom the following gaggle of bombers were supposed to drop their bombs with. It was claimed that Main Force BC had got so used to bombing by night that they just bombed in the day as though it was still dark! PS Highly recommend any of Martian Middlebrooks's books on the subject.

[@primmakinsofis614]

Plenty of Bomber Command squadrons flew daylight missions in the second half of 1944 and in 1945, in addition to still flying night missions. 433 Squadron, for example, on 15/16 Sept. 1944, flew a night mission against Kiel, with the take off time at about 11 p.m. The next day, 17 Sept. 1944, the squadron flew a daylight operation against Boulogne, with the take off time at about 7:45 a.m.

[@edenbreckhouse]

The problem is that I don't think we can know with precision which air force put the most bombs on the designated target. If we knew that then we could also take data for planes used, planes lost and money spent to work out which air force was the more cost and resource efficient per ton of bombs on target. We can't do that or can we?

[@ME-xh7zp]

It's theoretically possible, the USSBS and Report of the BBSU both have conclusions regarding accuracy/effectiveness of the comparative forces. USAAF was unsurprisingly generally more accurate. Both criticized the effect of area bombing. Both criticized the comparative size of USAAF ordnance (not so much the total load, but the actual size of individual bombs). Sadly cannot measure the value of gaining A/S and defeating the LW. Also, it'd probably be a purposeless exercise as they should be taken together.

[@richardvernon317]

@@ME-xh7zp Both Surveys were very much flawed. British Survey was run by Zuckermann who was the instigator of the Transport plan. Neither of them made any use of German Documentation, but were based on questionnaires and interviews. Adam Tooze who has been though the German records which did survive made it quite clear that Area Attacks did a lot more damage than the bombing surveys admit.

[@walterm140]

"...yet two thirds of the [RAF]October raids were for general area-bombing, while little was thrown on oil or communications...Thus, on November 1, 1944 the commanders were given a fresh directive setting oil as the first priority, and communications as the second; there were no others to confuse the choice...Harris's obstinacy, however, prevented the plan from being properly carried out.--he even threatened resignation in resistance to it." -"History of the Second World War" P. 600-610 by BH Liddell Hart "...there were still many mornings when Harris sat at his desk confronted with the long list of targets of every kind, together with a weather forecast that -- as usual throughout the war -- made the C-in-C's decision a matter of the most open judgement. And again and again, Harris came down in favor of attacking a city rather than oil plants...The difference between the actual and potential effort Bomber Command concentrated on oil targets may have been only a matter of ten or twenty thousand sorties. But it is essential to reiterate what dramatic consequences might have stemmed from a real determination by Harris to put everything into oil, and even fractionally to increase Bomber Command's contribution..." -- "Bomber Command" p. 388-89 by Max Hastings

[@primmakinsofis614]

Tons of bombs dropped on German oil targets (British Bombing Survey): 1943 BC = 61 1943 8AF = 1,514 1943 15AF = 0 1944 BC = 48,285 1944 8AF = 62,297 1944 15AF = 45,552 1945 BC = 52,117 1945 8AF = 19,879 1945 15AF = 8,602

[@walterm140]

@@primmakinsofis614 RAF bombing worked at cross purposes. It created war industry workers. “A review of a biography of Galbraith said that the survey "found that, contrary to the claims of the U.S. Air Force [sic],[15] "Germany’s war production rose for much of the period when American and British air attacks were at their fiercest.[16] An obit of Galbraith continued, 'Galbraith wrote wittily, “Nothing in World War II air operations was subject to such assault as open agricultural land.” ... Galbraith’s boss, George Ball ... found something equally disturbing about the firebombing of cities. The RAF’s bombing of central Hamburg, for example, destroyed many lives and many businesses in the central city-restaurants, cabarets, department stores, banks, and more. What were the newly unemployed waiters, bank clerks, and entertainers to do? That’s right: seek jobs in the war plants on the edge of the cities “to get the ration cards that the Nazis thoughtfully distributed to workers there.” ... [T]he incredible destruction that the British and air forces wreaked on Germany, with the high loss of human life, didn’t even have the intended effect of slowing Germany's war-production machine. Galbraith had to fight hard to have the report published without it being rewritten to hide the essential points. “I defended it,” he later wrote, “with a maximum of arrogance and a minimum of tact.” ... Galbraith also visited Japan, where he analyzed the effect of the use of the atom bomb. He wrote: "The bombs fell after the decision had been taken by the Japanese government to surrender. That the war had to be ended was agreed by at a meeting of key members of the Supreme War Direction Council with the Emperor on June 20, 1945, a full six weeks before the devastation of Hiroshima. The next steps took time. The Japanese government had the usual bureaucratic lags as between decision and action."'[17] -- WIKI

[@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-]

@@walterm140 Continuous British bombing forced Germany to deploy a couple million or more men in the West, in the Luftwaffe, Flak and civil defence. Speer wrote that 6 more of these attacks would cripple Germany. *In May 1942, in Operation Millennium 1,046 bombers dropped over 2,000 tons of high explosive and incendiaries on the medieval town of Cologne, and the resulting fires burned it from end to end. The damage inflicted was extensive. The fires could be seen 600 miles away at an altitude of 20,000 feet. Some 3,300 houses were destroyed, and 10,000 were damaged. 12,000 separate fires raged destroying 36 factories, damaging 270 more, and leaving 45,000 people with nowhere to live or to work. Only 384 civilians and 85 soldiers were killed, but thousands evacuated the city. , but thousands evacuated the city.*

[@vrdrew63]

Great stuff. And a timely topic now that MoTA is airing. The USAAF "Bomber Mafia" were convinced that high altitude precision bombing would work. That being able to take out a handful of key industrial facilities (ball bearings) would cause a war economy to crash. That worked in theory but not in practice. The USAAF should have learned from the experience of the RAF that unescorted bombers would be slaughtered. The real strategic achievement of the USAAF was this: Once they deployed long-range fighter escorts, and allowed those fighters to engage Luftwaffe fighters, it put the Germans into a situation where their losses of Luftwaffe pilots became unsustainable. The RAF's night bombing campaign never did, or could have, done this. The Luftwaffe lost many of its experienced pilots, and resorted to shortened training schedules. This lead to an inevitable "death spiral" in pilot skill. One "myth" that needs addressing: The P-51 Mustang was the "only" plane that made this possible. Not so. The P-47 Thunderbolt had comparable range if fitted with drop tanks. The delay in the decision to use these drop tanks was costly. But it was P-47s, operating in late 1943 and 1944 that killed most of the Luftwaffe's old hands. The P-47 was ultimately phased out of the ETO. But this was because it cost almost 50% more than a P-51. Without the Luftwaffe being destroyed in this way, giving the Allies tactical air supremacy anywhere they wanted it, then Overlord would have been impossible. So would Market Garden, or the destruction of German forces at Falaise. Were the RAF or USAAF more effective at bombing? Undoubtedly the bombing campaigns caused serious disruptions to German production. But they never stopped them making guns or tanks or airplanes. The bombing campaigns forced the Germans to deploy vast resources of artillery, ammunition, and personnel for Flak etc. that they could have used elsewhere.

[@primmakinsofis614]

_The USAAF "Bomber Mafia" were convinced that high altitude precision bombing would work._ Anyone who uses the term 'Bomber Mafia' should be regarded with great skepticism, as they are pushing an agenda. _One "myth" that needs addressing: The P-51 Mustang was the "only" plane that made this possible. Not so. The P-47 Thunderbolt had comparable range if fitted with drop tanks._ Unequivocally false. The maximum combat radius of the P-47 with 305 gallons of internal fuel was ~425 miles, that's it (and that assumes sufficient fuel in drop tanks to get out that far). Enough distance to easily cover the Ruhr, but it was never going to escort U.S. bombers to Berlin or Schweinfurt. The P-47D-25 and later, with 370 gallons of internal fuel, had a maximum combat radius of about 600 miles (using 2 x 150 gallon drop tanks). These didn't arrive in the ETO until May 1944. A fighter's maximum combat radius is limited by the amount of internal fuel remaining after deducting the fuel consumed by: (1) warm up, take off, an initial climb; (2) fifteen minutes of full MIL power and five minutes of WEP; and (3) a thirty minute reserve based on the fuel used by maximum range engine settings. If you take the above and run the calculations using the cruise charts in the Pilot's Flight Operating Instructions manual, the P-47 pre -25 had a theoretical maximum radius of about 425 miles, while the -25 and later had a maximum radius of about 600 miles. The problem with drop tanks on the P-47 rests squarely with Republic, which dragged its feet getting the necessary wing pylons, internal plumbing, and sway braces made for underwing drop tank usage. The P-38 and P-51, in contrast, had the capacity for underwing tanks early on. Republic was also slow in boosting the internal fuel capacity, something which the P-38 and especially the P-51, achieved more quickly.

[@vrdrew63]

@@primmakinsofis614 I think the concept of Ad Hominen logical fallacies ought to be readily apparent to any serious discussion. There existed a cadre of senior US Army Airforce officers who, prior to the outbreak of war between the US and Nazi Germany, had spent considerable time and energy developing their doctrine of unescorted, high-altitude precision bombing as a means of winning a war. That really cannot be debated. You can call these officers whatever you want. I use the term "bomber Mafia" as shorthand. Any serious student of the topic will understand what is meant. The "bomber Mafia", while well-intentioned and obviously highly skilled officers, got things wrong. The B-17, while an obviously capable and high-performance aircraft by 1939 standards, simply couldn't defend itself adequately against a 1943 Luftwaffe. The Norden bombsight, while highly accurate in ideal conditions in an undefended airspace, simply could not deliver effective accuracy in the existing conditions over WWII Europe. Ultimately the "Bomber Mafia" techniques were abandoned, perhaps most absolutely, in the USAAF campaign against Japan. Curtis LeMay, sent to replace Heywood Hansel (an original "bomber Mafia" consigliere) swapped hit-level day light precision bombing by his B-29 squadrons for low-level night time incendiary area attacks on Japanese cities. I'd perhaps call this Bomber Harris on Steroids. LeMay learned his lessons in Europe.

[@nickdanger3802]

@@vrdrew63 "Ball-bearings were, however, vital to the war machines of all the belligerents. if the supply of them to Germany or if their manufacture could be reduced or cut off completely, it would be impossible for her to continue the struggle. As early as November, 1942, the Ministry of Economic Warfare had estimated that more than half the ball bearings made in Germany came from the V.R.F. factories and the Fischer factory at Schweinfurt. there was also a factory at Stuttgart and others at Leipzig, Berlin and Elberfeld. France too possessed a number of small establishments. Operation 'SELFRIDGE', an assault on Schweinfurt, was therefore planned, but month after month passed and it was not executed: the technical difficulties were too great. The Air Ministry, however was determined that it should be as soon as they had been overcome." page 25 Hyperwar Royal Air Force 1939-1945 Vol III Connect the dots. COMPLETE Whirlwind speech DEFENCE: World War II: Air Marshal Harris on bombing raids (1942) kzbin.info/www/bejne/a6bNq4mnrK-heJI

[@harryurz]

It needs to be said that Bomber Command started flying daylight raids with heavies again in July 1944, increasing in size and distance through until May 1945.

[@StuartH922]

Regarding accuracy how about doing Peenemunde. Martin Middlebrook's book compares the accuracy of that with the best efforts of the 8th.

[@nickdanger3802]

Practice runs ? Altitude ? Losses ?

[@StuartH922]

It was a Main Force attack using standard tactics.@@nickdanger3802

[@StuartH922]

It was Main Force using standard tactics.@@nickdanger3802

[@johnhayes9547]

War is war, people die. We should try not let it happen..but it does

[@grahamhighmore7702]

I definitely believe Bomber Command were vital to wining the war but they didn’t achieve air superiority over Europe, arguably even the 8th air force didn’t achieve it either. Surely the numerical superiority of the short range fighters/light bombers enabled the beach’s on d-day to be secured while the transport/oil plan taken up by both heavy bomber forces was the real key to grounding the Luftwaffe. Definitely should mention the P-51 mustang, the US vs RAF claims of accuracy plus weight of bombs both air forces delivered plus the fact that on the ground civilians and military personnel were hopelessly intermingled which made the precision vs area bombing debate a little more reductive.

[@nickdanger3802]

IWM "Germany’s air force and navy could do little to resist invasion. The Luftwaffe had withdrawn nearly all its fighters to counter American daylight bombing operations over Germany. The Navy’s warships had been hounded to destruction or were bottled up in ports." The German Response to D-Day page

[@mikeryan7468]

I feel so conflicted about bomber command. Living in Livepool and having my maternal grandmother tell me about the blitz I can imagine how German civilians felt. Living in BAOR in the early 80s I remember people my age now talking about the raids with horror. I feel sorry for the boys in bomber command as well, my wife's great uncle was in bomber command as well and judging from the photo an air gunner. I kind of feel the whole allied and axis bombing strategies of bombing civilians was just a horrible crime against humanity.

[@davidsabillon5182]

❤

[@soppdrake]

Interesting slide show! The actual series does do something that even Band of Brothers did in some aspect: and that was to give the impression that the Brits were utter twats, with a "looking down the nose" attitude. One thing I often think about is the grinding, relentless numbers of missions the RAF crews were expected to carry out, with those inherent, grindingly dodgy odds. That took balls, as did flying over a target in daylight in a shiny 'fort while being peppered by wave after wave of schwarm-grouped enemy fighters.

[@nickdanger3802]

Philip French of The Guardian commented that he had "seen nothing in the cinema this past year that impressed me as much as BBC2's 10-part Band of Brothers"

[@brunozeigerts6379]

I wonder if the Allies considered dropping leaflets telling the Germans that this was what their own Luftwaffe had done to Warsaw, Rotterdam, Coventry... etc.

[@WW2TV]

Oh they definitely did that

[@USAACbrat]

How long would WW-2 last without the Bomber effort. Do you think the people of the Netherlands or Poland feel the same way about Dresden that modern hand ringers claim to feel from their safe perches of historian.

[@WW2TV]

Why are you under the impression that we don't think the bomber offensive was worth mounting?

[@nickdanger3802]

Mosquito Bomber Missions "On the night of 18th/19th August, 1944, twenty-one Mosquitos attacked Berlin, seven Cologne, two Wanne Eickel and five the airfields at Florennes. By then Mosquitos of eleven squadrons had been used for diversionary attacks on a small but gradually increasing scale since the first thousand-bomber raid on Cologne on 30th/31st May, 1942. From the spring of 1943 until the end of the war 'harassing' raids as they were originally termed were to prove a constant and, from the point of view of the enemy, a most irritating and unpleasant feature of the bomber offensive. Night after night the Mosquitos were over Germany, flying at between 30,000 and 40,000 feet to inflict damage out of all proportion to the weight of bombs they dropped. They were at once of great value as a nuisance, for they caused the sirens to wail and tired workers to spend yet another night in fetid, if bombproof, bunkers, and they created a diversion, thus drawing the enemy fighters away from the main bomber stream." - -259-- Hyperwar Royal Air Force 1939-1945 Chapter XII Oil and the Climax

[@edenbreckhouse]

The Mosquito also experienced far fewer losses per ton of bombs dropped than.the Lancaster.

[@primmakinsofis614]

@@edenbreckhouseThe Lancaster provided far more striking power, and tremendous flexibility in terms of bomb load options.

[@nickdanger3802]

@@primmakinsofis614 They did not strike much in the way of enemy aircraft which was the objective of the Pointblank directive. Operation Pinball kzbin.info/www/bejne/nn3dpaGura12Z5o

[@dermotrooney9584]

Hello air guys. The thing that struck me was the loss ratio: 58,000 highly trained aircrew in expensive technology kill 600,000 civilians. Looks inefficient to me. Any idea where I can get some unvarnished detail on RAF raids in 45? 🌟

[@andrewflindall9048]

Killing civilians wasn't the only aim, though. Shooing them away from industrial zones, preventing them from getting to work or having a good night's sleep all contributed, over and above physical damage. I recall being quite surprised at the high proportion of BC losses on training and conversion sorties, though I'm afraid I can't remember that figure. A breakdown of the air forces' operational and non-operational casualties might make an interesting short. For example, are USAAF training casualties 'lost' figures because many were stateside?

[@dermotrooney9584]

@@andrewflindall9048 Cheers. Would be interesting - chore to find the data though. ☹️

[@andrewflindall9048]

There was a chap at East Kirkby some years ago (a bonfire night before Covid) who'd crunched the numbers for BC. I suppose the question is how close 6 years of BC operational losses are to 8AF's, what, 2 years? Then I start to think how little I know of this air stuff because I don't know if the BC figures include other theatres, not just NWE. There certainly seems scope for some spreadsheet-based summaries!

[@primmakinsofis614]

_Any idea where I can get some unvarnished detail on RAF raids in 45?_ I would suggest _The Bomber Command War Diaries_ by Martin Middlebrook and Chris Everitt.

[@dermotrooney9584]

@@primmakinsofis614 Thank you. Been there already though. It has huge gaps and inconsistencies -some raids missing, others with no detail (did they hit the target? how many loses? which sqns etc.) From my perspective -a land geek trying to bridge the gap to the air war to join some dots- the jargon is a barrier too. I think I need squadron diaries maybe. 😵‍💫

[@vladimirpecherskiy1910]

First I do not think it is fare to say "Harris did it". Harris was only man found to do it. Not like it was up to him to do so or not. Yes, he had need attitude for that - that why he was appointed to position, not other way around. Second - arguably, mast impotent was not bombing itself, but fact that Germans had to counter-measure that and basically lost Luftwaffe doing so.

[@lllordllloyd]

My Father, a Lancaster tail gunner, could quote Harris (11:15) to the end of his life, and always with some relish. A couple of other notes: USAAF high-altitude precison bombing failed in the Pacific, with little damage done to Rabaul and the chief proponent of the method being KIA trying to make it work. Kenney threw the idea aside and started again based on realities. In Europe, the USAAF/8th AF leadership were embarrassed by the need for escort fighters and spread myths to hide their failure to use what was available (please get Greg from Greg's Airplanes and Automobiles on to discuss this). In my mind the real benefit of strategic bombing was 'curing' Germany and Japan of decades... centuries... of militarism. Unproveable, but battlefield defeat would only have resulted in yet another 'stab in the back' myth: they'd have said the soldiers suffered bravely and the home front was weak. No German officer could walk through the ruins and say 'democrats and socialists lost the war'. Strategic bombing was the very direct and inescapably obvious cost of fascist rallies and the massive social mobilisation in the service of invading other nations.

[@primmakinsofis614]

_In Europe, the USAAF/8th AF leadership were embarrassed by the need for escort fighters and spread myths to hide their failure to use what was available (please get Greg from Greg's Airplanes and Automobiles on to discuss this)._ Sigh. Greg is wrong, and definitively so, as ample documentation from the period readily shows, and as author Bill Marshall has exhaustively chronicled. (And Greg regularly refuses to engage with anyone who disagrees with him.). Anyone who uses the term 'Bomber Mafia' should be regarded with great skepticism, as they are pushing an agenda. The maximum combat radius of the P-47 with 305 gallons of internal fuel was ~425 miles, that's it (and that assumes sufficient fuel in drop tanks to get out that far). Enough distance to easily cover the Ruhr, but it was never going to escort U.S. bombers to Berlin or Schweinfurt. The P-47D-25 and later, with 370 gallons of internal fuel, had a maximum combat radius of about 600 miles (using 2 x 150 gallon drop tanks). These didn't arrive in the ETO until May 1944. A fighter's maximum combat radius is limited by the amount of internal fuel remaining after deducting the fuel consumed by: (1) warm up, take off, an initial climb; (2) fifteen minutes of full MIL power and five minutes of WEP; and (3) a thirty minute reserve based on the fuel used by maximum range engine settings. If you take the above and run the calculations using the cruise charts in the Pilot's Flight Operating Instructions manual, the P-47 pre -25 had a theoretical maximum radius of about 425 miles, while the -25 and later had a maximum radius of about 600 miles.

[@johnhayes9547]

But after Hamburg, Speer said if it had continued they would have lost the war….and we didn’t

[@nickdanger3802]

He also said if bombing had been concentrated on military production instead of area bombing the war would have been over in 1943. Hamburg was possible due to weather conditions that would not happen again in the war. Harris tried to do the same to Berlin to little effect.

[@primmakinsofis614]

The destruction at Hamburg was the result of a firestorm. Firestorms were rare, freak events that could not be created on command. Another half-dozen or so German cities being destroyed like Hamburg in quick secession is what Speer was talking about. Achieving that was simply impossible. The big impact in 1943 that is ignored was the campaign against the Ruhr. That resulted in German war production stagnating for seven months afterward. Had Harris continued pounding the Ruhr instead of switching to his ill-fated campaign against Berlin, the German war economy would have been even more impacted than it was historically.

[@ToddSauve]

@@primmakinsofis614 I think the higher ups in both the RAF and USAAF just did not know with much certainty what affect their bombing campaigns were actually having on the Germans. Thus effective consistency was not possible to achieve. 🤷‍♂

[@nickdanger3802]

@@ToddSauve Land line comms in German territory could not be intercepted so AF's had the less of it in signals intel. IMHO

[@zebradun7407]

The real master of the air in WW2 was "Death."

[@PauMaz]

Excellent presentation. I don’t know, I am just asking, shouldn’t the Americans get more credit for essentially eliminating Luftwaffe fighters from the skies of Europe by 1945? I know from other presentations that the percentage of bomber losses from flak increased as the war progressed and as German pilots were killed off. Was there any attempt at suppressing German flak batteries during the war? IRONHAND, to use an American term from the Vietnam War. One would think that marauding fighters flying on the deck (with additional squadrons flying top cover) could have really discouraged German flak batteries with machine gun bullets and an occasional dosage of napalm. They knew where the flak batteries were located did they not? On a final note, I don’t think very many Americans realize how small the bomb capacity of the B-17 was compared to the British “heavies.” Embarrassing. It’s a shame that the B-29 wasn’t developed soon enough for the European theater of operations. The B-29 with its advanced gunnery systems (that ate up Japanese fighters) would have been an interesting matchup with the 1943 Luftwaffe.

[@nickdanger3802]

B-17 vs Lancaster Payloads and Armor (unlisted) Gregs Air and Auto kzbin.info/www/bejne/qnq0m2Wnm9WLick&lc=UgyqEM1O_qNRScyeM7t4AaABAg

[@ToddSauve]

I suppose it was the arrival in sufficient numbers of the P-51 Mustang in early 1944 that allowed the air war over Germany to finally be won by mid to late 1944. Prior to that it was a see-saw battle with many aircraft being destroyed, and pilots and crews on both sides being killed. The Luftwaffe had little effect in Normandy but were still nettlesome over Germany until the last half of 1944 arrived.

[@primmakinsofis614]

_shouldn’t the Americans get more credit for essentially eliminating Luftwaffe fighters from the skies of Europe by 1945?_ Two points: (1) If you graph USAAF combat losses to enemy fighters against combat sorties, you will discover losses were commensurate with sorties through Aprill 1944. That is, as sorties increased, losses increased in about the same proportion. This completely stops in May 1944, with losses falling substantially as a share of combat sorties. This decline continued until pretty much the end of the war. The Luftwaffe as an effective daytime fighter force ended in May 1944. (2) The Luftwaffe's nighttime fighter force, which in Dec. 1944 still comprised roughly one-fifth of its fighter strength, remained a potential threat almost up to the end of the war.

[@primmakinsofis614]

@@nickdanger3802If that's the video I remember, Greg claimed that the B-17 could have regularly carried as big a bomb load as the Lancaster by lugging 4,000 lb bombs on the wing racks. It was an absurd claim, as external bombs came with big drag and handling penalties. I pointed this out in the comments, but Greg hand-waved it away. Lancaster = max. internal 14 x 1,000 lb bombs B-17 = max. internal 6 x 1,000 lb GP bombs (8 x 1,000 lb SAP bombs) B-24 = max. internal 8 x 1,000 lb GP bombs

[@nickdanger3802]

@@primmakinsofis614 At 10 minutes of Gregs video: "it didn't do that very often" 17's could carry 12,600 pounds of a particular bomb type internally, but rarely did. There were other factors. 17's had almost 2,000 pounds of armor compared to next to none on Lanc's plus 250 pounds of reverse Lend Lease flak jackets and another 1,000 pounds of crew and MG's. 17's needed another 2,000 pounds of fuel to form up and climb to alt Lanc crew could only dream of. RAF heavies operating at night took off and made their way to the target on their own. If you will have a look at this Lanc you will notice it started with bombloads of less than 4,000 pounds and did not carry 14,000 pounds until 1944 and it did not go very far. Aulnoye is about 100 miles from the Channel coast. Search Operational history of Lancaster 1B R5868 This Lanc flew 136 operational sorties in two years and ten months (less than one a week) and dropped "466 tons approx" or 3.42 long tons/7,675 pounds on average. I did not deduct missions in which bombs were jettisoned due to engine failure or the entire load was flares or mission was called off in flight. On pages one and two (July and August 1942) the entire load was 3,360 pounds of bombs. On page one two raids were in daylight, the next daylight raid would be in July 44. On page two a bomb load is 2,000 pounds plus "6 x 4 flares". "(USA)" appears nine times with bomb type. Some of the notes are interesting. Recommendation by two pilots the aircraft be withdrawn from bombing, one friendly fire incident, "bomb doors damaged by bombs" and one midair collision with another Lanc over the target. I was amused by the listing of a USAAF general as "Passenger" instead of observer, as if they were going to drop him off somewhere.

[@arniewilliamson1767]

If extreme accuracy was needed did not the Commonwealth nations use Mosquitoes?

[@WW2TV]

Yes they did, and in many other roles too

[@nickdanger3802]

Not strategic bombing.

[@WW2TV]

Lots of Tactical though, and pathfinder work for Strategic

[@nickdanger3802]

52,910 airborne radar sets Lend Leased to Britain plus 1,204 to Canada. page 8 Hyperwar Lend Lease shipments Signal

[@dexterscott7824]

This episode was not sharply focused enough. A 20-30 minute "myths" episode needs to take one myth and debunk it. This one was all over the place, tried to tackle numerous different topics and thus couldn't get into any detail on any particular one. Who were the real Masters of the Air? The point has to be made that the American daylight campaign forced the Luftwaffe to come up and fight, enabling American long-range escorts to kill the German fighter force and thus securing Allied air superiority for D-Day. The RAF night campaign could never have done this. Therefore, the conclusion is inescapable that it was the Americans who were Masters of the Air in Europe in 1944-45. Apropos of the trolley problem: 55,000 Bomber Command KIA 1939-45 were bad, but that was about two weeks of fighting in the Eastern Front of WW2, and relatively small compared to 950,000 British Empire KIA in WW1, so the Bomber Command trolley really did avoid WW1 mass slaughter.

[@WW2TV]

Your conclusion maybe, but many would disagree

[@dexterscott7824]

Which conclusion? About the USAAF being the ones who won air superiority in Europe? Or about the trolley problem?@@WW2TV

[@WW2TV]

Your conclusion about the US being MOTA based on your criteria

[@dexterscott7824]

I think it's indisputable. Happy to give a presentation to that effect anytime. @@WW2TV

[@WW2TV]

But your premise falls apart when you consider that the Luftwaffe came up against Bomber Command too

[@oceanhome2023]

You have to make money so you have to make it about the Yanks !

[@walterm140]

​​"These Allied successes were mainly due to daylight operations. They, in fact, delivered the real, decisive, death blow to Germany. - Galland

[@stephenm.fochuk7795]

Give it a rest, Walter.

[@primmakinsofis614]

Bomber Command dropped more tons of bombs against German oil targets in 1945 than did the USAAF.

[@andrewflindall9048]

The Germans were always quick to tell their American captors just what they wanted to hear...

[@scrubsrc4084]

Having looked at bombing data the Americans had worse accuracy in daylight training than the raf had during night raids

[@walterm140]

@@stephenm.fochuk7795 I am sorry if the truth offends you. You have no counter argument. This waffler of a presenter submitted a huge number of falsehoods. B-17s carried 5-6000 lbs of bombs and up to 2 tons of .50 cal ammo to Berlin and beyond. They attacked at up to 10,000 ft higher than the sadly lacking Lancaster. Most importantly B-17s fought the Germans toe to toe to clear the way for invasion while the RAF hid from the Germans, to include Fighter Command with its lame second rate aircraft.

[@derek6579]

Another pointless KZbinr earning money with his pathetic rerun of thing past!

[@WW2TV]

Another pointless commenter who didn't need to leave a comment. If you're not interested - don't watch