Searle: Philosophy of Language, lecture 5

[@paulk8224]

as a footnote: in one of the first lectures searle says one cannot use "hint" in a performative way. in german you actually can. e.g. something like: "ich möchte sie hiermit darauf hinweisen, dass jede entscheidung, die hier getroffen wird, in übereinstimmung mit geltendem recht getroffen werden muss." which translates to something like "i hereby hint, that any decision, which is made here, has to be in agreement with prevailing law." or "i (hereby) want you to notice, that..." but i think in every case you talk like that, the hinting is an indirect speechact, not a genuine hinting. because in order for such an utterance to work, one has to presuppose, that the hearer already knows that P (that any decision has to be in agreement with prevailing law). one can see that by the fact, that the hinting-part can be replaced by "i want you to remember, that P": "ich möchte sie daran erinnern, dass P". or even more explicit "in the case you forgot, that P, i tell you, that P": "falls sie vergessen haben, dass P, P". such that its not a genuine hinting but an hidden directive, that is, depending on the position of the speaker, either a threat or a request/plea.

[@tim57243]

The main point is at 57:30: The essence of meaning is the intentional imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction. For example, raising your arm is a condition of satisfaction, and if you're trying to get someone's attention that is an intentional imposition of conditions of satisfaction (you want their attention) on conditions of satisfaction (you want your arm to move a specific way). I disagree. If I have a stick in my hand, and I intentionally move my hand for the purpose of moving the stick, and I'm indirectly moving the stick for the purpose knocking some object out of a tree that I can't otherwise reach, that fits his definition. He prefers examples that are speech. We can repair my previous example to fit this: If I'm yelling at someone, and my purpose is to cause them to become partially deaf because of my loud sounds, that is an act of speech that fits his definition of having a meaning. He has an example of an apparently non-meaningful statement at 1:06:12: "The Absolute is universal and eternal".

[@die_schlechtere_Milch]

When he says "il pleu" and means to say that it is raining, than this sentence has gained further 'conditions of satisfaction', in this case the sentence now has a truth value. He goes on 'the creation of meaning is the creation of this ... entity, that has these further conditions of satisfaction.' I think that this is meant with IMPOSITION of (further) conditions of satisfaction. Do the acts of your examples gain any further conditions of satisfaction? I am not sure about what you mean with "directly" and "indirectly" in your example with the moving of the stick. The moving of the stick is a condition of satisfaction and if you do that in order to knock some object out of a tree, than your desire to knock this object out of the tree can be satisfied or remain unsatisfied, which is clearly a "condition of satisfaction of an intentional state" according to Searle: "Every intentional state that has a direction of fit has conditions under which that fit will come about or fail to come about. It has truth conditions in the case of a belief, satisfaction conditions in the case of a desire, fulfillment conditions in the case of an intention [...]" I think that [to do sth. with an intention in mind] and [mean sth] are not the same and I think that here I agree with you. I can fail to do reach the end of my action but I cannot fail to mean something. I can fail to communicate the meaning I want to communicate, but I cannot fail to mean what I want to mean. I think that I can live with Searle's definition because when I do sth, e.g. screaming very loudly, and do this with a desire in mind, e.g. making you deaf, and if this form of communication is a language which can be understood not only by the speaker but also by the speaker, than the signifier (the screaming) expresses the signified ([the speakers desire to make the hearer deaf]). This might be a reason why Searle stresses the distinction between meaning and communication so much. If this was a form of communication, it could get communicated. Therefor I think that it is meaningful.

[@die_schlechtere_Milch]

what is a "direction of fit"?

[@snoski2697]

Word-to-world DOF: you make sure your words fit to state of affairs in the world (e.g. reports, statements, warnings). World-to-word DOF: you pronounce words which influence the world in such a way that they fit to those words (e.g. decrees, requests, orders). Note that some speech acts have mixed directions of fit or none at all (e.g. apologies, condolences, excuses).

[@BenJamin-qx1ok]

Snoski explains it well, but it helps me a lot to make use of his direction of fit from his philosophy of society lectures also on youtube. There is a world to mind DOF that includes things like perceptions (think the airplane is external and makes an impression on the mind, effectively altering it), juxtaposed by the mind to world DOF (think actions, I have a plan in my mind to fill this glass with water, it is executed and so my mind has altered the world).