Second Saturday: Pearl Harbor and the Kimmel Controversy

PEARL HARBOR AND THE KIMMEL CONTROVERSY:
Revisiting Questions of Accountability
On December 7, 1999, the Naval Historical Foundation hosted a colloquium at the U.S. Navy Memorial to discuss the question of accountability for the tragic losses suffered 58 years prior. Join us as we revisit this issue ahead of the 80th anniversary of the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. This webinar will feature an introduction from former Naval Flight Officer Ward Carroll, after which former General Counsel of the Navy Steven S. Honigman will provide an overview of the numerous investigations and subsequent efforts to exonerate the Pacific Fleet commander at the time-Admiral Husband E. Kimmel. Former colloquium presenters David Alan Rosenberg, and Randy Papadopoulos will return as panelists to offer their commentary and respond to your questions about that fateful day in American history.
00:00 Preshow
10:28 Program Begins

[@markmorris5880]

How in the hell Short and Kimmel got hung out to dry while McCarthur got off Scott free despite THREE war warnings and still got his Air Force in the Phillipines blown to hell without any recrimination absolutely amazed me.....😠😠😠

[@andymckane7271]

Interesting question, but the answer has been public since publication of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur's book, REMINISCENCES, in 1964. MacArthur wrote, on page 113: "My orders from Washington were not to initiate hostilities against the Japanese under any circumstances. The first overt move in the Philippine area must come from the enemy." This order was in effect even after the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor had been hit. Why? The Philippines were a separate country. The Filipino people, like the American people, needed their own "first overt act" as the war warning messages sent to Short and MacArthur on 27 November 1941 ordered. One has to read through the "do/don't" instructions to fully understand the full context of these two War Department dispatches. I am not in the least bit critical of the manner in which the United States and the Philippines entered into World War II. You may find it interesting to visit my Facebook page, Pearl Harbor McKane. If you still have questions, contact me at: Andy McKane, P.O. Box 166, Maunaloa, Hawaii 96770. Alternately, you can email me at: [e-mail]. Andy McKane, 2136, Hawaiian time, 27 October 2022.

[@brucenadeau2172]

also macarthur did not park his plane wing tip to wing tip so one bomb could take outmore then one plane

[@livingadreamlife1428]

@@brucenadeau2172 Regrettably, neither Kimmel nor Short took necessary precautions against a bombing or a full scale invasion. Instead of following orders, they are and their staffs “thought” that an attack would first come in a more forward area. Their war prep in Hawaii largely consisted of preventative measures against sabotage hence the directive to park planes close together so they could be more easily protected. In hindsight, more should have and could have been done to protect against a bombing. A really string military leader always plans on what his enemy is capable of doing, not guess at what they think they will do. Kimmel and Short, along with numerous unpunished Navy and Army staff in Wash DC, either guessed wrongly or didn’t take a threat on PH seriously enough.

[@HitsTownUSA]

There is no way to know if any of their warnings were sent to overseas commanders in the far east. Japan’s offensive on the Philippines was a day after Pearl Harbor I believe and what MacArthur had at his disposal wouldn’t have been enough to stave off a massive invasion, let alone air raid bombardment from Japan’s Navy Strike Force.

[@deepcosmiclove]

@@andymckane7271 The Philippines were an unincorprated territory and commonwealth on the USA. They became their own separate country when Japan granted them independence in 1943.

[@bearowen5480]

Having read Summers' and Swan's "A Matter Of Honor", I remain convinced that both Kimmel and Short should have their retired ranks elevated by the President as recommended by Congressional resolution. It is clear to me from all the books I have read on the subject that both Kimmel and Short were indeed made scapegoats by a Washington military and political establishment desperate to "cover its tracks" for its own dereliction of duty that led to the Pearl Harbor disaster. It is long past due to have the honor of these two officers restored. Respectfully, LtCol J.D. "Bear" Owen (Ret) US Naval War College graduate

[@jeffmilroy9345]

I worked doing home maintenance for a survivor of the death march to Bataan who had been wounded by shell fire and restricted to a wheelchair all his life. He had become wealthy and was happily married. This intelligent adjusted level headed former officer indicated to me most vociferously that Roosevelt knew of the impending attack but let it happen so that the US would be drawn into the war. Imagine what would have happened if the US prepared Kimmel; counterattacked; and destroyed the enemy carriers.

[@jeffmilroy9345]

​@@dukeford8893 I doubt the enemy carriers would have launched full on air strikes against Pearl if they knew they had lost the element of surprise; and, that three U.S carriers and the entire Pacific fleet supporting cast threatened. The enemy was a long way from home or a supply base and were counting on shooting surprised "fish in a barrel". After all - they hightailed it before finishing the mission. All Kimmel had to do was get the big iron out of the harbor and pose a threat.

[@BK-uf6qr]

To bad the audio was bad for a good part of this. Disappointing couldnt enjoy the discussion.

[@obriets]

What a great tragedy that our political leaders aren’t held to the same standard of their subordinates.

[@markmorris5880]

Your picture of General Short early in the video is of actor Jason Robards who played Short in the movie Tora Tora Tora.....😒

[@GrumpyPop]

It was at this point I stopped watching the video…

[@andymckane7271]

At approximately one hour and twenty-seven minutes into this video you ask the question, "Who was the guy who may well have been more responsible for Pearl Harbor in terms of making some decisions?" You then answered your own question by stating, "Kelly Turner." I just discovered this "Second Saturday" video today with Ward Carroll's opening narrative. I wish I had known about this last December when you gentlemen were in conference. This month is the thirty-ninth anniversary of my starting an in-depth study of Pearl Harbor. I've read all 39-volumes of the Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings (I have not yet read all pages of the "exhibits illustrations," but I have them in my library). I've also made three extended visits to Archives II in College Park, the FDRL in Hyde Park, and to the Library of Congress. There are some major discrepancies between some of the documents published in those 39-volumes of PHA and documents my wife and I found at Archives II. I've written a number of essays over the past 20 years that were sent to the Clinton Administration and to NSA's Center for Cryptologic History. I hope to have a book manuscript on the subject of Pearl Harbor, titled CLOSING THE LOOP ON PEARL HARBOR, completed by 26 March 2023. I share the same birthday in March with Rear Admiral Isaac C. Kidd, but while he was born in 1884, I didn't come along until 1948. Unlike so many other "revisionists," my conclusion is that President Roosevelt wanted an Axis nation to commit the first overt act that would bring the United States into the Second World War. By late summer of 1941, it was clear which Axis nation would be delivering that first overt act. I believe the Pacific Fleet's commander did "defensively deploy" his ships, which is why the CV's were not in port on 6-7 December 1941; it's also why the BB's were for the most part moored side-by-side. This also explains why anti-aircraft weapons on those BB's were manned overnight on the weekend of 6-7 December 1941. Several days prior to that weekend, both Com14 and CinCPac circulated within their commands the Army's unified grid system. The Hawaiian war plans contained an "approach and departure procedure" for aircraft coming into and departing from Oahu (which Lockard and Elliott may not have known about). Some years ago, while still living in San Diego, I had several long discussions with Lieutenant Colonel Kermit A. Tyler. At the time of our discussions I had already reviewed all of Lockard's, Elliott's and Tyler's testimony published in PHA. After 2 or 3 days of these conversations, and in the privacy of his living room, Colonel Tyler asked: "What do you think happened?" The answer he gave me after I stated what I thought had probably happened at Fort Shafter's information center, was the finest compliment anyone has ever given me. Getting back to Rear Admiral, Vice Admiral and finally Admiral, R.K. Turner. Vice Admiral Dyer's two-volume biography of RKT converted me from someone who had long blamed Turner for Savo Island, to a true believer in "one of history's ablest military leaders." It's my opinion, based on many years of serious study and analysis, that "Pearl Harbor" was the result of deliberate strategy on the part of the United States. Ships were deployed to lessen American losses. Our three carriers were either in port, e.g. Saratoga at NAS, San Diego, and Enterprise and Lexington at sea. It is to be recalled that at the age of 42 in 1927, then Lieutenant Commander Turner became a naval aviator. Read Thomas B. Buell's biography of Admiral Spruance and consider carefully what Buell and Spruance said about Turner as head of the strategy section at the Naval War College prior to assuming command of USS ASTORIA (one of the 4 cruisers the allies lost on 9 August 1942). As you gentleman know, losses will always come with fighting wars. The strategist must consider potential and probable losses before going into action. I believe, and I suspect Admiral Turner believed, that our losses on 7 December 1941 were justified by the lives spared by the United States getting into war with the axis nations while it was to our advantage to do so. Unlike Vietnam, our people were unified. You gentlemen and everyone else can call me prejudiced should you wish, but I suspect the name "Terrible" Turner was probably applied to R.K. Turner by naval officers who suspected the Navy's director of war plans had something to do with why the Japanese Navy found our "obsolete" BB's in port at Pearl on 7 December 1941. Thus I agree with you that Rear Admiral R.K. Turner may well have been the American most responsible for the fact that select elements of the U.S. Pacific Fleet were in port that Sunday morning rather than at sea. President Roosevelt was looking for "the first overt act" against us. He tried to find a potentially far less costly overt act via OPNAV 012356 of December 1941. Admiral Turner did not believe the Japanese would take that bait. I believe he was correct. Pearl Harbor was the result. I never went any higher than E-3 HN while serving in the U.S. Navy from 24 August 1970 to 10 November 1971. But, after 39 years of serious study into U.S. entry into WWII, I believe our strategy that got us into that war---and brought us out of that war---was brilliantly conceived. I salute Richmond Kelly Turner, President Roosevelt and all the other Americans who contributed to the U.S. and Allied victory in World War II. Andrew "Andy" McKane IV, 1704, Hawaiian time, 27 October 2022. P.O. Box 166, Maunaloa, Hawaii 96770. (P.S. One of the chapters in my first book, not yet written, will be titled: CREATING THE NARRATIVE. I suspect that even back when I was an HN, at the age of 22 or 23, having had my intelligence officer tell me he didn't know where the Japanese aircraft carriers were on 1 December 1941, just to make sure they were not close to Diamond Head---which on clear days I can see from my office in my home---I'd have had ordered every operational aircraft out, in, say, a 270 degree arc, searching for the KIDO BUTAI. We knew of the creation of the First Air Fleet via ComInt on 10 April 1941. My wife found evidence of this at Archives II. According to Kimmel and Layton, after receipt of OPNAV 031855 (Dec. 1941), they didn't know what a Purple machine was, and thus didn't understand the significance of the Japanese embassies in Washington and elsewhere destroying their Purple machines. The DNI from 1939 to January 1941, Rear Admiral Walter S. Anderson, was dispatched from the Navy Department in early January. After Anderson's arrival on Oahu, he assumed duty as Commander Battleships Battle Force. He was thus one of Vice Admiral Pye's subordinates. Pye, for that matter, was "one of the best strategists in the Navy." I've read all his testimony. I know what he said about the "obsolete" BB's. I got hooked on Pearl Harbor history while living on Oahu as a Navy junior in the mid-1950's, and than again from 1959-1961. I once thought the revisionists on this subject were a bunch of nuts. But there were so many strange matters that needed to be cleared up; I finally decided, in October 1983, to change careers and become a writer. Fact is, those "revisionists" didn't do enough original research. Many of them probably had never served in the armed forces. A number of them probably had no respect for folks who serve in our armed forces. My message to all of you folks who do serve, who have served, and eventually will serve, is that you have my trust, respect and admiration. And let us not forget, you've got my thanks for your service! Andy McKane, 27 October 2022.) (P.P.S. On 9 December 2018, I presented Admiral John C. Aquilino a hardbound edition of ON THE TREADMILL TO PEARL HARBOR: THE MEMOIRS OF ADMIRAL JAMES O. RICHARDSON. I said nothing about Change No. 6 to the Orange war plan nor did I mention that Change No. 6 was omitted from the Rainbow 3 and Rainbow 5 war plans. The late VADM John L. McCrea probably knew a good deal about the absence of Change No. 6 from Rainbow 3, as he, in the rank of commander, was the officer messenger who delivered Rainbow 3 to Adm. Richardson and Admiral Hart. I've read and encourage you gentlemen to read McCrea's "secret" memo for CNO Stark written upon McCrea's return to the Navy Department. That memo is an appendix in VADM McCrea's USNI oral history. By interesting coincidence, Vice Admiral McCrea was keynote speaker at the September 1958 commissioning of USS SWORDFISH (SSN-579). I was sitting in the audience---in a wool suit---for that commissioning. My dad, then Commander Andrew McKane, MC, USN, was 579's medical officer. That's what brought us to Pearl the second time in 1959. Semper Fidelis! A. McKane IV.)

[@barrycole6294]

While I do not dispute the core analysis presented regarding Admiral Kimble, the bulk of materials suggests that Kimble was not afforded the same considerations or "fairness" that more politically connected leaders (MacArthur and Marshall) enjoyed. It appears that when the full record is weighed in the balance, it presents a picture of their culpability being roughly equal to that of Kimble.

[@johnfleet235]

MacArthur survived being held accountable for political reasons. Marshall's fault was not on the attack, but in not fixing the system of reviewing and disseminating Magic to the interested parties. The system actually broke down in the Spring of 1941, when copies of the decoded messages were lost. That should have told Marshall that a new process was needed.

[@markmorris5880]

For a good book on all of this and more read Edwin Layton's ' And I Was There' about his service in the Pacific including Japan before the war....pricey to get a copy but worth it!

[@johnfleet235]

Kimmel and Short were the two commanders at Pearl Harbor responsible for anything that occurs good and bad. The sources I have read indicated that Kimmel and Short felt they did not have the assets available to defend Hawaii. Nimitz was placed in charge of Hawaii after Kimmel. He knew he had to make do with the ships, planes and men that were available in 1942. But more then anything else, Nimitz brought imagination to the position of CinCPac. I think both Kimmel and Short did not consider that Japan might attack Pearl Harbor. I believe in one of the Fleet Problem exercises of the 1930s included an attack so they should have been thinking about it. I did read a book written by a former WW2 Navy pilot who met Kimmel in 1941. This pilot felt Kimmel was not actively thinking about carriers and what they could do. Yes, others shared the blame, especially Admiral Stark. Kimmel and Short were the two officers in command and therefore responsible for the disaster. The problem in Washington was they were focused too much on Germany especially the Army. They expected an attack by Japan, but Washington was thinking about South-East Asia not Hawaii.

[@davidkemp4605]

On

[@davidkemp4605]

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[@donaldgrant9067]

Since the brass back home knew that war was coming, I don't care where Japan was going to strike, why wasn't the battleships at sea that Sunday? For the purpose of a quick response to where ever the Japanese were going to hit? And that leads right back to Rosevelt.

[@robertscott8226]

Admiral Kimmel must be retired😮

[@richvedrus4171]

Common is there one war ever not a lie really we as humans have been scammed forever nothing has ever changed namaste