Sellars on the Inconsistent Triad

Wilfrid Sellars, "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," The Analytic Tradition, Spring 2017

[@demonstructie]

Yo D-Bone I don't know if you read these comments but I think your lectures are great, entertaining and valuable. My only gripe with the videos is the audio quality though, becomes a real pain after a while.. Why don't you consider using a lavalier microphone?

[@thattimestampguy]

0:00 The Layer Cake of Foundationalism 4:03 What conditions must be met for Sensation to be the Justification of Knowledge? 4:53 A. Sensings Entail Graspings B. Sensings are Not Conceptual C. Graspings are Conceptual 6:56 Defending Immediacy Theory 8:03 “In what sense” Sensing is Pre-Conceptual 10:03 Is it possible to speak about Pre-Conceptual stuff? 11:30 E!S 15:30 Fake Chalk! 17:10 Conflicting Accounts. 20:25 Input Registering of Events & Missing what you’re not looking for. 32:00 Perception depending on Lighting. 33:00 Same Sensation, new Grasping given more knowledge, different knowledge. (Words develop experience.)

[@beatleswithaz6246]

The fact that there is no color something is “normally” is a Buddhist insight. Even something as ‘direct’ as the color of something has no existence independently of everything else, no fundamental nature. If you cannot say of the visual appearance of an object that it gives any information about its existence independent of other things, how much can you say of the independent existence of anything?

[@Jwilk.o]

Prof: Good Students: No good

[@alias9025]

I thought they did very well given the subject.