Shattered Sword - the untold story of the Battle of Midway

Shattered Sword - the untold story of the Battle of Midway
With Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully
Part of Reanalysed Week on WW2TV
Battles at Sea and Naval History on WW2TV
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This show will examine primarily (but by no means exclusively) the Japanese side of the battle of the Battle of Midway. For their brilliant book my guests made extensive usage of new Japanese primary and secondary sources that have not been utilized in prior studies. These include the official Japanese War History series (Senshi Sosho), the translated carrier air group action reports of the four Japanese carriers involved in the battle, the comprehensive Japanese casualty figures found in Sawachi Hisae's groundbreaking volume on the battle (Midowei Kaisen Kiroku), and many others.
Their findings were based less on first-hand personal accounts and more on concrete operational data. This shift in focus has led to many important, and potentially provocative, re-interpretations of the conventional wisdom on the battle.
Jonathan Parshall's interest in the Imperial Japanese Navy developed in childhood. He has written for the U.S. Naval War College Review, Naval Institute Proceedings, and World War II magazine. In 1995 Jon founded www.combinedfleet.com, the foremost Internet site on the Imperial Navy, which currently attracts more than 50,000 visitors monthly.
Anthony Tully's interest in the Imperial Japanese Navy is long-standing and wide-ranging. His interest in Midway, in particular, was inspired by Walter Lord's Incredible Victory and its careful attempts to reconstruct events. This attention to detail mentored the pattern of all of Tony's subsequent art and writing. A frequent contributor to journals and periodicals on matters both nautical and topical, Tony has been published in the U.S. Naval War College Review, Naval Institute Proceedings, Naval History and Warship International.
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[@andrewtaylor940]

Not to question Parshall and Tully’s superb analysis. They’ve given us the best most forensically accurate view of not simply Midway, but of how the Kido Buttai operated. But dismissing Midway’s land based defenders as “Largely Ineffectual” misses an important detail. But it was something that would not become important until much later in the battle. The Japanese Strike group suffered somewhere around a 22-23% loss rate attacking Midway. Not simply planes and crews lost, but planes returned to their carriers too damaged to fly again that day. This is well within expectations so would not have made a huge difference, except for the way the Kido Buttai operated. Those 20%+ losses were almost entirely centered on the Nakajima B5N Kate Torpedo Bombers. Which had been doing level bombing against the island. They were shredded by the few Wildcats and by the massive amounts of AA Nimitz had sent to Midway. The way Kido Buttai worked was each attack wave was half the compliment of the 4 carriers. So for the wave 1 Midway attack Akagi and Kaga sent their Dive Bomber squadrons, and Hiryu and Soryu sent their Torpedo planes. With all sending Fighter escorts, and the roles reversing for the next wave. The 22% loss over Midway was concentrated almost entirely against Hiryu and Soryu’s Torpedo planes. (Midway really was a bad day for Torpedo Bomber crews all around). So those two carriers only had a tiny handful of working torpedo planes after the first wave. When Kaga, Akagi and Soryu were hit this left Hiryu still functional. But she no longer had her best weapon system. She had a bare handful of torpedo planes left. While those few remaining did press on to make an attack and hit Yorktown, Hiryu really didn’t have the strike capacity to take on all three US carriers very effectively. She had already lost her best most effective weapon system over Midway itself.

[@AnthonyBrown12324]

Very interesting point ; it shows once again how vulnerable torpedo planes were too. Maybe a price worth paying if the torpedoes worked ; in the case of Midway Island they were carrying bombs but the aircraft were slow and ungainly never the less .

[@thecappeningchannel515]

They are IJN fanboys.

[@mauricedevine7350]

Gentlemen. This is an interesting point of view, and a different perspective for sure. However, this discussion really reminds me of the type of conversation that I overhear in a coffee shop as a group of liberals myopically and passionately discuss the merits of gun control.

[@kentiffany8872]

War, chaos, unguessed chances, good luck, bad luck, making your luck. In the American civil war it was who struck first and who got the last swing. Amazing that it’s the same 80 years later with much advanced technology

[@reidawg72]

@@mauricedevine7350 He made great additional points that helped me more fully comprehend what transpired. If that type of comment annoys you ... why are you here?

[@matthewhinds1706]

I met Mitsuo Fuchida in 1967, although he was a missionary christian at that point in his life, he was open to questions and answered honestly. I met him at the chief petty officers club on Guam. the viet nam war was escalating. he was concerned about the american political industrial involvement that Eisenhower had warned about. On the attack on Pearl, he said that national patriotism to the imperial sentiment was intoxicating. He was later to realize that the war was a disaster and the cost and loss of life was unbearable. He admitted to the Chiefs that he did lead the attack on Pearl . He voiced his regret of his involvement. He also said that at the battle of Midway he was not directly responsible for any loss of life, and was gravely injured himself. He also mentioned that Admiral Yamamoto and his staff were concerned about his health and asked for advice as he had witnessed the catastrophe. MY father had invited him to speak, there were also several US Navy and Army Intelligence Officers in attendance. They spoke with him for a while, and I noted that he seemed perturbed. My father rescued him. He Said that he preferred to preach the word of God. BUT THAT THEY WERE MORE CONCERNED WITH AMELIA EARHART . I never had the good fortune to meet him again. Matt Hinds

[@gerardhunt1890]

I think shattered sword was one of the finest books about world war two in the pacific i've ever read

[@txtifosi]

It’s my privilege to know Tony Tully and eat lunch with him regularly. I got to proof read several chapters of Sword and this manuscript was clearly going to be amazing. The finished product really exceeded my expectations still.

[@nizguy]

This great book is now free on Audible.

[@michaelburke5907]

I agree. The land based bomber attacks forced the Japanese fleet into evasion mode, limiting their offensive operations against Midway. This allowed the U.S. carriers to close and prepare a strike window. Certainly made a difference of at least an hour, when the battle hung on minutes.

[@tonetriv]

One of the best episodes on WW2TV. In 2006 SHATTERED SWORD 'ruined' my childhood memories from Incredible Victory and Miracle at Midway 😊 Most importantly, it turned mythical heroes into humans, young pilots making critical in-flight decisions with history-altering consequences. When I fly my Cessna over water, navigation takes up so much of my bandwidth, and this book (and discussion) reminds me of how stressful it must have been to have to deal also with the search for the enemy, the attack, enemy fire -- on BOTH sides. Terrific research, substantial myth-busting, and some really good illustrations in this episode. Thank you Paul, Jon, Anthony. Met all my expectations. Wish you all could sign my hardcover, maybe one day we will meet up and talk some more. History education and narration at it's best!!

[@frankpienkosky5688]

is he'also saying that many more of the Japanese pilots actually survived this battle than had been previously reported?...

[@andrewtaylor940]

@@frankpienkosky5688 Yes. Actually most of the pilots and flying personnel survived. When the Carriers were hit, with the exception of Kaga, the pilots were quickly evacuated to destroyers. Japanese Naval training tended to be very job/ship specific. The pilots were all but useless for Damage Control, and were quickly gotten out of the way. Kaga was the exception as her senior officers had all been killed. And a Pilot was the most senior officer left aboard. Not that he knew it. What was lost at Midway was most of the experienced aircraft support crews. The mechanics, plane handlers, etc. The Pilots from Midway would almost all end up flying from land bases such as Rabaul in the Solomon’s. Where 98% of them would eventually die in the fight for Guadalcanal.

[@bearowen5480]

ToneTriv, good incites all, but in reference to your point about aerial navigation demands, I would mention one additional point. Those pilots and gunners had the additional stress of finding their way back to their carriers after completing their harrowing attacks. They had to rely on dead reckoning for their outbound legs as well as their return flights to carriers that had been steaming at 30+ knots in random directions for several hours. A relatively minor navigational error would mean missing the fleet entirely and ditching at sea. Many did exactly that, either from fuel starvation on the "flight to nowhere", inadequate navigational training, or simply from bad luck. This point is largely lost to history because of unfamiliarity with the complexity of navigation by the historians who write about it.

[@michaelmichael4132]

Mistakes by both sides are the brightest common thread running through Pacific naval action in 1942, but cryptanalysis and code-breaking turned out to be worth plenty of aircraft carrier strike forces.

[@your_royal_highness]

And the goddamn cheapness of prewar funding for torpedo testing led to the incredible frustration of sub crews shooting off duds for the first year or more of the war. Just awful. Drives me nuts everything I read something about that issue.

[@bearowen5480]

Because of criminal lack of effectiveness of American torpedoes, torpedo planes and US submarines played no decisive role at Midway. Nevertheless the US submarine campaign against Japanese merchant shipping was starving Japan of food and critical raw materials by 1945. An absolutely critical part in winning the war was played by Joe Rochefort's Station Hypo code breaking efforts. The fact that Nimitz met with him first thing every morning confirms that. Lockwood's submariners and Rochefort's code breakers did not receive the recognition they deserved, because their work was done clandestinely behind a wall of secrecy, simply out of sight, out of mind. Now their stories can be told and the recognition they deserve can be awarded appropriately. Bravo Zulu!

[@tonetriv]

I must add one more comment. This particular episode was structurally robust. There was a disciplined synopsis, and repeated references to the battle timeline. All the charts and tables had time stamps. The battle revolved around a single morning, so time flow is critical in analysing it. Jon and Anthony themselves wrote exquisitely about it in their book: "Like blood from a wounded patient, time-the lifeblood of decision and action-had been oozing out of Kidō Butai all morning, slowly and inexorably." This episode stood to benefit from the disciplined synopsis and time-based recounting of key events. History, after all, is all about timelines.

[@frankpienkosky5688]

I'd like to know more about the aftermath...did the American carriers stick around or head back to Pearl?...except for the Yorktown, of course...a jap cruiser was sunk on day two...where did those attacking planes come from?....and what about all the downed pilots?....how extensive was the effort to recover them?...and how successful was it?

[@Conn30Mtenor]

@@frankpienkosky5688 Enterprise and Hornet supported the Guadalcanal operations and tangled with the Japanese carriers again at The Battle of Santa Cruz. Hornet was sunk by a Japanese submarine and Enterprise severely damaged, requiring a lengthy repair and refit on the East Coast. The Japanese cruise sunk was the Mikuma which was caught in a pursuit by aircraft from Hornet.

[@billisaacs702]

I first heard of this book from Dan Carlin while listening to his "Supernova In The East" episode 4 and I must say I liked the analogy he drew to the true pace of the battle which I assume he took from "Shattered Sword". He likened it to the Americans trying to strike a match and the Japanese trying to blow the match out; strike-strike-strike-strike-strike and finally it lights. As he points out, the Japanese found themselves under nearly constant attack from just after 7:00 AM local time until the pivotal attack at about 10:20 AM, and I can see now that as he says, this work by Jonathan and Anthony awakened him to the true tension and unfolding of the fight that day. I for one am comforted by the idea that the United States Navy didn't require some deus-ex-machina or blind luck to accomplish what they did at Midway. In my mind it comes down to good intelligence, a willingness to trust the commanders in particular Nimitz, and excellent flying on the part of the Navy pilots. That take on events, while a very positive one, may not have been the most effective message for morale at home at that particular moment but it is nonetheless true. American will and bravery in that instance ruled the day.

[@flhxri]

I've always been interested in the battle of Dutch harbor. I have been looking for a list of what ships were there. My grandfather was severely injured in the battle. He was serving on an oiler that was there at the time.

[@scottgrimwood8868]

An excellent show! I have heard Jon speak several times on Midway and the level of research that he and Tony did for thier book is amazing. I hope they consider producing a revised version of Shattered Sword to add all the new things they have learned since the original book came out.

[@francisbusa1074]

Thank you gentlemen! Such a trove of knowledge of the Pacific war. My dad and his brothers all served in the USN in combat. Thank God they all managed to come home in one piece. However 3 of them received the Purple Heart.

[@jamesthompson8133]

Good to have you back Jon it’s not the same without the shirt and the wallpaper. Y’all are absolutely great!!! Wonderful show guys!!

[@ChristopherNFP]

From Australia in reply to Jon's comment about Australian's prioritising Kokoda over anything else. Firstly - New Guinea was in 1942 an Australian territory. Equivalent to Puerto Rico today or Hawaii in 1941. The bombings of the Australian mainland in February 1941 made us see the approaching Japanese forces as an existential threat. Secondly, Kokoda attracts a mythology because of the proximity in time to the fall of Singapore (and the capture of most of the Australian 8th Division) and the sinking of HMS Repulse and Prince of Wales. I think the more nuanced and sophisticated Australian student of military history would consider the Battle of Milne Bay more significant than Kokoda. Thirdly. Australians can and do remember both Coral Sea and Midway as both crucial/critical battles, and that our freedom was dependent on the result of both of those battles. IMO those actions underpin the strong unwavering military alliance between the two nations and their shared commitment to freedom. Coral Sea Day is commemorated each year. See the Australian perspective published here this month: kzbin.info/www/bejne/eXS2hpiYg7aWppY

[@richardbennett1856]

Excellent points, mate. Australia being isolated was real, even if invasion of the mainland was improbable. The veteran units were in the middle east and Africa and performed heroically. But the A Team wasn't home, Prince of Wales and Repulse bombed and sunk, Singapore falls, Java, PI, Burma are invaded all in a two month span. Dark days.

[@petestorz172]

I commonly recommend both "Sword" and Symonds' book. Symonds devoted about half the book to the progress of the war leading up to Midway. It's kind of the view from 20,000 feet. "Sword" dives deep into detail, and there's a lot to learn that mattered in the battle. It's kind of a waves-level view, going from the wargame table to the last ships departing the scene.

[@bearowen5480]

The discovery and analysis of the Japanese air ops logs as well as the B-17 reconnaissance photos is an interesting development in the studies of Midway. It unquestionably gives the lie to Fuchida's account. As to why he would attempt to obfuscate what really happened I would say that the embarrassment of the Japanese veterans of the Pacific war over their defeat ran very deep. The loss of face to them was more profound than the loss of lives and materiel.

[@user-tf1rq9vg1j]

Playing devil’s advocate here. If I am not mistaken, was not Fuchida still recovering from an appendicitis operation and was painfully trying to get to the bridge just to at least wave his colleagues off. If he didn't make it in time, he could have asked a crewman what was happening and the crewman, attempting to make everything look 'peachy' for this officer told him what he wanted to hear. So Fuchida believes him and writes it down in his book. I could be wrong but it would explain his side while not being an outright 'Lie'.

[@sirboomsalot4902]

@@user-tf1rq9vg1j The problem is, Fuchida never claimed that they were about to launch the strike until well after the war, after he found out that the Americans thought they were. This could either be lying, or his memory was failing him in his later years

[@Fulcrum205]

​@@user-tf1rq9vg1jFuchida is notoriously full of sh!t. He contradicted his own testimony he gave to the US Army right after the war.

[@stevej8005]

Great discussion of the doctrine, tactics, mistakes and myth busting around the Battle of Midway. Highlighted how both sides were coming to grips with the relatively new concept of carrier warfare. When you read the book (in association with John Lundstrom's The First Team) you realise how much of the technology was new (ish) and still had teething problems.

[@model-man7802]

My dad was at Coral Sea and Midway.

[@steel5791]

I am always left breathless by your shows and the guests you, so perfectly, choose. Whether for the background that gives depth to what I 'already knew', but more for the new angles that force me to rethink what I do know. Thank you for your presence in the historical mix.

[@WW2TV]

Wow, thank you!

[@lewistrott417]

Always playing catch up with these episodes because life is busy. This was really exceptional.

[@briankorbelik2873]

It's interesting to me anyway, that the first book of military history that I read was one my mom had. It was Walter Lord's 'Day of Infamy. This would have been about 1966 or so, when I was about ten. Thank you veey much for posting this video. I've read just about everything that I could lay my hands on regarding WW2. I agree that 'Shattered Sword' is the best book about the Battle of Midway.

[@ThomasWIck-ms5tj]

The authors seem to not be sure what struck or hit in front of Kaga's Bridge. According to the book, "Never Call Me A Hero", about Lt."Dusty" Kleiss, Enterprise SBD pilot. He states he scored and was credited with a hit on Kaga. He also stated he was armed not only with his heavy bomb but also with two 100 LB bombs and those struck in front of the Bridge.

[@chipsawdust5816]

I watched Parshall on Drachinifel's channel before I saw this. Great add to have Tony there, although Jon talks a lot more :) Thanks for bringing this out for those os us who have had long-held belief in the history as it's been published for so many years and now have a new perspective. To me the most critical bit, and maybe they think so too, was seeing the number of airplanes NOT on the Japanese carriers when the B-17s flew over. Great stuff.

[@Conn30Mtenor]

1:12:00 That is a very good point, Paul but I can take that a tad further. The men of the USN were so MOTIVATED towards revenge against the Japanese. This comes into play for the rest of the war- the sting of Pearl Harbor lent every action of the USN an extra edge of motivation. One glaring example is the defense of Taffy 3 against the IJN Force A; a group of DD's and DE's taking on battleships and cruisers. I have to throw out the point that the IJN officers who lined up behind Fuchida had a less than noble motive- to make their force look better at the expense of Nagumo- who died on Saipan and never had a chance to clear his name.

[@philbosworth3789]

A great presentation from Jon, followed by a great Q&A from Tony, Jon & the sidebar crew.

[@steventoal6594]

I never considered the thought that both USN and the I JN were just still cutting their teeth in Carrier Warfare operations . It was very interesting to see the IJN Carrier ops logs had actually survived ..that was mind blowing.! Then the B-17 photos of all four of the IJN Carriers with empty decks I always only saw just one in the books and videos.! This was a great examination of that battle .

[@frankpienkosky5688]

mostly just zeroes landing, refueling and re-arming....

[@captainbinghamton1319]

Tully and Parshall are Pitt Bulls when it comes to truth and history. Well done men.

[@ritaloy8338]

This video needs to be watched many times to fully grasp a full understanding of this video. I have watched this more than once, and I will definitely watch it again and again. Excellent job without a doubt.

[@WW2TV]

Glad you enjoyed it!

[@Littlefish347]

Read Battle of Midway by Shiro Mori published 2012. Unfortunately no English language version available. The book contains a lot of information not covered in English literature on the battle. e.g. Admiral Nagumo issued a notice to his fleet that no enemy action was expected for the day in the early morning of June 4. Also, although not directly related to the battle, the Eternal Zero by Naoki Hyakuta will be interesting reading. It is a novel about an ace Japanese fighter pilot. Not only is the plot engrossing, but the details of WWII from the Japanese perspective were quite accurate to the best of my knowledge.

[@bobkonradi1027]

When talking about Scout Plane #4, (1:00 poinr of the video) other authors say they've taken the time to retrace what would have happened if it had taken off on time, and they conclude that in that event the flight plan for it would never have carried it over the course of Yorktown. At the time that Yorktown was spotted, the flight of #4 would have had it at another point far away. The conclusion of some authors is that Yorktown was spotted only because of the launch delay to #4.

[@korbendallas5318]

Parshall and Tully say the same thing.

[@sailordude2094]

Jon is a captain without his support staff, lol. Thanks for the great objective military history!

[@Kamaole3]

I read this book about 4 years ago. It was so well done that I immediately reread it.

[@frankpienkosky5688]

Is he saying that B-26 that allegedly made a suicide dive on the Akagi actually survived?

[@andymckane7271]

Superb interview and commentary! Thanks to the three of you for a remarkable program on the Battle of Midway. Andrew "Andy" McKane, Maunaloa, Hawaii.

[@williamstall4420]

Just watched Jonathan on Drachinifel's youtube vid. Excellent!

[@alandean3472]

Fantastically researched episode and a real eye opener , will definately be reading the book to get the full story .

[@livingadreamlife1428]

Great show, excellent questions that provoked additional thought on how the aftermath Midway affected the war in the Pacific.

[@carlstephenson8901]

Outstanding show! I found this by accident. I'm a huge fan of WWII in the pacific and especially MIdway. I've read Craig Symmonds Midway book 3 times. Have to get Shattered Sword. I'll have to go back and look at your previous posts. Thank you!

[@Mark-df9fu]

This was a superb podcast Paul, I read the book on your recommendation, Tony and Jonathans research is amazing.

[@nicholasconder4703]

One question I would have for Parshall and Tully is whether they have definitive proof that Soryu was scuttled, given that the two survivors who were aboard the ship when she started her final plunge never reported explosions. I can see it for the other three carriers, but the lack of witnesses confirming this does raise questions.

[@currentbatches6205]

Suggest you read the book. There is likely no definitive proof, but Parshall and Tully do not leave a lot of room for doubt. I would ask if you have any reason to claim otherwise..

[@nicholasconder4703]

@@currentbatches6205 As I mentioned in my response, there were two survivors from the Soryu's engine room who indicate they made it to the main deck shortly before the ship sank. First, they mention that the water level was rising in the bilges where they took refuge for a while. Second, they don't mention one or more concussions and water spouts that would indicate a torpedo hit. Most accounts I have read of American ships being hit by Japanese torpedoes equate the effect to being like an object being shaken in the mouth of a bull terrier. People get thrown off their feet and have limbs broken by the impact. The tow survivors do mention a jolt, but that could be the result of a sudden change in the centre of mass as the stern started to go under and massive flooding started. Indeed, all they mention is that they made it on deck, they felt a jolt and the ship began to go down by the stern, and the two men jumped off into the ocean and watched the bow lift out of the water before the ship when under. It certainly does not sound like the effect of the impact of several Long Lances striking the carrier. Unfortunately, we are missing the log of Isokaze, and eyewitness accounts of torpedoes actually being launched and striking the ship. The accounts that we have are incomplete (from the two survivors) or are second-hand accounts (Kanao was informed by crewmates). Although this is good circumstantial evidence, we don't have proper first-hand accounting. Given the wrecked ship was taking on water and had suffered a hit that damaged a boiler room, it is possible that it did sink on its own rather than being scuttled. It would be good to get verification from the wreck itself, which should lie within about 10km or so of Kaga and Akagi.

[@currentbatches6205]

@@nicholasconder4703 You are welcome to argue with whoever is willing to waste time; not me. Read the books and STFU.

[@nicholasconder4703]

@@currentbatches6205 In response I would say two things. First, there is no reason to be rude. I am entitled to an opinion, as are you. Second, Parshall and Tully wrote their book because they found discrepancies between images taken of the Japanese carriers during the morning and accounts written by Fuchida and others about the battle. Had they accepted your advice "Shattered Sword" would never have been written! Most sources up to the release of their book indicated that the Japanese were just about to launch their strikes when hit by the dive bombers. Parshall and Tully provide ample evidence in the form of the carrier flight deck operations records that this was not the case. All I am saying is that it would be nice to have corroborating evidence apart from some eyewitness accounts that have been shown to be somewhat dubious (i.e. holes caused by torpedoes in the Soryu's hull or the missing pages from the destroyer logs). It would also be nice if the group that found the wrecks of Kaga and Akagi would release detailed descriptions of what they found, and perhaps artist's depictions of the wrecks.

[@currentbatches6205]

@@nicholasconder4703 You are welcome to argue with whoever is willing to waste time; not me.

[@user-xj6rr3yv8q]

Just read the book, best book on WWII aviation I have read.

[@strelnikoff1632]

Paul I've seen one or two of your episodes but I'll be watching a lot more. This show was excellent not only the two authors but your astute handling of your managing of questions. Full marks.

[@WW2TV]

Thank you, and please share the word about WW2TV on social media

[@Bob.W.]

I think Tameichi Hara's book has a good discussion of the dissension in the Japanese Navy (and Army) about whether to strike east or west, and how the strike on Midway was adopted.

[@YYCRS]

Keep them coming Paul . Another great episode and conversation !

[@markherman50]

Amazing interview, while I used this book for my wargame Empire of the Sun, the discussion summarized the situation brilliantly. Fantastic. What Empire of the Sun does does per your comment is ties it all together.

[@VenturiLife]

These were battles on a massive scale, lacking the technology that we take for granted today, with relatively basic, fixed tactics. There was a big element of chance. The Japanese had had a lot of luck, momentum and a first-mover advantage if you like earlier in the Pacific, and they lost that forever at Midway, and the Battle of the Philippine Sea sealed the fate of the Japanese navy, their naval airpower, and therefore the war in that theatre.

[@bretrudeseal4314]

Guadalcanal campaign was where the Japanese lost the war. It is the campaign where we ground them down in a bloody battle of attrition that the Japanese could not win.

[@thomasbernecky2078]

Nice to actually see the co-author of a great book. The absent Jon has become a celebrity, so this is pleasing to hear. And Jon usually hogs the conversation anyway.

[@WW2TV]

Jon rejoined a few minutes in

[@dave3156]

Paul another impressive show I hope you are able to bring these two back again. Great job as usual. Glad I joined up today!

My late father would have enjoyed this book that I am gonna buy soon, he was really passionate about the WW 2 and the Battle of Midway. Good job!

[@TheVigilant109]

Great presentation. Wonderful attention to detail and the arguments are supported by evidence. Thank you

[@mizaru5413]

I remember "Bombs over Tokyo" as being the most uplifting thing to happen in the early part of the war. I remember one of my first memories dropping things while yelling "take that Tojo!"

[@frankpienkosky5688]

the Hornet was actually abandoned at Santa Cruz...and later found still afloat by the Japanese who considered taking it as a war prize...before ultimately deciding to finish her off

[@BK-uf6qr]

I’ve watched most of these shows. Paul does a great job. I wish the us v them was toned down. I’m referring to the US v. Other Allie’s. Even on the BBC, I hear the same tone. What’s odd, American shows do not preface WW2 documentaries stating that the British leaves out the US contributions. The Allie’s fought together, needed each other or would t have won. Let’s honor the truth and leave out the subtle divisiveness.

[@jimplummer4879]

What an excellent presentation !

[@icewaterslim7260]

I think that the A6M Zeke's usually-non-functional radios were a huge factor in the absence of their CAP for the arrival of VB6 and VB3.

[@manilajohn0182]

Although lack of quality radios was undeniable a factor, at least equal reason was the emphasis of Japanese fighter pilots on the attack. Harada Kaname alluded to this mindset himself when he said that prior to Midway, he always saw the role of the fighter pilot to be that of attack- but that the battle taught him the value of patrols.

[@Rocketsong]

The A6M2 Zero also only held 60 rounds for the 20mm. They were almost certainly Winchester on their main armament.

[@rsrocket1]

I just realized that Fuchida was very likely below deck this whole time because he was recovering from appendicitis. He very likely was not on the bridge of Akagi with Kusaka, Genda and Nagumo. Hate to badmouth the dead but maybe much of Fuchida’s narrative was based on conjecture on his part. The Japanese projected that torpedo planes were a severe threat because of their excellent Kates and Long Lance torpedoes which is probably why they expended so much energy chasing and attempting to destroy all torpedo planes even after dropping their ordnance. The bottom line is that Midway was incredible news to the USN morale and probably shortened the war by only a couple of months. The US was focused on “Germany First” and could have beaten Japan by simply starving it to death but there was the threat of the USSR so fortunately for Japan in a roundabout way, time wasn’t completely on the side of the western allies and they needed to conclude the war as soon as convenient after defeating Germany.

[@grahamgillies6907]

This wonderfully detailed description of events has certainly helped understanding the significance of the Battle of Midway and strategic situation in the South West Pacific at the time. I do note the historic focus on the Kokoda Battles and subsequent battles of the Northern Papua coast. This is of course is understandable though it does somewhat over look the strategic significance of the Battle of Milne Bay on the eastern tip of New Guinea. This Battle was the first time the Japanese were defeated in a land battle, thus haulting the possibility of a direct Japanese invasion of Port Moresby and Australia.

[@darylroughley4846]

Just got hold of their book today, thanks for all your work guys, very interesting.

[@gizmophoto3577]

I’ve heard Parshall and Tully elsewhere, and this adds even more. You’ve gained a subscriber. Thanks!

[@WW2TV]

Welcome aboard!

[@user-xf1lh1go3q]

one thing everyone seems to forget is that the val dive bombers had to be re-armed as well, because they were armed with armor-piercing bombs which are not ideal for attacking land targets. do they had to be armed with high explosive bombs. that meant all the japanese carriers were involved in the re-arming.

[@sirboomsalot4902]

Shattered Sword makes the argument that the Vals wouldn’t have had to rearm at all.

[@keithfosterlgsowner1232]

In regard on the torpedo planes drawing the zeros down. and unable to get to altitude. With the torpedo planes rear gunner the Zeros would want to do full throttle attacks to give the gunner the least time to react. The main problem would be ammo as the cannons are good for two bursts and the machine guns probably five. So the Zeros would be on the way to land when the dive bombers showed up.

[@fehner27]

I'm currently reading this book. I'm only at the beginning but excited to dive into it.

[@tomhutchins7495]

What an incredible pair of guests! Wonderful insights, and I loved the accounts of unpicking what was really going on. It's very similar to the problem we have with the Axis-Soviet Front where one set of memoirs was written under Soviet censorship and the other by people trying to distort their role in the Nazi regime. It's only in recent years with historians really interrogating the primary data that a new picture is emerging.

[@MarvinStroud3]

Thank you so much for making this program available. I watched it and then bought the book for my Kindle. I am really enjoying reading history at such a depth. It is more like an exciting novel than an old dates and names history book. Cheers from Texas.

[@WW2TV]

You are so welcome!

[@agesflow6815]

Thank you, WW2TV.

[@ED-es2qv]

I imagine the Japanese expected their aircraft carriers to be nearly impervious to Americans until they weren’t. The rest of their military efforts to date had been fantastically outperforming everyone. I don’t think they were afraid of getting jumped-they we’re hoping for it.

[@tomt373]

Their carriers burned and blew up beautifully thanks to their design which closed in their hangers below the main deck.

[@frankpienkosky5688]

he also doesn't really touch on the misgivings among the Japanese senior staff that the element of surprise may have been compromised...something they failed to relay to Nagumo

[@frankpienkosky5688]

at that point in time everything in their military was geared toward offense...with little thought to defense....

[@AnthonyBrown12324]

yes ; they were over-confident , with some good reason . Considering the allies ; ineffectual performance up until this time . Clearly their carriers were very badly designed to sink , ( burn )after a few bombs hit them . Were the fire control systems adequate ? It seems in their mania for attacking ; they overlooked defensive measures ; even such basics as armour plating on their fighters .

[@davidnemoseck9007]

Don't get to watch a lot of these videos. Need to make more time to watch more of this channel. Awesome video! Thanks!

[@FilipDePreter]

It is nice to get a balanced view, which this presentation provides.

[@brianschwarz]

Excellent work. I love these great discussions!

[@OTDMilitaryHistory]

Another excellent episode!

[@mtygardsurgimesh]

Great Job Gentlemen! I have always loved stories surrounding this battle and I appreciate all your work. Gotta give a shout out to Dusty Kleiss and his book "Never Call Me A Hero"...it's a great account of his participation in the battle. Strong Work!

[@WW2TV]

Thanks Mark

[@philipryan25]

Excellent thank you

[@oneofspades]

Giants of the field. This is education that is entertaining. What it is suppose to be..

[@Pam_N]

Exceptional program and learning experience.

[@rpestess]

Great program Paul! I was on one of your Normandy tours with Battle Bus in 2003 which was awesome. This is the first time I have seen you online. Thanks!

[@WW2TV]

Well, welcome to the channel, you have another 750+ WW2TV videos to watch if you liked this one

[@lastboyscout6437]

I read their book (Shattered Sword) a few years after it was published and it was a real eyeopener.

[@frankpienkosky5688]

the "flight to nowhere" reflected badly on Fletcher...in that not only was it ineffective it actually involved something of a mutiny as...one by one... the pilots abandoned their leader and tried to get back to their carrier or make for Midway...many didn't make either...not the sort of thing the navy would want to make widely known...

[@ThePrader]

Can someone speak to the quality of damage control on IJN carriers in 1942 ? I ask as a former DC Centeral LT aboard both the LPH-7 and the CV-62.

[@neilwebber7749]

This is a wonderful presentation of a really good piece of revisionist history - Shattered Sword has been on the list to buy for a while and this has rocketed it up that list. Thank you!

[@WW2TV]

Glad you enjoyed it!

[@kemarisite]

I have no problem with correcting Fuchida's memoir. I've seen similar nit picking about Guy Sajer's memoir (The Forgotten Soldier), but if we keep in mind that neither is a historian and is writing a memoir, then clarifying certain points should offend no one. Fuchida provides a vivid recollection of the lead Zero taking off from Akagi just before the bombs hit, and as a memoir that's useful and characteristic of eyewitness testimony, but the kodochosho makes it clear this was the lead Zero of a CAP chutai, not of a strike package. I'd like to see more evidence and a tighter case before saying, "Fuchida lied" as opposed to "Fuchida's memory mislead him".

[@WW2TV]

It's not just Fuchida's memoirs though, he carried on sharing details he knew were incorrect for pretty much his entire life

[@kemarisite]

@@WW2TV would we then say that Belton Cooper lied in "Deathtraps" and all of the subsequent interviews (I've seen a few) he gave for the rest of his life where he said objectively incorrect things that he knew (or should have known) were untrue? What I'm getting at is that "liar" carries a moral condemnation, promoting a visceral counter reaction, that is not present if we simply say, "That's not correct and here is why".

[@WW2TV]

@@kemarisite I absolutely see your point and i guess it's a language issue. I think in Cooper and Fushida's cases they carried on saying things even after it had pointed out that they were incorrect.

[@manilajohn0182]

It's clear enough that Fuchida suffered from serious memory issues after the war. His memoirs exhibit a number of memory lapses regarding issues of even a personal nature. That Fuchida related what he understood to be accurate is as likely as not. Since Fuchida was accurate regarding aircraft launching from Akagi when the dive bomber attack began, the number of aircraft which attacked Akagi and the number of hits on the ship, there's every likely hood that he conflated the launching of Akagi's CAP with the launching of the strike which he knew was being prepared. While I'm not saying that this is in fact the case, I am saying that it's entirely possible. In fact a good case can be made that the authors went after Fuchida in an attempt to lend credence to Senshi Sosho- the so- called "Japanese Official History". I say so- called because Senshi Sosho is not an official history at all, despite statements made in the west. It was neither commissioned nor endorsed by the Japanese Government. The contents of each of the 102 volumes are the stated responsibility of the authors and the Japanese War History Office.

[@Fulcrum205]

​@@kemarisiteBelton Cooper was a liar. Most of Deathtraps is pure fiction.

[@MegaBloggs1]

Ceylon raid was easter sunday in April 1942-Japanese admiral Mikawa(victor of the battle of savo island) sank most of the shipping in the bay of Bengal with cruisers-both nugamo and ozawa were not thorough enough at ceylon

[@denmikseb]

I somehow just stumbled on this channel today. It is among the best!

[@WW2TV]

Welcome aboard!

[@user-me4yr6vt3v]

Read “Islands of Destiny” by John Prados. It describes the battle of attrition in the Solomon Islands that broke the back of the Imperial Japanese Navy.

[@smelton7]

Great show, finally some truth out there on this war.

[@frankpienkosky5688]

luck was clearly a factor...but the two sides were actually closer to equal as Midway itself functioned as a fourth carrier...the real difference was how much better the Japanese were at this sort of thing while we were still mired in a learning curve...

[@timmeinschein9007]

Post Midway: As bad as the IJN was hurt, remember what they "knew": 1 Lexington CV Sunk, and 1 Lexington (Saratoga) CV Heavily Damaged, ALL 3 Yorktown Class Carriers SUNK (Yorktown Sunk at Coral Sea and the other 2 Sunk At Midway. The 2 remaining USN Carriers are in the Atlantic, both are smaller and less combat capable and CV-4 (USS Ranger) is already obsolescent in regards of what is needed for Carrier Combat in the Pacific, and CV-7 (USS Wasp), as I've already noted, was "built on a budget" and has marginal protection from torpedoes and bombs.... PLUS it they are Both In The Atlantic. I believe this is why they went after Guadalcanal (as an island it will be an "unsinkable carrier"!). However, in reality, there are still two Yorktown CVs available (USS Enterprise CV-6 & USS Hornet CV-8) plus the CNO (Fleet Admiral King) has already ordered the USS Wasp (CV-7) was already enroute to the Panama Canal for transit to the Pacific.... In Military Circles the Japanese thinking is correct, based on what they think were good (and true) facts, but is also known as an Oops!

[@futuresonex]

Fantastic discussion!!!

[@WW2TV]

Thank you!

[@bertarndt9953]

Thanks. Very informative.

[@robbrown4621]

Great show. Would love to see more on the sea battles of 1943, 44, and 45...

[@frankpienkosky5688]

they attacked with nine carriers at Philippine Sea...we responded with fifteen!...times had certainly changed by then....

[@MrArtbv]

Midway proved that NO 3rd strike at Pearl Harbor was a spectacular mistake...

[@Conn30Mtenor]

"Shattered Sword" sold extremely well- no wonder Jon does these different KZbin channels- free advertising.

[@jamesthompson8133]

Great job man!John is right midway sent electricity to the sausage grinder known as Guatalcanal.

[@jerrycegelske7968]

The B-17s and other Midway based planes didn't hit the carriers however, the carriers had to maneuver to avoid the bombs dropped from those planes. This prevented the carriers from launching or recovering their aircraft, thus giving the US more time to figure out what to do. As someone mentioned, time was blood to the IJN and they were bleeding all the time.

[@manilajohn0182]

That is almost entirely inaccurate. While generally speaking, the 1CSF was under attack for much of the morning, the time spent by carriers in radical maneuvers which would have prohibited rearming or spotting was very small. This was even less of an issue for CarDiv2, because Hiryu and Soryu didn't have a torpedo rearming issue. Moreover, Soryu's executive officer stated that Soryu's strike was on the flight deck awaiting the order to launch when the ship was attacked- while Kaga's air officer stated that Kaga had what amounted to approximately 20 aircraft on her flight deck.

[@kemarisite]

@@manilajohn0182 correct. What those strike packages did accomplish was to force the CAP fighters to expand their ammunition and then land to reload (and possibly refuel). These early A6M fighters relied on the 20 mm cannon for their firepower, because without them they had WW1 level firepower with just two rifle-caliber machineguns, and those cannon only carried 60 rounds per gun, enough for about seven seconds of firing. It is not advisable to spot and warm up air raft on a maneuvering carrier, but it is far from impossible.

[@manilajohn0182]

@@kemarisite Yes, you're right. It's clear enough that the need to land and re- arm the CAP Zeros delayed the spotting of the strike against the U.S. carriers (which Nagumo stated was to launch at approximately 1030), and that there was no strike five minutes from launch. The time frame in which these aircraft could have been spotted for that strike varies between carriers. It is the time frame between: a) the last landing time of an aircraft on that carrier, and; b) the time at which that carrier was attacked. These time frames are; Akagi 1010- 1026, Kaga 1005- 1022, Soryu 0950- 1025, and Hiryu 0910-... From 1010- 1026, Akagi had the time to spot 6-7 (likely 6) Zeros on her flight deck and begin launching them. Eyewitness statements supporting this are Lt. Cmdr. Best and Lt. Cmdr. Fuchida. Fuchida very likely conflated the launch of these CAP fighters with the launch of the strike which he knew was being prepared, as he was accurate regarding the number of aircraft which attacked the ship and the number of hits which were made. From 1005- 1022, Kaga had the time to get approximately 20 of the 27 aircraft of her strike (27 Kates and 3 Zeros) to her flight deck via three elevators. This is per her senior surviving officer (her air officer, Lt. Cmdr. Takahisa Amagai), whose postwar statement is not mentioned in "Shattered Sword". How many of these were spotted is a good question, but probably very few of them were. From 0950- 1025, Soryu had the time to spot her entire strike of 18 Vals and 3 Zeros on her flight deck. This is per her senior surviving officer (her executive officer, Cmdr. Hisashi Ohara), whose postwar statement is not mentioned in "Shattered Sword". From 0910 until the beginning of the attacks on the other three carriers, Hiryu had the most time of any carrier to spot her strike. That it 'was' spotted can be established from the following. The dive bomber attacks on the other three carriers ended at 1030. Hiryu's retaliatory strike of 18 Vals and 6 Zeros began to launch at 1050 (they were all in the air by 1058). If Hiryu's strike had been in her hangar when the other three carriers were attacked, she could not have spotted, warmed up the engines, and begun launching 24 aircraft in just 20 minutes. Photographic and filmed interview evidence clearly shows that CAP fighter sections could and often did spot and launch from abreast carrier islands- and could have done so while these strikes were being spotted. The amount of time spent by the carriers maneuvering radically enough to halt the movement and spotting of aircraft during these time frames was minimal, to say the least.

[@robertbufkin5568]

Thanks!

[@WW2TV]

Thank you

[@greendragon4058]

Oh how I wish I found your channel earlier. I would have loved to be in this life chat. I remember watching Midway in grade school and then we watch Tora Tora Tora. My mom would not let us watch it in the house I didn't know why until she told me that she lost three uncles on the Arizona. I guess since then I've always been fascinated with the Pacific War. I have this book I also have it on audiobook what a great book of great information this book is so impressive on the scale of investigating and picking out things myth vs truth. As you see, I am in playback land. This is so wonderful to hear from the authors I absolutely loved this book and I've kept it my Kindle. If anybody else is wondering whether to pick this up or not I highly suggest that you do it is very well-researched. Thank you so much for this episode I really enjoy hearing from the authors of the book. Tell them thank you very much even though it's a year late for me Beaver very enthusiastic full of knowledge but they couldn't get out fast enough shows me that they really love what they do. I have two questions 1 being have you done an episode on the Asiatic Fleet? I find the fleet to be very interesting because they held everything together until the ship. It could be rebuilt and some of the ships repaired they had a tough time of it. And to have you ever heard of the Nazi Titanic there is such a thing and I read a book not too long ago about it I found it very interesting. When it came out I looked at the title and I went no way oh, well it's stuck out my mind so I ended up buying it and it was really well research it was an interesting project that didn't get too far but it was out there. Thank you again for another great presentation this one was super awesome because I love the Naval History of WWII❤ I even know some of the people that painted those pictures interesting

[@WW2TV]

Hi, we haven't done a show specifically about the Asiatic Fleet, but its come up briefly in discussions

[@koeberle]

Awesome presentation.

[@waynesmith8431]

A tremendous book!

[@roberthohlt469]

Liked this very much.

[@WW2TV]

Many thanks

[@Rocketsong]

Jon is such a fantastic presenter.

[@PalleRasmussen]

He is also a very nice guy.

[@brianford8493]

Brilliant analysis.......this is how its done folks.........made my day ta!

[@CJ-ib2jy]

It was a huge win for the Americans. The USA had as many aircraft but much of their aircraft was inferior and their torpedoes were terrible. Their 1942 torpedoes often failed to detonate or detonated too soon. If a torpedo fails to detonate, then it is recorded as a miss, even if it was on target. The US pilots were less experienced.

[@frankpienkosky5688]

it took quite awhile to correct those torpedo problems...even the subs had problems...

[@egonzinc]

Great show! Have been looking at a lot of KZbin programs on Midway and have seen Jon in various of them. Good to see Tony for the first time! Fantastic and clear presentation. As far as I know I have not seen one item regarding the code breaking events that were so important in Midway. I recall many years ago, first reading on the ULTRA secret, and it specifically mentioned that the British were VERY upset when it came out that "code breaking" was a big part of the Midway battle. The rationale then was that the Japanese Navy were using some of the 4 cypher German naval Enigma machines, so if the US had broken at least some of the messages using those machines, the Germans could be alerted that some of their messages were also compromised! The British, of course, had gone to great lengths at making sure that their intercepts were kept secret. To the point of not alerting the civilian population of a bombing target etc. Was there any truth to this? Were the Japanese using the Germans Enigma machines?

[@julieneidert7810]

this was a great book. Well done

[@WW2TV]

Glad you enjoyed it!