Square Pegs for Round Holes: When it's not a bad Admiral but the wrong job for that Admiral

[@g.d.hamann9812]

Re. Kimmel: Sometimes it's wrong place at wrong time, sometimes it's politics and sometimes it's both. As pointed by others, Kimmel gets the frying pan and MacArthur (who actually had the warning of Pearl Harbor and really screws up despite the warning) gets the Medal of Honor!

[@PalleRasmussen]

Everyone would have failed in Kimmel's job. And he happens to be supplanted by arguably the best Admiral since Nelson. Drach just had an episode on Rosso.. Roszo... the binocular-tossing Admiral.

[@duncanward1718]

I know you're asking about Admirals who could have been better used, but the name that immediately sprang to my mind was Trafford Leigh-Mallory who litteraly wrote the RAF's book on Army Co-Operation. Rather than A.O.C 12 Group Fighter Command he should have been turning the Army Co-Operation force into the equivalent of the later 2nd Tactical Air Force.

[@Yandarval]

Dowding, Park et all. Would have loved to be able to shunt TLM to do just that. As they could not. Command of 12 Group was the best they could manage, to get him as far enough from the Battle of Britain as practible. TLM is sort of like the Beatty of the RAF.

[@wierdalien1]

Keith Park got shafted,

[@Yandarval]

@@wierdalien1 Yep. As did Dowding, if not quite as much. However, the silver lining is Park was eventually able to be sent to Malta, and sorted the air part of that out, within weeks of arriving.

[@wierdalien1]

@@Yandarval yes, indeed

[@troymcmahon488]

Admiral Du Point at Charleston. Du Point was ordered to attack Charleston with a fleet of ironclads, which was never going to work, and he was sacked after this attack failed. Overall Du Point was good commander and he was superior to his replacements(Foote/Dahlgren). Also, looking at his record he would have served well in and administrative role after the war.

[@abhoren13]

RN adjacent, but please do Takeo Kurita. His actions during and after Samar are perplexing. Would he have been better in a different position? It seems like you want an admiral in that position who will follow through on the sacrifices that have been made to get him there

[@Buddieboy1957]

Great video, especially on Kimmel, Doorman, and Lutjens. Dr. Clarke covered some issues i hadn't thought about considering the circumstances each faced.

[@dvpierce248]

I'm not sure what the better use would be, but I've always gotten the impression that Fletcher was shuffled off to shore duty unfairly after Midway.

[@davidthornthwaite2149]

Cunningham's background was in destroyers and light forces. Was his ability to adjust to big ships a reflection of the interwar RN's great size, and Lutjens' inability a reflection of the German navy's diminishment and consequent lack of opportunity? Another benefit for the British of Versailles.

[@petehall8381]

Looks like a good year for naval history coming up. Wilhelm Marschall probably could've done more useful things than command a desk in France after he sank Glorious, Acosta, and Ardent.

[@leighrate]

Every time you bring up your PHD I just give you a massive cheer.

[@Buddieboy1957]

I gave Dr Clarke a big cheer, too. Never let anyone tell you that you will never make it in any field. Go for it. If you don't make it, at least you have tried. However, more often than not, you'll find the impetus to prove them wrong will get you there.

[@MrBenjaminowns]

Love the video, excited for the year of leadership ! remember to say like and subscribe in your intro !!!!

[@canuckled]

Would Admiral Pierre Villeneuve have been better placed somewhere other than playing fox and hound with Nelson?

[@WALTERBROADDUS]

Who names a kid, "Husband?"🤔

[@oriontaylor]

A mother named ‘Wife?’

[@WALTERBROADDUS]

@@oriontaylor that must have been rough as a kid? The only guy I know who had a rough life as a child was that NASCAR driver. His family decided to name him, Dick Trickle... 🤦🏽‍♂️

[@derekmcmanus8615]

There is a persistent rumour that a parish priest in Derry Northern Ireland point blank refused to christen a child Beyonce Coyle a few decades back

[@WALTERBROADDUS]

@@derekmcmanus8615 not a bad name for a girl?

[@WALTERBROADDUS]

Interesting "what if" you bring up. ABDA with Philips instead of Doorman?

[@stuartwald2395]

Mine are bigger than yours.

[@canuckled]

Or just give Doorman Prince of Wales to command from

[@indplt1595]

Realistically, the primary issue in each of these cases seems to be having the wrong men in positions of ultimate leadership. Admiral Raeder is probably the best case--most military officers in his high station (as overall commannder of the Reichsmarine/Kreigsmarime) serve a maximum of four years, such as his predecessor Hans Zenker, but Raeder remained in command for over 14 YEARS, and proved that he probably should have been forced to retire long before the outbreak of the Second World War when he relieved Wilhelm Marschall for the crime of...sinking HMS Glorious. Lutjens was in an improper command directly due to Raeder's goofy decision to relieve Lutjens' predecessor for winning a battle, and this multiplied exponentially once Raeder's planning turned disastrous in 1941. Exercise Rhine was a very odd operation just in terms of forces--it pretty much exemplifies why a weaker power should always concentrate its forces, particularly its capital ships. Bismarck, Gnesienau, Scharnhorst and Tirpitz should have been operated first and foremost as a single unit, particularly at the outset of Operation Barbarossa. Ending the Siege of Leningrad in 1941 or 1942 might have been possible if every 11-inch and 15-inch armed German warship had been deployed for the task, and the Arctic convoys would have been much more perilous if Archangelsk and Murmansk faced a Kreigsmarime battleship blockade from bases in occupied Norway. In regards to the Americans vis-a-viz Admiral Kimmel, the command structure was a chaotic mess in 1941 and the first half of 1942. Kimmel was effectively CINCPAC, and probably should have had a direct superior as CINCUS/COMINCH in Norfolk or Washington, DC in December 1941. Instead Stark was CNO, who unlike Admiral Leahy did not have FDR's ear and by custom was equal, not superior to CINCUS in stature. It was only after Admiral Leahy was recalled into service from his ambassadorship in Vichy France that the U.S. Navy's leadership became functional again--see the disastrous effect of the Joint Chiefs under Arnold, Marshall and King before FDR appointed Leahy chairman of the bickering three. This almost certainly led to the creation of ABDA Command, at the insistence of the Americans despite Eastern Fleet having been activated in 1941 specifically for that purpose. Herein comes questionable British leadership, as General Archibald Wavell was appointed commander of ABDACOM despite the theater being primarily naval and air dominated. This probably was not helped that the Secretary of State for Air was the ineffectual Liberal politician Archibald Sinclair, and the First Lord of the Admiralty was the impotent Labour politician Albert Victor Alexander, who was denied access to secret information or the War Room--strikingly similar to Kimmel's lack of information on 7 December 1941, but Alexander remained in place from May 1940 to May 1945. If the RN leadership had more sway, the logical naval commander, Phillips' successor Geoffrey Layton or Layton's successor James Somerville, would have taken command from the available flagships HMS Indomitable or HMS Revenge. Then again, Admiral Pound and First Lord Alexander were overruled when they opposed sending HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse to Singapore without carrier cover, so perhaps the real lesson was the UK Prime Minister should not be wearing so many hats, including First Lord of the Treasury and Minister of Defence. Issues of rank also played major role in these disasters. USAAF chief Hap Arnold was promoted to Lt. General on 15 December 1941, meaning no USAAF commander could rank above Lt. General Walter Short a week earlier, let alone General Douglas MacArthur (MacArthur, despite ranking as a Lt. General in early December 1941, had previously served and retired as a four-star on account of service as Army Chief of Staff from 1930-35, and as such acted like he outranked George Marshall). This left the USAAF flat-footed when the Japanese struck, particularly on Oahu as Short had even reassigned USAAF personnel to guard warehouses in Honolulu after standing down AA gunners and grounding all USAAF aircraft the day before the Kido Butai struck (in an act of absolute insanity, Short ordered all aircraft under his command placed wingtip to wingtip to protect against outside sabotage when any pilot will tell you the way to protect against sabotage is to FLY AND DISPERSE THE FIGHTERS). Not to be outdone, MacArthur froze on 7 December 1941, allowing the Japanese to catch the USAAF on the ground AGAIN in the Philippines 10 hours later. This is why claiming access to information would have changed Pearl Harbor might not stand up to scrutiny. The U.S. needed officers that were naval aviators or USAAF pilots in command on 7 December 1941, as demonstrated by naval aviator Ernest J. King in 1938 when he launched two successful mock attacks on major USN bases--first Pearl Harbor followed by Mare Island. This followed naval aviator Harry Yarnell striking Pearl Harbor with Lexington and Saratoga at 8 am on Sunday, 7 February 1932 from the North...for over nine YEARS, the USN and USAAC/USAAF KNEW the danger of a dawn air attack on Sunday from the North against Wheeler Field and Pearl Harbor. Yarnell himself was following the model set in 1928 when Admiral Reeves struck Pearl Harbor from seaward with Langley, leading to the fact Patrol Wing 2 was searching vigorously for Japanese carriers on 7 December 1941...South to West to East of Pearl Harbor, not North, as that was the responsibility of the USAAF. Admiral Reeves' raid was prompted by Hawaiian Department commander Major General Fox Conner, who feared a naval air attack on Pearl Harbor was a possibility, and advocated more aircraft carrier construction after Reeves demonstrated that the fear was logical. As MacArthur, Yarnell and Reeves were recalled to active duty after retirement, the fact Conner wasn't was an odd choice. Had Conner been recalled to active service in 1940 or 1941 and (ideally) been given command of all U.S. Army forces in the Pacific, there is a distinct possibility the USAAF would have hammered the IJNAS as they struck Wheeler and Clark, and vigorously defended Pearl Harbor and Cavite.

[@ibex485]

This video got me thinking... What was the career path of the RN officers who command the two current carriers? Hope I remembered this correctly, but I think Alex previously mentioned that historically RN perferred carrier captains with carrier air operations experience - usually aircraft observers. (But it's been so long since the RN operated any fixed wing carrier aircraft with more than a single seat, the only roles for RN air observers must be in helicopters or land-based aircraft.)

[@ducthman4737]

All the best for the New Year to you and those who kicked you out of the kitchen.

[@timandellenmoran1213]

Look at Miles Browning, Halsey's chief of staff

[@joesheridan95]

Good idea. Seems to be a good Officer overall, but not for a command-level position on a carrier. Yes, mistakes were made under him but i don´t think that he can be made fully responsible for them. Yes, he was the chief of staff..... with enough people serving under him who could have said something when they thought that something is going south. Things like telling the Pilots where she ship will most likely be when they come back from their strike are a thing of such high importance that there have to be multiple Officers, NCO´s and Crew man who should get one question into their mind: "Why haven´t i gotten those coordinates from my higher ups?", same goes for the Pilots: Why haven´t they asked for those coordinates. Same goes for finding out if those coordinates are possibly wrong? Such things should be checked and rechecked and when someone finds out that they are wrong, then this mistake has to be brought up towards the Admiral to find a sollution as soon as possible. Either by moving to those wrong coordinates or breaking radio silence if that isn´t possible. Browning did mistakes, but my opinion is that they shouldn´t have lead to real consequences, but they did and that´s speaking for a cultural problem threwout the whole command staff under him. Mistakes are human and systems that include humans have to be designed in such a way that those mistakes are corrected before something bad happens.

[@TheBrad574]

I strongly disagree that pushing yourself through challenges out of vehement disagreement with someone's negative opinion, i.e. spite, is hardly petty. You are motivated; you are channeling the machine spirit of Warspite. Unrelated note, i hope you have beaten your aunt for the subscriber increase challenge.

[@indplt1595]

Sorry Dr. Clarke, but chalking up the woes of Admiral Kimmel to politics is just...simplistic. Politics was the primary reason Kimmel's career was finished, but it was inevitable because U.S. Federal law, not chicanery. The U.S. military has operated on an 'up or out' system for hundreds of years--either an officer is promoted or retires because otherwise it obstructs the promotion flow; only so many flag officers of certain rank were authorized by Congress--until Kimmel retired, that was a Rear Admiral slot that could not be filled by another officer, such as Captain Willis Augustus Lee. Moreover, the senior military ranks in the U.S. military are inherently political, because Senate approval is required for all senior officer appointments. Both of these became a problem on 28 January 1942, when the Roberts Commission presented its findings to Congress. Chaired by Supreme Court Justice Owen Roberts--appointed to SCOTUS by Herbert Hoover in 1930--the commission that bore the associate justice's name placed the responsibility for Pearl Harbor squarely on Lt. General Walter Short and Admiral Kimmel. Getting Senate approval for further assignments for either Short or Kimmel was essentially impossible, because an independent commission (chaired by a Supreme Court Justice appointed by one of FDR's greatest political foes) had made both officers radioactive. There is also political reality--FDR's party lost three Senate seats in the 1940 election and would lose eight more in the 1942 election. Had Kimmel not retired in 1942, would the Congressional losses been so great the U.S. military would have faced a Tommy Tuberville stunt 80 years early? (look no further than the Republican-controlled Congress of 1947-49 to see how willing the political opposition would have been to throw a spanner into the works in the 1940s).

[@wierdalien1]

So give him another vice-admiralship. Still insane to lose a decent officer when you need them.

[@indplt1595]

@wierdalien1 Again, this requires Senate confirmation--three and four-star ranks are 'temporary' (in reality the issue was/is U.S. veneration of George Washington prevented the U.S. military to elevate any officer to a permanent rank of Lt. General/Vice Admiral or higher while that officer was in active service), so putting Kimmel into a three or four-star position after the Roberts Commission would be untenable.