The Atlanta Campaign, Part 2 | The Battle of Resaca, Part 1 | Animated Battle Map

[@ramona14220]

I live in Ringgold Ga. I have been to Chickamauga and my sister has a home on the bottom slope of Ringgold Gap but I have never been to Resaca.

[@ArmenianBishop]

After the Confederate defeat at Chattanooga, Cleburne fought a successful delaying action at Ringgold Gap (November, 1863), and pursuing Union forces withdrew to Chattanooga, where they made camp. The Army of Tennessee then positioned itself at Dalton.

[@travisbayles870]

My great great grandfather and my great great great uncle both of the 32nd Tennessee Infantry CSA Browns brigade Stewarts division fought at Resaca

[@charlesbuckalew4246]

Could've swore Browns brigade was in Stevenson's division.

[@BlueOpinion]

I wonder how many maps were changed because of the Civil War and the constant altering of land.

[@bamf5549]

Thank you sir

[@CAROLUSPRIMA]

As I recall, Thomas wanted to take a much stronger force to get in Johnston’s rear at Resaca. This was vetoed by Sherman who instead sent his and Grant’s favorite, McPherson, who promptly blew the assignment. If Thomas had gotten his way the outcome of the campaign would probably have developed very differently. So much for the “defensive-minded” Thomas. Thomas wanted to stop Johnston then and there and had the plan and the troops to get it done. But Sherman, either fearing giving Thomas the limelight or at best fearing a Johnston attack, and his protege McPherson fell into a fit of timidity just when they should have been attacking.

[@liberalman8319]

You’re right.

[@MegaFlipWilson]

The Confederates held the peaks of the mountains and observed every movement the Federal Army made, how would Thomas have gotten a larger force through Snake Creek Gap without eliciting an appropriate response from Johnston? And remember, the road through Snake Creek Gap was an unimproved wagon road. You could march troops through, or you could march a wagon train through, but not both. It would take days to widen the road enough to bring the wagon trains along with the troops.

[@CAROLUSPRIMA]

@@MegaFlipWilson The same way McPherson got his divisions through the gap. Before he wimped out.

[@MegaFlipWilson]

@@CAROLUSPRIMA McPherson got a handful of divisions and no wagons through the gap. If you want to storm and occupy Resaca against the entire Confederate army, you might need some wagons unless you want to arm your troops with pikes and just let them get stabby. :D And that's ignoring the fact that Johnston didn't send a blocking force to the gap because McPherson's force was so small it looked like a raid, and Johnston wasn't sure if the target of the raid was Snake Creek Gap or Rome.

[@aaronfleming9426]

@@MegaFlipWilson I can't recommend highly enough Albert Castel's treatment of the debacle at Snake Creek Gap, but in brief: McPherson got 18,000 men through SCG without being noticed, because the rebels were *not* on every mountaintop observing his movements. His appearance near Resaca was an absolute surprise. Why couldn't Thomas have done so with 40,000? It was Thomas' plan in the first place; he knew the route better than McPherson did. By the time Johnston realized what was going on, it would be too late , and Thomas would be astride the railroad, with plenty of time to bring up his wagons to resupply his men.

[@oldtruthteller2512]

I didn't know Loring was there. One of my 'favorite' rebel officers. I believe he was also there at Champion Hill in Mississippi. I think he escaped into Mexico at the end of the war.

[@aaronfleming9426]

After the failure at Snake Creek Gap, Sherman also failed to put forces across the Oostenaula south of Resaca to cut Johnston off; he even failed to place interdicting artillery fire on the railroad bridge, which was within range, as Johnston withdrew.

[@thearizonatreasurehunter2313]

I love this history! Thanks for another great video!

[@CarolinaThreeper3534]

Thank you for these great videos

[@jyienger]

Is the same image of Johnston the only one available of him? Would love to see a series on just images of each iconic individual.

[@HistoryGoneWilder]

@@jyienger his are very limited.

[@Jbird1988]

Bro watching this channel grow into what it is. You are that guy. Keep it coming

[@HistoryGoneWilder]

@@Jbird1988 thank you so much!

[@Skipper.17]

Thanks

[@HistoryGoneWilder]

I can't thank you enough for the support.

[@Skipper.17]

@@HistoryGoneWilder just keep up the great work. As an Australian the American civil war really interests me.

[@HistoryGoneWilder]

@@Skipper.17 I'm so glad to hear that. And will do.

[@astralclub5964]

Sherman proved he could tramp wherever he wanted in the Confederacy!

[@MegaFlipWilson]

Looks like you haven't had time to read Dave Powell's Volume 1? McPherson was never ordered to storm Resaca. He was ordered to break the railroad and fall back to the mouth of the gap. Storming Resaca was a fever dream fabricated during a Sherman episode of manic optimism when he heard the news that McPherson was nearing Resaca. As Dave points out, even if McPherson with his 9,000-10,000 effectives had somehow managed to storm the hastily erected breastworks against the 6,000 Resaca defenders, there was still the issue of the fortification that dominated the city, two divisions of Confederates were marching south and would have arrived by the morning, and Johnston's entire army could have simply retired on the Federal Road while Polk's arriving army could have held Sherman north of the Oostenaula. There was no eventuality in which Johnston's army could have been destroyed at Resaca. The strike through Snake Creek Gap was intended to force Johnston out of his fortifications at Dalton, and that's what it did.

[@aaronfleming9426]

Taking Resaca was Thomas' original plan, which clearly would have worked. Sherman was right that a once-in-a-career opportunity had been missed, but he was wrong to place the blame on McPherson, to whom he had given too few men and zero cavalry. The strike through SCG accomplished what Sherman intended, yes; but it accomplished far less than what it could have. It was Sherman's first, but not last, major failure to crush the Army of Tennessee.