The crew flew as they were trained, and everyone died. American Airlines flight 191

[@CoDWiiPS3Gameplay]

Thank you for covering this terrible accident Captain. I actually now work for United myself as a Ramp Supervisor here at O'Hare. Some days I drive out to the memorial to remind myself about the realities of the industry we are in and why safety must NEVER be compromised. Great video, keep up the good work sir.

[@GoatzombieBubba]

Mayday tv show did a good episode on this accident.

[@realSethMeyers]

Thanks for your work, I fly exclusively United through O'Hare all the time.

[@InvertedFlight]

My father used to fly twice a week from Chicago to LAX and back. He did so for years and never once was so much as 1 minute late for flight. He was a businessman, and always on time. Except one time when a board meeting kept him late. When he got to the gate, he looked out the plate glass window and saw his airplane climbing out. Then it rolled and dived into the ground. As 7 year old I remember my mother frantically calling my ante in Chicago as they tried to find him. In those days no cell phones. it was several hours before we were able to finally get word that he had for first time in his life missed the flight and was safe. When the event was over, I went outside and played and forgot all about it. Until a few years ago when I asked my dad about that flight. I never understood the effect that it had on him. He turned white stared into the distance and just mumbled. "My board meeting went late...." I could sense it was the end of the conversation.

[@ronrogers]

Thanks for sharing a great story!

[@kimmer6]

He was very lucky. I was booked on AA191 but changed my plans that Friday morning. It was a very busy Memorial Day Weekend. Everything was booked. As an Engineer, I was always very thorough in everything that I did, but this time I didn't cancel my flights thanks to an extremely busy and stressful day. Just before Covid hit, my friend in Los Angeles went to an entertainment industry party for singers. He used to live in Chicago. When the homeowner mentioned that his dad passed away in a plane crash in Chicago, my friend found out that his dad had been called to board AA191 from the standby line. Maybe he got my seat when I didn't show up for the flight. That still bothers me. I had been in standby lines to board airplanes all over the world maybe 25 times. When my name was called, I always felt like IA just won the Lotto. I'm certain that the person who got my seat was overjoyed. My parents and brother always changed the subject whenever I mentioned my near miss. I was 26 back then, 70 now. My parents and brother all passed away. My friend lives in their home now. The subject of AA191 and his days in Chicago come up often.

[@eric-o4t1d]

Maybe someday he will reconcile it in his mind. It would mess with my head.

[@3414mercury]

@@HyenaEmpyema exactly what part?

[@Sreybk]

Wow. Extremely lucky.

[@levelninenerd]

Captain Rogers, my late cousin was the Maintenance Manager for World Airlines at the time of this incident. He told me the maintenance crew literally banged the engine assembly into the wing mounting assemblies because of a forklift handling error, then immediately looked for physical damage and did not "see" anything wrong. They continued on with the maintenance procedure as "Time is Money" drove the process...

[@paulbrogger655]

My dad was an engineer with Douglas, And I vividly recall reading the accident report in his Aviation Week magazines. A telling case study of the "swiss cheese model" in action. (As I recall, the engine rotated up bedore tearing off, in the process crushing the hydraulic lines, which happend to be routed along the forward face of the wing spar.) Devastating accident.

[@olebluemoon958]

I was hired by American and had a mid June 79 training date when this happened. This accident was one of several incidents that caused the public to lose faith in the aircraft and accelerated it's replacement. A few years later I flew FO on the DC10 and this incident was well covered and trained with updated procedures. never flew Engineer/FE on the 10, went from 727 FO to DC10 FO. At American we had "2 stripers", AKA PFE or professional flight engineer. These were hired on not as pilots but engineers only. At one point they were given the option of upgrading to a pilot position or forever flying as engineer. These guys might have come from another airline under as take over of another airline, don't remember. Funny story about the cockpit camera. The view in the passenger cabin showed the two pilots and the center consol/throttles but not the engineer. On takeoff the pilot would stand the throttles up, push em up to approximate setting. and the engineer would fine tune the epr for takeoff power. All the cabin saw was the arm of the engineer leaning up to set the power. Well this 2 striper put on a glove of a hairy gorilla hand up to his armpit, and the public saw what looked like a gorilla as a crewmember on the throttles. Rumer was he was fired for it but who knows. Like you said for various reasons the cameras were removed including the liability from some lawyer in the back using the video against the airline and crew. Thanks for the video.

[@michaeldavenport5034]

A difficult video to view since I spent 34 years in aircraft maintenance as a jet engine mechanic. I believe quite a number of DC-10's were found with damaged hardware with other airlines from these maintenance procedures after they were grounded for inspection? You covered it all on this one.

[@georgerosen5425]

A few years after this accident I was working for a corporate aircraft maintenance company and an aircraft from Chicago came in. The chief pilot for that company had a co pilot with him that I had never met. Over lunch he explained that his copilot was a pilot with American Airlines. The co pilot, whose name I do not recall, began to talk about some of his training as it related to this flight after I asked about it. He explained basically the same story as you did without the electrical and hydraulic details and said that he had flown this same situation in the simulator and that he was able to bring the aircraft around to a successful landing. He too said the crew performed exactly as they were trained. Thank you for bringing this information out to refresh my memory.

[@redwingdetroit9671]

Ron you have a way of making complicated simple. Thank you for that. I was a student/part time parking attendant at loyola medical center and at that time the security had us leave all gates open in readiness for the expected triage, all medical personell shift change was not going to happen, and no one ever showed up, reality set in then.

[@tommcintyre2963]

Very well done and excellent research. I was at ORD at that particular time and place. My crew was on a short layover when the accident happened. We ran to the windows to observe a large column of smoke and fire. We took off only 2 hours after and flew right over the accident scene. Not a pretty picture. As time would tell, Forklift Joe and Langhorn became infamous folks shortly after. I still remember Langhorn in his flight suit directing the investigation. As an airline, we at NWA were very concerned as we had the same engine coupling on both our DC-10-40's and all of our 747's. We changed our flight operation slightly and of course we never used a forklift. Joe Leonard was a product of NWA. He used cheap whenever if suited him, one of the reasons he ended up at American. I agree with you on the stick shaker being of most importance. Our revised procedure would have us fly to the stick shaker and stay there. As I remained vertical for 36 years with NWA, I eventually became chief accident investigator on the 747. Do not reinvent the wheel again, ever. NICE job on presentation..................

[@kbalch]

Many years ago, my chief pilot was the former AA captain who flew the accident airplane into ORD. He said that there had been no perceptible change to the airplane's flying qualities despite the pylon having clearly been working itself loose for some time. Sometimes, it's just not your day.

[@kimmer6]

The pilot, Captain Lux, was not scheduled to fly AA191 that day. The scheduled pilot had some kind of problem and Captain Lux filled in for him that afternoon. The AA Crews always had good things to say about him.

[@thekill2509]

In early 2012, I flew SWA from PHX to ABQ. I had a wing seat on the right side of the airplane. Looking out the window, I could see a couple of rivets missing from a panel on the top of the wing, this panel was directly above the engine pylon and in line with the leading edge of the wing. As we taxiied out to take off, I noticed the engine bouncing around a lot more than normal and that panel was flexing open and closed along the leading edge. On takeoff, we had some turbulence and I noticed the engine really bouncing and that panel was really flexing. I shut the window and took a nap, figuring that if we made it to cruise, we would make it the rest of the way into ABQ. We did. When we landed I opened the window and notices there were more rivets missing on that panel. I stopped by the flight deck and told the crew, the FO said "well, we'll have to take a look at that!" in a voice that reeked of "another dummy thinks the airplane is broke". I had to run for my connecting flight, I am pretty sure SWA MX must have caught the issue at some point before it become critical.

[@dx1450]

It was the gremlin from that Twilight Zone episode starring William Shatner. If you'd opened the window shade he'd have been looking in on you.

[@biscuitag97]

Ehh he probably took it seriously and at least had someone inspect it. If you noticed rivets popping thats pretty serious. The pilots lives depend on the airplanes too.

[@nightshift5201]

Ron, a Tristar pilot told me that would have never happened on an L1011 because of inertial sensors on the slats. If they retracted too fast a brake would hold them in position. Douglas later modified the slats so if they lost hydraulic pressure they would keep their current position.

[@BNU30C]

I had never heard about the electrical systems being divided side to side in the DC-10 before. Thanks for providing some great insights. This is a bit more damning to the DC-10 than the more mainstream coverage.

[@cennsa140driver]

In 1972 as a 12yr old my family and I flew out of LAX on a DC-10. On rotation the right engine started banging and shaking like an out of balance washing machine on the spin cycle. They shut it down as we climbed out as you could see we weren't climbing very fast. They went out over the ocean, dumped fuel and landed with out incident. Thanks pilots! I'm glad the pylon was not compromised beforehand. We got put on a 707 for our return flight. That was my only opportunity to fly on one.

[@77leelg]

My mom’s luggage from a previous AA flight likely ended up on that flight. The airline never found it as it probably ended up on a flight from PHX to ORD. She was in Phoenix for my college graduation. Fortunately it was just her luggage. This was such a horrible and preventable tragedy.

[@who2u333]

Thanks for reviewing this one. I only remembered the 'broken bolt' part.

[@abbasrizvi9389]

I remember this accident like yesterday. I grew up in CHI and just got home from school and my mom was watching the ABC news report of the accident. Really a huge impact on me. I loved airplanes. I also remember the the cockpit camera on a flight from LGA to ORD on a DC-10 in 1987. That was cool.

[@amp888]

13:32 "The night before he was to be disposed, he committed suicide."

[@GaryL3803]

I would bet that the mechanics that performed that engine install that had the same thoughts. The mental anguish must have been overwhelming. What a tragedy all around.

[@ronrogers]

One of the many reasons I am not an attorney!🤣🤣

[@Brian-kl1zu]

@@ronrogers Lol. *Oxford Languages*, (for my own information; may as well share it.) Deposed: (1) remove from office suddenly and forcefully. (2) testify to or give (evidence) on oath, typically in a written statement.

[@AaronHarberg]

Ron, would love to get your take as an experienced pilot on the skill it took to get 2 planes down safely. The 767 Air Canada Gimli Glider, and the American DC 10 Windsor incident flown by Bryce McCormick. Nerves of steel in both cases. Thanks for your channel, love watching your stories.

[@ronrogers]

A whole bunch of skill!

[@CapitalismSuxx]

I love that you call it "this presentation" 🙂

[@dutchflats]

I was flying freight in and out of ORD at the time, was there the morning of the accident and the night after.....so tragic! Excellent review and explanation of the event. I believe the Captain's name was Walter Lux and had just picked up this trip for another pilot who needed off.

[@marcmcreynolds2827]

"The crew was not cited in this accident" The NTSB report did however note in two places that EMER PWR could have been used to restore power for at least thirty minutes, had any of the crew twisted the knob. My (nonpilot) guess is the captain's thinking was along the lines of "Something bad's happened, but we have control, are climbing, and the FP has most of his instruments. Let's not mess with what's working. Climb to 3000 and then sort things out." The FAA did not require slat locking since DAC was able to demonstrate (in cruise flight) that that even with the slats on one side completely retracted the aircraft remained controllable. Apparently that was considered a worst case, presumably backed up by an FMEA of dubious pedigree. Perhaps not all of the flight regimes were examined? I witnessed several of the FAA's simulator tests, with one crew after another rotating through. In a room a few floors above the MBS was a simple model airport, with a TV camera suspended above the runway painted on a very large table. Crews adhering to 191's control choices (i.e. the flight manual) were causing the camera first to tilt and then to point down while only a couple of feet off the model runway (at which point the run was over). Those flying the "we know what's happening" test cards flew away (camera rose a few more feet into the air and the run was over).

[@stevenrobinson2381]

Worked with the son of the F/O on AA 191 at YX in the late 90s.Those guys tried-when the L/H leading edge slats retracted due to the damage done to the actuating mechanism when #1 departed the wing stall speed went up 7 kts.

[@rogerrees9845]

Such a tragedy..... Thank you for explaining it in such detail....Roger..Pembrokeshire

[@timoconnor3360]

Thank you for mentioning Mr. Marshall, I think he is often forgotten.

[@peterhodgkins6985]

Thanks for the explanation Captain Rogers! I was doing a considerable amount of flying back then, mostly on American, sometimes on DC-10s, and often went through Chicago from San Diego on my way to New England. The previous disaster with the PSA crash in 78 which I saw the aftermath of from a few miles away, and flight 191 sure had me rattled for a time. My brother who was a pilot claimed that 191 could have been saved, but it seems unrealistic to me. (Although Tim was usually correct about such matters!) I now understand much more clearly why my brother thought 191 had a potential solution... Although it still seems like there was a lot stacked against them. Training sometimes seems to be a blade with two sharp edges.

[@raytheonbuna1021]

Great presentation of this accident Ron. I didn't know this level of granular detail. Thank you.

[@Bobm-kz5gp]

They were trained as we all were on our jets, lose an engine on takeoff go to or back to V2+10, 20, they were above those numbers and the FO did as trained. Of course the worst of it all was the maintenance guys had developed the procedure of using a fork lift that caused stress on the engine mounts. I enjoy your stories, you’ve had an amazing career.

[@ronrogers]

Thanks and you are exactly correct!

[@AaronHarberg]

The leading edge slat retracted and the left wing stalled? He couldn't have known. On a better note, Bryce McCormick and the AA DC 10 Windsor incident was an incredible display of airmanship getting safely back to Detroit in 1972. Nobody had much experience yet on the aircraft.

[@cjswa6473]

I have always been a ,speed is life guy. If something explodes, quits, falls off and you are still flying ,,,I have always tended to hold that configuration. The only time I didn't like to go fast was when I would say.." Speed kills, Haste makes waste, time is Money, and we are paid by the hour😅. What is interesting to me. In all my emergencies. Looking back, it was as each one happened in slow motion. My best case example was losing a main Rotor drive belt in a helicopter at 60ft. Just coming back from the fuel farm. Low, relatively slow, quick stop maneuver to a run on landing. Took maybe 6 seconds but seemed like 6 minutes...I had good training,, enough to not even break a fingernail😮

[@ronmoore5827]

Once again as in most aviation accidents it wasn’t one thing that causes it. The holes in the Swiss cheese unfortunately line up and you wind up with a disaster. You do an excellent job presenting your videos and whether serious or amusing I really enjoy watching.

[@fomfom9779]

I flew out to Honolulu from LAX, while the DC-10s were grounded. The grounding was lifted a day or two before my return flight, which was with AA. When I went through the pre-boarding process, I asked what kind of plane we were going to be on. "Modern wide-body jet, Sir." was the response. I asked a second time. Was told the same thing. So I flat out asked, is it a DC-10? The response was "Yes". I could hear several people behind me gasp. I told her thank you. I will take the flight, but I wanted to know, so I can make the decision. Obviously, the flight went without incident. And they were running the cockpit video camera for my flight.

[@jaytowne8016]

Excellent video Ron!

[@ronrogers]

Many thanks!

[@7thsealord888]

Very informative, filled in a number of details I was previously unaware of. Good stuff. :)

[@JBrandtBuckley]

I'd be interested in hearing your thoughts on American Airlines Flight 587, if you have any. In-flight separation of vertical stabilizer over Queens, NY back in 2001. NTSB probable cause focused on the pilot flying's excessive rudder inputs. APA report argued that it was Airbus's change in rudder sensitivity between the A300B2 and A300B4-605R models under the same type certificate, and pointed out that they didn't perform a verifiable handling qualities rating test after doing so.

[@ronrogers]

Yes I plan on covering that one. I was at a test pilot symposium where we discussed several aspects that led up to this specific accident.

[@JBrandtBuckley]

​@@ronrogersExcellent.

[@alikartal8426]

I read about this accident, including the NTSB report, time and over again since 45 years ago when it happened. And on your presentation, I still learn new things. Thanks.

[@InvertedFlight]

I was obsessed with this incident. I read every book I could find. I read every report I could find. And I've seen every video and documentary on KZbin. Since I had almost lost my father on that plane, and I am an aviation that I was completely obsessed. And I still learned so much from this vid.

[@boeingav8tr525]

Ron, couple of questions / observations. Would of the dual AoA stall warning really have made a difference. From my experience working for a AoA system manufacturer, most stall warning computers are programmed to trip the stall warning at an airflow angle sensor based on the selected / actual flap setting. Not sure how the DC10 was configured (was the computer set to the flap handle or the slat /flap position?) Additionally, as most transport airplanes deploy slats before flaps, if actual position, would've have there been a sensor on both sides of the aircraft? I don't know enough on the -10 systems, but I'll wager there is only one position sensor feeding the stall warning computer, and if so, right side or left? Obviously if it were the side that didn't loose the engine, the slats would've been sensed at the appropriate position, and I would think you wouldn't get a stick shaker. Also, regarding on engine failure you maintain achieved speed up to v2+10. From my understanding (correct me if I'm wrong), didn't the flight director on this plane command pitch for V2? Again, having worked for the instrument manufacturer, I'd ask, was this what was in the -10, and what was it programmed for? (Or am I assuming too much having flown the 320, 757, 767 which have more advanced flight directors?)

[@jodyhill303]

I flew the DC-10 for American Airlines from 1990-1996, years after the 191 crash. We were trained at that time to keep your speed up to V2 + 10 or more on an engine failure. Several pilots at American flew the simulator in the 191 configuration successfully by maintaining the higher speed. Sadly, and stupidly in my opinion, McDonnell Douglas chose to program the flight director to automatically command pitch nose up and reduce the airspeed to V2 during an engine failure. The Flight Director was never changed, so we were trained to DISREGARD the flight director command to pitch up. So, we were told to just fly raw data for pitch, while the flight director command bar was requesting something wrong. I am sure you were trained the same way, and the flight directors on DC-10s today are still programed the same old stupid way. Personally, I switched the flight director OFF for engine failures because the incorrect flight director was more distracting than flying raw data. Obviously I am not a fan of McDonnell Douglas airplanes, especially The DC-10, MD-11, DC-9, MD-80, etc. As a side note, not only did American opt for only one stick shaker they also saved about TEN DOLLARS by installing only one clip on the yolk to hold your approach charts! Their reasoning was that approaches in bad weather were flown by the Captain, so only the First Officer needed a chart holder. American bought some Pan Am DC-10s, and you could tell them immediately upon entering the cockpit because they had TWO chart holders, one for the Captain and one for the FO. Another act of cheapness was in our B-727s. Each comm radio had only ONE HEAD for selecting frequencies instead of Dual Heads. Thus, you were supposed to write down your frequency before changing in the event you selected the new frequency incorrectly and needed to recontact the old frequency.

[@ronduncan9527]

Watched this on Air Disasters. They and you did a great job.

[@robertjones8598]

I was only a PPL who gave up flying years ago. I didn’t feel I could maintain true proficiency with the limited hours I could put in even if I could keep my license current. With that limited knowledge and experience I cannot imagine doing anything other than increasing or maintaining airspeed in that situation. I tend to think instinct to increase or maintain speed would override any written procedure or training in that situation. Did the manual procedure call for an actual slow down to V2 if above V2? Hard to believe. I don’t get that. I’m curious, Captain, do you think you would have gone by the manual in that moment or maintained higher airspeed? Hard to believe only the left seat controls had a stick shaker. Never heard that before.

[@alexmelia8873]

Robert, we have things in jets called first, second, and third segment climbs. They’re predicated on obstacle clearance, terrain, runway length etc etc etc. Because of these varying segments we maintain a speed until an altitude. In this limit, V2 is the speed that ensures the minimum climb gradient is met after engine failure *until your flap retraction altitude in which case you DO speed up* but we have to clear obstacles first. If you go faster, you aren’t climbing and as much as ALL love airspeed, we also love not flying into a radio tower off the end of the runway. Think of V2 on an airliner as Vx on a 172 flying out of a short field with 50 foot trees at the end. If you do not abide by the book, you are a test pilots and airlines don’t like test pilots. So yes you absolutely do as you’re trained. It’s just unfortunate that the slats retracted and the weights they were at predicated a stall speed higher than V2 for that one wing.

[@parrotraiser6541]

That one incident contains almost every factor that comes up in accident reports. Training flaws, maintenance procedure flaws, the combination of multiple factors, without which it would not have occurred. Even the accident that it was the #1 engine rather than the #3, which might have left the captain in a position to fly outof it.

[@leerussel2033]

Joe Leonard changed the procedure for changing the engine. This was done to save money. He then went to Eastern Air Lines. This time he changed the procedure for putting O-rings on magnect oil plugs that are pulled to check for metal flakes in the engine oil. The plugs were charged on a L1011 out of Miami. The guys did not realize the O-rings were not on the plugs. As a result the bolts worked themselves loose on the way to the Bahamas. Oil drained from the number 3 engine and auto shutdown. The crew was told to turn around and come back to Miami. On the way back the number 2 tried to shut down but was overriden dy the crew then number 1 did the same . As they were landing the engines started sneezing. The crew realized rhat they could restart the first engine in time to keep it in the air till they got to the runway. All three engines seezed on that L1011 as it landed Forklift Lenard almost caused a second catastrophe. All in the prosute of savings money.

[@bkailua1224]

I flew the 10 for AA as an FO and we went over this accident many times. It was the thrust of the engine that pulled the engine off after the aft attach point failed.. If it was g load the engine would have not gone upward over the wing. Other than that I think you did a very accurate description of this accident. Also at AA we called the person in the FE position who held a flightengineer certificate a Flight Engineer. We called the professional engineers the same, but the slang term for them was 2 striper.

[@Brian-bp5pe]

I remember seeing the huge cloud of thick black smoke, from Oak Park, IL that afternoon. What a nightmare it must have been for those unfortunate souls. I don't see how the pilots could be faulted for any of what happened. Even if they knew beforehand what was about to occur, they would have had a difficult time keeping that airliner aloft.

[@dennislyons3095]

One more tidbit: Of course the fleet was grounded & all engine mounts were examined by every operator. At the time of the accident there was a pilot strike at United. The anecdote that was circulated was that United found one wing mounted engine which nearly fell off when they examined it. The most important aspect was that the crew had a flyable airplane on a day VFR flight &, had they not slowed to V2 but kept their speed, likely all would have survived. The only lucky thing about this accident is that the airplane hit the ground where it did & not a few hundred feet further as that would have taken out the trailer park & likely killed many more. That flight had a person sitting in every seat belted place on the airplane. Systems knowledge is everything in these situations. Good basic airmanship is also the key to survival in so many accidents.

[@leeoldershaw956]

America's maintenance head came to Eastern after that under Lorenzo's gang and sold all our spare parts. We called him "forklift Joe". He became CEO of AirTran

[@AndreySloan_is_a_cnut]

Yep - he was a bona-fide POS.

[@stephenbritton9297]

I'm not old enough to remember when the take offs were on video, but I remember as a kid being able to listen to the ATC radio traffic on the seat arm radio - (both bygone things today)

[@jsr8884]

Yes Capt. Very informative, thank you.

[@fleetwin1]

As my Mom always said, "by the grace of God go I". I just can't imagine being on the maintenance crew that did the work on the engine, having to live knowing that those people perished because of failing to follow proper procedures. Even though AA might have sanctioned the "short cut", I know I couldn't have lived with myself for sure. May God bless them all. I remember this tragedy like it was yesterday, was flying home from Milwaukee on AA that day.

[@bobcfi1306]

Thank you for your insight

[@ronrogers]

You are so welcome

[@juliemanarin4127]

I live in Chicago...i remember this incident...i was 19.

[@code3responsevideos872]

Great video Ron! Can you elaborate on why the 10 training at the time was to slow to V2 during engine failure on climb out?

[@ronrogers]

They felt that since V2 gave you the best climb performance you should slow to it. However, that sort of increased climb performance is rarely necessary.

[@marblox9300]

The DC-10 was the best looking airliner ever built. Unfortunately it was not the safest.

[@williammoreno2378]

Is it normal for multi-engine airplanes to operate with split ac busses? I come from the commercial cargo ship world where we operated with up to four generators where the main bus tie is always connected and only split if reconfiguring electricity from an alternative or emergency power source for a loss of main power or isolation of the port or starboard switchboard for maintenance. We would normally operate with one generator on line at full sea speed and only started additional machines manuvering in and out of port.

[@AndreySloan_is_a_cnut]

It’s entirely dependent on the design philosophy of the aircraft. Many older aircraft run with AC busses paralleled so that if one generator were to fail, there should be no interruption of power. A lot of newer aircraft run with busses split, so that a catastrophic failure on one bus will not result in a loss of any other busses. Two different, but both valid design philosophies - just depending on what the engineers determine the greatest threat to the system would be (which in turn is somewhat dictated by the architecture of the system).

[@williammoreno2378]

That is why you have a main bus tie(s). One side has an issue it can be opened manually or in high current conditions it will trip automatically to save the unaffected bus, preventing total power loss. I would want power to both sides all the time. I was wondering when the AA 191 Captain lost all power to his instrumentation, stick shaker if the busses not being split could have made a difference in saving the airplane. The two remaining engines were unaffected and generating electricity. This is not to second guessing the gallant efforts of an experienced and well trained crew that fought to the end to save the airplane.

[@AndreySloan_is_a_cnut]

@@williammoreno2378 - The system architecture of the DC-10 absolutely contributed to this accident. It’s been fifteen years since I was on the DC-10, so my memory is VERY fuzzy on its electrical system, so take all,of this with a large dose of salt. That said, my recollection is it operated (as did most aircraft I’m familiar with of that era) with the busses tied. The reason the captain’s bus lost power was not simply because the generator was offline (and in this case, completely missing), but that the cabling which was severed shorted to ground, resulting in a differential fault, which (in an effort to protect the rest of the system) tripped the bus tie open. With a more modern, damage tolerant design, it’s likely that key systems would not all be put on the same bus, and particularly critical items and/or busses would be fed from dual sources, so that failure of one component or even a single bus would not result in the loss of critical systems. The same could have (somewhat) been achieved had AA opted for the stick shaker on the FO’s yoke - it would have been powered by one of the busses that was still online (again, I can’t recall which one, but I do remember researching that specific point).

[@williammoreno2378]

Excellent clarification and explanation, sir. It seems there was no automatic bus transfer (ABT) to Captain's vital equipment built into the system, which, upon engine separation, would momentarily have interrupted power.

[@AndreySloan_is_a_cnut]

@@williammoreno2378 - Correct - that was the emergency power switch discussed in the video.

[@AjF392]

When I enrolled in the ACADEMY OF AERONAUTICS (now Vaughn college) in flushing Queens NY, we had the college brochure with a dedication to one of the belated college instructors who also worked as an American Airlines mechanic who instructed maintenance crews to do engine overhauls with a high-low instead of using the ceiling chains. Everyone thought the time it saved made it a good idea. ☠️☠️☠️

[@lakewoodil]

Captain you may already know this but the crash site was into a trailer park by Elmhurst road and just a few blocks from UA corporate headquarters in Elk Grove Village. If he had flown just a few more seconds the story possibly would have been much worse.

[@ZakWilson]

I'm wondering why the standard procedure ever involved giving up a comfortable margin over the minimum safe airspeed for any maneuver, especially close to the ground.

[@IndianOutlaw1870]

I was at a band pageant - jazz ensemble competition when this happened. I was a high school senior. The next morning, it was front-page news.

[@Chris-de2qh]

Thanks for the video. Question about the slats. You said the slats were designed to retract should a hydraulic failure occur. You also said the pilots had no way of knowing the slats retracted. This would indicate to me they were also unaware they had a hydraulic failure or they were unaware of the slat retraction due to hydraulic failure. Can you clarify that? Also, what was the theory behind maintaining such a slow speed? That seems counter intuitive. Thanks.

[@ronrogers]

The slats weren't actually designed to retract, they were not able to remain in the extended position without hydraulic power. Because of the multiple failures, the crewe probably were not aware of all of the failures, other than the engine failure. V2 gives you the best climb performance in this case.

[@Chris-de2qh]

@@ronrogers Thank you. It just seems adding 10kts to V2 in case of hydraulic failure due to the slat retraction would be a memory item.

[@blatherskite9601]

Excellent presentation, the last few minutes of which is a perfect list of the holes in the Swiss cheese model that all lined up at the moment of the engine separating - any one "hole" being misaligned would have saved all those people.

[@waynemayo1661]

So many accidents related to/caused by management's cost saving decisions.

[@ChiscoTube]

Had the Crew applied Max power on the remaining engines, using also the rudder, could they have flown out of it?

[@ronrogers]

Airspeed was the critical issue since the other two were already met.

[@k53847]

I remember seeing the huge plume of black smoke from the crash on my way home from school.

[@user60521123]

If the crew had maintained the higher speed, would the aircraft have leveled off? It seems like the uneven lift and weight caused the aircraft to get too steep of a bank angle, but you’re saying that the bank was caused by the stall. FYI, have no flying experience. Just asking to better my understanding of flight dynamics.

[@ronrogers]

If they had lowered the nose the climb rate would have been slower but they would have avoided the stall. The loss of the slats was easily controlled with sufficient airspeed.

[@glenwoodriverresidentsgrou136]

Ron, what is the advantage of slowing to V2, I.e., why were they trained to bleed off excess airspeed in this situation?

[@ronrogers]

Better climb performance. Usually not needed.

[@gottadomor7438]

This horrific tragedy impact site was right beside an interstate highway - seemed not more than a football field's distance from - & I remember driving by it a day or two after; the ground was still smoldering & there were wooden poles sticking out of the ground marking where bodies recovered. Speeding past, it appeared like something from a Hollywood movie set except of course it was all too real. So many years ago but the mind's eye still sees.

[@adotintheshark4848]

The pilots acted on the assumption that they had an engine failure, not an engine detachment. They never knew the engine had come off. Since the engine separation caused such an imbalance on the airframe, had the pilots known what really happened they still couldn't have recovered the plane in time. They didn't have enough speed nor altitude.

[@mambagr]

I agree. Training is last in the contributing factors, if at all. One stick shaker without power, no slat position indicator, slat retract on loss of hydraulics, emergency bus out of reach to name a few. The Captain is too lenient on the manufacturer.

[@johnwoodall3791]

What a terrible tragedy this was, I read about it at the ADF in Australia during my training & it's a horrible situation of Maintenance nightmares I believe that caused this. Engine failures on take off is thankfully not that common and as you say we train for these scenarios but I don't know if anything could have readied the Crew for what happened. In that time then they probably did not know the Engine had seperated from the wing & they did not have the height nor speed for any possible recovery not to mention the massive loss of controls from systems lost. Not enough time full stop to brain storm this one. Rest In Peace to those who lost their lives in this incident. Its one that should never have happened. The Person who captured that now famous picture of the stricken plane probably knew that a lot of innocent People were about to die. No doubt the picture gave investigators a starting point to go on... Respectfully...

[@geffen928]

Sir....Great video. I remember watching this on one of the Chicago news channels. I was mad because we had to leave the houser to go to my sister's HS graduation. I've seen many reports on this accident. It has always been stated that the roll to the left was caused by the added lift of the right wing due to it's LE Slats remaining extended while the left LE Slats retracted. Would the additional needed speed have been enough to overcome this unbalanced condition??

[@ronrogers]

Yes

[@rivetjoint6355]

As I understand it, that iconic photo of the aircraft with the left wing down and a noticeable release of hydraulic fluid streaming from it provided one of the earliest clues into what happened.

[@stevemoore12]

I can't believe you'd have to get out of your seat to switch over emergency power. Also I never knew the pilots even had a chance at bringing the plane back. It's so unfair to have their own training betray them.

[@bob2161]

I was a teenager when this crash happened and I remember it well. My grandfather worked for United, there at O'hare back then. I followed this case closely, and read everything I could find that was connected to this case. I remember reading that one of the maintenance guys had killed himself some time after the crash. My understanding was that he did it out of a sense of guilt. I don't recall any mention of him being disposed of. In this context, this is a new term to me. I'm assuming that meant that he was to be terminated, or fired the next morning. Is this a term used by American Airlines when they fire someone? If that's the case, I can understand a man killing himself if he knew he was going to be fired the next morning. That term is almost cruel. Being "disposed" sounds much worse than being "fired". It's as if you're just a piece of trash in the eyes of the company. Wow, is all I can say about that.

[@ronrogers]

I misspoke. I meant to say deposed.

[@geoffmorgan6059]

I'm not going to disagrees with your overall assessment. Hindsight always has 20/20 vision. The DC10 was designed by McDonnell-Douglas with the overriding theme of holding down costs, nothing else mattered, well, except speed of developing and delivery of the first aircraft. Quality was given lip service but there was no "enforced zero defects" type program and little attention given to fail safe operation. Contrast with the Lockheed L1011 which was a far more advanced aircraft with (for the time) cutting edge features -the differences are outstanding. Of course, the cost of the L1011 doomed the program and resulted in Lockheed abandoning the civilian aviation market. Sadly, the combination of cost and the fact that the L1011 shared the overall layout of the DC10 tainted the program. Many of the features you discuss in the video were incorporated in the L1011. The eventual merger of McDonnell-Douglas with Boeing resulted in the fiasco that has infected Boeing ever since the merger. Boeing fell into the Bia-school game of stock value and cut costs that McDonnell-Douglas. Let's not forget the disaster of United Flight 232 DC 10 (July 19 1989, Sioux City, IA) that was caused by a GE engine disintegrating fan disc and the total loss of hydraulics thanks to McDonnell-Douglas lack of back up considerations (The L1011 had four independent hydraulic systems). The engine removal procedure was not only not recognized by MD, but MD advised AA and Continental, that using the engine with the pylon removal was "not encouraged". The FAA probably had no idea that this procedure was being performed; look at the sad state they are in today (What does MCAS mean?).You're correct the crew followed the emergency procedures as they were trained, but the real cause of the accident was the blind approach to build cheap at McDonnell-Douglas and the effort to short cut maintenance by American Airways mechanics. Now Boeing is busy trying to recover from the inheritance of avarice.

[@dennislyons3095]

Ron, I think you have left out some critical items. I was a 727 FE when this accident happened. (I flew F/o on the DC-10 for a few years before upgrading to CAPT on the S-80 (DC-9)). I was at DFW in the crew room when the chief FE @ DFW came through with the word that "we just lost an airplane" Followed by "do not talk to the media about this". RE: electrical system--the electrical busses(AC) are separated, not connected (or "synced" like the 727/707) HOWEVER--loss of a use is supposed to be picked up by an operating buss--i.e., losing the #1 buss will be picked up by the @2 buss. Principally this is designed in for generator failure but when loss of that buss is sensed the #2 buss is supposed to pick it up---it didn't. Each kid slats are powered byte HYD systems 1&2, 2&3, the same for flaps & all flight controls. We (American Airlines) had been 'dinged' boy our POI for not slowing to V2 after an engine failure on T.O.. Had this crew done what was done prior to the "ding" (& what is done today) this accident would not have happened. Review of the FDR (on the NTSB report) shows that as they slowed the right wing stalled & the rest is terrible history. I'd like to add that Douglass had proven to the FAA that the airplane could be flown with one stall retracted & the other in Land. There were no speeds or even mention of that in the AA manual. I was told that Douglas did not share that information with the airlines. That is why the airplane was certified without locking the slat out & requiring HYD pressure to move them from the selected position. Totally preventable accident, even with #1 engine being torn off the airplane. You are correct: This was an accident caused by training. Those guys didn't have enough time to figure out what kind of airplane they were flying. I took lessons from this accident for the rest of my 28 years at the airline & have learned to figure out what airplane I have in any situation. I retired in 2015. I wish I had an old airport diagram of ORD with : "new scenic", "North-south", "old scenic", "bypass" & all of the old names of the taxiways. Those days were fun & you knew you'd accomplished something when you learned the names & knew where they were! I only ever flew off the old configuration airport. I even had an engine fail on T.O. there at night in the weather. The F.E. looked around for the instructor, it was so much like the simulator training.

[@dennislyons3095]

Actually the Buss-tie should have worked on #1 &#2.

[@petehuckleberry5068]

Left wing, not right stalled

[@dennislyons3095]

@@petehuckleberry5068 correct. Rushing to beat Lockheed into production was a big factor in the failures of an otherwise great airplane. It seemed to love flying at .82M but hated anything below .80m.

[@alexrebmann1253]

My favorite plane is the B-52. Would like for you to talk about the 1994 Fairchild afb crash if you have not done it.

[@ronrogers]

Have not but I agree, good subject!

[@torgeirbrandsnes1916]

Great vlog as always! Then you have other AA fatal crash at JFK in oct. 2001 with F/O Sten Molin at the heln. He overcorrects them into Jamaica Bay. As far as I know UA must have had the first bomb onboard that brought down a DC-6 back in 1956. It was out of DEN. He hated his mother, and he met «Old Sparky» the year after.

[@swiftadventurer]

the night before he was disposed?... or deposed?

[@ronrogers]

He was not disposed to be deposed

[@peanutbutterisfu]

Correct me if I’m wrong but aren’t the bolt’s designed to break in the event of extreme force to avoid damage to the wing? If that’s true even though the bolts broke why did the engine coming off make the plane crash then? Why wouldnt the hydraulic lines be designed to not leak if the engine comes off.

[@TenMinuteTrips]

You’re not wrong. The technical name for the engine and pylon bolts is “fuse pins.” Also, remember the El Al flight 1862. The Boeing 747|-200 freighter crashed in Amsterdam in October of 1992. It was determined that fatigue cracking of the fuse pins resulted in the entire pylon being ripped off the wing The aircraft subsequently crashed into an apartment building, killing four people on the airplane and 39 people on the ground. Boeing ended up modifying the pylon attach points within the fuel tanks on all 747s. The DC-10 didn’t have hydraulic fuses installed which are designed to stop the unregulated flow of hydraulic fluid in the event of a line rupture. And finally, on the American 191, crash, as Ron said, “airspeed.”

[@K2075-g7k]

I find it truly appalling that slats can retract un-commanded. What a design failure!

[@jhealan3751]

Captain Roger’s, are you by chance still living n the Chicago area? I’ve got a 16 year old who has an interest in being an airline pilot and I am looking for someone to speak with him on the ins and outs. He is a fourth generation Cub pilot soloing this summer (grandfather was his instructor) and he is pushing me for additional training to get his private. If you are in the area I would love a chance to connect.

[@ronrogers]

Absolutely, I live in Crystal Lake. Contact me [e-mail]

[@katout75]

@@ronrogers Love that gmail address!!!

[@shanemyers4142]

There was also another flight 191 accident at dfw. I think it was an L-1011 tristar.

[@briancooper2112]

As a kid, I remember this.

[@cowboyfrankspersonalvideos8869]

This reminds me of an unrelated maintenance issue. My partner was an army officer for two tours in Vietnam. At the time, instructions in the official maintenance manual for some big equipment said "to find high pressure hydraulic leaks, run your hand along the hose until you felt hydraulic fluid leaking out." After several people lost all their fingers, my partner got the manual changed. Makes you wonder what idiot wrote the manual in the first place.

[@SimonWallwork]

Sometimes, the SOPs ain't your friend.....

[@maraudersr1043]

I Did not know about the crew chief.

[@planeflyer21]

Thank-you, Ron. I remember this crash. Question: would the retracted slat have had an impact on V2/V2+, seeing as it put the aircraft in an asymmetrical lift situation? In other words, would the left wing technically have a higher V2/V2+ speed than the right wing? Thanks again!

[@ronrogers]

Essential yes. The stall speed increased because of the lack of lift.

[@DannyFreiburg]

Just a side note: For me, this accident remains connected to the vanishing of little Etan Patz, who probably lost his life in NYC around the time when this disaster occurred.

[@paulchsney5994]

Don’t the airlines require a test flight after a major maintenance evolution, such as an engine change? It sounds like the went straight from maintenance to a passenger run. I know in the military we did a test flight after major maintenance activity….

[@ronrogers]

I think one is required, but this aircraft had operated on a number of passenger flights before this event.

[@paulchsney5994]

@@ronrogers Ok, not knowing the full history it didn’t seem right to me. Guess I work in aviation too long….

[@Sreybk]

You have the number 1 engine departing the aircraft and have severed hydraulic lines at that altitude, you have no chance. Amazingly, Michael Laughlin was nearby to snap the final tragic moments. I remember first seeing this as a kid on "That's Incredible."

[@stephenp448]

But they DID have a chance... If they had known to maintain their airspeed. It was only in reducing back to V2 that they lost control of the plane.

[@Sreybk]

@@stephenp448 The problem was they didn't have enough time to identify or verify to get back to V2, I am not blaming the crew at all. They did everything they could. But in the heat of battle, three people can only do so much.

[@AndreySloan_is_a_cnut]

@@Sreybk- You are correct the crew really didn’t have enough time to diagnose what was going on, however that’s the point with the change to how we now operate though - you don’t need time to figure it out, if it’s flying you don’t change anything. Had foolish, myopic people at the FAA not interfered and required crews to aggressively target V2 following an engine failure, this event (as bad as it was) WAS in fact survivable - but not with the procedures the FAA required then.

[@Sreybk]

@@AndreySloan_is_a_cnut I completely agree with that.

[@Sreybk]

@@AndreySloan_is_a_cnut You are right.

[@tbm3fan913]

Never liked the DC-10 and so I never have flown on one. I always wondered about that engine at the base of the rudder. What if something happened to that engine? What is that engine has a catastrophic failure and took out the rudder? No thank you I'll stick with the 747 or nothing. Of course that isn't what happened here but still the engine below the rudder alarmed me.

[@jumpinjack1]

Capt. Rodgers great vid but I think the proper pronunciation of clevis is " kleh·vuhs" as in clevis bolt not cleavis as in great cleavage. This DC 10 accident I have heard was also the reason for the invention and use of hydraulic fuses to keep the the fluid from leaking out of lines such as the slats, to bad for the suicide didn't know that, dumb move. Several airlines where using this engine change technique with pylons attached at this time. Douglas DC10 was the real casualty :(

[@jamesmurray3948]

“Forklift Joe” was the cause. FAA had a nickname for him because they didn’t like his shortcut. He switched airlines and implemented another cost saving procedure. No spare parts. You just moved the inop part around the fleet to comply with Mel time limits.

[@RMSTitanicWSL]

As much as I like airplanes, it's stuff like this that caused me to quit flying anywhere.

[@47mphill]

Every fighter pilot and all good pilots know that speed is life. Rotating rapidly to 15+ deg at Vr does nothing for you if this situation is encountered. Slow rotation when heavy gains the speed you need to control in the case of engine failure or worse as in this accident. My educated opinion.

[@ShelbyRacerRich]

Half RUDDER? If I read your chart correctly at 7 min the rudder is split top and bottom with the systems. So maybe they had only half the rudder as well to prevent the roll?

[@ronrogers]

No, The lower rudder is being powered by system 2 and three thru a motor pump, and the upper rudder is being powered by a motor pump from system 2 even if system one is gone.

[@ChrisBre1]

My Dad was a commercial pilot and aeronautical engineer, and so I grew up around airplanes and airports. I remember reading about this accident years ago and learning that the stick shaker for the copilot was an option that American Airlines passed on. I was absolutely gobsmacked given the obvious necessity of both pilots having a working stick shaker. I'm also baffled as to why AA's maintenance facility in Tulsa didn't check with Boeing on their use of a forklift to R&R an engine. If a manufacturer has a certain procedure for something, chances are they have a very good reason for it. My personal opinion is that these people died a tragic death because of corporate greed.

[@jocelynharris-fx8ho]

I think you mean't that maintenance should have checked with McDonnell Douglas. Boeing did not merge with McDonnell Douglas until 20+ years later. But their issues with 737 Max, are due in part to the fact that many McDonnell Douglas executives crossed over in the merger and apparently infected Boeing with their poisonous corporate culture. 🥺

[@jocelynharris-fx8ho]

ChrisBre1, I think what you MEAN'T to say was, why didn't the maintenance team in Tulsa check with McDonnell Douglas. ( You said Boeing). This crash occured in 1979, Boeing wouldn't merge with McDonnell Douglas for another 20+ years, although the problems that they are now having with the 737 Max, are directly caused by them bringing the old MDD executives into the company after the merger. The 737 Max is on track to be Boeing's ".DC-10"

[@ChrisBre1]

Jocelyn, big mistake on my part to say Boeing instead of McDonnell Douglas. I guess I just had Boeing on my mind given how much they've been in the news of late. Good catch!@@jocelynharris-fx8ho

[@donc9751]

I rember this accident. So was it the maintenance supervisor that committed suicide because of the mistake that was made due to the forklift sagging during the shift chane? I saw another crash where I think a shift change was related to the mistake that was made. But in that case, I believe it was a maintenance guy whos job was to inspect after the work was done decided to give a hand. They were removing the leading edge on a T tailed type plane to repair something to do with the de-icing system. The inspector guy climbed up on top and took out all the screws on the left side leading edge while mechanics were working the other. But when everything was put back together none of the screws were reolaced on that 1 side and it tore off during its decent. Might of been improper recording of what was done as well. Wish I could remember the flight number but it was a smaller regional type plane I believe. Anyway, man what an aweful thing to have happen.

[@jocelynharris-fx8ho]

By the way, you made an incorrect statement, that picture WAS the actual plane involved in the crash and it WAS taken at O'Hare, but that particular picture was NOT taken the day of the crash. It was taken in 1974, 5 years before the crash. There IS a photo of the plane as it left the terminal that day but in that photo, it is crossing an access bridge with a parking lot on it's port side and a hangar on the starboard side. That photo was taken by Michael Laughlin, the same person that took the other infamous photos. The photo that you showed, was taken by Jon Proctor, the former Editor in chief of Airliners Magazine.

[@ronrogers]

Wow. Thanks for that great clarification and comments!

[@quick65filly]

I've always wondered why you would ever reduce speed with an engine out on takeoff. You're low and heavy with half your power gone. I would think you'd push the nose down and pick up some speed. As you said, speed is your friend.

[@johnandersonjjr]

I can’t believe the bolts are so small.Surly it’s not a concern -the weight of a bolt when there’s only 2 or three fastening an engine to a airplane

[@moi01887]

I was familiar with most of this except the "stick shaker optional on the FO's side" part. That seems so ridiculous... would you buy a car that has ABS on the left wheels but not the right? Sadly there are probably some people that would...

[@CruceEntertainment]

So it wasn’t an error at all. They did as they were trained.

[@mouseandryforever6848]

Airbus has cameras on their planes so crew can see. What a great thing. I wish Airbus had a proper yoke tho. After AF 447 I am now freaked out by flying on Airbus.

[@GoatzombieBubba]

NTSB could never tell if the camera was still running behind the Captain, it allows the passengers to watch the Crew fly the plane so if the camera was rolling and the tv was still running the passengers watched the ground come up.

[@TheSurrealGoose]

The aircraft was in a nose-down position for only a fraction of a second before impact

[@dx1450]

I remember when this happened, though I was only 8 years old at the time.