What was the Greatest Allied Mistake during World War II? Military and Sociological Analysis

Do you know how the fighting in France evolved after the allied victory in Normandy? Do you know what both Allied and German soldiers thought at the end of 1944 about the outcome of the war? Have you ever wondered why the allies were again held back on the German border for another 6 months?
Next, in this program we are going to answer these questions and many others, in which we will see the keys to the Allied stalemate on the German border during the autumn of 1944.
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[@waracademy128]

👉👉Do you want to support the channel? You just have to watch another video. This will help You Tube to recommend them more to new users. ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ 🔴📣Other videos of interest: - ✅ What did the Germans Think of the British and American Soldiers? kzbin.info/www/bejne/nGi7kIx-pthgiMk - ✅The 7 Main Differences between the Eastern Front and the Western Front: kzbin.info/www/bejne/n5bZl4eBpMmAgJY

[@rpm1796]

Request: The Canadians did not land in Normandy under the '1965' Maple Leaf Flag. Canada fought proudly under Red Ensign. Cheers,🍻

[@pebble100c]

Your audio is distorted. You need to improve it.

[@ianbell4816]

A subject this deep and profound and you use a voice synthesizer instead of a live voice?! No, I will not support this channel.

[@johngaffney2605]

The greatest failure was to halt the British 11 Armored division in Antwerp instead of pushing forward another 10 miles to sever the Beveland peninsula. This would have isolated the 15 Army in the Pas de Calais and by default opened the Schledt estuary for Allied shipping to enter Antwerp in September rather than December 1944. This would have solved the Allied armies logistics nightmare of that autumn and made Market Garden irrevelant and a 12th Army Group offensive into the Ruhr, via Kleve, a realistic operation with every reasonable expectation of success.

[@nobbytang]

I think you’ve nailed it …dead right there .

[@historicalbiblicalresearch8440]

Absolutely Absolutely!!

[@littlehandsgivescovfefe4837]

Who was responsible for halting the Brit 7th Armored?

[@johngaffney2605]

@@littlehandsgivescovfefe4837 The order to halt in Antwerp was given by Gens. Roberts(division) and O'connor( VIII Corps)

[@grazis]

Apparently, nobody considered the source of Rommel's difficulties in North Africa. Antwerp was vital.

[@ToddSauve]

That is not the correct Canadian flag for 1944-45. It was the Red Ensign flag. The Maple Leaf flag did not come into existence until 1965--20 years after WW2 ended.

[@richardshort3914]

You beat me to it. They got the US flag right: 48 stars. Why not ours?

[@ToddSauve]

@@richardshort3914 Because Canadian history has not been well researched or disseminated. Even Canadians have a bad perspective and level of understanding of our own history. Especially about WW2. But that has been changing in the last 20 years or so. There are some astounding books out now that have gone back to the British Archives at Kew and sought out what the latest declassified documents show, and a 180 degree turn is occurring. "Stopping the Panzers: The Untold Story of D Day" is one by Dr. Marc Milner, and "One Day in August" by David O'Keefe is another. Both have turned the "accepted" history of WW2 on their heads. Give them a read if you haven't already. 👍

[@guywerry6614]

@@ToddSauve I am 61 years old and have always had a casual interest in the history of war, especially WWII. I am also Canadian. I have found it very striking to see how interested the recent generations of young people have been in the Canadian contribution to WWII compared to my generation's interest, which was very limited.

[@ToddSauve]

@@guywerry6614 That is great Guy! Your local library probably has the books I mentioned, or can get them for you. They are top notch historians and writers, world class, and their works are truly turning the so called history of WW2 on its ear. There is also a channel here on KZbin run by a guy named Paul Woodage called WW2TV. He is a top Normandy campaign historian and serves as a tour guide there, out of Bayeux. He gets all the very best WW2 historians on his channel everyday and covers absolutely every aspect of WW2 in great detail. The best WW2 website I know of. And he actually pays serious attention to what happened on Juno beach and the entire Canadian campaign there. We Canadian subscribers have adopted him as an honourary citizen! Ha, ha! You'll enjoy his channel for sure! 😉👍

[@roybennett9284]

@@ToddSauve what the world needs to know is that like in the "great war" the Canadians were the shock troops the go to people if you wanted something done,like our Australian contribution it sometimes gets lost.

[@54blewis]

Another reason for the optimism was what was mentioned in the last part of the video(in my opinion)the carnage of the Falaise gap lead many at SHAEF to believe that the Wehrmacht couldn’t possibly recover from such a disaster the amount of men,equipment and materiel destroyed had created the belief that the Germans had virtually no reserves left in the west, and with the Russians practically on the German border there’s no way possible for them to shift forces away from the eastern front….also the Allies had near total air superiority and this is before the battles of Aachen and Hurtgen Forrest after those battles SHAEF took a more somber approach but still did not think that the Germans had the strength to continue the war much less launch a major offensive…. But the battle of the bulge shattered any illusions that the Allies had about an early end to the war…

[@nobbytang]

Spot on analysis that Barry …

[@54blewis]

@@nobbytang thanks 😊

[@seanpoltzer1107]

Shaef? _ _ Allied Expd.Force?

[@54blewis]

@@seanpoltzer1107 Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF)

[@seanpoltzer1107]

@@54blewis thanks

[@chaseschneier1076]

The allies made many blunders...from not preparing for the hedgerows in France after D-Day, to getting stuck in the Hurtgen forest, to not being prepared for the German counterattack leading to the Battle of the Bulge. Many mistakes were made costing thousands of lives.

[@Chiller01]

I agree with the video that Market Garden was a big mistake. Eisenhower should have ordered Montgomery to clear the Scheldt estuary and secure the Port of Antwerp. It would have prevented the logistical problems that bogged down the allied advance in the autumn of 44. Approving Market Garden was more a political decision than a military one.

[@philipliethen519]

The purpose of M-G WAS the Scheldt per Eisenhower but Montgomery stopped short for yet another “regroup”.

[@moss8448]

my take on one of the biggest mistakes was not closing the gap and entrapping the German Army at Falaise Pocket they had to fight the same guys in Market Garden

[@michaelkenny8540]

Montgomery and 21st AG had no shortage of supplies and they did not 'divert/steal' supplies from the US Army. Monty being Monty made sure his supply chain was robust and working. Unlike the US Quartermaster who was hopelessly inefficient. The US was short of ammunition and tanks as they badly underestimated their attrition rates. By deciding to do away with Operation CHASTITY they denied themselves a proper supply chain and suffered for it. Things were so bad the UK had to supply 25 prdr guns and in Jan 1945 give the US 400 tanks from their stocks to make up their shortages. You would think a thank you was fitting rather than 75 years of falsely blaming Monty for every mistake made by a US General.

[@andym9571]

The biggest mistake was the failure of Gavin and the 82nd to attempt take Njimegan bridge on the first day as per plan. ( A fact left out in the film ) That allowed the bridge to be reinforced and as a result XXX Corps had to fight for it when they arrived which made them 3 days late. Why Gavin did not attempt to take it is a bit of a mystery.

[@Chiller01]

@@andym9571 I don’t find that argument at all convincing. I know Gavin has become the popular KZbin generals’ whipping boy since RG Poulessen published his book and the idea was multiplied by a UK KZbinr but it’s far too easy to blame this complex failure on one guy. Having never risen above E6 I don’t claim to be a large unit genius but to me the overarching plans were seriously suspect. Sending a huge column up a single raised road under severe time constraints is asking for failure. Just look at the static Russian column that sat outside of Kyiv as a modern day example. There were dozens of smaller failures, tach air was poorly coordinated, Airborne jumps were spread over days, coup-de-main capture of the bridges that proved successful in Normandy was impossible because of distant LZ’s, etc etc. Montgomery, who was noted for meticulous planning and deliberate set piece battles threw this thing together in weeks. I think the responsibility for Market Garden lies at the top with Montgomery presiding over inadequate planning and Eisenhower for approving it.

[@blockmasterscott]

From watching these WW2 videos here and the WW2 channel, I'm just amazed at the colossal sized blunders both the Allies and the Axis made. No one on either side was innocent of major screw ups lol.

[@davidtrindle6473]

True. Same in the Pacific. Many huge errors were made.

[@secretagent86]

"the fog of war" aka, "oops i f*cked up"

[@parrot849]

Another huge mistake, in my opinion, was Eisenhower’s decision not to exploit Lt. General Jacob Dever’s U.S. 6th Army Group’s rapid southern advance into the Rhine River area east of Strasbourg, France in November, 1944. By that time, 6th Army Group, along with the Free French 1st Army attached to Dever’s army group were probing across the Rhine in (battalion) force, and it’s opposition, the German 19th Army, was a gutted shell. It seems that most historians agree, based on lack of any other documented reasoning, it was Eisenhower’s personal hatred of Lt. General Devers that was a chief motivator into Eisenhower’s and SHAEF’s decision to “pin” 6th Army Group into place along the western bank of the southern Rhine that winter directly west of Stuttgart, Germany. Another possible reason in freezing out Devers while maintaining a losing campaign in the Hurtgen Forest, was his (Eisenhower’s) alliance -keeping goals and British Field Marshal’s Bernard Montgomery’s constant demands of breaking into Northwestern Germany with the simultaneous use of his own British 21st Army Group directly along side Eisenhower’s “favorite” combat commanders (Patton, Collins, Hodges, etc.) who always reported to him directly through his close friend, U.S. 12th Army Group Commander General Omar Bradley. 6th Army Group along with the Free French potentially could’ve rolled up the eastern bank of Rhine taking the pressure off the rest of allied ground forces and spoiling Hitler’s upcoming planned Ardennes offensive…. Hell, Devers had the actual bridging units staged in advanced forward positions awaiting word to launch at predetermined points when Ike, with literally no explanation at the time of his visit to Devers HQ to assess the situation; pulled the plug on a 6th AG/FF crossing. A crossing and planned following attack that was to be led by one of the U.S. Army’s most capable Generals serving at that time, Lucian Truscott. Eisenhower’s poor decision (and personal bias) in this matter may have facilitated the battle of the Bulge and perhaps prolonged the war several months.

[@bigwoody4704]

Exactly I know IKE didn't like him but along with the French Devers reached the Sigfried Line LONG before either Patton and most certainly Monty. One of the few times IKE turned petty.Why F*** with a successful outfit that's driving,when Monty/Patton could be one big pain in the ass?

[@michaelplanchunas3693]

@@bigwoody4704 Bradley didn't like Devers either, because he got things done. Marshall probably felt that the cancellation was a mistake. He promoted Devers to 4 stars and asst. SHAEF Commander, over Bradley. Bradley was overrated due to Ernie Pyle's pumping up his abilities. IKE was scared of Devers. In North Africa Ike thought Devers was sent to replace him. Ike and Devers butted heads several times, with the debate going up to Marshall. More often then not Marshall agreed with Devers, much to Ike's annoyance because he was used to getting his way with Marshall, except for Devers who was the better overall general. Devers after the war was asked, as Clark's boss why didn't he replace Clark, Devers replied he would have if he had a replacement available, which he didn't.

[@bigwoody4704]

@@michaelplanchunas3693 Really they had some fine JR officers with experienceTruscott,Collins,Middleton and Patch who was in his 6th army group

[@parrot849]

@@bigwoody4704 - Yes, 6th AG had some fine commanding division and corp officers. In fact, Ike had earlier asked Devers if he (Ike) could have Truscott for senior command operations in the Normandy campaign and Devers would not give up Truscott to Eisenhower. That was another reason Eisenhower later on held a personal grudge towards Devers. Apparently Eisenhower had a great capacity for being small and petty with certain officers…. A couple of fairly good reads on the subject are David Colley’s: The Folly of Generals and Decision at Strasbourg.

[@bigwoody4704]

@@parrot849 Ya I'm now reading Air Marshall Arthur Tedders *With Prejudice* as much as Monty and many times Alan Brooke popped off about IKE, he should have let them have it.Real condescending Aristocrats with no real military accomplishments, not enought to look down their noses at anyone.Propping them up as a favor I guess for using the UK as a base.I know Patton and a few others stated IKE was the best Officers the British have. IKE kept caving into their rants .Tedder was the top Air Chief in the Med,Desert and later France - he was a very capable officer and almost always made the right decisions Churchill also was a disaster when getting involved in military matters,though a great statesman . Britain had much better field commanders than Bernard like Richard O'Connor and Claude Auchinleck,unfortunately O'Connor was taken prisoner for 2 years. This of course after he commanded a smashing victory in the Desert and Winston rewarded him by taking 50,000 of his veteran troops and moving them to Greece.THAT proved disasterous in both places

[@drdisrespectsburner5777]

Greatest allied mistake was no all out offensive from France September 1939

[@jjayyoung7335]

Exactly correct

[@johnratican3824]

Thank you! One other person here gets it. The other mistakes mentioned in this video may have prolonged the war a couple months, but that one you mentioned caused the war to start all together. If the French had acted forcefully, they could have conquered Germany in 1939 and Hitler would have been remembered as a minor historical figure.

[@jamesguitar7384]

@@jjayyoung7335 The German tactics of mechanised warfare were much better than ours . We were lucky to escape at Dunkirk and develop from there . Anyway , no wish to cause offence but the Soviets did the great bulk of the defeat of Germany ( about 75 to 80% ).The allied fighters did well but perhaps history is being re-written in our favour and we exaggerate our importance in the defeat of the Nazis . I have to wonder , what would have happened without the Soviet involvement . Would we be fighting still ?

[@craigstanley3680]

@@jamesguitar7384 It would have likely came down to who developed the A bomb first.

[@jamesguitar7384]

@@craigstanley3680 Good point

[@Strike_Raid]

Taking the Hurtgen Forest was pretty bad; it didn't extend the war by much but pointlessly killed a huge number of US soldiers.

[@scooterbob4432]

A total of 33,000 unnecessary US casualties.

[@jeffrachau3920]

Exactly! Thank you!

[@johngaffney2605]

From the first incursion in mid-September until the taking of the blown Ruhr River dams in February 1945, a total of 51000 First Army casualties. The whole affair was such a botched campaign that accomplished nothing on the strategic level.

[@jeffrachau3920]

@@johngaffney2605 the Germans considered it a miracle from heaven that we were so dumb. Lightning Joe Collins. Yeah. Right. He was the catalyst. He and Mark Clark were not good generals!

[@PurpleCat9794]

On a flip side, the Wehrmacht performed brilliant defense.

[@jameshaxby5434]

The biggest allied mistake in the Pacific was fighting for all of the tiny atolls, which were just gloriefied sandbars.

[@johnelliott7375]

I have always found your videos to be informative and mentally stimulating. I always think that I have been able to generalize what happened, but you always seem to find just a little bit more than before that can make you always think about well what could have happened if this occurred and this might have be different. God bless you and your family and thank you for sharing your work and time with us as always. Good morning to you!

[@williamherndon4873]

I find your information as thorough and accurate and we should Cease second guessing.😊

[@davidturk6170]

Greatest mistake was letting Montgomery be in charge of anything.

[@johnmasterman]

He masterminded d day

[@retepeyahaled2961]

The biggest mistake was made in 1940 in France at Sedan, when the Germans broke through the Ardennes and cut off the entire French and British armies in Belgium. The French air reconnaissance planes had informed the French high command that there was a 100 kilometer long line of German vehicles working it's way through the Ardennes. They deliberately ignored the alarming messages and even threatened to courtmarshal the ones that reported it. If the French had held the line at Sedan, Western Europe might not have been overrun by the Germans in 1940. After all, France was concidered to have the most powerful military when the war broke out...

[@astrobullivant5908]

The worst Allied mistake was to not wipe out the Germans at the beginning of the Battle of France when they were completely backed up and jammed. The Allies could have won WW2 in Europe in about six hours by bombing the Germans when they were crammed due to logistics errors.

[@oldtugs]

That's a no-brainer ... supporting Russia instead of letting the Germans get rid of Stalin and his henchmen has cost the world untold misery and treasure.

[@mikecain6947]

If France and others had attacked Germany after the declaration of war when Germany was attacking Poland, the war may have been different.

[@kevinlove4356]

That was not the Allied strategy. They learned the lesson of The Great War. A one-sentence summary of which is this: The Royal Navy starved Germany into submission while an entire generation of European youth killed each other in futile land battles. So the Allied strategy was to skip the great land battles in which the defence had a three-to-one advantage over the offence. And skip straight to starving Germany into surrender. Also depriving Germany of critical resources such as oil. France had no planning, training or equipment to undertake a great offensive in 1939. That was not how the politicians decided to fight the war.

[@nigeh5326]

@@kevinlove4356 agreed France had a defensive mindset. A lot of senior French officers thought they could hold Germany on the border with the Maginot Line and fight a repeat of WW1. They were 20 years out of date strategically and tactically.

[@kevinlove4356]

@@nigeh5326 No. The whole point of the Maginot Line was to avoid a repeat of The Great War. Specifically to avoid the great land battles that killed an entire generation of European youth. Throughout history, right up to today, the offence requires approximately a 3-to-1 superiority over the defence to be successful. This ratio sways back and forth depending upon technology. The machine gun gave an advantage to the defence until fire-and-manoeuver tactics were developed to overcome this advantage. The development of new blitzkrieg tactics gave an advantage to the offence as long as those tactics were a surprise, as they were in 1939-41. You will notice that in spite of overwhelming military superiority, the allied offensives in 1944-45 resulted in slow, grinding victory. Neither side had a 3-to-1 advantage in 1939, so the predictable outcome of any offensive was failure amidst massive casualties. The purpose of the Maginot line was to provide a hard defence with minimum casualties. With amazing hindsight, it is popular today to criticize the Allied strategy in 1939 of avoiding land battles and starving Germany into submission. But the reality is that this was the best and only Allied strategy. The allies did not have the 3-to-1 military superiority required for a successful offensive. Nor was there political support for such an attack, essential in a democracy. So any attack would have been a bloody failure that would have resulted in these governments being voted out of power. This 3-to-1 superiority can include force multipliers such as better generals or pure blind luck. Which is how the Germans won in 1940. They had better generals who successfully fooled the Allied generals with their feint into the Low Countries. And a good share of luck in the intelligence failures that kept secret their true centre of attack for so long.

[@nigeh5326]

@@kevinlove4356 I am aware of the 3 to 1 ratio etc. my point was more about senior French officers and politicians thinking. The Maginot line was to give defending troops an already in place defensive system with built in bunkers, artillery points etc that could be used to decimate German artillery and infantry while giving French forces strong protection from German artillery and infantry attacks. But they didn’t take into account the combined arms ideas used towards the end of WW1 where infantry, artillery, air power and armour had broken the German defences. Instead they counted on a defensive strategy that failed. An offensive thrust into Germany in 1939 would imo have been better as Germany had most of its forces in the east at the time attacking Poland. A 3 to 1 advantage is generally considered necessary but as Britain showed in 1982 in the Falklands it’s not essential. Cheers

[@kevinlove4356]

​@@nigeh5326 The defensive strategy did not fail. Its execution failed due to bad luck and good German generals. Even looking back with the hindsight of historical knowledge, the Allied strategy was a good strategy that should have worked. Bad luck happens. An offensive alternative? France did undertake an offensive in 1939, the Saar Offensive. The German covering forces withdrew to the Siegfried Line, the French Army reconnoitered those defences and the French government decided not to incur the massive casualties required to assault those defences. A key part of that decision was the French government getting intelligence reports about how much petrol the German Army was using domestically and in Poland vs. how much oil and petroleum products Germany was able to produce or import. Also on those reports was food, iron ore and a whole long list of other resources necessary to support a modern economy and armed forces. Let us think about how an assault on the Siegfried Line would have played out. In 1939 neither side had air superiority. So German reconnaissance aircraft would have detected the logistical effort to concentrate armed forces and supplies at whatever point on the Siegfried Line was selected for assault. The Germans would have responded by concentrating their own forces there, even taking forces from Poland if necessary. Remember, the German rail and road network was explicitly designed to facilitate a two-front war by allowing forces to be easily moved East-West. This means that the Allied assault upon the Siegfried Line would have been a bloody failure. Even in the fall of 1944, the tattered remnants of the German army were able to use the Siegfried Line to hold back the Allied armies over the winter. This in spite of the Allies having superior numbers of well-trained and fit men, total air superiority, armour superiority, massive logistics supremacy, intelligence superiority due to cracking the Nazi codes, etc, etc. None of which existed in 1939. As well, a lot of the Siegfried Line defences, particularly the artillery and supplies, had been removed after 1940 to be used elsewhere. For the Allies to assault the Siegfried Line in 1939 would have been a bloody failure. Which is why they did not do it.

[@tom170670]

As Patton said: "We fought the wrong enemy..."

[@wombatwilly1002]

Totally

[@sslaytor]

Patton was wrong. You fight the enemy who attacks you. Not defending Stalin and the Soviet Union's version of evil but just pointing out that Nazi Germany and its evil were the active enemies. After all, what did the Soviet Union achieve after World War II? Not much really. While their conquest of East Europe was a disaster the rest of the Allies did not have the military might to continue a war against the Soviet Union .

[@badgerresistance4322]

We should have nuked them as well.

[@mikeh2613]

Too true! Nazis/Communists - both the same brutal regimes!

[@B-and-O-Operator-Fairmont]

Why, why, WHY do most of these You Tube videos have computer generated voices doing narration? Does no one do voice over work anymore? This was an excellent production, but the voice was very distracting.

[@susanwhite7474]

Seriously good point.

[@richardsuggs8108]

Montgomery’s plan called Market Garden cost over ten thousand casualties. It was rushed and the commanders both British and American didn’t pay attention to the intelligence reports that paratroopers would be facing armored personnel.

[@johnburns4017]

There was no armour at Arnhem on the jump day. Market Garden was planned by Brereton and Williams, both Americans. Montgomery did not plan or was involved in the execution. The operation could have succeeded if two US para units, the 82nd and 101st, had not *failed* to seize their assigned bridges. Easy bridges to seize as well.

[@bigwoody4704]

As British General David Fraser recalled "Nevertheless I remember the impressive silhouette of the long bridge across the Maas (Meuse) at Grave. This had been captured by the American airborne troops and took us across the first main water obstacle at about ten o’clock in the morning of 19th September. By then the operation had been running for over forty hours and was already well behind schedule." So that's 'well behind schedule' before they reached Nijmegen and that's not counting the late start of XXX Corps' offensive. That commander Fraser who was there agrees. *ARNHEM,by William Buckingham,p46* the shortage of navigators was so acute that only 4 out of 10 C-47 crews used on the D-Day drop included one,usually flying at the head of the serial.The situation didn't improve by September 1944. the key issue was lack of natural illumination,the 1st airlifts into Normandy involved 900 C-47s and gliders .MARKET envisioned doing the same with around 1,600 flights,with inexperienced and partially trained air crews in the total darkness of a no moon period would have been suicidal. *Williams insistence on a single lift per day and Brereton's acceptance of it may have been less than ideal,but it was the only realistic option in the prevailing circumstances. Because of a shortage of navigators on longer flights with much shorter days*. The Operation was approved by who?If Bernard was a real Field Marshall like Model he would have made his battle assessments and made any necessary alterations.But the dim bulb did not this then got scarce. So almost 2x as many flights with just under 4 less hours daylight on September 17th than on June 6th then the flights were much longer into N.E Netherlands instead of just across the channel. Quit reading your coloring books.They could hardly get the same amount of flights in the same day with the afore mentioned deprivations

[@johnburns4017]

@@bigwoody4704 Rambo, a quiz. Name the bridge the 101st *failed* to seize in Operation Market Garden? 20 points for the correct answer.

[@bigwoody4704]

Have that head wound checked out.I think Monty's has been getting a little rough with you in the tub again - ring the nurses station and report this. And johhny stick to pillow fights at least your losses there don't hurt as much

[@johnburns4017]

@@bigwoody4704 *BZZZZZZZZT!* Wrong answer. Rambo, the name of the bridge the 101st failed to seize in Operation Market Garden?, was..... 🎊🎈🍾 *Zon bridge* 🎊🎈🍾 Zero points Rambo. Zero. Better luck next time.

[@leebiggs1685]

I would say that the allied invasion of Italy was the biggest mistake of the war. Lots of casualties, little gain against easily defended land.

[@tekis0]

Whenever I watch videos from this channel, I must use subtitles.

[@cawreshist1019]

Not turning Patton lose to get to Germany fast and put the Russian in there place was the biggest mistake. We are still paying for it to this day.

[@davidevans3498]

So so so true

[@wombatwilly1002]

Totally agree

[@philiplongee1149]

I’m not sure what “place” the U.S. Army were supposed to do. Russia was an ally at the time but Patton wanted to use POW German soldiers to go after the Russian Army. To what end? First win the war and celebrate. Then find another enemy.

[@WLBarton4466]

Anzio. Mark Clark letting landing force huddle in the beach. Germans set up artillery and pounded the U.S. troops on the beach.

[@somewhere6]

Anzio was terrible. Arguably, most of the Italian campaign was counterproductive after the Italian surrender.

[@michaelplanchunas3693]

Anzio was a disaster from the beginning. Clark appointed John Lucas as corps Commander for the invasion. Patton just before flying to London after being replaced, paid a visit to Lucas and told him to watch his back with Clark. Patton said Clark put Lucas in a No-win Situation. Post war analysis showed that Lucas" actions were correct. Had he rushed to the highways, the Germans would have split the forces and wore down the troops through attrition with no chance of resupply. Clark was a glory hound and all Newpaper dispatches carried his name only.

[@jeffrachau3920]

Clark was very overrated in my humble opinion.

[@somewhere6]

@@jeffrachau3920 There is a video called "Blundering General Mark Clark" on youtube. Although I don't like many of the videos that creator makes, I think he nails Clark for what he was.

[@jeffrachau3920]

@@somewhere6 Clark was an egotistical pompous ass. The Canadians should have taken Rome-he weaseled in and...... I can't even..😣

[@zenglider2145]

Where did Churchill get the idea that attacking Sicily & Italy was more useful than focusing solely on getting to Berlin? Rommel had already been stopped from getting to the mideast oil fields.

[@georgekaragiannakis6637]

Thank you for an interesting analysis. I’d suggest there are 2 issues pre the start of the war and one at the beginning. The failure of the UK and France to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union to protect Czechoslovakia in early 1938; the sell out of Czechoslovakia at Munich in Sep 1938; and the failure of the French army to first defend their frontier and then unable to successfully pinch off the panzer salient.

[@waracademy128]

Ty

[@sharonwhiteley6510]

You know DeGaulle wrote a book outlining the problems with the French beliefs in their defense system. Very few senior commanders read it. Those who did totally blew off his concerns. One person who read his book was Hitler. He definitely took notice of these shortcomings. Hitler used DeGaulle's notes during his attack on France.

[@donrobertson4940]

You could argue the first mistake was the Rhineland. Or the treaty of Versailles.

[@wombatwilly1002]

The French actually advanced good against the Germans initially then inexplicably retreated!

[@pierren___]

The failure of the UK to not runaway at Dunkirk

[@TheFreddking]

Dieppe was such a disaster England knew and was hesitant

[@dmbeaster]

The Allied advance after the Battle of Falaise was a classic blitzkrieg, but had the same problem encountered by the Germans in 1941 and 1942, and the Russians in all of their great offensives from 1943 onward. The breakout rapidly outruns its supplies and begins to weaken in strength as it cannot be replenished while galloping forward and spreading out. In the same time frame, the Russians dealt the Germans a far greater defeat in Bagratian, but had to pull up even though the Germans were utterly shattered. At that moment, the wise thing is to pause and consolidate, and resupply. Without question, the proper course in September was to exploit the capture of Antwerp intact on 9/4, and clear the Scheldt and get the port open. The notion that they could just keep driving into Germany because the Germans were done was a big mistake, but understandable since this was the first Allied experience with continental mobile warfare. Eisenhower understood this, but got talked into Market Garden by Montgomery, who wrongly believed that he could just drive to Berlin, and insisted that he be given all available supplies to do so. Eisenhower knew that was ludicrous, but saw that crossing the Rhine at Arnhem put the Ruhr in striking distance, which if captured could end the war promptly. And that had a lot to do with another Allied misperception because of limited experience - the utility of paratroopers as the spear for a strategic attack. There was a burning desire to use the paratroop army idling in England in a dramatic fashion, but the Germans and Russians had already learned the hard way that paratroopers could not effectively perform this function. The classic defensive technique was a armored mobile reserve that could counterattack any breakthrough, and paratroopers were at their weakest in that scenario. The decisions made in September, 1944, were mistakes, but due to these reasons.

[@johnhall8516]

Hindsight is wonderful thing. Looking back how many decisions would the average person change if they could?

[@lorenzonotarianni1667]

The senseless and sadistic bombing of Monte Cassino Abbey. My father observed it as he was born there.

[@mossbergshockwave9629]

Fighting Germany should have fought the communist.

[@PurpleCat9794]

Communists were even bigger murders than the Nazis.

[@johnchristensen4002]

While I pretty much agree with the assessment made in this program. I do not agree this was the biggest Allied mistake made. I am huge admirer and supporter of Churchill. However, it was he who made, in my opinion the biggest mistake by the allies by not taking Tripoli and finishing off the Italians in Africa first before sending them to Greece which had no chance of succeeding. There would have been no way for the Germans to get into Africa. All the generals on the ground at the time could see this, especial O'Conner. (See O'Conner's comments in the series the world at war) Churchill forced it. This mistake resulted in an unnecessary 2-year struggle for north Africa that consumed a huge number of ships, aircraft, men and resources. Had he finished off Africa by June 41,. Britain could have taken and healed Crete, turning it into a bomber base to attack Ploesti and those ships lost and damaged along with the men could have had a much better chance of holding Singapore. I think this mistake prolonged the war at least by 1 year and the economic and material damage to Britain and the empire would not have been as great as it was.

[@somewhere6]

The effort in Greece was certainly wasteful and doomed although seen as political necessity. Cleaning out Libya would have been a better military strategic choice although I think the possibility of the Germans rushing troops to Tripoli was high. They were sending Rommel anyway. The Allies would have been at the end of a long logistical tail and would be hard pressed to break through. The Crete airborne attack might have been directed at Malta. Interesting scenarios and implications.

[@Jinxohh]

Churchill is a shill and drunk that lost the British empires throne in the world haha

[@guyvert49]

it was a political not a military decision. They tend to be finely balanced

[@johnchristensen4002]

@@guyvert49 not sure what you mean balanced. Political decisions are for peace time not in war. Either way it was a disaster that was almost a wat looser.

[@catinthehat906]

The biggest mistake made in the North African theatre was made by the Americans, specifically Colonel Bonner Frank Fellers, the U.S. military attaché in Cairo who continued to use a code to send reports to Washington that had been stolen from the American Embassy in Rome, despite concern expressed by the British. This essentially meant that up until June 1942 Rommel had comprehensive information about British and Commonwealth troop movements and intentions- a hugely significant advantage that almost led to the loss of the Suez Canal.

[@marksterner7532]

The biggest mistake made by Eisenhower and his top brass was to play politics and not allow Patton to continue his drive from eastern France on into Germany. Patton had the Germans on the run. It was the Allied command that chose to not keep Patton's supply lines filled, largely in response to Montgomery's constant whining. That failure allowed the Germans to regroup, mount their famous counter-offensive, and prolong the war by more than a year!

[@garry1214]

Agreed with all you stated.

[@craigstanley3680]

There were also concerns about the V2s raining down on London and they were likely unsure how far along Germany’s nuclear program had progressed. There was also the concern of getting to Denmark to prevent the Russians getting there first and thus end up controlling the Baltic.

[@billalexander8011]

I thought they had to stop because they ran out of gas.

[@terrysmith9362]

So what happened at Metz? Advanced 12 miles in 2+months with 50000+ American casualites Patton was described by his German opposite number as hesitant and indecisive. Also read.the official US military history of the campaign. The movie was fiction not real

[@the82spartans62]

The biggest Allied mistake? Becoming allied with the Soviet Union.

[@joechang8696]

pursing the Italian campaign beyond the initial operations was a mistake because the Italian terrain was highly defensible, and perhaps Kesselring was a good commander. But still it was good to put forces in Italy to keep good German units there. The Normandy force was initially contained until the Cobra campaign finally opened operational space. It's hard to see except in retrospect. Operation Dragoon was meant to relieve pressure on the Normandy forces. However, it had been cancelled, or just feinted, have destroyers and land craft show up at a defended area, then turn back. Perhaps Army Group G would have remained in southern France instead of withdrawing enmass. It is hard see how this could have been foreseen. Since when did Hitler allow mass withdrawal and surrender of territory?

[@neilcampbell2222]

The mistake was not having a clear plan as to what to do after Normandy. It is clear in retrospect that the logistics supply train is inadequate for what was done. This would have been clear if reviewed before dday. Something has to change to increase supply or reduce demand. Options are reduce supply to Italy, Southern France, or either Montgomery or Patton. Or to speed supply by earlier targeting of a port. Both Patton and Montgomery were complaining of shortages as they advanced. There are two routes possible from Normandy to industrial northern Germany (which needed capturing to ensure surrender). Either a more southerly route across multiple rivers upstream leading into mountainous / forrested rural areas and then turn north (Patton's route), or a northerly route crossing the same rivers downstream where they are larger, but fewer, avoiding the mountains and staying closer to a captured port (Montgomery's route). One should have been chosen as the primary route. By the autumn of '44 there is no chance of Patton advancing through the mountains before the height of winter. Market-Garden as an aggressive advance would get to there. It has the potential to allow an advance during the winter over the plains and leading to a surrender that winter.

[@michaelkenny8540]

The plan was to build a 'port' on the Atlantic coast (OPERATION CHASTITY) so that supplies and reinforcements could be shipped direct from the USA. However the German collapse meant that Bradley went east instead of west as that was too good an opening to ignore. The original intent was to have a consolidation period where the US built up its troops in the west and then for that entire army to move east and on to Germany for a July 1945 victory. The problem was that no Allied planner expected to be in Belgium by August and you can liken it to someone pushing at a door and then falling flat on his face when the person holding it shut just runs away and leaves you struggling to find your feet. The Allied supply problems was caused by the spectacular success of the Normandy Campaign that was many months ahead of schedule. Montgomery had no real supply problem that burden fell almost entirely on the US Army which was failed by its Quartermaster. Ammo was severely rationed and all Armored Units were short of replacement tanks. Monty could have kept going using his own supply channels as that was something he was quite good at organising. In short no planning could have foreseen the sudden collapse of the German Army in a matter of just 10 weeks.

[@neilcampbell2222]

@@michaelkenny8540 So Patton was sabotaged by his subordinates failing to follow the plans and secure the ports of Cherburg and "chastity" and his own failure to order them. And then blamed everyone else for failures that can be blamed on him.

[@kentr2424]

The Allied supply lines from the Normandy beach head (and ports such as Cherbourg) were getting to be extremely long in summer/early fall of 1944. The Allies needed Antwerp - and its 40,000 tons per day capacity - to get fuel, ammo, food, and all the other supplies a military force needs to the front line troops. The Allies only stopped the chase of the Wehrmacht because the forward divisions ran out of fuel, food, ammo. Read a memoir by George Wilson called If You Survive. He was a Lt in the 4th Infantry Division, and fought all the way from Normandy to the Rhine (where he was wounded and sent to England for treatment). He describes in detail exactly why the 4th Infantry Division was halted at the Siegfried Line by SHAEF - the division had one day's worth of gas, food, and ammo. Had the Allies taken Walcheren (sp?) Island and had the navies clearing the Scheldt Estuary, supplies could've been brought much closer to the front by ship instead of a long road march from the Normandy beaches and small ports on the northern French coast. Failure to advance to clear Walcheren Island meant that the port itself was liberated, but that the German Army controlled the north bank of the Scheldt which rendered the port utterly useless to the Allied cause until Walcheren was cleared of German troops.

[@michaelkenny8540]

If Bradley had taken the Atlantic ports and carried out Operation CHASTITY then there would have been supplies enough for everything. It was Bradley's decision to cancel CHASTITY and his failure to capture Cherbourg and Brest quickly enough to prevent the Germans from destroying the ports infrastructure that caused the supply issues. Blame the man responsible for the hold-ups, Bradley.

[@kentr2424]

@@michaelkenny8540 Even if Bradley HAD taken the Atlantic ports it wouldn't have done much to help the supply situation as a) the distance from Brest to the front was a hundred or more miles than from Normandy and b) the Allies simply didn't have enough transport companies to move supplies that far with any speed....

[@michaelkenny8540]

@@kentr2424 The French railway system south of Normandy had been left relatively intact because it was planned to use those lines to move supplies into France by train. No Allied planner had expected the Germans to be completely destroyed in 2 months and that they would be into Holland by September. All the Allied problems were the problems of success and it would have been impossible to field an Army that could move that far forward fully supplied in 3 months. Totally unrealistic targets have been set for no other reason than to find fault somewhere and in my opinion, find a way to blame Montgomery for it.

[@christopherwebber3804]

Read "it Never Snows in September". Market Garden came so close to success and could have succeeded. The German troops were a far cry from the men of 1940. They were throwing in troops who had only just arrived at the recruiting depots without any training, coastal troops, stomach battalions etc - even the panzer divisions were incomplete and being rebuilt after being destroyed on the eastern front. The biggest mistake was not to give priority to either the British or the Americans and to advance on a broad front. Thus the Germans were able to keep ahead of the allies and there weren't other battles of encirclement after Falaise until the Ruhr pocket.

[@Zagg777]

This is seriously overstated. In any case, over-optimism is hardly a military “mistake”.

[@jameshaxby5434]

I was watching a thing about the Yalta Conference between the allied leaders, and it turned out that we already had a mass of troops south and East of Germany, which were as close, that we could have used to invade Germany without facing the Atlantic wall and the prolonged march through France. But DeGualle convinced us to go through France, which made for longer, bloodier fight.

[@kenlodge3399]

No! Uh-uh! You blew it! First off like to say I love the concept. Observing the history of WWII, just when you think absolutely every angle of that war has been addressed, you guys have seen to it the only remaining discussion I believe remained... finally gets attention. Though I appreciate your effort it's my opinion that of all the amazing blunders that took place, especially in the period of the war you cited, post D-Day, the one I have the hardest time accepting is what has been referred to as the "Ghost Front". The Ardennes, where Germany borders Belgium and Luxembourg. To press your point as to what demonstrates the allies true arrogance and hubris and /or total and brazen lack of military/war history let alone strategic awareness. That the US Army chose that specific area to leave lightly defended with troops in R&R was asking for it. Using the lead up you eloquently provided, it had to be complete absent mindedness less the conviction the war was over and done, even though they couldn't breach the Rhine while still getting lambasted in the Hurtgen forest. At the very spot in the history of all their wars in the west that Germany used to SURPRISE attack going back to the 1870s. The very route Germany utilized to perfection for it being the most unlikely route, had to be a topic of study in every war college and military school, including any and all battle plans for anyone attacking Germany.

[@michaelkenny8540]

Given the ultimate disaster that was their Bulge Offensive The Allies were correct in their assumption the Germans did not have enough resources to mount a successful offensive in late 1944. Yes the Germans could attack but given their situation this was considered such a foolhardy action that no sane commander would attempt it. They did and paid dearly with the destruction of the very last of their reserves. Reserves that could have made the Allied advance over the Rhine much more costly and protracted. You fall into a common trap with the simplistic assumption that because the Germans were not wiped out of captured to the very last man and tank then all their attacks were successful and a 'disaster' for The Allies. The bar for a German success appears to be very low whilst that for an Allied success is insanely high.

[@johnburns4017]

Logistics was the major issue in Eisenhower's mind after the Normandy breakout, so focused on Antwerp. But Antwerp wasn’t the only option. If Eisenhower had let Monty go for a Rhine crossing in late August/early September supported by US divisions, his pursuit operation Operation Comet, they could have got Rotterdam and even Amsterdam instead. Antwerp was an awkward port, being 80 km inland reached by a winding river, with a warren of tidal inlets, islands and estuaries covering the approaches. Many armies came to grief in that part of the world, including a British army in 1809, of which Monty was aware of. Monty was all for bypassing the problems of Antwerp and its approaches, going for Rotterdam. The Germans were still in disarray. The First Allied Airborne Army were on standby and there was fuel in the British tanks. Rotterdam was possible, stopping to open up Antwerp was always going to take too much time. Eisenhower wanted to concentrate on Antwerp as the logistical supply head before pressing on. Antwerp needed protecting from German counter-attack and artillery securing Noord Brabant. Operation Market Garden was that plan. Once Noord Brabant was secure then the approaches to Antwerp could be opened which will take time. Antwerp would not be _fully_ open to allied shipping until early January 1945. The first ships entered in October 1944, but the majority of supplies would come from Normandy until November. Le Havre was operational in October supplying the US armies to the east. Le Havre was not too far away in distance than Antwerp, so there was an over focus on Antwerp. That was around three months from Antwerp's capture. By that time the French railway service had been largely rebuilt and stores coming in from Normandy and Le Havre for Bradley’s 12th Army Group, and through Marseilles for Devers’ 6th Army Group. In August 1944 Monty was for pushing on with a 40 Division thrust. Eisenhower was for caution with his broad-front. Eisenhower's caution allowed the Germans breathing space to reinforce, gifting them an opportunity to counter-attack. Eisenhower's caution only made it easier to supply those armies to force the Germans back.

[@craigclemens986]

Patton was no where near Rotterdam or Amsterdam. His drive to the Rhine was through Alsace-Lorraine, through the back side of the Maginot Line.

[@johnburns4017]

@@craigclemens986 We know that. Patton never got over the Maginot Line (German westwall), after telling Bradley on 5 November 1944 he would be over it in a few days - suffering 50,000 casualties in Lorraine.

[@pfarden5836]

Ike would have been crazy to trust Monty. He was always late. Late at Caen, late at the Falaise gap, late at Market garden. He just should have given Patton the fuel and supplies he needed and let the hound off his leash.

[@johnburns4017]

@@pfarden5836 Churchill was crazy to trust Eisenhower, who was inexperienced and proved to be an incompetent. Patton had all the fuel, men and supplies and *failed* in the Lorraine with 50,000 casualties. The Saar was an unimportant part of Germany. The important part with most German troops was the Ruhr. Monty was not late at Caen, he never initially bothered to take an unimportant 2nd tier objective inland city, not wanting to tie up vital resources when the important issue was to establish a supply beachhead. Ports were important. The Falaise Gap was not closed by orders from Bradley. Montgomery was most successful allied commander in WW2. He went thru 9 counties without a reverse. He had to take command of two shambolic US armies in the German Bulge attack. Eisenhower was slow. His broad-front proved that. Monty did not want to stop, wanting a 40 division thrust. Monty moved over 1,000 km in 17 days in North Africa. The fastest advance in WW2. Do not get your history from Hollywood.

[@pfarden5836]

@@johnburns4017 revisionist hogwash. What lengthened the war was slo-mo Monty's failures at Caen, the Falaise Gap and the idiocy of Market Garden. Monty couldn't afford casualties like the Americans or the Russians could with their endless supply of men. Look at how slow he was from the end of Market Garden to the end of the war. He crawled the last 4 months of the war against a retreating enemy. His success in N. Africa only occurred because the Americans gave him an overwhelming number of tanks and other equipment against an army running out of it's own The loss of Gott and O'Connor was a curse the Brits never fully recovered.

[@westpointsnell4167]

For the British I feel that market garden was not the answer to shorten the war losing a whole para division...

[@michaelkenny8540]

It was sitting around doing nothing so why not use it? . One of the reasons for Arnhem going ahead is the fear the war would end with any real glory for the Paras.

[@nigelmansfield3011]

History is what history is. Speculating on what might have been is never sure, who knows what other problems might have eventuated?

[@kaletovhangar]

After looking at topic through some not so obvious factors, the allies could have probably captured Tunisia by end of 1942,could have landed earlier at Sicily and Southern Italy,even went further east through France,but I seriously doubt that they could cross the Rhine by end of the year.Logistics and weather prevented any such ideas. If Soviet Red army from the get go decided to retreat in depth of the country instead of conducting futile counterattacks,Germans could have probably been already stopped along the Dvina-Dnieper line,but that wouldn't have necesarily shortened the war.In february of 1945,Red army was already close to Berlin, but knew better than to rush without supplies into heavily entrenched city,and opted to first clear the flanks like Germans did in late summer of 1941. I seriously doubt that war could have ended much earlier than it did. Only thing that maybe would have allowed that would have probably been Red army offensives in late 1942-early 1943.If they didn't obsess about Rzhev salient so much and focused more mobile troops and logistics in Southern parts of the front,maybe entire AG south could have been encircled and destroyed south of Don,but it's doubtful.In that case,AG center could have probably sent it's forces south and broken through the siege.Still,it's interesting to think about possibility that Red army could have reached Dnieper by march of 1943,rolled the right flank of AG center and already by summer of 1943,instead of battle of Kursk,there probably could have been German offensive at Smolensk or Kiev,and Red army probably reaching Minsk,Pskov,Odessa and Lviv by year's end.So by late 1944,Oder line would have already been breached,but again, Berlin wouldn't probably fallen before February 1945.

[@Jinxohh]

Valid points you make there, but they still had a tough and stubborn opponent fighting to the death.

[@Russell-re8te]

The Allied failure to seize a major port by coup, and the failure to take Caen in the first day(s) of Overlord, combined with the doomed efforts of Market Garden, and the Hurtgen forest fiasco, destroyed any chance of the Allies ending the war prior to 1945.

[@Bullet-Tooth-Tony-]

The Broadfront strategy.

[@sharonwhiteley6510]

When taking Antwerp, the Allies faced heavy flooding caused by the Germans. At times, troops were sent into obvious funnels where the Germans held the highground on both sides. The Canadians were hit especially hard in attempts in these conditions. Also, the Allies were outrunning their supply lines. Montgomery should have faced expulsion following OPERATION MARKET GARDEN. He refused to accept information received from the Dutch resistance and underground. Also, recon photos showed obvious armor/artillery in the area. Again, he blew this off as just a few old men. Plus, the road leading to the primary objective was narrow. This hampered the rate of tracked vehicles, supplies, etc. The civilians were partially blocking the road while trying to evacuate. At one point, the British troops actually stopped for tea. The British personnel were informed to try to keep destruction of civilian hones/businesses to a minimum. Montgomery wanted to "be helpful to the locals". In contrast, if Americans were informed of a potential target, i.e., tank hiding in a building, it was fired upon even if "they didn't have direct eye contact with the target." The British had to confirm before firing. This initially resulted in the loss of material and men. Even though not mentioned, just before the Battle of the Bulge began, troops along the front reported hearing a large amount of tracked vehicles and trucks moving at night. The command staff didn't believe the reports. Saying it was probably a "ghost army" (just sound tracks like the Allies had used multiple times as a ruse). Another huge blunder. At least the best response of the war was given: NUTS. It's like in Italy. When the Allies initially approached Rome, there were no Germans. Instead of maintaining their push forward, Clark had the men dig in and wait. Thinking it was a trap. This provided the Germans to regroup and take control of Rome. What about the Battle of Hurtgen forest? The Germans were dumbstruck when the Allies went through Hurtgen.

[@terrysmith9362]

Sharon learn some history about MG

[@terrysmith9362]

They stopped for tea?????. A complete lie. Good old Stephen Ambrose. What a wonderful Anglophobe

[@johnburns4017]

@Sharon Whiteley Montgomery never planned or was involved in the execution of Market Garden, only proposing the concept. Eisenhower approved, under resourcing the operation. Two American Air Force Generals, Brereton, in command of the First Allied Airborne Army, and Williams, USAAF, were the prime culprits of why the Market Garden plan was flawed. The Market part was planned by mainly Americans while Garden mainly the British. Nevertheless, despite their failings, the operation failed to be a 100% success by a whisker. It was Brereton and Williams who: *1)* Ignored nearly all the Airborne tactics and doctrine that had been established, practised and performed in operations in Sicily, Italy and Normandy; *2)* Who decided that there would be drops spread over three days, losing all surprise, defeating the object of para jumps; *3)* Who decided that there would only be one airlift on the first day, despite there being multiple airlifts on day one on Operation Dragoon weeks previously. The RAF offered to man the US planes for a second lift but were refused; *4)* Who rejected the glider coup-de-main on the bridges that had been so successful on D-Day on the Pegasus bridge and which had been agreed to on the previously planned Operation Comet; *5)* Who chose the drop and landing zones so far from bridges - RAF were partly to blame here by agreeing; *6)* Who would not allow the ground attack fighters to attack the Germans while the escort fighters were protecting the transports and thereby not hindering the German reinforcements. Ground attack fighters were devastating in Normandy, yet rarely seen at Market Garden; *7)* Who rejected drops south of the Wilhelmina Canal that would prevent the capture of the bridges at Son, Best and Eindhoven by the 101st because of "possible flak". The job of the Airborne was to capture the bridges with as Brereton said 'thunderclap surprise'. Only one bridge, at Grave, was planned and executed using Airborne tactics of surprise, speed and aggression - land as close to the objectives as possible and attack the bridge simultaneously from both ends. General Gavin of the 82nd decided to lower the priority of the biggest road bridge in Europe, the Nijmegen road bridge, going against orders compromising the operation. To compound his error, lack of judgment or refusal to carry out an order, he totally ignored the adjacent Nijmegen rail bridge, which the Germans had installed wooden planks between the rails for light vehicles to move on. At the time of the landings by the 82nd there were only 19 Germans guarding both bridges with a few troops in the town. There were no bridge defences such as ditches and barbed wire. This has been confirmed by German archives. Gavin sent only two companies of the 508 seven hours after they had landed to capture the bridges. They arrived at 2200, eight hours after being ready to march. Company A moved towards the bridge while Company B got lost. In the interim eight hours the 19 guards had been replaced by Kampfgruppe Henke with 750 men and then a brigade of the 10th SS Panzer Division (infantry) setting up shop in the park adjacent to the south side of the road bridge at 1900 hours, five hours after the jump. The Germans occupied the town, which was good defensive territory being rubble in the centre as the USAAF had previously bombed the town in March 1944 by mistake thinking they were in Germany, killing 800. An easy taking of the bridge had now passed. XXX Corps Guards Division's aim was to reach Arnhem at 15.00 on D-Day+2. They arrived at Nijmegen in the morning of D-Day+2, with only 7 miles to go to Arnhem. Expecting to cross the road bridge they found it in German hands with Germans fighting 82nd men at the edge of the town, seeing something seriously had gone wrong. The 82nd had not captured either of the bridges or cleared out the Germans from Nijmegen town itself. XXX Corps then had to seize both bridges themselves and clear the Germans from the town, using some 82nd men in clearing the town, seizing the bridge themselves. What you see in the film 'A Bridge Too Far' is fiction. It was the Grenadier Guards tanks and the Irish Guards infantry who seized the Nijmegen road bridge. If the 82nd had seized the road bridge, immediately on landing, as ordered, XXX Corp's Guards Division would have reached Arnhem well within time relieving the British 1st Airborne men on the north side of Arnhem bridge. The German archives state quite clearly that failure to capture the Nijmegen bridge on d-day was the reason for XXX Corps not making a bridgehead north of the Rhine. A clear failure by General Gavin. Even the US Official War record confirms this. The Market part of Market Garden failed. The Garden part was a success. XXX Corps hardly put a foot wrong.

[@terrysmith9362]

Are you seriously suggesting Hurtigen was anything other than a disaster. It was the only mass retreat by allied forces post dday

[@johnburns4017]

@@terrysmith9362 Hurtgen Forest was a US defeat. 33,000 casualties, when they could have gone around it. The biggest retreat after D-day was the US retreat in the German Bulge attack. 85,000 casualties.

[@michaelbowes9894]

Caen, Market Garden, The Ardennes, the Allies failed their way to victory. For me, Mark Clarke's grandstand move of liberating Rome instead of going across Italy and cutting off the German armies to the south was one of the big mistakes, and led to a great many seasoned troops being tied down on an unnecessary front.

[@neiltappenden1008]

Also being tied up at monte casino hence being slowed down by winter roads

[@DFMSelfprotection]

His Glory Hunt to get to Rome for the cameras cost an estimated 50,000 extra casualties. If he had done what he was ordered it could saw the allies push faster up Italy.

[@terrysmith9362]

CAEN.You are ignorant of history. Described by Bradley as a great noble national sacrifice when in a preplanned strategy. 21st Army Group took on 9 German divisions and 700 tanks in a war of attrition to enable an American.breakout. Also the plan was to reach the Seine by day 90. They did it by Dsy 78

[@michaelbowes9894]

@@terrysmith9362 pardon my ignorance O Great One! As I understood it, the plan was indeed to hold a strong flank guard, but Montgomery did boast ( how very strange, coming from him) that he would take Caen at the end of day 1. I think it generally agreed that Caen was a failure ( Beevor, Ambrose, Wilmot). Certainly 6 weeks to cover 8 miles under overwhelming air cover is not a responding success.

[@terrysmith9362]

@@michaelbowes9894 Caen was not taken the first day as St Lo and Cherbourg were also not taken on the first day. Its called strong enemy resistanc. The plan spelt out at St Pauls School pre Dday was that 21st Arny Group would take on the bulk of German forces around the Caen area to allow American forces to build up in order to make the breakout. This is confirmed by both Bradley and Eusenhower. This is exactly what hapoened. 21st Group faced 9 divisions and 700 tanks whereas Bradley faced 2 divisions and 200 tanks. Bradley called it a noble national sacrifice. The plan WORKED. The objective was to get to the Seine by 90 days. They did it in 78. Take no notice Ambrose. He was simply an Anglophobic liar. Read Alanbrooke, Horrocks, Bradley Eisenhower who were there

[@waydel4]

In Europe the big mistake was the broad front. The Battle of Hürtgen Forest could have been avoided by bombing and burning the forest. Giving Paton enough fuel to go to Berlin. In the pacific the Mark IXV torpedos should have been tested before 18 months into the war. That one thing alone cost the lives of over 3,000 sailors.

[@johnelliott7375]

We love all these videos I still can watch them twice while waiting for the new ones to come out!

[@chrisholland7367]

The mistake of not reinforcing Singapore sufficiency especially after Hong Kong had fallen. The overconfident some may arrogant oversight of senior command. The lack of vision foresight to see what was on the way.

[@Rossbach2]

Had it not been for the Western Allies' silly insistence of "unconditional surrender", we likely could have induced the German High Command to enter into negotiations for a separate peace and allowed them to use a greater fraction of their resources against the Red Army. This would have spared Eastern Europe from the Red Army invasion of 1944-45, weakened the USSR, and made Germany a powerful Western ally for decades to come. A similar approach in the Western Pacific could have ended with the US and Japan crushing the Maoists in China and limiting support of Communist insurrections in SE Asia. No Korean War, No Vietnam War, no Cold War.

[@duniagowes]

It seems the Allies didn't have any concise longer term plan after Normandy? Wondering

[@thevillaaston7811]

How concise should such a plan have been?

[@guyvert49]

mistakes are made on both sides. Market Garden was an allied failure. The Bulge was a German failure. Perhaps they evened themselves out!

[@Jinxohh]

The bulge was definitely a risky play and at that point of the war a risk was worth taking

[@guyvert49]

@@Jinxohh afterwards the generals said that it was their greatest mistake

[@Jinxohh]

@@guyvert49 when you’re being pincered from both sides you don’t have much options to regain any initiative

[@guyvert49]

@@Jinxohh actually the war was lost when Barbarossa failed. It was just a question of time, pincer or not

[@Jinxohh]

@@guyvert49 nah I don’t believe that it was over when the Germans targeted Moscow instead heading the caucuses to fight the war of attrition and failed by 1942 to achieve that goal fully.

[@alpearson9158]

biggest mistake simple the US not entering the war until actually attacked. Most agree that if the US had joined the allies in early 1941 then the European war would have ended about the middle of 44 and Japan would never have attacked a US already on a war footing. Hindsight yes but pretty much would have changed much

[@peterfeltham5612]

A very good brief summersation of the events at the close of the W11,however i do believe that Market Garden was fundamentally a sound and good idea,it's failure was more a question of bad luck than bad planning.

[@raywhitehead730]

Mark Clarks decision to capture Rome, instead of destroying retreating German Army under Kesselring in the Italian campaign.

[@MainesOwn]

The content is very interesting and fascinating but the computer voice makes it very hard to listen to it for more than a few minutes. That's a shame.

[@johnwright291]

Very well done. Obviously the allies dropped the ball when it came to the ardennes situation.

[@billburr5881]

Many think the Italian campaign was a mistake, or at best an irrelevance. However, the airfields in Italy made the attacks on the Oil fields of Romania much more effective. The resultant fuel shortage was a serious problem for the Germans, critical at times e.g. Ardennes 1944 or pilot training.

[@avenaoat]

I am against this. After the peace of Italy the Germany army had to send 40 divisions to substitute the Italian divisions in Italy, Southern France and in the Balkan! The Soviet Red Army got areas easily from the German Army and the Red Army reached Romania! The half of the 40 divisions could have stopped the Red Army! According to me the biggest mistake was to send British and Australian divisions to Malaya. They would have sent these divisions to India! But we would not have watched the movie Bridge on the River Kwai!

[@johnburns4017]

@bill burr Sicily had to be taken to shorten the route to India and the Far East though the Med. Britain supplied armies in the Middle East and North Africa via the Cape for two years. The equivalent of sailing half way around the world. Opening up the Med made matters so much easier. Many merchant ships were released to supply the North Atlantic route.

[@billburr5881]

Market Garden - putting Monty in charge of an offensive that needed dash and elan - crazy. He was always way too cautious!

[@terrysmith9362]

Oh dear. Another Hollywood historian. Do you know Horrocks troops advanced 400k in 6 days. Is that slow?

[@bigwoody4704]

Where in a desert as empty as your head?Monty never caught Rommel in 1500 miles with every conceivable advantage - BIG ADVANTAGES

[@terrysmith9362]

@@bigwoody4704 why do you hate Brits?

[@CM-ve1bz]

The biggest mistake of the allies in WWII was they didn't make a hard left and go to Moscow.

[@xornxenophon3652]

Maybe one should add the "minor error" made by Stalin in 1941, when he did not listen to his secret service and the warnings of the British that Germany was preparing an invasion of the Soviet Union...

[@craigclemens986]

It wouldn’t have mattered much.

[@markgendala5689]

A film about it was called "A Bridge Too Far"

[@oatis053]

The biggest mistake in my humble opinon was putting Montgomery in command of the ground forces instead of Patton!

[@michaelkenny8540]

Look up Metz and see why Patton was unsuited.

[@oatis053]

@@michaelkenny8540 Metz would have been a struggle for any general. Look up Market Garden. Look up the battle for Caen. How about not closing the Falaise pocket. These were just a few of Montgomery's failures. The only way Montgomery ever won a battle, is if he had overwhelming superiority. Even then victory was not assured.

[@michaelkenny8540]

​@@oatis053 How about Patton not closing The Bulge and capturing all those Germans? Perhaps you should check the numbers before claiming Monty only won because he outnumbered the Germans and you would see that the US Forces always outnumbered the Germans by much more than Monty did. Oh and check which Para unit failed to take its bridges on time at Arnhem-the 82nd!

[@oatis053]

@@michaelkenny8540 The whole plan of Market Garden was a failure. It should never have even taken place. Certainly not the fault of the very distinguished 82nd Airborne. But Eisenhower, being more of a statesman than a general, wanted to mollify the Brits by letting Montgomery go ahead with his plan. Patton was one of the main reasons the Germans were stopped at the Bulge. Without question, Patton was one of the best field commanders during the war, on both sides!

[@michaelkenny8540]

@@oatis053 ​ Eisenhower is the one who gave the go-ahead for Arnhem.? The 'failure' to take Antwerp first is again down to Eisenhower as he never made it a priority. Is it not the case that the man in charge is responsible for both his decisions and his non-decisions?

[@michaeldowson6988]

Depends which country you're from. Canada considers the messed up raid on Dieppe the worst. Or the Battle of Monte Cassino in Italy. Serving under Montgomery was deadly.

[@terrysmith9362]

Oh God such rubbish. Monty was back in the UK when Monte Cassino happened

[@michaeldowson6988]

@@terrysmith9362 Montgomery ordered the useless Battle of Ortona; he had some Red Army observers with him at one point in Italy.

[@terrysmith9362]

@@michaeldowson6988 oh behave

[@michaeldowson6988]

@@terrysmith9362 The Battle of the Scheldt was fun with little material left, after the raid on Arrhem.

[@terrysmith9362]

@@michaeldowson6988 like you I never fought in the war but I would never regard it as fun. Do you know that the Allies advanced 60 miles and liberated 000's of Dutch. I am sure they were relieved when their fun ended. I am sure the Londoners were relieved when their fun ended with the destruction of the V1 sites. i am sure you know that US General Brereton was responsible for the planning of the airborne ops which resulted in too few troops on the ground. I am sure you are aware that the failure of Gavin to take Nijmegen bridge which led to a 36 hour delay which was the ultimate reason why Frost could not be relieved. Google Charles B. McDonald, an American soldier/historian and discover who and what about MG rather than rely on Hollywood

[@rudolfx1070]

Piping gasoline under the Channel seas to Normandy got us to the Rhine seven months early.

[@vblake530530]

The information was good. The images were totally random. The A.I. voice was Basic.

[@westpointsnell4167]

For the Americans it was the hurtgen forest..this battle was so unnecessary,the Americans could have gone around it and avoided

[@bigwoody4704]

Sorry The GIs were not going to leave that many Germans behind them like Monty at Antwerp - that didn't get opened until November 28th.And the Brits weren't taking a step toward Germany w/o American men/materiel/food/fuel/tanks/trucks

[@westpointsnell4167]

@@bigwoody4704 huh??

[@bigwoody4704]

The GIs were not going to leave how many divisions in their rear,leaving them easily in a pinch depending how the Wehrmacht would attack them.Montgomery did precisely that not opening the deep water port of Antwerp.That he had to order opened after his mad dash for glory failed.Any operation of this size needed immediate resupply,they couldn't depend on the Allied air corp factoring in distance/weather/AA Guns/troop movements.Antwerp was needed and Germans were there. Same thing you go around a Position in this case the Hurtgen,you risk flanking in front/back/sides a huge tactical blunder

[@lewis7315]

The entire Italian campaign!!! Invading Italy in the South, then having to fight all the way North up the Italian mountain chain... Next, The failure of the invasion of Rome was because of total incompetence, not advancing immediately waiting for the Germans to encircle them before finally breaking out at dreadful cost.

[@Chris-tn7qp]

In hindsight, partnering with Stalin's Russia.

[@billballbuster7186]

The Americans were the problem, totally unrealistic in their planning and strategy, expecting to just walk into Berlin in 1943. Roosevelt's ill timed declaration of Unconditional Surrender, which he did without consulting his allies, stiffened Axis resistance immeasurably. Eisenhower's slow advance, the "Broad Front" strategy, gave the Germans breathing space to regroup instead of keeping them on the run.

[@mikeanderson4401]

No mention of the Battle of the Bulge ? Why did it take the Americans by surprise?

[@frankhaddock5577]

Eisenhower always deferred to the British defer to the British by attacking Sicily and Italy instead of going to Sardinia like he proposed in the beginning of the campaign. He gave the right flank of the Normandy invasion to the British and Montgomery was noted to have very little panache when it comes to fighting. Obvious choice would have been general Patton who was dynamic aggressive and would have taken Khan on the first day which was the key to the battle in northern France. The Americans wanted Cherbourg for its port which turned out to be useless and did not contribute to the campaign.

[@WJack97224]

The mistake was in not nipping AH in the "bud." Immediate invasion of Germany and marching on Berlin in 1936 when the Rheinland was occupied would have eliminated AH.

[@kevinlove4356]

Politically impossible! Everyone in France and Britain was mourning the massive Great War casualties and would have (and did do) anything to avoid another war.

[@ub1953]

HURTGEN FOREST and don't overlook some major landings in the PACIFIC that in retrospect yielded little at major cost.

[@johnburns4017]

Iwo Jima was non-strategic. Because the US could build a long range bomber correctly, they took the island to form an emergency landing strip for B29s in trouble. Most B29s lost were not to enemy action. So all that blood because the aircraft industry screwed up.

[@bigwoody4704]

Burns unlike you they straightned the problems out with the Superfortress.The only thing non strategic in the Pacific is your British bombast envious as your empire got shoved aside so slappies like you badmouth dead GIs

[@westpointsnell4167]

This is just Westpoints opinion ..I hit both British and Americans on the subject.. Wars aren't won in one day,mistakes were made ,politics played a role and the fighting man suffered as a result ,or it's just that the Germans were very elite fighters and knee how to use the land for which they fought on...

[@roybennett9284]

Not getting another Australian division in the D-day Invasion.. after the 6th,7th,9th..had shown the world that like in the first world war we love punching above our weight..ask Rommel at Tobruk.

[@brucenorman8904]

There were NO Australian divisions in D-Day by 1944 the Australian divisions had been returned to Australia to fight the Japanese.

[@roybennett9284]

@@brucenorman8904 yes Bruce I realise that but even Churchill himself vwhen at the moment of doubt wished he had the Australian divvy in the landing.

[@OldWolflad]

Rommel initially considered Aussie troops the best the British Empire had, but then reviewed his view and said that honour went to the New Zealand Army. Having said all that, in Africa, Aussie and NZ troops were volunteer, and inevitably better than conscript armies at the time like the British who Rommel said were 'tenacious and tough, but immobile' - a reflection of British Commanders cautious approach. . Rommel certainly highly respected specialist British Army groups like Commando units - Long-range Commando Group and SAS Commando groups gave him more trouble than any other similar unit according to Rommel, to the point that Hitler ordered that all captured British Commandos were to be executed. The Germans also respected the Red Devils (Red Beret British Paras), the famed German commander Wilhelm Biitrich said they gave him the hardest fighting he ever experienced in all his years of fighting. The Canadian and South African troops were also highly rated, but Rommel doesn't mention the former, not sure why as they were very highly regarded by British commanders.

[@michaelkenny8540]

@@OldWolflad Gotta love the way everyone thinks 'their' nation is feared by the enemy.........

[@OldWolflad]

@@michaelkenny8540 I don't think the Germans feared anyone TBH

[@crustyoldfart]

Up to the liberation of Paris on 25th August 1944 all had gone essentially according to plan. After that date proper planning of the ground war by Allied forces suffered a number of serious setbacks : First was the seldom mentioned Paris Black Market in which theft of war materiel commenced on an industrial scale and continued for years thereafter. Next was the effect of battle fatigue, which we now know cuts in after something like 70 to 90 days of continuing combat. This caught the US forces by surprise, and their recruiting and replacement policies were essentially inadequate to maintain a fully effective force. The British who had been fighting more or less continuously since May 1940 had exhausted their reserves of manpower by that time and this had a highly detrimental effect on general moral. The manpower situation, withe US forces gradually assuming an increasing share of the fighting led to there being essentially no coordinated ground force strategy. after Montgomery was relegated to a secondary role. A case can be made that winning the western European theatre of operations was largely to the credit of Allied Air Forces. Another fact that seldom gets mentioned is that the German Army was the best at that time.

[@michaelkenny8540]

The whole NWE Allied campaign was a spectacular success and far from being 'slow' they actually had forecast a date of July 1945 for the German surrender. It is amazing the number of people who are trying to find ways to take away the credit and find fault where non exists. Yes the Germans kept fighting after Normandy but that in no way means they put up an EFFECTIVE fight. They were totally routed in Normandy and never recovered from that debacle. Can anyone explain why a 11 month campaign then ends with total victory is 'slow' and why an army that was always going backwards is considered effective? From what I see those in awe of all things German completely ignore the overall strategic situation and obsess over Umpenstumpenfuhrer Heinz Beanz knocking out 10 Shermans with his Tiger whilst his SS Division is defeated sent fleeing for the Rhine. They elevate meaningless small German tactical wins into great victories and totally ignore the massive strategic blunders & defeats . It is like boasting your team scored 4 goals in their last game but not adding that the other side scored 12

[@crustyoldfart]

@@michaelkenny8540 With respect for what you point out, I think it is somewhat misdirected in this particular discussion. We are looking at what mistakes the Allied Forces made in the campaign. We do this as interested amateurs. I don't think anyone is disputing that the German armies were defeated. Beyond that can anyone claim that the Allies fought a perfect campaign ? It is also well known that reported history always omits the facts that are awkward and embarrassing to the victors. It is concerns like these which are being questioned here - at least that is what I have assumed, and attached my remarks accordingly. You write " those in awe of all things German completely ignore the overall strategic situation obsess over Umpenstumpenfuhrer Heinz Beanz knocking out 10 Shermans with his Tiger " WOW ! Such a remark leaves little doubt about how you feel personally about certain individual Germans. I can only remark that those who seek to identify our own mistakes do not necessarily simultaneously try to glorify the enemy. Furthermore those who can find charity in themselves may realize that these young men in their Tigers undoubtedly believed the lies their own leaders told them, [ in the same way that most people do to this day ] especially as dissent during wartime is a perilous position to take.

[@michaelkenny8540]

@@crustyoldfartThe history of WW2 was written by the defeated German Generals. For decades they were allowed to distort and fabricate 'their' version of history. The 'we were only following orders'/Hitler's mistakes lost us the war'/If he had listened to me we would have won in 1942' etc. Uncritical acceptance of this skewed German narrative distorted Western history books and the Germans were allowed to completely whitewash their crimes in Russia and establish the myth that they were 'outnumbered' and thus never had any chance of winning. Its absurd to claim the Allies covered up their campaign mistakes as nearly every post-war WW2 history delights in recounting how the Allies were constantly outfought by the outnumbered Germans who only turned and fled when their tanks ran out of petrol. Special classes of tank casualty were specifically invented to take away the ignominy of Germans soldiers simply running away for their fully functioning tanks instead of standing and fighting in them-the 'non combat' loss. The 'abandoned/ran out of petrol/blown up by crew panzer loss so beloved by those who are smitten by all things Panther and Tiger. .

[@ristorantanen5769]

The US was very concerned that the public support would falter should they lose too many troops. This influenced the tactics and also led to that all of eastern Europe came under Soviet rule after the war. A tragedy that we still suffer under now as Russia seeks to reinstate this hegemony with military force

[@frankohrt3347]

The Soviets had the western allies heavily outnumbered. We would have lost a fight for Eastern Europe.

[@ristorantanen5769]

@@frankohrt3347 Its not so much the numbers Ivan will accept losses that we never ever could, hence the number issue can be negotiated with kills. But ppl were weary of the war, Britain was a spent force close to bankruptcy. It took them 30 years to recower economically. The United States was also starting to feel the cost of the warbonds and the goverment -warmachine was streched beyond what it was designed for. And beyond the losses, added to that there was a true fear that if the war prolonged and became too costly, a dictatorship would follow. The fear of socialism was a lot stronger then. Makes one think

[@frankhaddock5577]

He took supplies away from Patton to give to Montgomery to be used in the field market garden campaign. Patton would have crossed the R😮hine and entered Germany in 1944. Eisenhower's more a politician than a general. He was placed in command because of general Marshall who really ran the army through him.

[@susanwhite7474]

This makes a lot of sense. Thanks!

[@3lullabies]

The lack of defense at Pearl when Japan was so clearly on the move. Or thinking the Nazis wouldn't come through the Ardennes.

[@user-et5lt4gf4i]

The mistake the AIF made was too much celebrating and not securing the french-german border and approaching Berlin from the southwest. the Battle of the Bulge could've been avoided ending WWII October 1944

[@TheYeti308]

Hooking up with the sowjet .

[@scoutandastir]

Biggest mistake is that they didn't start building the Chunnel before 1941.

[@michaelmayfield4304]

The UK wanted to Italian campaign, as well as a possile Balkan or Greek campaign as a means of protecting the Suez Canal and restoring their empire after the war.

[@eltonrista3243]

Of course the Allies would be confident in a quick collapse of Germany. You’re only looking at the drop in the bucket, Fallaise. You forget that at the same time operation Bagration had succeeded in destroying Army group center, 1million men, and the subsequent chess like operations of the red army severely weakened army group South and effectively encircled army group north. By September the situation in the east was beyond calamitous for the Germans. The Soviet juggernaut only stooped because it had reached the end of it’s supply lines. Romania and it’s oil fields were by now in Soviet hands effectively sealing the fate of the third reich. The fall was only a matter of time at this point. Who wouldn’t be euphoric.

[@jimthorne304]

I think a much bigger mistake was invading Italy, starting at the South end of the country.

[@lonnieparsons5058]

The thought that daylight bombing would work. I have often wonder why more attention wasn’t paid to power stations, no power limits the capability to produce. I would also add that having Mac Arthur any where near a command position didn’t help in the Pacific.

[@JonathonMitchell-ig4bv]

What is British one world wars without allied forces

[@24bronte]

to walk around with silly gas masks that were never used by anyone, the MP who dreamed that up should be unmasked.

[@jeffbybee5207]

24bronty did you know why the germans did not use gas in ww2? The allies had huge stockpiles of nitrogen tanks to keep the recoil working in artillery and thought they were poison gas so dared not open that kind of warfare. Also prevailing wind went west to east

[@NorthDownReader]

@@jeffbybee5207 "The allies had huge stockpiles of nitrogen tanks to keep the recoil working in artillery and thought they were poison gas so dared not open that kind of warfare." The Americans took mustard gas with them wherever they went, just in case. Hence the disaster at Bari.

[@briancooper4959]

My vote for the greatest Allied mistake would be the failure of Eisenhower to allow Patton to close the Falaise gap. An entire German army escaped to fight another day. Yes, it would have been a risky tactical move, and would have certainly resulted in many casualties as the Germans fought desperately to force their way out, but it was a moment that cried out for a bold move that might have lead to the surrender of between 50,000 and 100,000 German troops and the total - instead of partial - loss of their equipment. Such a defeat would likely have dramatically weakened the defenses at the Siegfried Line, allowing for quicker penetration of that barrier, and leaving the Germans no room or forces to launch their later Ardennes Offensive. Eisenhower's reasoning for forcing Patton to halt was based less on the tactical problems than on political considerations.

[@cajunengineer7874]

Exactly right! Montgomery refused to close the Falaise gap and when Patton wanted to do it, Eisenhower vetoed that plan based on political pressure from Churchill. Falaise could (should) have been another Stalingrad with an entire army destroyed.

[@adamstrange7884]

The biggest mistake by far was King not mandating blackout for the East Coast and Gulf Coast and Caribbean Island chains in the first year of the war.

[@bigwoody4704]

Ya there is that too - many a merchant marine never made it home,not to mention the value of the loads lost

[@scooterbob4432]

U boats sank a total of 233 US and allied ships in the US Atlantic East Coast and Gulf of Mexico.

[@TheCdecisneros]

Not turning Patton loose.

[@stevenescover7251]

The errors go back further. The allies should have taken Sardinia after Sicilian campaign. The placing of air force bombers in Sardinia would have allowed for the invasion of Southern France with plenty of air protection from Sardinia and Corsica. Completing this in 43 would have drained Axis troops southward in France. Once Southern French coast line was taken we could have pushed up into the Rhone Valley and into the Po Valley cutting of large axis formations and equipment. We were strong in naval capacity and the axis were weak. Our bombers we're superior and the P 51 escorts were chewing up the Axis. In 44 the invasion of Normandy would have worked well then.

[@grantcarpenter5313]

Thank you. Very well done. I think you hit the nail on the head.. What was Germany's greatest mistake?

[@jaybrown6174]

The biggest mistake the Americans and British made in the war was in helping Russia as much as they did! They should have given Russia only enough help to keep them fighting the Germans as far east in Russia as possible. Then when the Americans and British finally defeated Germany they could have saved all of Eastern Europe from Russian communism and brutality! The world would be a better place.

[@Thom3748]

Where's Russia in this assessment? Eight out of ten German soldiers were killed on the Eastern Front. That tells you where the most important battles of the war took place. What happened in the East is far more important than a few mistakes on the Western front. Indeed, the real story here is that the U.S. and UK forces would have never been able to pull off an invasion of Europe without Russia as an ally.

[@jamieholtsclaw2305]

The overconfidence after Falaise didn't cause the failure to use Antwerp as a port. The failure to seize every meter of the land between Antwerp and the English channel did that. I always found it baffling that the British overlooked that.

[@michaelkenny8540]

Be baffled no more. There were not enough troops available to 'take every meter of land between Antwerp and the channel' and get as far as Brussels. A lot of units were grounded when their transport was diverted to helping the advance get into Belgium.

[@johnburns4017]

Logistics was the major issue but Antwerp wasn’t the only option. If Eisenhower had let Monty go for a Rhine crossing in late August/early September - Operation Comet - with the intent of making the inland sea in Holland they could have got Rotterdam and even Amsterdam instead. Antwerp was an awkward port, being 80km inland with a warren of tidal inlets, islands and estuaries covering the approaches. Many an army came to grief in that part of the world - a British one was destroyed there in 1809. If Monty was all for bypassing the problems of Antwerp and gaining Rotterdam it wouldn't have been the worst judgement, it was very sound. The Germans were still reeling, the paras were on standby with fuel in the tanks. Rotterdam was possible. Stopping to open up Antwerp was always going to take considerable time. Eisenhower, felt it was better to concentrate on Antwerp as the supply head before pressing on - operation Market Garden was that plan. And then the endless operations from Hurtgen Forest to Walcheren. Antwerp would not be fully open to allied shipping until early January 1945. The first ships entered in October 1944, but the majority of supplies would come from Normandy until November. That was three months from Antwerp's capture. Twice the time it took to break out of Normandy. By that time the French railway service had been largely rebuilt with stores coming in from Normandy and LeHavre, for Bradley’s 12th Army Group, and Marseilles, for Devers’ 6th Army Group. The supplies could be shifted faster. Monty was for pushing on in early September,, Eisenhower was cautious. Eisenhower's caution allowed the Germans breathing space to reinforce gifting them an opportunity to consolidate then strike back. Pushing Monty into Holland and then going for caution was sound - you get Rotterdam and possibly Antwerp .

[@bigwoody4704]

Quit pulling bombast from your ample backside slappie *The Dutch Army Staff College final exam before the war asked students about how to advance north on just this road. Any student suggesting a direct assault up the road was failed on the spot. Only flanking well to the west was accepted as an answer* It appears that Monty wouldn't have passed in the Dutch Army *With Prejudice, by Air Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, Page 599* " Eisenhower assumed, as he and I had done all along, that whatever happened Montgomery would concentrate on opening up Antwerp. No one could say that we had not emphasized the point sufficiently by conversation and signal." *Ardennes 1944,By Sir Antony Beevor,page 14* Sir Bertram Ramsey ,Allied Naval commander-in-chief had told SHAEF and Monty that the Germans could block the Scheldt Estuary with ease. The mistake lay with Monty,who was not interested in the estuary and thought the Canadians could clear it later.* *page 19* Admiral Ramsey was livid that SHAEF,and especially Monty,had ignored his warnings to secure the Scheldt estuary and the approaches to Antwerp -From Triumph in the West, by Arthur Bryant, From the *diary of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke* entry for 5 October 1944: Page 219 "...During the whole discussion one fact stood out clearly, that access to Antwerp must be captured with the least possible delay. *I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault, Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place. Ramsay brought this out well in the discussion and criticized Monty freely..."* *Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45* The release of the files from German Signals by Bletchley Park conclusively showed that the 9th & 10thPanzer Divisions were re-fitting in the Arnhem area.With their Recon Battalions intact. *Yet when Bedel-Smith(SHAEF) brought this to Monty's attention "he ridiculed the idea and waved my objections airly aside"* *Max Hastings,Armageddon:The Battle for Germany,1944-45* *Freddie de Guingand* Monty's Chief of Staff telephoned him saying the operation would be launched too late to exploit German disarray.That XXX Corps push to Arnhem would being made on a narrow front along one road, *Monty ignored him*