Why Did Soldiers Fight in Lines With No Cover? Because Muskets!

[@BrandonF]

One little point of correction- towards the end, I say "The British always fought in two lines" but that really just reflects my preference to the late 18th C. above the rest of the period. This was NOT always the case, it just became the more common method during at least the AWI and Napoleonic Wars, and even then you can find plenty of exceptions where they fought in different styles. That line was a little more 'off the cuff' and I was way too broad there!

[@texanman1998]

it depends cuz skirmishers dont need to stay in line but in cover

[@beepboop204]

🙃

[@Purple_694]

You should do a sinking ship sketch for an add

[@greenmountainhistory7335]

I was about to comment on this but then you ruined my “um ackshually” moment.

[@chickencharlie1992]

Shame on ye!

[@LokiLaughs2]

Explaining the necessity of closed rank formations requires people to understand that opposing armies are going to be using combined arms warfare against you. Enemy cannons will out range your infantry and make a mockery of cover. Enemy calvary will easily run down dispersed infantry caught in open ground and spike unsupported cannons. Most importantly if a route begins it is contagious and retreating infantry cannot outrun horses. Most will be killed or captured by enemy calvary.

[@lanequick7451]

Very succinctly put.

[@nomms]

Densely packed infantry without cover are very vulnerable to artillery, no? I understand Calvary in a fairly open battlefield (e.g. not wooded, marshy, etc) but massing your infantry means a single shot of artillery can kill far more people with higher likelihood.

[@thejo1723]

​​@@nomms i mean if your regiment stand in a line with 2 rows it will decrease the amount of casualties and is usually not a choice of target for artillery than lets say a square. However standing in line is highly vulnerable to cavalry charges thus most armies march in a column so that they are more prepared to deploy into square when cavalry attacks or a line when they engage infantry. Its like rock, paper scissors, cavalry beats an infantry line (mostly if they outmaneurver it), infantry square repels cavalry (again mostly), and artillery shatters infantry squares. However, if you combine all of the attacks of infantry, cavalry, and artillery then you have a much better chance of winning. The reason Marshal Ney failed with his mass cavalry charge against the british squares is that he failed to bring infantry support in order to engage the squares and bring about more casualties onto the british squares until they waver.

[@sidesaddleintobattle4984]

Closed ranks with volley fire will have be more accurate and put down more rounds than a crowd doing their own thing. Naturally independant soldiers may be busier trying to stay alive than returning fire

[@podemosurss8316]

In fact the Spanish 1801 manuals (which were an improved version of the French Napoleonic doctrines) emphathised flexible formations (quickly shifting between open order and close order). What you said about a route is only true when fighting on a plain field, whereas in the mountainous terrains of Spain the opposite happens, in fact many guerrilla units began as military units that had withdrawn after losing a battle and had lost contact with the rest of the army.

[@TedSandwich-tq6lr]

Brandon F should review the siege of fort william henry in the last of the mohicans

[@Shredx1]

Our nation is having a peculiar moment. I am grateful that our less embarrassing episodes are remembered. My family was old 1000 years ago, so I know that this phase will pass. Hic Semper

[@Purple_694]

Porple is no more...

[@Altrantis]

Also, one thing to consider: These armies could beat any army that fought in a more traditional manner. Quite overwhelmingly, too. That meant they only had to worry about what other armies that did the same thing as themselves did. Which is what leads to this sort of firepower over cover logic.

[@joelvannatta3266]

Sorta how the Banzai charges of the Imperial Japanese worked very effectively until they met a force that had stronger firepower than they did.

[@anaussie213]

That same thinking led to isadawana.

[@gadyariv2456]

I really don't see the issue. Humans fought in formation ever since the first organized armies in Mesopotamia, all through History into the 18th centaury. would be actually strange if they suddenly stopped doin that, that just how combat worked, why would we expect the introduction of fire arms would immediately change that. it's just our Anachronistic modern point of view that expects 18th centaury people to apply 20th centaury sensibilities on their era.

[@damien4197]

So why don't they do it any more? What's this "sensibilities" BS... tech can change warfare, it's not unreasonable to question why the musket didn't change formations so much. There's NO chance there was intractable thinking involved? Right.

[@damien4197]

In fact, almost every other version of this I've heard landed on the logical, and acceptable, "it's stops conscripts and other less well trained troops just running as easily"... this was touched on, but in a general morale sense, as though a professional and conscript army were in the same boat. Pretty sure when certain, with more ideological fervor perhaps, or strong reason not to desert, armies started using highly mobile loose skirmish formations when cavalry weren't an issue... they fucked some shit up. Perhaps that also required rifling, though. Doesn't discount the original question.

[@rotwang2000]

Formed troops are far easier to command than random clumps of people. Also keeping in formation made the job of fighting immensely easier. Unlike the homogenous distribution of dueling you see in most films, forming up in ranks with somebody covering your left, right and back, makes it much easier to focus on the problem right in front of you. A well ordered formation tends to win against hordes and a bunch of people improvising. That's why riot police still uses that method. If using modern squad tactics would be superior you can bet they would use that. But when dealing with masses of people, formations with the proper gear tend to be hard to beat.

[@herecomesaregular8418]

@Robert Stallard Your contribution is also sound, but doesn't go far enough. Though not as tightly compacted and strict, WW1 still saw mass attacks in waves, even with the advent of the bolt-action and machine gun. This all boiled down to command and control relative to the technology available. Radio comms were still in their infancy, and thusly too bulky to be carried or used outside of static emplacements at HQ's at the company, regimental, or brigade level and so on. So once a mass of men began to move, they could only communicate as far as they could see, shout, or blow a whistle at each other. All those things break down very quickly as is once the chaos and noise of battle commences, if you add squad-level, independent actions or small unit tactics to this equation, where you're moving in more of a modern sense, you would quickly lose contact with one another, and unit cohesion (and therefore effectiveness) breaks down. Not too different from why, in the American Civil War, formations remained linear even with the advent of rifling making small arms and artillery far more accurate. You still needed the morale effect of tight ranks, and the ability to communicate in an era that was still several decades before the advent of radio communication. (Not to mention that the average soldier wasn't exactly an expert marksman, without enough time to train them all to be such, and so, rifling or not, mass fire was still the way to go.)

[@LEARSIKCIGAM]

Brandon (Britphile) F stands in his living room and sweetly fondles his musket.

[@BrandonF]

Treat Bess right, and she'll treat you right!

[@davidbarr9343]

@@BrandonF Ha! Ha! Brilliant!😂

[@Nikolapoleon]

I think it may be helpful to at some point add concepts of maneuver on the strategic [rather than tactical] level to the dialogue, to help potential viewers understand the relative value of conventional and irregular [guerilla] tactics and the circumstances under which each can be used. What I mean is that some viewers may question why any army or faction in a war would wish to risk fighting a "set piece battle" in the first place, when it might be safer to always hide from the enemy and slowly pick them off bit by bit. From my own research, I get the impression that it's because it becomes necessary, at times, to mass as much force as possible to protect or attack _strategically_ valuable targets. For example if an army isn't willing to engage in open battle, how can they prevent the enemy from capturing or destroying their supplies, command posts, or civilian population centers? [Consider, for instance, how Julius Caesar would famously force battle upon his Gallic adversaries by positioning himself to pillage population centers or supply depots.] I think this bears mentioning, and you may have something even greater to add to all that. Either way, though, I think it's important for the viewer to be made to understand why anyone would fight a "field battle" in the first place, before going into too much depth about the utility of line formations in the field.

[@lanequick7451]

This is certainly a broader topic than linear warfare. I would argue that “decisive battle doctrine” (to borrow from the naval Mahan tradition) can be seen as the main hallmark of Western war in general, from the Trojan war through to today. The desire for a “decision”, ie. a single momentous battle (after a campaign of maneuver) with a clear victor and immediate strategic benefits, is at the core of Western military thought. I recommend Clausewitz to anyone to get a well-regarded insight into this sort of military thought. One final opinion is that if it’s not clear why a battle was fought and what it’s implications were, I find the answer is usually logistics.

[@Tareltonlives]

Exactly. Guerilla warfare basically allows the enemy to take your territory. You will constantly HAVE to run and hide. it's the resort of an inferior force, the plan B. Good example- the Native Americans in the east. They could harry, ambush, and wear down American armies, but if that army managed to get to a settlement, all those buildings and food and resources were destroyed. It didn't matter how many colonial soldiers you killed, you would still starve that winter. Or the Anglo-Boer wars- the Boers could run and hide and ride circles around the British, but the British could just take Boer cities and put the entire population in a blockhouse. The Vietnamese beat the Mongols , but still paid them tribute because they still had to REBUILD their capitol and all that lost towns and farms. Russia fended off all European invasions, but at the cost of cities and millions of people. It wasn't just the Grande Armee that suffered, it was the Russian people. Guerilla war is a war of attrition, and that means cost.

[@the_tactician9858]

​@@Tareltonlives Absolutely. A pitched battle will cost a few thousand men but will keep the infrastructure and the greater population safe. Guerrilla warfare doesn't. That's also why most conventional armies struggle so badly with guerrillas; their task never was to deal with counterinsurgencies or with irregular troops, but rather to take key points and defeat an equal foe. It's also worth noting that the whole reason Napoleon entered Russia (which is exactly the same reason Charles XII marched into Russia 100 years earlier) was to force a decisive battle. So far Russia had suffered little at his hands and given other major nations quickly gave battle when he threatened their capital, he saw little reason to not attack. In fact, he was not even wrong, as Moscow was not, as many think, immediately burned down and deserted, but was only deserted after the Russians barely lost the Battle of Borodino. There is a chance that if the defeat at Borodino had been severe enough, it might have convinced the Russian Tzar to surrender anyway. As it stands, the Russians saw the damage their strategy had inflicted on Napoleons army, decided to keep up the fight, sabotaged their capital and the rest is history.

[@Tareltonlives]

@@the_tactician9858 Indeed, Kutuzov and Barclay didn't WANT to fight at Borodino, but Alexander felt obligated to look strong. Fortunately, Napoleon was as disconnected as Kutuzov and the Russian corps fought as well as the French in the chaos. The Capitol had to be defended, and attacking the capitol is a good way to lure the opponent into a decisive battle. This was Napoleon's talent, and was sought after in the American Civil War (where the war was decided by the capture of several regional capitols and strategic points). We still saw this in the World Wars- Stalingrad was fought because the Soviets weren't ready yet for a setpiece, while the Western assaults were intercepted at the Anzio and Ardennes. This applies to naval strategy- Trafalgar was fought far from French and British ports, Jutland was on the far end of the North Sea, and the Imperial Navy of Japan was destroyed far off from the home islands. You don't want the enemy that close. Even now the Ukranian army is fighting very offensively to drive the Russian columns out rather than holding up in the cities, while the Russian strategy has been to destroy Ukranian infrastructure with long-range attacks.

[@hedgehog3180]

You also can't fight a guerilla war on enemy soil, it is solely a defensive tactic because you need the advantage of local knowledge and support. That obviously is a bit of a problem if you're an empire trying to expand your territory.

[@ReviveHF]

The musketeers or Line Infantries are fulfilling the archers or crossbowman's role in the early modern period. Archers and crossbowman from the classical and medieval period tended to launch their arrows in volleys to suppress the enemies before engage in melee combat. Linear warfare was not limited to Europe, the Japanese, Koreans, Manchus and the Chinese were known to fought in lines. There's a Chinese General named Qi Ji Guang wrote manuals about linear tactics.

[@theprancingprussian]

Idk about crossbows doctoring but ye, makes sense sorta, they took longer to load than a bow and less training needed, may not have been as accurate in general as a bow

[@junewalker9341]

I think a lot of armchair tacticians forgot the critical part where people don't want to die. If the enemy masses up in a line, yeah you could take a series of potshots when they pass by you hiding place or something, but everyone who does that is dead. If you bring a les dense line, yeah maybe you could get a scenario where you're trading better than they are, but most people in that battle will probably die. The only way you're getting people to stand up to that (without bolt action levels of firepower or machine guns) is to bring as many people as they do so that the people you bring think they might survive if they win.

[@olliephelan]

People instinctively group together when in danger too. Soldiers being shelled will often huddle despite knowing its more dangerous. /the most dangerous thing is panic. Organising in tight groups might stop panic. They,ll also keep doing the same thing - relaoding and firing

[@mustacheman2549]

Nonsensical

[@olliephelan]

@@mustacheman2549 one word is "nonsensical" Whats nonsensical is that no one knows who youre replying to or why. Thats "nonsensical"

[@bavarianpotato]

Yeah, that logic doesn't work. Skirmishers existed, sharpshooters existed. Your presupposition is that spreading out means having singular men spread out that can be taken out one by one, which just isn't the case. As far as people not wanting to be put in a high risk of death: There's always been men more than willing to lead a cavalry charge from the front or, in more modern times, drop behind enemy lines in a bloody parachute. If a natural fear of death was the motivator, every musketman would run for cover or at least drop down. This wasn't done, because discipline was instilled in such a way as to make people follow a reasonable but instinctively suicidal tactic (lines).

[@minderbart1]

@@bavarianpotato and yet every single army used line tactics over skirmishers and sharpshooters.

[@uccmaster1938]

Brandon you’ve done an excellent job at explaining the roles of various European armies of this era. Would love an opinion essay from you as to why the American Revolution whet the way it did. We’re taught in our high schools and colleges that Americans won with lots of guerrilla tactics and our ability to skirmish vs British over reliance on linear combat. However your prior videos have suggested that the British redcoat army was not as heavily reliant on linear combat as we were taught and used a great amount of light infantry and forest warfare. So then, how did Nathanial Greene and George Washington and Benedict Arnold and other such early American field officers survive against what feels like a very versatile and flexible army?

[@fredjohnson9833]

One major element in favor of the Rebels was the sheer distance between Britain and America. Another is that after 1777 Britain had to fight France as well. Spain and the Netherlands ended up joining as well.

[@stevekaczynski3793]

@@fredjohnson9833 Many Americans still seem to have a rather caricatured view of the American Revolution, with homespun farmers and frontiersmen triumphing against stiffly drilled fops in brightly coloured uniforms. In reality Steuben was commissioned to teach Continentals linear warfare tactics in European style, and the majority of battles in the war were fought that way.

[@fredjohnson9833]

@@stevekaczynski3793 true. Most Americans also aren't aware of the role the Dutch and Spanish militaries played in keeping Britain busy and giving the American Sepratists breathing room. It doesn't help that most of our movies seem to encourage the stereotypes of Redcoats as incompetent morons and American Military troops as unstoppable supersoldiers.

[@Tareltonlives]

Part of it was attrition- the British logistics meant that their army was never big enough to occupy enough territory, and they couldn't replace men quickly Part of it was a lack of an organized strategy. Each of the British commanders was talented, but they were all doing their own things rather than coordinating. Part of it was the grand alliance against the British- the French and Spanish wanted revenge, and the British still had to maintain their colonies in Ireland and India. The British had just lost a war in India when the American Revolution began. So things got spread thin, and the biggest battle in the war was the Franco-Spanish attack on Gibraltar And what Washington and Greene did was an indirect strategy, something the allies did against Napoleon in the final wars; avoid the main army, and deploy the army against smaller forces. Saratoga and Yorktown were successful battles, but fought when the smaller battles were won. Saratoga wasn't really a guerilla campaign- it was American attacks on British support columns, stripping them of supplies, of mutual support, of their native allies. Then, once those things were out of the war, they fortified a key point and attacked the British from the fortifications with clear numerical superiority. Yorktown was an attritional campaign- Greene retreated from Cornwallis' main force, but won smaller battles that injured and starved Cornwallis. Cowpens was a pitched battle between regulars on an open field, BUT it was between support forces. Cornwallis finally managed to catch and defeat Greene, but Greene exhausted Cornwallis' force, and fought defensively to inflict a pyrhic victory. Thus, while Cornwallis was licking his wounds, that's when Washington pounced with the main army. You have a giant Franco-American force descending on the town, and supplies being cut off by the French navy. Smaller battles lead to more favorable circumstances in the main battle. Guerilla warfare isn't the only kind of indirect warfare, the only kind of attritional, defensive warfare. There was guerilla warfare involved, but the decisive actions required large, professional units.

[@goodboi1725]

@Tareltonlives when you state how british commanders did not coordinate their efforts often, it reminds me of the underlying weakness of Hitler’s generals. Although his insanity weeded out the incompetent, it also had the unintended side effect of creating lone wolves seeking approval from him.

[@bromhead]

you always know it is good when you see Brandon has uploaded 3 minutes ago

[@Purple_694]

I said I would do it Bromhead...

[@bromhead]

@@Purple_694 thanks

[@bromhead]

@@Purple_694 see you at next stream Brandon does

[@Purple_694]

@@bromhead You as well.

[@TheReykjavik]

I think the value of close order comes more from melee combat (infantry vs. infantry or infantry vs. cavalry) than from concentrating musket fire. The example of two units with different density but the same length doesn't really make sense, unless one side has only half as many soldiers. If two forces of approximately equal numbers fight with musket fire only, the side with the looser formation will hit a higher percentage of shots, and also holds the flanks. The morale impact of enemy fire is also diminished if you are in loose order, because if they kill someone three spots down from you in close order, that's a couple feet away and you may be splattered with blood and hear them screaming, but in loose order you might not even notice in the battle. And without at least the threat of a bayonet or cavalry charge, punching a hole in a loose order formation doesn't mean that much, if 100 men concentrate fire on 10 and wipe them all out, while the other 90 distribute their fire, even if the concentrated force hits all their shots and the distributed force only hits 1/3, it is the concentrated force that loses more soldiers. Overconcentration of fire is a waste of combat power that can lose a battle. A close formation can theoretically distribute their fire across a wider length than they occupy, but coordinating that is impractical, and would defeat the purpose of concentrating fire in the first place. But as soon as the possibility of a charge is considered, the need for close order becomes far greater, while a loose formation can aim at an angle across the line to focus fire onto a close formation to exchange volleys at close to parity, they cannot do the same for melee. A close formation can fire one or two volleys at a looser formation, killing enough and breaking the formation enough to walk in and have an overwhelming number of bayonets, and each of the soldiers in loose order in turn faces 4 enemies at once, their musket and bayonet will be parried aside while two or three others stab them, they will die quickly with little chance of even wounding their attackers, who can then turn to the next soldiers in line, and the soldiers not yet in melee might refuse to fire into the charging enemy after they've met the line because their could kill their comrades (although shooting into a clump of 3 enemies and one friend who has already been stabbed won't make your friend any more dead and might save your life). So the ideal density of a line is enough to repel a charge and no more. In the period this channel covers, that means a tight formation is needed in a field, a loose but still linear formation in rougher terrain (as the rougher terrain inhibits charges). I don't think more accurate modern rifles fundamentally change the ability of skirmishers to kill everyone standing on a battlefield, with muskets it will take more volleys and each volley will take longer, but the opposing force also suffers the same inaccuracy and slow rate of fire, so the skirmishers can still kill them all if they stand still. Loose order still gives one volley in the same time as close order does. What modern firearms and artillery do fundamentally change is how well a loose formation can defend against a charge. While skirmishers with muskets or muzzle loading rifles may get 1 to 3 volleys off at an advancing enemy, the same soldiers armed with Enfield rifles can put 10 accurately aimed rounds downrange. Machine guns and rapid firing artillery with explosive shells further enable the braking of charges. In the age of linear warfare, artillery could already wipe out close order formations, but with their limited range (especially for cannister shot), infantry or cavalry could form up for a charge out of range and potentially cover the distance before all being dead, but with the extended range and increased rate of fire, that slowly became impossible (except for unusual circumstances) first for infantry then for cavalry.

[@idonnow2]

You touch on two very important issues. First is that line infantry is really best seen as heavy infantry, their bayonets just as important as the muskets they're fixed to, it's no coincidende that the arrival of bayonets led to the dissapearance of pikes. It is thus very similar to roman legions throwing their javelins before closing in, the difference being that muskets obviously had so much greater range and firepower, and were so much more widespread since every single soldider had one, that line infantry often found itself in long distance firing because no one wants to fire a volley and then be caught off guard by the enemy advancing and firing an even closer, deadlier volley. As such line infantry should be understood as heavy infantry with highly integrated long range capabilities, massed together in order to charge or repel charges. The second point is also relevant. Rifled muskets in the mid 19th century didn't really drastically change the conduct of war for line infantry, because although they could be more accurate, they were still limited in their firepower by rate of fire, and as such infantry charges could stil be viable between volleys or through disconnected low intensisy firing at will. I always think of this hypothetical idea of a smoothbore, lead ball shooting maxim gun, if such a weapon were to exist it would have easily heralded the end of infantry charges, because its capacity to fire 500 lead balls a minute would very easily make up for the innacuracy of the individual shots. Indeed despite the superior technical accuracy of modern weapons, the practical accuracy is worse than ever before, as it is estimated that it takes several tens of thousands of bullets to achieve a single kill in modern wars; this is of course because in the world of machine guns and assault rifles individal accuracy is not in fact that important

[@dynomitejones]

I would say that there is a benefit to concentrating firepower, if you’re a PC gamer try out the game “war of rights” and you can experience it firsthand the benefits of being in a group all firing at once. Especially when they had muskets which were less accurate than the later rifle counterparts

[@andrewsurja3580]

You also unintentionally brought up a country point. Picture this: you’re a group of skirmishes spread out with about 5 men equivalent spacing between the nearest buddy. Great! You can’t hear your buddy’s brains disappearing. Until you need to more about 50 feet northeast to repel a bayonet charge. Two things, you’ll have to yell or relay orders at the speed of smell, and you’ll be massacred by bayonets since you’re alone

[@Thurnmourer]

Me thinks it was because they was a bit daft. Now, you see, unlike them, I'd take cover. I'd roll and dodge and get flogged for breaking formation and do nothing helpful as my relatively inaccurate weapon went far because I was too busy faffing about.

[@BrandonF]

Don't forget ducking behind trees and rocks before sniping Napoleon himself from on top of a mountain! Anything less is for pansies!

[@seapirate65]

@Brandon F. haha..Great comment..to Heck with Marching in a Line, hoping to not get Gut/ Head Shot frm a Non round bullet.

[@Fusilier7]

Linear warfare was not limited to Europe, Asian militaries fought in lines too. Shogunate Japan is a good example, during the Sengoku period, Oda Nobunaga began adopting the matchlock musket, called the Tanegashima Teppo, as a result the Japanese began to change their tactics. Originally, the ashigaru fought in open order, but soon realised random potshots was impotent at stopping an infantry advance, so Samurai clans began experimenting with formations, to improve the efficiency and use of the teppo. Like Europe, teppo ashigaru were arranged in either two or three ranks, depending on the size of the province's population, and the availability of teppos, those without a musket were armed with pikes called yaris, however, the bow, or the yumi was still retained to protect the gunmen while they reloaded, and it worked as a skirmishing weapon in order to save volley fire for tactical advantages. The ashigaru eventually developed tactics that utilised these arms, first, the bowmen would skirmish, next, the gunmen would fire a disciplined volley, then the pikemen would advance to capture the field, so even Japan joined the infantry revolution, and used identical tactics familiar to Europe.

[@stephenwood6663]

One thing that I find interesting is how, in Europe, archery suffered a gradual decline due to better stopping power, and it being much quicker to train a reliable musketeer than a reliable archer. At the time when gunpowder technology was introduced to Japan, it already had a solid tradition of archery, and its solution (at least initially) was to embrace hybrid tactics. The Zohyo Monogatari, a sort of tactical handbook and field manual from the 17th century, recommends that the ideal ratio is 1 archer for every 2 musketeers. These would snipe officers, and keep up a continuous hail of fire during the inevitable reloading lag of the musketeers, making it more hazardous to attempt to charge the formation while the muskets were reloading.

[@mikeritter7207]

@@stephenwood6663 More tradition than effectiveness. Sniping officers with bow is rather fantasy idea - officers usually have better armours and arrow is relatively slow projectile, easy to dodge at greater distances. Bowmen also lacked power to effectively stop or disrupt charge by themselves.

[@stephenwood6663]

@@mikeritter7207 Regarding sniping, I thought so too, but I'm not going to pretend to understand 17th century Japanese warfare better than people who survived it. Perhaps what the authors meant was that a medieval bow has a longer effective range than a matchlock, and is capable of targeting an individual at ranges where a firearm will be obliged to merely aim at a formation. As far as the capabilities of a ranged unit to stop a determined charge by themselves, the authors of the Zohyo agree that the odds are not in the ranged unit's favour, which is why they include advice on when and how one should engage in hand-to-hand combat under the protection of friendly spearmen. Nonetheless, you must surely recognise the disruptive advantages of a unit that is capable of maintaining a continuous hail of fire.

[@mikeritter7207]

@@stephenwood6663 From my experience contemporary accounts should be treated with caution at least. Modern experiments and computer simulation show quite a lot of source based myths busting. And from my knowledge of japanese sengoku warfare it was a strange mix of partly quickly adapting new ways of fighting and partly holding strongly on outdated tactics and equipement. Propably caused by relative isolation, safety and low external "military evolution pressure". " Nonetheless, you must surely recognise the disruptive advantages of a unit that is capable of maintaining a continuous hail of fire." I'm not so sure about it. To be a "hail" of fire you need a amount and power of such a fire. Continuous fire is very good for harrasement, but for disrupting enemy common military tactics prefered salvo/volley with much bigger morale impact.

[@BountyFlamor]

@@mikeritter7207 There's this English re-enactor here on KZbin who says with the English longbow he could accurately and repeatedly shoot mock arrows at the head of a rider that was farther away.

[@fellington2398]

I think in this period, keeping the men in close order would limit desertion/routs. If you have guys that are shaky and don't want to fight. Having them in open order will make it more likely they just disappear from the ranks in the smoke of fire. Weren't most of the soldiers of these European armies drawn from conscripts and the dregs of society?

[@robertjarman3703]

In the Napoleonic era and after, yes, often conscripts, although less so before then.

[@kyleheins]

Not quite, the troops raised during wartime were often less reputable volunteers or unwilling conscripts, but that only applies during things like the various coalition wars of the napoleonic wars. In peacetime or minor conflicts the troops would almost always be volunteers drawn from the general working classes, well trained and then deployed or would be militia units with some training and discipline who could, if time permitted, be given proper training before deployment. So yes, linear close order combat can help with desertions but that would be a secondary effect. Unit cohesion, concentration of force, ease of command, and ease of maneuver are the main considerations behind linear close order tactics. Even now, we keep troops as close together as firepower and cover will permit because concentration of fire and unit cohesion are still decisive and benefit from close proximity. We just have tech that requires greater spacing and use of cover to avoid extreme losses.

[@SusCalvin]

@@kyleheins At the start of the Great War, the UK remains the odd man out among the Great Powers who doesn't have a conscript mass army. Just moving a bunch of people around at the same pace in the same direction is a chore even when not being shot at.

[@ncrrangerrolandtembo4615]

Love your videos Brandon I have always loved and been into 18th century military’s and I learned a lot of stuff from you keep up the good work

[@BrandonF]

Thank you! I'm glad you enjoy them!

[@kazak8926]

You have a pretty cool name dude

[@anitaibele7743]

I suspect control and communication were also important reasons for fighting in closed formations. In a formation, even less disciplined soldiers would know "where their place is" It is also much easier for officers to command a group of men than individual soldiers scattered on the battlefield. Remember, communication in combat was limited to shouts, trumpets, and flag signals.

[@lanequick7451]

If you watch the whole video, he mentions that he may have an entirely separate video for this topic

[@anitaibele7743]

@@lanequick7451 And this will definitely be an interesting video on an often overlooked topic ^^

[@addisondebter9468]

And drums but yeah

[@rasmasyean]

Yeah this guy just rambles about what seems like totally insignificant "features" (if they are at all) while the real reason is just commanding with voice to a bunch of farm conscripts who not only lack range experience with military equipment but rely the rare officers who know any form of tactics.

[@whatisahandle221]

Read the Sharpe novels by Bernard Cornwell, set in the Napoleonic age, following a private who wins a battlefield commission. The author did wonderful research for each historical place. I believe he almost always visited them in person. Besides the viewpoint of the protagonist, he usually has a short chapter at the end describing the truth versus fiction and what you might see at the location today. Often, 80%+ of the overall events are truth-albeit the protagonists “borrow” real life soldiers’ and units’ bravery, luck, and skill.

[@katazack]

Cornwell has written several series of remarkable historical fiction highlighting many of Europe's instrumental battles. His descriptions of the wars and the events leading to them is fascinating.

[@capnstewy55]

As always, whoever has more balls usually wins...

[@Matty10thDVN]

Shoulder to shoulder in a desperate square, shot and smoke fill the Flanders air, sabers rattle horses thunder pass but they stand their ground and the square holds fast.

[@jeromydickey8200]

Brandon, I’ve been watching your videos for a while and I love seeing the passion and expertise you bring to this niche interest, keep up the good work. It amuses me when people ask “why does/did the army do this/that?” In the army we only have one question: “how do we maximize unit lethality based on our current situation?” And everything else that we do is the answer to that question. I’m glad that you elaborated on that concept in this and similar videos and don’t try to muddy the waters with random hogwash.

[@mnk9073]

As in so many other things, the best way to do it is BOTH. Have a screen of light infantry that fights in open formation whittling down the enemy with needle pricks in front of your main body of regular infantry who then will deliver the decisive freight train. People just love to forget that combined arms tactics are nothing new.

[@michaelgarrow3239]

I am Napoleon!!!

[@SusCalvin]

The light infantry/rifles/jäger/chasseur portion of those armies a specialist role a relatively small group of napoleonic soldiers had but they show up in the vast majority of armies at the time. I can't recall how many of these people there would be.

[@jimmy12347654]

This a unofficial response to a recent Joe Rogan podcast ? I hope so! 😂

[@Yandarval]

Brandon, you sound like a certain mouse with a large castle in Florida. Unless you want to be sued. I suggest NOT doing that voice again for an ad.

[@benhayfield6182]

It's so they fit in their movement tray isn't it?

[@CrazayFish1]

1:26 POV Brandon forgot to take his medication and begins to experience psychosis

[@FelixstoweFoamForge]

that Prussian phrase "schwerpunkt" comes to mind. Or as the ACW general Forrest once said; "get there fastest with the mostest". Technology changes, but the principles remain valid. Plus, as you point out. just imagine the psychological impact of 600 muskets going off in your face at 30 paces and the whole front rank of your column going down....followed up of course with a little bit of "give Johnny Crapaud some BRUMMAGEM!".

[@SusCalvin]

This was the guiding principle in the Great War where each power had a sort of mobilization arms race for who could have the fastest way to raise troops, transport them and have the whole pre-planned machinery in motion.

[@GeneralJackRipper]

This has to be the single most annoying historical question ever asked. Because all individually wielded projectile weapons achieve their intended battlefield effect by the application of FIREPOWER. Turns out, a bunch of dudes all standing and firing together have more FIREPOWER than a bunch of dudes standing and firing all by themselves. _IT'S FIREPOWER! GET IT? FIRE-POWER!!_

[@teteusinho123]

Superior firepower can suppress an enemy, making them unable to return fire allowing you to get closer and outmaneuver them

[@robertjarman3703]

Remember at the time, the longer the campaign went on, the more that other causes of death would take their toll. Napoleon´s troops in Russia died of the summer heat, the frigid cold, starvation, disease, and the immense damage of the partisans and small raids. A set piece battle had the potential to be decisive enough to force the political aims of the war to be won, such as what happened with Austerlitz in 1805. It was dangerous to be in a set piece battle, but the long campaign grinds down morale, probably ultimately killed more people than set piece battles did in most campaigns, is riskier to your political institutions, and has all kinds of other problems. And think, what is the alternative to line formations like this in a set piece battle? Everyone has muskets, nobody has invented better guns. They tried inventing revolvers, but that let the gas out the back and into the eyes of the soldier, which is not a problem for pistol revolvers because you don´t hold them next to your face the way you do with a longarm. Muskets are powerful enough to go through body armour reliably by the 1700s, and even the latter half of the 1600s which did try to increase its thickness but couldn´t keep up by the 1600s. You could try charging horses at lines, but that is what the bayonets help with and in particular the ability to take down huge horses at a distance are there to prevent. A long line helps to prevent flanking. A responsive command and control needs good communications, but all you had were mirrors, flags, and horns, not great, plus those who could at times run from one unit to the other, and then hopefully return back with new orders. You could try shooting them with cannons, but spreading out line a line means that cannonballs don´t roll through as many people as if they were in one dense column. They did build fortifications where they could. The Raevsky Redoubt is one good example. But that keeps you on the defensive, even if you need to be able to control the surrounding area or if you could be bypassed, so it wasn´t practical do build huge fortresses in all cases. Generals were not stupid, and while they were corrupt by our standards, they did well enough for themselves, and often did show at least some merit. If they had a better idea in 200 years of fighting like this, they would have invented an alternative right away. Napoleon the military genius didn´t change this style of fighting, and you would expect the revolutionary French and especially Napoleon of all people to be able to come up with alternatives if there were any, right? Same with Frederick the Great or one of many others. In fact, the lines were a reform of Gustavus Adolphus in the 1630s, as an adaptation of the Dutch model of Maurice from the 1500s who had suggested say 10 ranks of soldiers, who fired a shot and then ran to the back of the line to reload, with mere seconds between the shots, which the increasing commonality of cannons would make into a risky tactic because you can aim at one point of the line and take out a dozen men where a two line formation only at most is three or four in a shot if you are a lucky artillery gunner. By the way, if you ran away, that was a very good time for your opponent to run after you with bayonets to slaughter you all. Formation fighting up until the time of repeating rifles or at least needle guns was the most effective way to protect yourself from such instances all the way back to Egyptians with bronze kopeshes and spears.

[@herv7539]

Would be great seeing you on Joe Rogan, he recently released a video with some comedian and it’s safe to say they don’t have a clue about history.

[@Tareltonlives]

People really act like morale isn't important- if you run, oh, you're a coward. If a unit routs, they're rowdy and unfit. No, that's just morale. Even in the old days of hoplite warfare, the reason the Spartans did so well is that they trained psychologically as professional soldiers to withstand pain and fear. They're not any better at killing as any other hoplite, but they're less likely to run, and whoever runs first, loses. And that's such an important thing about guns- they are scary. They kill really fast, there's a lot of smoke and noise and fire. Elephants are going to run., horses are going to run. PEOPLE are going to run. Plains of Abraham is a classic example of this even when both sides are experienced soldiers- the British fired a few full volleys at close range. It's just as deadly as the constant long range fire of the French, but all that fire at a time time killed the same amount of people in a much shorter amount of time. And excellent point about bayonets- they're not as deadly as an actual ball, but nobody wants to get shish kebabed, and it's just people running at you as one big group. That was a problem with the Sudanese fought Egypt in the late 19th century- the Egyptians weren't trained well enough and had pretty lousy officers, so when thousands of people charge at them with swords and spears, they run. Same with the Jacobite highlanders charging at the British in the 45 rising. This was all covered by that video on the Ga Pa tactic, which really embraced that idea. Same thing with any arm- standing up to a charging horse? Standing up to cannon fire? Camels and elephants were used for thousands of years not only because they could carry big guns, but because they scared men and horses just by being big and smelly and weird. Napoleon understood shock, and his goal as a general was to deliver shock. Rockets aren't necessarily deadly, especially in this time, but at Bladenburg, Srirangapatna, and Second Accra, they scare people who didn't see it coming. The British didn't expect Mysorean rockets, and the Ashanti and Americans didnt' expect British rockets. Rockets can go anywhere, fast, spiraling, making all sorts of noise, giving tons of fire and smoke in their path- that's gonna scare you if you don't see it coming. That's the real reason the militia failed at Camden- it's not actually fighting in linear fashion with Cornwallis' army like the Patriot argues it is, it's about having one side having men who could brace themselves for the noise and smoke and blood and death and lines of men charging at them with giant knives on their guns, and the other side having less of them. There were plenty of Continentals at Camden, but they got hit in the flank, where even professionals can't really defend themselves easily. And I can't wait for that video because I'm sure I'm getting that wrong.

[@markopetrovic7376]

Bayonets are invention which made pike obsolete as a weapon. But packed pike formation was needed still as a defence against cavalry, one reason more for such tight packed lines.

[@Ramtin-Blue_rose]

Hi Brandon. Can you cover the economic aspect of late 18th century ? How these mostly agricultural Empires fielded so many soldiers ,how they could mass produce muskets and gun powder to support these armies and how they built so many land and naval cannons ,dwarfing the cannon production of 17th and early 18th century ?

[@robertjarman3703]

Well, they were proto-industrial. They did have some pretty advanced tools for their time. They had early steam engines but water power was a bigger deal. A flowing river can be very useful in blacksmithing for instance, a windmill can be a good sawmill. They also had agricultural changes like crop rotation, used for hundreds of years by that point, and more recently, the crops from the Americas like potatoes were calorie dense or planting clover to regenerate soil. France has 643 thousand sq km, or with 27 million people as of the Napoleonic wars, about 42 people per square kilometre. Europe was slowly regaining a lot of the industrial capacity they had in the time of classical Rome, and in many ways far surpassing it. Remember as well that the population was younger on average. More soldiers were on the way if some of them died just because the number of children, of whom some would become adults, was so high. And that meant that people in general would be more eligible for the military, men between roughly 16 and 30 being in the best class of soldiers. As deadly as Napoleon´s invasion of Russia was for the French, losing maybe 270 thousand French soldiers, that was 1% of their population. It would not take a massive spike in child birth rates to replenish that if you wanted to. It was always happening anyway because of epidemic diseases periodically ravaging through.

[@Ramtin-Blue_rose]

@@robertjarman3703 1)steam engines were not used in Industries .at least not up until 1830 2)Victorian era Europe was proto-industrial . 3)in late 18th century at least 80% of state incomes came from agricultural sector (that is not a proto -industrial economy) 4)your argument about larger population and later mass conscription directly contributing to create much more larger armies in comparison to 17th century and early 18th century are true but i still don't see industrial capacity to arm these army . 5)considering the small and disperse workshops of 18th century , it doesn't make sense How did different individual European countries (the big ones ) for their theater of wars fielded thousands of cannons ,few hundreds of thousands muskets , tons of gun powder ,hundreds of thousands of uniforms and so much more? 6) only uniforms make sense in which 18th century was one of the centuries in which cotton plantations were all over colonies ,exploiting the free labor of slaves producing a lot of cotton oversees .

[@markwatson8714]

@@Ramtin-Blue_rose Steam engines started to be used in mining just over a century before 1830. Muskets are relatively easy to produce by hand and the work can be distributed as piecework should it be necessary. Artillery pieces tended to be more complicated, but they tended to see longer use too - not only were there cannons dating back to the War of the Spanish Succession still in use during the Napoleonic war, they'd changed owners a few times to boot (which is the other thing; your nation doesn't have to be productive enough to equip it's entire army, it just needs to equip enough of it's army to be able to take the rest of the equipment from someone else). It's also worth noting the government didn't necessarily pay to equip it's army. In the early 18th century it was still on the regiment owner to supply the men with arms and equipment. Standardisation starts to come in around the middle of the 18th century, though even then it's not really until the Victorian era something approaching a modern funding method comes into play. For much of the Napoleonic period the government still billed the army for the supply of arms and munitions rather than the other way around (state income isn't a particularly useful guide - most taxation systems in use throughout the 17th century were applied to land, so it makes up a disproportionate amount of that income despite much of the wealth - in Spain, France and Britain's case generated primarily through overseas trade - not actually being linked to it).

[@titolovely8237]

cohesion was also a huge part of it. most armies did not have the totality of their men being professional soldiers. the core of the army was ofc, but to fill the ranks levied troops and mercenaries were quite common. the flight risk of these troops was therefore much greater and in order to prevent routes, tightly packed units interspersed with veterans and officers assured most of the time that these troops would stay and fight at least up to a point. desertion was a huge problem within armies of all periods. the romans actually employed a similar tactic by putting veteran troops behind the auxiliaries to both fill the gaps as the frontline units faltered but to also motivate the troops in the front to stay and fight rather than route.

[@sempersuffragium9951]

Fewer men, surely, not less

[@stevekaczynski3793]

In "Barry Lyndon", when the British attack a line of French, I felt that the first French volley at least was premature as the oncoming enemies seemed to still be 300 yards away or thereabouts - effectively out of range.

[@ReedCBowman]

I've always been curious whether drill and training (and standard commands) in this period ever emphasized real concentration of fire - giving an order to a whole company or whatever to aim not forward, spreading their fire over the same width as their own front, but rather at a specific portion of the opposing line, specifically to create gaps rather than general attrition. And for that matter, how far can you turn your aim diagonally when firing in multiple ranks in close order without beginning to cause issues in your own ranks?

[@kyleheins]

I've never seen or heard tale of orders to fire on an area smaller than your own unit frontage inorganically. Oblique orientation will concentrate fire naturally, not along a frontage smaller than your own necessarily, but against the unit overall due to shots passing down the line rather than through it. Oblique fire into a line perpendicular to the bullet arc rather than the unit front or flank will naturally concentrate fire as well, but will get your own unit flanked in the process, removing any advantage the concentration of fire might have given. As for maximum angle of oblique fire, 45 degrees is the standard for oblique fire maximum angle since anything more makes it wiser to wheel toward the enemy, and if the target is down a parallel line from you then exceeding 45 degrees usually means the range is far to long to be effective. Hope that helps!

[@HansLemurson]

My guess is that their Muskets just weren't accurate enough for that to have made much difference.

[@romaliop]

I don't think it makes a lot of sense to do that. You'd likely increase your chance to hit the same enemy soldiers multiple times instead of hitting multiple different men. Then, even if you succeed in punching a hole into the enemy line, how would you exploit that? You'd probably need to go into melee immediately after and hope that the one decimated part of the line triggers a chain route. Cavalry could probably do wonders with an opening like that, but it would require a level of coordination that likely wasn't possible on the battlefield at the time.

[@hedgehog3180]

Punching holes in the line was the job of the artillery not the muskets.

[@arrow1414]

🎼 Don't stand... Don't stand so... Don't stand so close to me!"🎶😉

[@sidesaddleintobattle4984]

Well of your line is ragged and full of gaps you might run, but closed ranks gives solidarity and allows for manuvers that a loose crowd could not do

[@SusCalvin]

It's entirely possible to get lost and separated, and move too far ahead or into the wrong position.

[@NocturnalPyro]

6:40 much like how people say that medieval archers didn't aim at specific points on the enemy, which they absolutely did, if an archer could see the enemy they would aim at weak-spots in their armor, and in siege warfare, if they could see someone on the walls they would most likely be aiming at that person. They don't just randomly shoot their arrow and hope it hits, they take aim and then hope that it hits.

[@mandospence]

Until the machine gun came around, they really couldn’t improve much on the phalanx.

[@vikingsundlof9040]

Phalanx good

[@goodrowj]

Bruh this video could have been ten seconds of you saying "horsemen would decapitate them"

[@VikingTeddy]

Lines evolved due to muskets, but clumping together was done for command and control.Things didn't change all that much until radios became available. You still had to keep your men close in the early 20th century.

[@crimony3054]

Not radios, but the combustion engine. Trucks, jeeps, and especially tanks, made the trench-and-railroad system obsolete. As did the airplane. Soldiers were kept in close ranks to keep them from running off. It's said the weapon that won the Civil War was the revolver, which Union officers used to shoot any five or six Union soldiers who spontaneously retreated.

[@britishmuzzleloaders]

Great topic... talked about this very subject on BOTR the other day! Super nerdy point here,...... "Extended Order" vice "Open Order"... The former refers to the interval between files, whilst the latter refers to the distance between ranks...

[@rianmacdonald9454]

Volley fire - those muskets couldn't hit shit passed 200 yards. so part of it was just send a giant wall of lead, something is going to hit something else. Other tactics came into play with cannons, horses etc but mainly those guns were so inaccurate, you could spend all day shooting at not hit a damn thing.

[@478DopeRecords]

Brandon is that guy from highschool that one of the popular kids is best friends with and no one understands why

[@lcpltpow5870]

I just hope that streaming couple doesn't do a "reaction" to this video

[@polishbro5256]

Warfare is terrible.

[@asahearts1]

It's a tragedy, but there are plenty of "peaceful" ways for groups to oppress one another, and even in the absence of war (be it the final option or otherwise) the threat of war alone works to keep the dominant party from being too severe in their treatment of the other.

[@josephwalukonis9934]

The main lines using close order in European combat were mainly due to the threat of cavalry. Loose formations would simply be ridden down by the horse. Looser formations were used in American wars because the armies did not have large numbers of heavy cavalry. There are a few instances of American Civil War infantry forming square when threatened by cavalry. As early as the last quarter or so of the 17th century, the French were of the belief that the most effective fire was that delivered by skirmishers. This was the view of Marshal Turenne. By the Seven Years War the French were experimenting with units of Grenadiers and Picquets drawn from the line leading attacks in open order supported by troops in close order line and/or columns. Also, by the Seven Years War the British were experimenting with light infantry and sometimes line infantry in open or loose order. This really becomes a complex subject and I hope future episodes touch upon it more.

[@vinz4066]

Always was Always will be

[@troydodson9641]

Commenting because it's a good essay and to break the 666 comment number, let it never sit there

[@CornPop4.10]

I learned from ashtyn&jon2.0 that they were just stupid 😂. I go back to your reaction to their reaction occasionally for a good chuckle.

[@dandannoodles7070]

I think you're overemphasizing the line's effective firepower here. A company in open order can engage a battalion in line; they won't win outright, but with the harder targets they present and the greater accuracy of individual fire, they can punch above their weight class and disrupt the enemy to the point they crumble against the rest of the battalion. By the Napoleonic Wars, in which all infantry are skirmish capable, spending a company of skirmishers to kneecap an enemy battalion is a winning trade. It's true that the close order line brings the most muskets into action at once, but in the Napoleonic Wars, where the goal is to constantly maintain the most possible troops out of action to serve as reserves, this is a disadvantage. If employing musketry to the best effect was the goal, you would just continuously reinforce your skirmish chain to stretch your reserves as long as possible and keep trading at a better rate; you keep your main line in close order to exploit their breakdown of order with bayonet charges, forcing them to commit reserves to maintain equilibrium, until they or you run out of reserves and retreat. Also fire by sections/platoons/divisions etc. doesn't increase a unit's rate of fire, rather the opposite; you sacrifice some of the potential lead you can throw out to ensure that the unit always has some fire in reserve to check any dash made upon it, rotating which unit is reserving it's fire.

[@BloodyKnives66]

Never thought I'd learn so much from Austin Powers 😂

[@golokid]

This is a question I didn't know I needed the answer to..thanks!

[@woltews]

we keep firing the muskets are not as inaccurate as generally believed but never get any numbers on this ( what I have been told is that at 100m the group for 10 rounds is generally about 20-30 inches ) but how accurate are they in actual numbers not words at the standard 100 yards in inches ?

[@rotwang2000]

The musket is not the problem, but few armies wasted time and money teaching men to fire aimed shots. Learning the proper drill and fast reloading speed was seen as more important than actually learn to aim. Many muskets had only rudimentary sights at best. Oddly enough shooting was more accurate in the late 1600s and early 1700's because they still used wooden ramrods and these would break if used too intensively. Troops would be more careful and would try to aim to avoid wasting their shot. Once iron and steel ramrods were in use, reloading speed became the dominant factor over accuracy.

[@woltews]

@@rotwang2000 this somehow dos not sound like a number

[@eyeli160]

There are videos on KZbin showing people hitting a chest sized target about 200 meters out pretty consistently (lets say 90+%)

[@woltews]

@@eyeli160 still not a number

[@idonnow2]

i would really love to know the actual numbers. People nowadays discard muskets at longer ranges because they don't have 100% accuracy but a non 0% deadly accuracy is still useful, however since all they care about is accuracy then all tests only present the percentages of hits instead of spread dimensions. Most of the tests i've ever come accross suggest accuracy at a 100 yards to be around 40-60%, but i have no clue how to extrapolate group size from that.

[@poil8351]

no more mad than having soliders with giant long pikes shoving them in each others guts at close range like in the 1500 and 1600s.

[@vinz4066]

No More Mad than getting into a Tank while Artilerie and infantry with AT weapons can Take you Out

[@poil8351]

@@vinz4066 true though at least you don't have to see somebody shoving a pike or bayonet into you guts before you die. not that being cooked alive in a tank is a particuarly pleasant way to go either.

[@BladeFitAcademy]

In my school we train in team vs team melee combat. The missing concept is the human element. People close to you is comforting. You don't want to feel abandoned. So close order helps psychologically, which is counter intuitive.

[@jamoecw]

this is the first video of yours that i have watched and it seems you have gone back and read historical sources, so this might sound a bit harsh, but this theory was a bunch of paper pushers back in the day trying to show that their naval gazing was worth something. there is some use of fighting in tight formations in open fields, but mostly this was a bad idea and history reflects this if you look at the whole war that this was done at important times within that war. looking back with more knowledge really helps to explain why and when this works, but this video doesn't really get into that and instead just offers a largely debunked and romanticized theory.

[@BrandonF]

Do you have any particular sources I should look at? I may be misunderstanding your point, but it comes across that you're saying the majority of military theorists, artists, and even common soldiers in their accounts have been lying about how much of warfare was fought in Europe at this time.

[@Folgeantrag]

Close formation of fighting man was a essential element of organized warfare from the antique to the 19th century or the beginning of WWI when repeating rifles, maschine guns and modern artillery made this obsolete. Today close packed formations seme to us unbelivable but for nearly 2000 years any succesfull army had to move and controll large numbers of man this way.

[@mcsmash4905]

it is important to understand the reality of those times and put them into that context , which is something alot of people (infuriatingly) dont do and simply call it stupid

[@Dfathurr]

So in short. Why battle during 17th 18th century went that way, because musket was so innacurate, even when you aim a uniform line of soldiers very close to the range, there is no guarantee that the bullet will hit the way you intended

[@robowisanveithasung6022]

well its either low chance but at least you have a chance of hitting l or no chance at all, you have to use that mentality for musket warfare

[@BatangChulaVista]

There should be a discussion on the detailed psychological component (morale, elan) of these confrontations.

[@marcustulliuscicero3987]

Love your content! I also like that you are quite objective. I find that a lot of Anglophone reenactors and scholars can sometimes be a bit too jingoistic, perhaps because they only read English language sources. Your info seems to be a lot more balanced. As you show, different nations did things differently because that made sense for their situation. There was not a single ‘best’ approach. If that had been the case, everyone would have copied it.

[@Stephenguitarist]

Read mark urbans book rifles about the 95th rifles. They were generally at the head of the army on picket duty for the whole british army. Its interesting that when alongside the 43rd and 52nd also part of the light division the regiments fought in line some of the time but often in extended order using light infantry tactics including at major battles. I always get the sense that waterloo erased the memory of the use of such tactics because much of it was fought by red coated regiments in line/square.

[@SusCalvin]

Mostly everyone has some sort of light infantry. Jägers, rifles, chasseurs etc. With some function as sharpshooters, skirmishers, mountaineers/foresters. Britain and France recruited specific regiments of them and considered them elite troops. Sometimes militia/irregular units get some sort of light infantry designation.

[@stephenbenner4353]

This strategy only really works against this strategy. It’s kind of like many martial arts are developed essentially to combat the same or similar martial art. Until they go into a mixed martial art competition, you don’t know how effective/ineffective the particular strategy is. You are clustering together to maximize firepower against clustered opponents. If you faced a diffuse force, it wouldn’t be nearly as effective.

[@micahistory]

interesting question to analyse

[@PomaReign]

Dense formations were better defense against horse mounted soldiers, it they were to fight in loose formation and to look for cover they would be susceptable to calvary attacks because guns and soldiers at the time were not effective outside of close range and shooting a fast moving target was difficult for an individual. Cavalry has a much easier time attacking individuals spread out rather than a dense formation.

[@therover65]

Although this way of fighting sounds totally ridiculous to me in 2023, I trust in human’s ingenuity in murdering each other and based on what weapons were available then, this was probably the most effective strategy.

[@robowisanveithasung6022]

at least you understand well, some people think this warfare is stupid without taking into consideration the background and necessities to it

[@vinz4066]

Smart way of thinking.

[@jamesalias595]

If I was going to fight against close order infantry I would rely on smaller cannon and grape shot to kill them in mass while keeping my army dispersed. So a smaller army equipped with very small mobile artillery that could easily fire and relocate would be very effective against a group of men lined up in a tight formation in a field. Point is you don't want to do what your enemy is doing you want to do something different and changing and let them get killed for using the same tactics of everyone else.

[@Dannysoutherner]

Flying Artillary.

[@vinz4066]

Your dispersed troops will get charged by cavalary First and infantry second.

[@jamesalias595]

@@vinz4066 Who said I wouldn't have had cavalry too to counter cavalry? I sure would. Charging infantry is a great way to have the enemy come to you to die, while you pull back and encircle them. This is especially great if you use terrain too your advantage, let them come.

[@vinz4066]

​@@jamesalias595 Your dispersed infantry wont be able to Stop them. Wont Happen. And I think 18th century Generals knew More about 18th century warfare than you.

[@robcanisto8635]

the rizz, the RIZZ! swag, even!

[@lacrimosa315]

Ooh, new video from Brandon! What a lovely way to spend the afternoon!

[@rgddydshevchenko2448]

Hey brandon, I have a question and was hoping you could correct it. What was the difference between a late linear army and an early linear army? It all seems to blend together. By early, I mean like early 18th century, middle would be napoleon, and late would be American Civil War.

[@GaoDaHoi]

This reminded me the old Chinese Crossbow formations.

[@ConanLiuMD]

Very interesting video! Honestly just thinking about warfare and how it was conducted (in the past and even today) it’s just crazy how much strategy has been developed to be as efficient as killing each other as possible. Can’t imagine being a soldier in these armies, it just feels like living or dying would be so random!

[@ericamborsky3230]

Perhaps there may be a sort of comfort in it basically being up to luck. It's out of your hands, so there's no sense worrying about it.

[@iivarilappalainen9836]

Tbh might be less stressful then than now - these days soldier is under threat 24/7, nvm where you're you could get droned or hit by multitude of long range explosive ordinance. Moments of threat used to be pretty predictable and limited in the past.

[@amylutho]

Wish there was someway other than email or going on to the website to see when a video gets uploaded to Recast

[@BrandonF]

Normally I also post it beforehand in a community tab, but this one was only early-released by like half a day, because I was behind schedule in releasing this one. But the next one will hopefully have a two or three day leadup at least, and I will try to broadcast it more.

[@Winaska]

Your detailed comparison about close order and open order is eye opening. It throws into sharp relief how much of a gamble Cornwallis made in the Southern Campaign. While he did suffer heavy casualties, it paid dividends at Camden and almost worked at Guilford.

[@spacemanspud7073]

Your ad should've been you shooting the wallet with a musket to show how durable it is.

[@jackd4393]

You're a fantastic and engaging speaker! Thank you

[@BrandonF]

And thank you for the kind words! Very much appreciated!

[@SobaYatai]

if you knows how musket work and familiar with it you don't even have to question it, myself came to musket first and immediately understand why, however unfortunately i still have to grind my gears explaining these to Roblox players can't expect much

[@InceyWincey]

It’s more to do with the bayonets. They had skirmishers, and skirmishers would easily beat line infantry in a prolonged firefight since the skirmishers could easily whittle down the numbers of line infantry, but the volleys from the line infantry would be very ineffective against the widely spaced skirmishers. However the tightly packed ranks of line infantry could force the skirmishers to fall back by advancing on them, since the loose formation of skirmishers stood absolutely no hope of repelling a bayonet charge. Of course once the line infantry stopped chasing the skirmishers would just start shooting them again, so both sides were forced to deploy skirmishers to fight each other. The problem is really that it becomes necessary to hold a piece of ground because it is strategically significant, and then falling back is not an option, in which case line infantry are required to hold it, though you could in theory take it with nothing more than skirmishers, so long as your enemy simply sat there and let you shoot them.

[@teteusinho123]

If a musket takes at least 30 seconds to reload, it means that after a single shot, an enemy 100 meters (or yards) from you will have enough time to charge you before you can fire another shot. Therefore you need at least a second line to fire when you're reloading. Now if you're in a loose formation and a shoulder by shoulder enemy formation advances towards you, it's impossible to have enough firepower to hold their advance, unless you get in a close formation as well.

[@failsafe123123]

Actually I think today we could use hi-end computer calculations to really find a best, most optimal scenario. At the end of the day it is only about mathematics (much more than any other form of warfare). We could use cpu power to find out the figures we need. And yes, I agree that massing formations and using dense, two-ranked lines was something good enough then. I mean: they did their own tests back then and yhey found out what works the best. Typically, the military always looks for just next avarage solution that is workable, they never aim on adopting best possible options. Military itself is an organism that is not really capable of making quick decisions and being flexible. Something that works on every battleground is always considered much better that something that could work in particular circumstances. Great vid from you. Keep up with superb work!

[@glynluff2595]

Initially in European hostilities with musketry we must remember this was chess for monarchs who were frequently upon the battlefield. This explains the multicolour uniforms, the formal marching upon the field of battle and relatively short battles over limited areas. Then the technologists I.e. Generals took over with the arguments you propound. Then we come to the use of men relative to the armaments they use and focus upon non monarchical opponents such as in North America or India or monarchical forces with no monarch on the field. So the technician turned armies into what we have now.

[@SusCalvin]

You are going to stand with an incredible amount of blokes, several thousands of them. It's way more than a platoon, where you personally know most people, or a company where you can at least recognize their faces. The armies just keep growing in size and complexxity. Someone needs to figure out how all these blokes will have a chance at having boots, or how they might carry provisions, purchase them or loot the locals in an organized manner.

[@glynluff2595]

@@SusCalvin Yes logistics were a problem and often only vaguely regarded. WWI for Ritalin probably was the first time soldiers ever had multiple kit i.e. three shirts two trousers etc. In Continental wars up to late 19 th century a soldier had what he stood up in and a spare shirt and socks. If you gave home more he would probably sell it for drink. Most troops wore through their boots and were charged for repairs. Officers were supposedly against looting but would look the other way for usable apparel and food unless on Allied ground. Stripping the corpses after battle was the most general way to improve your uniform and if the enemy was wearing similar trousers to yourself that was an added benefit.

[@paulblichmann2791]

Because it looks really cool and INTIMIDATION was the main point. Actually fighting to death/incapacitation was really rare in history.

[@andrewpackham8236]

Thank you for putting together such a well explained video, you are a great educator!

[@Tareltonlives]

I mean, this makes sense for any armies without rapid fire firearms. You have to stand in order to fight, maximize your ability to take out the other side, and keep moving forward. Taking cover just means you don't get anything done, you can't take and hold ground. Before someone asks this- "Why didn't they hide behind walls" they DID whenever possible. Thing is you don't always have time to build walls, and those walls keep you from actually moving around and you lose your initiative. When the British invaded New Zealand, the Maori had big forts or Pa they could use to fight off the superior firepower and numbers of British soldiers. However, that still meant they could be starved out, bombarded with artillery, or caught before they could dig in. It doesn't matter how impregnable your bunker is, you need to eat, and you need to make it in the first place. The same thing happened with English colonies in the New World. The Natives fought using cover because there WAS cover. How did the natives fight where there weren't forests to use strategically and tactically? .,....CAVALRY! The Crimean War a few years before that saw all sorts of field fortifications because one side or the another began with forts and blockhouses. Why didn't they fight Napoleon like that? Well, they did when they could, but while you're building one fort, Boney's off attacking and capturing a city. Sieges are not fun. They are a drain on resources. Just look at the headlines- Bakhmut is a meat grinder, and Ukraine's economy is suffering from devastated territory while Russia's isn't very good to begin with, so nobody's doing well. Why did Ulysses S Grant have his men attack fortified Confederate soldiers in Virginia? Why did Robert E Lee seek a confrontation with the Army of the Potomac outside a city? They wanted to avoid a siege. Sieges are costly in terms of men, logistics, and the greatest resource of all, time. So I don't blame Arnold at Saratoga or de Beaujeu on the Monongahela or Montcalm outside Quebec- A field battle settles the whole thing a lot quicker and easier.

[@teteusinho123]

In Napoleonic the defending side would often employ earth works as cover

[@Tareltonlives]

Absolutely. All camps usually had thrown up works, while natural ditches, bushes fences and houses were used whenever possible. One simply has to remember the Guard at Château d'Hougoumont and the 40th at Cliveden using buildings. Or even earlier with Oakey's dragoons at the hedges of Naseby and likewise the Royalist last stand at Castle Yard. You don't have to be a Roman to make earthworks and fences and abatis or a native American to use natural terrain. If you're holding a position you'd use anything for protection until you were forced to either fall back or counterattack. @@teteusinho123

[@boomboombeach862]

Dense formations are hardcounter against cavalry! As a cavalry unit you can pick easily on skyrmishers or open formations... you can ride right through and score kills whilst a rigid line will stop your momentum and therefore agility. And armys back then were up to 1/4 (normally more like 1/6) cavalry therefore it was importent to defend against them in tight formations.

[@Fish-ub3wn]

damn ure good. thx.

[@Elrond_Hubbard_1]

It's a lot of the same consideration that went into ancient phalanx formations with the variables of width and depth.

[@TheSorryDude]

Yes, we really enjoy your little sketches! And accent in them too! Keep going

[@nikelaos5792]

04:04 Wow! I think this officer get to excited... Understentable that people can be happy while fighting, but COME ON!!!

[@mr.brouwer8083]

Dear brandon F. please never change the chringe element in your videos it takes a real man to show his passion and inner child to the world!

[@angusmackaskill3035]

Justified casualties.

[@OLDMANTEA]

The colorful uniforms also did wonders for those troops

[@vinz4066]

They did. Without them friendly fire would have gone through the roof ( Just Look at Ukrainian and russian troops marking themselves with Tape ) and Camouflage was rarely ever useful during that time Period.

[@edi9892]

One caveat: when does maximising firepower at the expense of increased vulnerability make sense? Even with muskets, I see it as a huge problem, at least until melee fights break out. You can also consider archers firing at each other, or crazier cases, where fire bottles or grenades get tossed at each other. It just sounds like a horrible engagement and it doesn't get any better when cannons, mortars, etc. get added into the equation... When does it become madness?

[@SusCalvin]

They describe how bayonet charges often did not lead to bayoneting anyone. One side breaks and legs it before the bayoneting can start in earnest. They start to think the intimidation of being bayoneted is more important than managing to do so.

[@vladislavshevchenko634]

I think that the best way in Napoleonic era was what Russian field marshal Suvorov. Skirmishers were the ones doing firing, using cover, if charged they would just run away behind friendly infantry but line infantry would fire only once about 20-30 meters away from the enemy, the job of Line infantry was not to shoot, but to reach the bayonet range as soon as possible.

[@SusCalvin]

Sometimes they describe wonky engagements where the sides reached bayonet charge range and for some reason refused to do so. Instead they start shooting, volley after volley. These situations are much more lethal than a bayonet charge where one side typically breaks and legs it before the others can get them.

[@vladislavshevchenko634]

@@SusCalvin these engagements mostly happened during American civil war. Russian army during Napoleonic wars was fixated on bayoneting the enemy. There's even a famous saying by Suvorov, turned into a proverb. Which means "bullets miss, bayonets always hit the target." A word for word translation would make 0 sense to a person not familiar with the culture.

[@SusCalvin]

@@vladislavshevchenko634 And experienced troops and commanders at the time know how bloody those situations are. When it happens, it seems to be between inexperienced people on both sides.

[@vladislavshevchenko634]

@@SusCalvin yeah, that's crazy to have two battalions at 50 meters distance just firing at one another. Especially when one is covered by a stonewall like Fredericksburg for example.

[@pohorex6834]

A massive thing is the “wow” and “intimidation” factor. The sheer image of an entire group firing can cause enemy troops to waver, especially peasants who have never seen any sort of organization like that

[@teteusinho123]

whenever some coverage was available in the battlefield, like fences, walls earthworks, logsz etc, they certainly would make use of them whenever possible. Defending armies would build some kind of barricade in front of the defensive lines. Russians in burondino did that for exemple.

[@theeraphatsunthornwit6266]

Hmm... i think it is just as follow.... Forward and flank left!!! What? I cant hear you, general. Why dont you stand closer?

[@teteusinho123]

It's simple: with muskets if you don't stay close together you don't have firepower enough to stop an advancing enemy formation. And vice versaz without concentration of firepower you can't break through an enemy formation neither suppress them