Why is there something rather than nothing?

[@Mai-Gninwod]

This is perhaps my favorite video of yours, and I have seen very many at this point

[@wenaolong]

46:15 It is really being asked "Why does nothing else than the actual world exist?" At least it is asking in general terms, "why does possibility pass into actuality rather than remain a possibility?" We are still asking for a sufficient reason.

[@gabri41200]

The queation "why does nothing else than the actual world exist?" Rests on the premise that nothing else than the actual world exists. But i would argue that all possible worlds exist simultaneously.

[@darcyone6291]

I love this. I have 2 notes open to discussion: 1- I don't think rejectionism assumes explanations have to be causal. We still can ask "How is something explained?", not necessarily "How is something causally explained? ". 2- As for fecundity, couldn't we still ask "Why are there possible worlds to begin with?"? What do you think?

[@SouthsideIsaac]

Thank you so much Kane baker I’ve been looking for you to upload this.

[@mrburns5245]

“I could think about the mechanisms that brought me into existence” I’d rather not thank you

[@showguyer]

Thank you so much for this. It does help me to understand a little better.

[@solomonherskowitz]

Great job as always!

[@cube2fox]

Hi Kane, this is again an interesting video. You are a good educator. :) As to the video itself, I would add that the possibility of explanatory self-subsumption is a rather strong or implausible view. Generally and intuitively explanation is regarded as irreflexive, asymmetric, and acyclic. But explanatory self-subsumption assumes that some explanation can explain itself, which violates irreflexivity. This in turn violates the asymmetry of explanation, which violates it's being an acyclic relation. I would also add that the very idea of an something explaining itself sounds like a metaphysical version of begging the question. When we want to "explain" something, we want obviously that it be explained with something else. This seems analytic. An example: Someone builds a time machine and travels back to the past to give himself the plans for building the time machine. So the existence of the time machine "explains" itself. But clearly, nothing is explained here. One would need an explanation for why there was such a time loop in the first place to explain the existence of the time machine. Regarding simplicity: There is indeed an argument why simplicity is more probable than complexity. Suppose there are just three possible objects: a, b, and c. Let A, B, and C stand for "a exists", "b exists", and "c exists". Then it seems that a world containing fewer objects is more likely, i.e. P(A & B & not-C) > P(A & B & C). This is of course only true if the non-existence of an object (not-C) is more likely that its existence (C). But that does seem somewhat plausible: There are many more possible but non-existent objects than existent ones, so non-existence seems more likely. Then a world with fewer objects, a simpler world, is more likely. Another remark: There is an interesting ontological view, held e.g. by Wittgenstein. The view says that the world is not a collection of objects but a collection of facts. In general one could hold that facts are the basic "entities", not objects. But then it seems the question of "Why does there exist anything?" is hard to rephrase in terms of facts. Objects exist, facts do not, they obtain. Is the question perhaps "Why do any facts obtain?"? No, for even if nothing exists, this would be a fact. The non-existence of any object would be a fact. So a world where nothing exists would not have any fewer facts. Then is the question perhaps "Why do _positive_ facts exist?"? Here a "positive" fact is one which says that some thing exists, while a negative fact says that some thing doesn't exist. But this would again presuppose objects (which can exist or not exist) as basic entities. But this is something one wants to deny when assuming that facts, not objects, are ontologically basic. Depending on whether this fact fundamentalism is plausible, the problem of rephrasing the titular question in terms of facts is interesting. Perhaps it leads to interesting insights or even answers to the problem. It should also be mentioned that there is currently no general theory of what an "explanation" is. Since we are seeking an explanation for why _anything_ exists, which seems to be an interesting edge case of explanation, clarification of the concept of explanation could be very helpful. Also, Derek Parfit has written about the question of why anything exists -- though I haven't read it yet.

[@KaneB]

To respond to some of this: (1) "This is of course only true if the non-existence of an object (not-C) is more likely that its existence (C). But that does seem somewhat plausible: There are many more possible but non-existent objects than existent ones, so non-existence seems more likely. Then a world with fewer objects, a simpler world, is more likely." Well, I don't think there are *any* possible objects. Granted, this is a minority position, but it doesn't seem all that radical these days: fictionalism has long been a significant minority view on modal metaphysics, and non-descriptivist accounts of modal discourse seem to be making a comeback due to the work of people like Amie Thomasson. Also, even if we accept that there are possible objects, what justifies the claim that there are more possible but non-existent than existent ones? We don't have an inventory of the existent objects. (2) "Fact fundamentalism" definitely puts the question in a different light; and should I ever revisit this topic, which I might since there were plenty of positions I didn't cover in this video, I'll be sure to look into it! Thanks for drawing my attention to that. (3) I agree that clarifying what exactly is meant by "explanation" is important here, but the problem is that if I were to tackle that question seriously, the video would be at least twice as long. As you say, there isn't any consensus on what exactly explanation is. So in an introductory lecture like this, I wouldn't really be able to "clarify" it, but only outline the various positions that others have held.

[@cube2fox]

@@KaneB Regarding (1), to say that there are no possible objects seems strange to me: Presumably you exist, so it is possible that you exist. For anything that exists it is possible that it exists, since actuality implies possibility. One could instead deny that the existence of anything is _merely_ possible. I.e.: If something doesn't exist, it is not possible that it exists. This would apparently mean that, if dragons do not exists, it is impossible that dragons exist. If there are no spheres of gold the size of Earth, it is impossible that there are spheres of gold the size of Earth. I'm not sure why anyone would hold such a view, except for people who think anything actual is necessary. (But perhaps I misunderstood what you meant.) There are arguably much more things which do not exist than which do exist because the existing things are strongly constrained by the laws of physics and by the initial conditions of the universe. There are no wizards because their existence would contradict the laws of physics. There are apparently also no spheres of gold the size of Earth. Such spheres would not contradict any physical laws, but the initial conditions of the universe were such that no such spheres came into existence. For possible non-existent objects such constraints do not hold since the laws of physics and the initial conditions could have been different, i.e. such that there are dragons etc. (2) Good to hear! (By the way, I don't know how strongly it is related to fact fundamentalism, but Wittgenstein also argued that some things exist necessarily. The SEP calls it "the argument for substance".) About (3): Yes, I didn't mean to suggest that you go into explanation here. I think it's not even the lack of consensus: as far as I can tell there are no _general_ theories of explanation (which would cover the explanatoriness of causal and all kinds of non-causal explanation) anyways, not even serious proposals.

[@KaneB]

​@@cube2foxAs I said, it's a minority position in metaphysics, but I don't think it's particularly strange. My own view is that there just are no modal facts, period; modality is a feature of our models, not a feature of the world. There are plenty of other philosophers who resist the postulation of possible objects. The available positions parallel the views taken in metaethics with respect to moral discourse. We can hold (a) that modal discourse is simply not truth-apt (similarly, see some forms of metaethical noncognitivism), (b) that modal discourse is truth-apt, but uniformly false, since it postulates things that do not exist (see error theory in metaethics), or (c) that modal discourse is truth-apt, that some modal statements are true, but that the truthmakers consist in something other than possible objects (see quasi-realism in metaethics, or some forms of metaethical constructivism). For (a) and (c), I recommend checking out the paper "Non-Descriptivism About Modality" by Amie Thomasson. As Thomasson demonstrates, this was a position held by Wittgenstein, who you seem to like: newprairiepress.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1022&context=biyclc "the existing things are strongly constrained by the laws of physics and by the initial conditions of the universe" That's true for the things that exist in this universe. Why should we suppose that this universe is all that actually exists?

[@Gavlavyus_Rumi]

About indifference argument, doesn't cosmologly always evolves into way more complexity? I am not sure we can trust Ockham's Razor at thst point

[@onecupofconsciousnessplease]

24:00 ish To me it seems that "nothing" doesn't require an explanation. If I ask myself why a ball didn't just pop into existence, I could just say "because there is no reason why it would" If you say "but nothing would prevent that ball from coming into existence", I would say that even if something would prevent the ball from coming into existence, there would still have to be a reason why that ball would come into existence if it wasn't the case that something would prevent it.

[@dimitrispapadimitriou5622]

Already from the beginning of this video, the arbitrariness of the definition of its subject is already evident. It is said that " we are not talking here about the existence of abstract notions, but only for the existence of the physical universe". The problem of this point of view is that it is overly naive: There are abstract notions that seem to be "necessarily existent", like concepts of mathematics ( especially for those who are Platonists) but there are abstract notions like the Laws of Physics e.g. that cannot be considered self- existent or necessarily existent by themselves, without the Physical world. The same obvious problem occurs with many other abstract notions ( e.g. music, novels etc...) There's no " dividing line" between the universe and abstract concepts that are associated with it, like the above... From the Physicalist point of view, the existence of the Physical Universe and the abstract concepts that are correlated with it cannot be distinguished by a sharp definition. So, it's inconsistent for someone to talk about the existence of non- existence. It's self- contradictory. The " big philosophical question" of why is there something than nothing is not a well posed question. It's not logically consistent.

[@absupinhere]

Oh, thanks man! I requested this in a Q&A a while back! I love your content, man!

[@coolkusti]

I'd like to note that it's not possible under the usual formulation of probability to assign equal probability to all members of an infinite set such that the probability is greater than 0 for any member, so appeals to probability in discussing infinitely many possible worlds have to do so with a greater degree of precision or nonstandard formulations of probability.

[@MyriadColorsCM]

The question of why is there something instead of nothing at all, as you present it, presupposes a more fundamental question: that "to be is to exist", one of the fundamental metaontological questions as Van Inwagen offers it. See how the question is presented, either there is something (it exists) or there is nothing at all. With "existence" I merely mean "something which enjoys spatiotemporal location and/or enjoys causal powers", that is, to be a physical/concrete thing. I, for one, disagree with the question posited as such, I see no reason to assume the identification of being with existence and, as such, even if there were no existent things, there could still be something that is necessarily non-existent (abstractions in general, impossible things, fictions and so on) that remains despite its non-existence. My reasoning is that, as Berto and Priest (2015) argue, nothingness is a necessarily contradictory object and, unlike Berto and Priest, since I am no dialetheist and I do not accept "real contradictions" in my ontology, there I cannot accept nothingness. A second reason is that nothingness as such, in absolute, cannot be, because it is antithetical and contradictory with being, and we know that something, whatever it is, is in absolute, otherwise, no experience at all would be possible. As Heidegger has aptly put it, Nothing Nothings, that is, Nothingness, when accepted, trivializes being (I am not, at all, compromising myself to the meaning of Heidegger´s phrase and I do indeed agree with Carnap when I say that I do not know what he meant by it, only that the phrases synthesizes my position on the matter). Edit: I'm also not arguing based on possible world semantics, it is just that nothingness cannot be, by definition, to assume there could be a "nothing world" would be that think that this world is, indeed, something, in fact, one could argue that this possible world itself is something and, therefore, it is not really nothingness, it is merely an empty world.

[@ahmedbellankas2549]

Is it the mathematical constraint? Suppose frank is a magician and he has ability t and ability t is if remains one thing of x then (if you cast spell d on x then a copy of x will be produced) So it seems in this thought experiment that the frank incpacity explains it,but what the nature of the thing to be distributed essentially resists t?

[@robotaholic]

When I think of nothingness, I think of empty space with no radiation or particles or forces acting on anything. If nothingness is even less than that ...if there is not even space, then the reason there is something rather than nothing is because nothing is incoherent lol it doesn't make any sense and it is not even something I can imagine. I don't claim to be a scientist but that's how it seems to me.

[@captainzork6109]

Apparently, though, nothingness exists outside of the universe. According to a university talk I watched, the universe expands itself into this nothingness. But actually it does not expand into it; rather, space must be created If it were to expand *into* something, it were to expand into other space. But that is not the case. It simply expands, and it could do so indefinitely - as long as it builds more space Perhaps nothingness can't even be quantified. Is there an infinite number of nothingnesses? Is there perhaps an infinite amount? Well, what if nothingness simply doesn't exist, not even for an infinitesimally small period of time before that something comes to existence?

[@showguyer]

It's hard to imagine nothingness that doesn't even contain space time.

[@Wolf-ln1ml]

There's a really good video by Sabine Hossenfelder on "What is "Nothing?"" that shows how pretty much nobody who uses that term defines well enough what they mean with it, or don't know what they're talking about in the first place. Bad definitions in discussions like this are *_always_* problematic since people at best talk past each other, and all too often are prone to false equivalence fallacies (using one meaning of a term in an argument, and then switching to a different meaning of the term as if the argument supported _that_ meaning). It's rare with actual scientists, but I see it all too often from philosophers, and pretty much every time religious people use "nothing" in a religious argument.

[@perplexedon9834]

Many binary questions _seem_ to make sense but don't have a reason for why they are one way or the other. That we can identify that a statement is true does not imply there is a reason why it is true, and proving by contradiction that a reason cannot exist is a valid logical demonstration. It _seems_ true that Schrodinger's cat is alive. Does that mean there is a reason Schrodinger's cat is alive and not dead? Any nondeterministic process would have this feature. I personally find the presuppositions that the question makes to be impossible to grant without extra argumentation. "There are other ways the universe could have been" doesnt seem obviously true to me, in fact that the fine structure constant could have been anything, or that it could only have been the value it is, are both ridiculous. "The universe is past-infinite" is equally ridiculous to the idea thay the universe is past-finite. Could pi have been a different value? It can be derived from pure logic, which seems universe independent, so "why is pi" 3.14 seems nonsensical. Even in maths, you can keep asking why back and back and back, and the regress terminates at a set of axioms, assertions for which there are no reasons.

[@marsglorious]

Kane is so chad, he transcended his neckbeard into a lion's mane.

[@robheusd]

Nothing can be defined as the absence of any being. Equally, we can define darkness as the absence of any light (in a given spati-temporal part of the world). But suppose there is a world in which light as such does not exist (no electro-magnetism, no photons). Would this world be dark? No, without the existence of light neither there is darkness. In the same sense, "nothing" as a notion only exists or has meaning in so far there is being. Outside of being, neither nothing exists.... So what exists then, if there is neither being nor nothing? Well, we can only assert the incomprehensiility of such a notion, which comes from the fact that we treat the notions of Being and Nothing as absoluitely seperate from each other, which they are not, they are part of a so-called dialectical unity in which one notion pressupposes the other, and each notion on it's own, has no meaning.

[@Gavlavyus_Rumi]

This is pretty interesting. Like you said, probaly our universe lacks a lot of other "things" but we don't cite them. Like a universe without light, there is infinite possibilities

[@DanielL143]

I forgot to say thank-you; excellent presentation.

[@yourfutureself3392]

I just thought of an argument to prove that nothing-ness is impossible. P1: many true modal statements are made true by concrete modal truthmakers (either by the modal properties of existing entities or by concrete, existent possible worlds). (For example, "the chair could have been gray" is made true either by the modal properties of the actual chair or by the chair being gray in some concrete possible world. I'll address modal platonism and other options later) P2: if concrete modal truthmakers are possibly inexistent, then true modal statements are possibly false. P3: true modal statements are neccesarly true/aren't possibly false. (If something is possible, then it is neccesarly possible; if it's impossible, then it's neccesarly impossible, etc.) C: concrete modal truthmakers aren't possibly inexistent. This obviosly means that there can't be nothing-ness. This argument presupposes that 1) some modal statements are true, 2) that either lewisian modal realism is true or modal properties exist and that 3) they make modal statements true (and not abstract objects). The conjuction of these three theories answers the question "Why is there something rather than nothing?" without appealing to controversial theories (if you run the argument with modal properties and not with concrete possible worlds), unlike theistic answers or the brute-fact view (if we can even call the latter an answer). I think this could be seen by many as a reason to accept this triad of not-so-controversial views.

[@dae316]

Great job. Im majoring in philosophy but took a break this semester. Your content fills the void i feel like I’m missing lol

[@RR-et6zp]

your degree doesnt have economic value and it comes from a time when people were ignorant as f

[@dae316]

@@RR-et6zp my degree got me into law school. Stay a hater i guess lol 😆

[@RR-et6zp]

@@dae316 law is bs

[@auroraufi6359]

@@RR-et6zp economic value isn’t the only kind of value. Mind your damn business

[@RR-et6zp]

@@auroraufi6359 haha then sleep outside and eat grass. Liberal arts and social sciences are BS invented by humans when they were scientifically ignorant of everything

[@TheFinntronaut]

10:56 I'm not so sure that it's not a false presupposition. Who says that *this* is something and not nothing? If *this* were something or nothing, how would you even distinguish it from its opposite? If it's nothing, then there is nothing to compare it against. If it is something, then there is only nothing to compare it against. If we have X, but we do not have ¬X, then X cannot be distinguished from ¬X. Therefore, there could be nothing rather than something, and thus "Why is there something rather than nothing?" might indeed be a false presupposition.

[@yourfutureself3392]

'This' clearly IS something, because if it wasn't then there wouldn't be any conscious agents to think about the question nor would there be brains or chemical reactions or horses. It's possible to distingush X from ~X even if there isn't ~X simply by knowing the definition of X. Once we know the definition of X, we concieve of something that doesn't fullfil the criteria of the definition and X and ~X are now distingushable.

[@dimitrispapadimitriou5622]

0:53 What about spacetime itself? Isn't it , obviously, a part of the physical universe? It's a not concrete object, though... Or gravitational waves, electromagnetic radiation etc... Already from the start of this video, too many vague restrictions... Not to mention all abstract notions that are inseparable from the physical Universe ( the laws of Physics, structures etc)

[@theot1692]

If you grant that mathematical structures exist out of necessity, that includes complicated structures like our universe that contain consciousness. Maybe our universe doesn't actually exist, it just exists mathematically. Maybe it doesn't even make sense to say that a world is actuallized. It just seems to us that our world is actuallized because it's the mathematical structure we happen to find ourselves in. What would it even mean to say that a world is actuallized? There's no property of the world that changes. Everything still works the same way, including consciousness. It doesn't seem to me to be weirder that a mathematical object can be conscious than that a physical object can be conscious.

[@KaneB]

This seems like the Fecundity view, albeit with a rather odd metaphysics, since I assume that every other mathematical structure - every other world - would exist as well, on your view. Also, per the way philosophers use the term "actual", our world would still be the actual world on this view. It would just turn out that the actual world, and, I take it, every other world, is a mathematical structure.

[@nonchai]

@@KaneB As a Steely Dan Ladyman and Tegmark fan I say "Everything [but Tegmark] ... Must Go"

[@ijime]

Yeah, Tegmark IV does solve this, but as Kane says it's basically the Fecundity/Modal Realist answer. Tegmark IV, and most other Fecundity-type ideas basically just pass the buck onto the question "Why is the actual world this one rather than any other?". Tegmarks idea of simple structures within others as basic justification of Occam's Razor, and the Anthropic Principle for why the actual world isn't even simpler is probably the best answer, but the AP is famously slippery in a very "just accept brute facts w/o justification"-way, so it might kinda degenerate into a brute fact view.

[@yourfutureself3392]

What do you mean by a methematical structure and by mathematical objects? If they can be conscious, perceptible, experienced as coloured and as solid and if they have all of the properties we experience, then under what sence are they 'mathematical' structures and objects and not simply physical structures or mental and objects? It seems like a pretty broad and maybe even ad hoc definition of 'mathematical'. "What would it even mean to say that a world is actualized? There's no property of the world that changes." Well, you're assuming that there ARE possible worlds out there that have all of their corresponding properties and that to be actualized something should be done to "them". However, there are many more views on the topic. I think most would say that possible worlds don't have any properties at all. They are simply human constructs based on the modal properties of the sole and actual world.

[@michael-oq9js]

Since everything complex comes from everything which is simple then that which is simple is more likely because complex requires simple but simple does not require and does not always heals complex

[@robheusd]

The question itself and how it is expressed must be rejected on the basis that the question itself makes an assumption about how the notions "something" and "nothing" are related to each other, ie. the underlying hidden asumption in the question is that these notions are indepent and unrelated to each other and are seperate from each other. So the question should be rejected on the basis that it makes a false assumption, that "something" and "nothing" are only seperate from each other. But that is not the case as "something" and "nothing" are not totally seperate but they are each other opposites, and it is neither the case that there is "something" nor that there is "nothing", but "something" passing over into "nothing" and vice versa, so the combined truth about "something" and "nothing" is that they change into each other, which is expressed with the notions "coming to be" and "ceasing to be", in which it is already understood that "something" and "nothing" are not totally seperate but can spontaneously pass over into their opposite.

[@slickfox]

Awesome video, thank you so much! "It’s one of the great wonders of life: What will it be like to go to sleep and never wake up? And if you think long enough about that, something will happen to you. You will find out, among other things, that it will pose the next question to you: What was it like to wake up after never having gone to sleep? That was when you were born. You see, you can’t have an experience of nothing. Nature abhors a vacuum." - Alan Watts

[@DigitalGnosis]

Kane - what would you recommend reading on philosophy of science to do with parapsychology and NDEs?

[@KaneB]

It depends on what specifically you're interested in, though a good general introduction to this sort of stuff is "Philosophy of Science and the Occult", edited by Patrick Grim.

[@DigitalGnosis]

@@KaneB Thanks. For some weird reason ive been invited to talk to a researcher into paranormal events as an evil "skeptic" of NDEs ... I always think you have interesting views about philosophy of science and metaphysics so might have looked into parapsychology and the explanatory virtues and vices of psi phenomenon!

[@nonchai]

Is this something where one's intuitions are likely to factor into one's preferences (answer-wise) more than mere reason? FWIW my intuition is for some form of Necessitarianism

[@dominiks5068]

I would definitely say that intuitions play quite a huge role here, especially with regards to the principle of sufficient reason. you can make lots of sophisticated arguments but in the end it kinda comes down to the question whether you find it plausible that things might exist with literally no explanation whatsoever. personally I'm an agnostic about the PSR because my intuitions about it are very very unclear

[@ahmedbellankas2549]

Suppose there's world w in which only john ( a person) exists,john conceives of d,and suppose d is the realm of mere possibilities,and suppose john can't actualize d,now is d really a possibility ? What's the difference between d and john being a square ? Is not fecundity a threat to free will? Suppose john searle has two moves in game:1 either to be a philosopher or 2 to be an economist, if 1 he will either do a or b or c,and if 2 he will either do x or y or z; It seems that if fecundity john searle has no choice whatsoever since the world he is in is already specified. Or you may say there's a possibility in which individuals like john searle have free will and there's a possibility in which they don't and all obtain,you can say the same thing for skeptical scenarios. And also is not fecundity just a subset of brute fact view?

[@gregorsamsa1364]

The modal realism explanation says the nothing world exists(you know what I mean) as well as all possible worlds. But it seems to me the nothing world can't exist if any other world exists. Isn't the nothing world necessarily universal in that sense? When we speak of "something rather than nothing" isn't the "something" meant to be in the context of the cosmos, and not just one closed universe? On a side note, i've actually only just recently come to realize people use "possible worlds" to refer to closed universes which can possibly exist simultaneously(for lack of a better word). I had taken the term to refer to something like "possible cosmos" or "possible reality", meaning only one of them could possibly exist. Learning a bit about modal realism, I realize this isn't the case- at least not necessarily. Makes me wanna ask a modal realist if all possible cosmoses exist. And is there a possible cosmos in which no possible worlds exist?

[@yourfutureself3392]

I agree. The realist answer misses the point of the question. The question is something along the lines of "Why are there ANY existent entities, instead of none?" The modal multiverse is simply 'something' and 'nothing' would mean the absence of the modal multiverse itself. To explain why the modal multiverse itself exists, they will have to collapse to the other explanations (either the multiverse is neccesary, or more likely than nothing-ness, or there simply is no explanation).

[@danzo1711]

In response to the idea that God is something and therefore can't answer why is there something rather than nothing, it should be noted that in the classical theistic tradition and in particular, the Neoplatonic tradition, God is not something, in these traditions, God transcends all categories, God is beyond essence, existence, and non-existence.

[@lopidav]

I was thinking about this "Why is there something rather than nothing" question and it's a more clear yet still not pure version of "why anything at all?" for something like 9 years, so please excuse my tilt. To be clear, nothing of that addressed to Kane B (even tho I don't prohibit him from reading it), I understand that he is interpreting the words of others. But I still want to express my frustration and thoughts under this video because I don't know where else I can do that. First of all, are natural laws considered as "something"? It looks like stand on that changes throughout the video. But if you don't consider them then the whole discussion is pointless since the answer is "because some laws that we didn't discover yet say so" and because of that I'll assume that they are something. So the question itself has some interesting qualities. It's one of the most "basic" questions in a sense that if you ask any "why" question and then follow with "and why is that?" over and over you'll get to the question of the video. Probably. Unless you got caught in the loop. How do you get out of the loop? You ask "why is there a system that allows that loop to exist." Yea, you just go over the loop, become meta-king, and continue asking "and why is that?" question like nothing happened. If you stumble across "just because" in any form, you can use essentially the same trick and ask "why there is a system that allows it to just exist." The sliding down "and why is that" line can be used to find a common ground, something on which both participants of the argument agree on. After that, you can build up common truth with logic and facts and without feeling. But without a common ground, both participants may be completely right in their statements, be interested in finding common truth, be completely honest and effective in their discussion, yet not be able to succeed. Sad. Any "basic" question acts as a shortcut or reference to the end of the line of "and why is that" question. Essentially, It's a dynamic question that is redefined any time it's answered. So to answer it and not a previous version of it you need to invent some really good trick. And all of the tricks in this video fail. But at this point, I guess the video is about some different questions and not about what I'm describing? Anyway, a lot of the arguments in the video don't work regardless of the question used, so here some critique: In the objections to the Rejectionism Kane B gives two examples for the explanation that is not causal: The first one fails because it's a "general form of it is true, so specific form is true also" explanation. Not only you still need to explain why 23 can not be divided by 2 (and you can do this only by looping back on the physical world so we essentially have a loop), but it's also assumed for some reason that it's applicable to the question of the video. You can hardly go more general than "why anything?" and the question of the video is essentially that. The second example says that any explanation can be given even if it's not true? huh? Ok, the answer to the "Why is there something rather than nothing?" is "because there is something if the sky is blue and nothing if the sky is yellow. And the sky is blue at the moment." Both statements are not correct but it is an explanation. It does loop on itself tho so we can't possibly determine if it's true or not even if the sky is blue. And the same loop stuff with P and S that are given in the example. Since when self-confirmation statements are considered to be examinable as true or false by themselves? Am I missing something? So both examples are simply not satisfactory. Rejectionism itself is intuitive and stupid. Now mystificationism calls me stupid so I don't like it at all. The brute fact view says that "it exists because it exists" which can be interpreted as "because the natural low says so." So yea, correct one, not usable tho and can be bypassed if you consider a low to be something by the usage of "why there is a system that allows it to just exist." 21:14 I've heard rationalization that stated that God is not "something" and doesn't exist at all as things do. So, essentially same as natural low. So why is it counts as "something"? Why shouldn't there have been something: not an argument. The absence of prevention only works if something is allowed to exist. If there is prevention then it overrules the permission and if there is not then the process goes as planned and existence happens. But if there is no potential existence (and there is nothing) then prevention would do nothing as well as the absence of prevention. Of course, that's if natural law is "something." But if it does not then arguments converts to "law stated that all should exist and nothing prevented it because nothing existed." In this case, why are we assuming that the law can't prevent the existence of the universe? I mean, looking around is a good argument to the case of existence not being prevented but still. About a ball popping into existence spontaneously: the model where the current world is just a part of the ocean of things that are spontaneously popping into existence yet our island has a law system with logic, causality, etc just because random is a mostly satisfactory model. But it does say that law is a random thing so by this moment things can just happen randomly even tho it's more probable that they don't. About atom decay: the theory of everything may have the answer to that? I'm not saying that it will, I'm saying that it might while it's stated that it's might not never. And stated based on the real-world modern theory? Quantum theory may be wrong, and for sure it's not complete. The indifference view is wrong. Ye, it assumes probability which is absurd since that assumes that there is a system that contains probability assigned to each world and it picked the world based on this number? In reality, there is usually just a lot of small causality that humans can not calculate to predict the outcome. But how exactly randomness are here in the middle of nothing? If that's quantum shenanigans then there should be a quantum field here. The usage of Mao portrait argument is confusing since it just says that "no, the simplest thing is not the most probable, the most probable thing is most probable." Yet so much time was spent to explain it. And It is entirely not applicable to the question of the video in any other way other than "simplest thing is not the most probable, no". I mean, it's obvious? And of course, there is nothing that makes an empty world a more probable world. About more than one empty world: it's wrong that for the worlds to be distinct there must be a proposition that is true to one and not true to another. At least, it's complicated. In programming, there is a common task to eliminate all of the duplicates from the list. There is no distinction within duplicates themself, they are equal and that's why they called duplicates but you can say that the positions are different and that would be true. Yet, conceptually I can say that I have two ones that are equal and that do not have a position. One is not the other even tho all properties are the same. I can assign a number to each of them but that'll be creating a property. The way you may think about it is that each empty world has a "this world is not that other world" relation with every other empty world. Also, there may be a hidden property that is kinda not existing. Consider a coin that has one side just blank and an arrow on the other. If you'll get a blank, that's a blank, nothing to it. But if you get an arrow you have a lot of possible states: an arrow pointing to the north, an arrow pointing to the north but with a 1° clockwise offset, etc. So you have one blank state, a lot of arrow states yet odds are 50/50. You can say there are hidden properties for the blank but we can't measure them unless we cheat. Maybe there are hidden properties that we can't measure for the empty worlds too? Maybe each non-empty world has exactly one empty version of it? And we just can't find that relation. The indifference view is wrong this so it's not relevant. I would've liked to give some criticism of Necessitarianism too but it's too late and I need to sleep.

[@wenaolong]

One should work on the metalogic which unifies these questions with questions of essence. Then one will definitely get somewhere.

[@Oskar1000]

Two things about the elimination argument. 1. It seems to rely on some quite outdated physics. Particles are excitations of field not balls that you can just remove 1 by 1. There is some article on this called "water is not h20" that complains about the weird science philosophy sometimes works with. 2. So you removed the particles, that doesn't make it an empty world. Just a world without particles. What about time and space?

[@KaneB]

There's also a nice video called "water is not H2O" that makes the same point ;) kzbin.info/www/bejne/oYLFaIR4p8aXnKs Anyway, I guess the response in this case would be: we're using the outdated physics because it's easier to communicate the point that way. But the same argument could be made via contemporary physics. Whatever the ultimate constituents of the world are, we can imagine removing them. The same goes for space and time: once all the particles have been removed, now just remove spacetime. Voila! Nothing. Personally, I'm not sure this is conceivable. I'm not sure what exactly it is I'm supposed to be imagining, when I try to imagine the entities postulated by contemporary physics. For me, the issue isn't so much about the ontology of particles (fields vs balls), but rather that if we consider a possible world in which there are no electrons (for instance), this would radically alter everything else about the world. What the subtraction argument seems to assume is that we can remove these things *while holding everything else fixed*. But this doesn't really make sense.

[@Oskar1000]

@@KaneB Haha that's brilliant

[@yourfutureself3392]

Particles are clearly just examples. You could replace those particles with quantum fields or with any entity and illustrate the point just as well. Aside from that, even if particles are excitations on fields, they are still numerable and quantifiable. One excitation at point A and another separate excitation on point B. At very least, we can speak of them as numerable when in conversation if we want to illustrate points.

[@dionysianapollomarx]

Is there a list of references?

[@KaneB]

I state them in the video.

[@michael-oq9js]

Simple is more likely than complex, because complex requires the accumulation of that which is simple. Therefore, complex requires simple, but simple does not require and there’s not always yield complex. At least this is when we are speaking abstractly such as in math. Because perhaps the universe is not made of simple entities but rather complex ones.

[@cliffordhodge1449]

It would probably be beneficial for the participants looking for an answer to this question to begin with arguments justifying the assumption that abstract objects are not included because they are necessary. Here it seems apt to ask, "Why is necessity taken to be itself a necessity?" Also, the use of possible worlds and probability seem pretty arbitrary. I would like to see some argument as to how we go about comparing the probabilities of different possible worlds, rather than just assuming each one has equal probability, or some such assumption. Most especially, why do any of them presume that the case in which there isn't anything is somehow commensurate with each case in which there is something, such that we can even begin to compare probabilities. Suppose I say the universe consisting of nothing but this red ball, and the universe which is identical to our own save for the one fact that I end this typed sentence with two periods instead of one are both equally probable universes. Further, suppose you deny this. How do I go about demonstrating the probabilities? This lottery model of probability - each ticket has the same probability of winning - does not seem a satisfactory basis for discussing the case (I do not say "universe", since that already seems question-begging) in which there is something, and that in which there isn't. In other words, this easy acceptance of possible worlds and probability renders the problem less interesting by sidestepping what is the most difficult and fascinating about it. Having said all that, it is clear the problem is quite baffling, a bit like trying to imagine one's own non-existence. I found the video to be enlightening and informative. I am still nowhere near offering any attempt at solution.

[@DanielL143]

I think that the most interesting argument is #4, the indifference view. My supposition is that both the empty world and the infinity of non-empty worlds exist in a state of superposition or simultaneously and non-exclusively. You never experience a conflict between any non-empty and an empty world because they are not mutually exclusive. Emptiness is right in front of your eyes, you just cant see it because its empty. Also and more importantly if you randomize the Chairman Mao picture you will necessarily arrive at the image of Christopher Walken. That is self evident.

[@dominiks5068]

good overview, thanks. personally I find the mystifcationist position most convincing - I totally disagree with the idea that the question is meaningless or incoherent, but at the same time it appears that we are just utterly unequipped to answer this one fundamental question. that being said, this might potentially change if science makes progress with regards to a grand unified theory of physics - maybe if M theory turns out to be correct it might provide at least SOME clues why there's something rather than nothing.

[@dmitryalexandersamoilov]

We are used to in our lives: simple things existing "first" and then complicated things existing "second", ie. The complicated things are made out of simple things. And so we go down the rabbit hole of simpler and simpler things and we end up at nothingness, which should be the simplest thing, therefore it should exist at the bottom of everything. But it doesn't. The fact that we exist means our intuition is wrong. Or.. there needs to be some way to bridge the gap between that primordial nothingness and our reality today. IDK the answer but I have a hunch it has something to do with nothingness being that which gives structure shape, think of the space between atoms, election shells, mathematical proofs that are not true. It turns out nothingness is a secondary thing that somethingness uses to differentiate itself into an infinity of forms. Or something

[@dmitryalexandersamoilov]

or maybe nothingness and somethingness are actually the same thing at the very "beginning" of things.... in the same way that the fundamental forces sort of unfold at different temperatures of the universe... in which case, somethingness and nothingness only become separate "things" when structure starts forming, which is does so because "empty space" or "nothingness" starts to grow between the "somethingness". so, instead of somethingness and nothingness, a more basic idea than that could be thought of structure-ness vs non-structureness... or tautologyness vs anti-tautologyness. Um

[@yourfutureself3392]

@@dmitryalexandersamoilov I think you misunderstand the concept of nothing-ness. By definition, it has absolutely no properties, relational or intrinsic. This means, it can have the relation of "sameness" with something-ness and later the relationships of "being different/separate" with something-ness. It also doesn't have the property of temporality. This means it can't change as time moves on. It can't first be identical with something-ness and later stop being identical with something-ness. It also can't experience any kind of change because it can't gain, lose or switch features or properties, because it never has any. Identity is a neccesary relation. If A is identical to B, then A is identical to B in every moment in which 'one of them' exists and in every possible world. This means that it's impossible for nothing-ness and something-ness to have been identical to each other and to have later 'lost' this relationship. Nothing-ness isn't a property, an object, a substance or a type of interaction like the four forces. It's an existencial quantifier. It means "not anything". The absence of any existing thing. It's definition is the opposite of that of "something": the presence of any existing thing. One means the presence of ANY thing and the other the absence of ANY thing. This is another reason why thet couldn't have been the same. That would be equivalent to redness being the same as non-redness. It's a logical contradiction.

[@robheusd]

To explore this question further, I would recommend the following video: kzbin.info/www/bejne/bJmqeWCopLufadk

[@geniustracks9213]

hmm, not sure I follow the strawberries explanation as being non causal. The reason he can't divide them evenly without cutting them...isn't that caused by...the mathematical constraint? Secondary cause is the constraint of not being able to cut them. I suppose we have to understand a more abstract definition of 'cause' for these not to be causal reasons that he cannot proceed.

[@DanielL143]

On a more serious note, did not Wittgenstein and possibly Gödel essentially put this to bed. Proposition: there are limits to logic, language and knowledge. Is this proposition true? Well it is not inconsistent with the empirical evidence. General relativity implies non-intuitive entities such as singularities and quantum mechanics (Heisenberg in particular) tells us that we can't know some things (or at least that our suppositions about those things and their properties are not real in terms of our macroscopic experience); special relativity implies a physical limit to information as does Shannon. The simple fact that language can be used to create logical paradoxes sets the scene. But this does not stop us from asking questions, right? As our knowledge expands though the unknown boundary expands with it until we know everything and nothing simultaneously in superposition at some theoretical limit that closes in on itself; infinite but bounded (the opposite of what Einstein said). The fact that philosophers have been asking these questions for thousands of years implies that there might really be serious limits to language. Maybe we have the answer but we just cant distinguish it from all the wrong possibilities. So we choose our favorite answer. The beauty of philosophy is that it invites us to use language and logic to investigate its own limits. Are we perhaps like those dogs you mentioned or is it possible that an alien intelligence can definitively answer these questions. The ancient Greeks were so advanced that they almost qualify as aliens. I believe that Christopher Walken knows and that explains what happened to his hair. Humor has a place in enlightenment too. It gives us sudden enlightenment on a primal level in a Zen like manner that cuts through the argumentation like a sword cutting through a knot. Hmmm.

[@perplexedon9834]

The strawberries counterargument is pretty poor. It explains a limitation on the interactions between certain things that do exist. I doubt such an intuitive counterargument exists for why things exist in the first place.

[@Brklyn-dd9yo]

About Time!!!!

[@Dystisis]

Why should there be nothing rather than something?

[@OBGynKenobi]

Well, would the world exist if there weren't conscious or even unconscious observers?

[@veganphilosopher1975]

This is important work you are doing

[@torealityAN]

This video, towards the end of it, made me wonder whether boundaries of something are just convenient things to be able to speak about them or something that can be observed. This would then entail natural observation to determine the nature and the form of a boundary to a world or a universe. If this boundary were to be substantial then a universe would be something necessarily. So it seems natural observation is required to be able to better speculate about the why something exist rather than nothing. It is not just a matter of abstract thought, yet abstract thoughts can give us guesses and directions about our work. I think it is more likely that there is no substantial boundary corresponding to any physical things between universe and what is beyond of it, whether that would have been in spatiotemporal terms or in any other one. There has to be conventional boundaries for us to be able to speak about them, hence it seems we created the word for it, just like any other word.

[@muhammadshahedkhanshawon3785]

Are you Modal realist?

[@williamhocter4658]

I enjoy your videos on modal logic and am grateful for the educational service you are providing. However, on this video you lost me from the start by excluding abstract ideas as being possibly not existent or, like arithmetic, necessary. The problem I see is that necessity is not nothing. If necessity is your unmoved mover or overarching principle I can respect that but then one must still explain how possibility comes to exist since possibility is not nothing. Impossibility (negation) must also be explained.

[@fanboy8026]

There can't be nothing because Mathematical entities such as numbers must exist because they are necessary entities and uncaused

[@yourfutureself3392]

The question is mostly focused on why concrete reality exists, not abstract reality. It's also controversial weather or not mathematical objects exist neccesarly or if they exist at all

[@1999_reborn]

Yay

[@dimitrispapadimitriou5622]

The existence of the "non- Existence" ( the existence of Absolute Nothingness) is a self- inconsistent notion. It's not a meaningful phrase, it's just a logical absurdity. This " big philosophical question" is meaningless.

[@theot1692]

To say that fecundity explains it self doesn't make sense to me. All your showing is that if fecundity is true, it follows that fecundity is true. But that's just a tautology. Am I missing something?

[@danielwa4819]

The fecundity argument is self-proving so it is immune to criticisms of being "incoherent" such as the possibility of a non-fecund reality. However, like a mathematical axiom it is neither true nor false. It is a valid and coherent argument, which may or may not be true. Imo, it boils down to your stance on the relationship between discrete entities and non-discrete entities such as laws. Personally I believe that there can be no laws without objects in the first place. Objects don't "embody" laws but rather interact to give rise to law-like behavior which are then expressed through equations. So, I do not believe in more than one empty world.

[@KaneB]

The idea is that Fecundity specifies a characteristic that would make any principle true, and Fecundity itself has this characteristic. So it's not as simple as "if Fecundity is true, then Fecundity is true."

[@michaelaristidou2605]

The "strawberries" argument against rejectionism is LAME.

[@StefanTravis]

Apparently a magic man in the sky did it.

[@Stephen-px4eg]

kzbin.info/www/bejne/qnWrnJubd8qHiKc

[@StefanTravis]

@@Stephen-px4eg Yes, odd how people who believe stupid things do so for stupid reasons.

[@Stephen-px4eg]

@@StefanTravis ?

[@thesnowybanana2971]

the funny thing about the whole fecundity thing, is that the statement of "all possible worlds are realized" or whatever else you want to say doesn't imply any other features beyond actualization sure, all possible worlds are realized but then that just means that any world that *isn't* what has been realized, no matter how close it is to the actual world, wasn't possible. the world in which at 6:11 PM CST, April 14th, 2023 a billion dollars spontaneously appears in my room is *not* the world that was realized it was *imagined*, *hypothesized*, whatever else you want to call it, but it wasn't realized which means, if you say "all possible worlds are realized," it wasn't possible, for one reason or another it also doesn't necessitate that all possible worlds have to be realized simultaneously, just that they be realized at some point the world as it was five minutes ago was a possible worldstate the world as it is now is a possible worldstate the world as it will be in five minutes is a possible worldstate all are possible all were, are, or will be realized, just at different moments in time

[@thesnowybanana2971]

@stonearecool2645 it doesn't necessarily, i'm not addressing the main question, i'm only looking at fecundity as a concept and only fecundity